Profitable and desirable corporate environmentalism in a delegation contract under incentive subsidy on abatement technologies

Lee, Sang-Ho and Park, Chul-Hi (2017): Profitable and desirable corporate environmentalism in a delegation contract under incentive subsidy on abatement technologies.

Abstract

This study investigates corporate environmentalism in a managerial delegation contract and shows that a well-designed subsidy scheme can enhance business profitability and thus, an environmental policy could lead to both social and private benefits. This analysis allows us to better understand the Porter’s concept of environmental policy and firm’s profitability.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: corporate environmentalism; environmental corporate social responsibility; managerial delegation contract; incentive subsidy scheme; Porter’s hypothesis
• Subjects: L - Industrial Organization > L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance > L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets; L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L21 - Business Objectives of the Firm; M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M1 - Business Administration > M14 - Corporate Culture ; Diversity ; Social Responsibility

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