Fu, Haifeng and Xu, Ying and Zhang, Luyi (2007): Characterizing Purestrategy Equilibria in Large Games.
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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a generalized large game model where the agent space is divided into countable subgroups and each player's payoff depends on her own action and the action distribution in each of the subgroups. Given the countability assumption on its action or payoff space or the Loeb assumption on its agent space, we show that that a given distribution is an equilibrium distribution if and only if for any (Borel) subset of actions the proportion of players in each group playing this subset of actions is no larger than the proportion of players in that group having a best response in this subset. Furthermore, we also present a counterexample showing that this characterization result does not hold for a more general setting.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Characterizing Purestrategy Equilibria in Large Games 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Large games, Pure strategy equilibrium, Characterization 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72  Noncooperative Games 
Item ID:  8025 
Depositing User:  Haifeng Fu 
Date Deposited:  01 Apr 2008 13:48 
Last Modified:  28 Sep 2019 20:47 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/8025 
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Characterizing Purestrategy Equilibria in Large Games. (deposited 07 Mar 2008 17:17)
 Characterizing Purestrategy Equilibria in Large Games. (deposited 01 Apr 2008 13:48) [Currently Displayed]