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Are Democratic Regimes Antithetical to Globalization?

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Abstract

In this study we have made an attempt to investigate into the relationship between political regime type (that ranges from authoritarian to democratic) and the extent of globalization, which of late has been considered as a path to development. We have made use of the Democracy index (and its constituent indicators) provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the globalization index (and its constituent indicators) of the KOF. Applying canonical correlation analysis on the data we have made an attempt to look into the response of globalization to the quantitative measures of democratic (versus authoritarian) practices of the governments in 116 countries distributed over Asia, Africa, Australia/Oceania, Europe and the Americas. We have also tested the Lee thesis in the context of globalization as a path to development. Our findings indicate that the empirical support to Lee's thesis if extended to globalization as a path to development is superficial and does not withstand critical analysis. Contrary to Lee's thesis, democracy promotes globalization. In African countries political discordance (at the national as well as international level) is not much favourable while in the Asian countries, political will, irrespective of regime type, is more or less in concordance with globalization. Therefore, rather illusively, it so appears that democracies thwart development as well as globalization as a means to development by implication, while the reality is very different.

Key words: Globalization, democracy, authoritarian regime, Lee thesis, canonical correlation, Asia, Africa, Europe, the Americas, Australia, Oceania.

JEL Code: F63, O54, O55, O56, O57

1. Introduction: This investigation has found its origin in the intrigue initiated by the so-called 'Lee thesis' which asserts that democracy hurts economic growth and development. If the 'Lee thesis' holds then, by implication, globalization as an engine of development, too, would be hurt by democracy and, therefore, democratic regimes would be antithetical to globalization. Hence, this study primarily purports to empirically investigate whether democratically governed countries in general have begotten lesser extent of globalization and juxtaposed to that whether countries having more authoritarian governments have attained more of globalization. Secondly, this study also investigates into the instances where more democratically governed countries exhibit more extent of globalization and, on the contrary, authoritarian governments have thwarted globalization.

2. Socio-economic systems as homeostatic ensembles: Socio-economic systems have three major aspects or subsystems organically knit into them, which are identified as material, psychic and organizational subsystems. The material aspects characterize natural endowments, geographical attributes including location, demographic wealth, man-made material wealth accumulated over time and so on. The psychic aspects characterise the animal spirit, the social psyche, the collective world view, the belief system, attitudes, etc. The organizational system has institutions or the body of all rules, formal as well as informal, that govern the activities of the people with regard to the elements of the system and the order in which they are put together, individual's personal and inter-personal conduct, individual's conduct to the social entities and vice versa, etc. in general (and any deviance in following those rules are socially discouraged).

At any given time, individuals (agents) act under the psychic forces mostly following the organizational constraints as well as the drive to exaptation (Gould, 1991) and set themselves to modify the material or organizational aspects of the system, successfully or otherwise. Individual as well as collective behaviour of agents has both a proximate and ultimate (functional or extraptational) cause and, therefore, the developmental history as well as the operation of current mechanisms matter (Buss, et al., 1998; MacDougall-Shackleton, 2011). Consequent upon the actions of an individual or a group of individuals, several types of feedbacks are set in motion that pervade throughout the system establishing homeostasis. In a larger frame, as time progresses the stress of material and organizational constraints as well as the impacts of individual actions accumulate. A specific energy builds up in a reservoir lying in the collective psyche or collective consciousness (Lorenz, 1950; Lehrman, 1953, Durkheim, 1997). This collective reservoir activated by natural forces, external forces and chance factors alter the ranges of homeostasis. A shift takes place which may be gradual or explosive. In many cases, the collectively accumulated impacts of individual actions make a collocation that waits until a 'critical mass' gathers, which ignited by a moving cause swings into action or set in motion a powerful positive feedback releasing the accumulated energy in the collocation. Depending on a host of conditions as well as chance, some systems may progress (evolve) slowly and gradually while some other systems may show up a marked jump to attain a punctuated equilibrium and the stasis in it (Gersick, 1991; Arrow et al., 2004).

Democracy provides freedom to the psychic aspects to alter the organizational and material aspects, the circumstances to materialize the adjustments and the requisite governance geared to welfare. Too strong regime thwarts realization of capabilities while too lax regime, a soft state, gives way to frittering away of capabilities to dissonance.

3. Political Regime as a part of organizational system: A political regime is an institution that primarily performs five functions: (i) defence from external aggression, (ii) making of rules to be followed by the citizens and the offices, (iii) governance to supervise that rules are followed, (iii) adjudication, and (v) creation, provision and maintenance of public goods and services. The first four functions are mainly for maintenance of order. The last one includes conservation, development and promotion of public welfare. Optionally, the government or the office that wields power to perform all the primary functions of a regime can (i) control the public opinion, (ii) enforce morality, (iii) interfere with custom and fashion, (iv) create culture, and (v) take up coercive actions or use the state machinery for its own perpetuation irrespective of its performance in discharging of its primary functions. Democratic governments largely limit themselves to primary functions and permit the public opinion to evolve even if it is against their perpetuation in holding power, regardless of their performance in discharging their primary functions. On the other hand, authoritarian governments in varying scope indulge in the activities beyond the primary functions. In extreme conditions, authoritative governments take up the optional activities as their primary functions while the primary functions become optional activities.

4. Political regime and development: Development means the movement upward of the entire social system (Myrdal, 1974). It may be noted that Myrdal's notion of development includes Sen's (Sen, 1999) notion of economic development (entailing political freedoms and transparency in relations among people, freedom of opportunity, including freedom to access credit, and economic protection from abject poverty), because no underdeveloped social system can provide the conditions that ensure freedom from hunger, freedom from tyranny and freedom of opportunity.

Maintenance of law and order is necessary, but not sufficient, for development and hence the state must be pro-active to create the conditions for development. This is so because the psychic and organizational subsystems of the socio-economic system have a strong tendency to homeostasis, arresting the transformation of material endowments and human capabilities to become resources (fruitfully exploited using appropriate technology in catering to the needs of the society). Secondly, economic underdevelopment itself has a negative feedback to weaken the political machinery leading to make a regime an 'impervious state'. In a democratic set up where the government is elected by the people, impervious states turn to Myrdal's 'soft state' (Myrdal, 1970) that are protective of rent-seeking tendencies at all levels. They are unable to maintain law and order also. In autocratic or authoritarian conditions impervious states become tyrannical where rulers become self-seeking. Impervious states vitiate the social psyche, the collective world view, the belief system and attitudes which, in turn, arrest efficiency and economic growth. Under these conditions, the people exhibit only weak will to development.

It is natural, then, to think that development needs either a massive help from without the system (a big push) or a benevolent and wise authoritarian ruler. A 'big push' argument has been promoted by several economists, although only in matters of providing capital or technology. However, since institutions and the social psyche cannot be imported, a big push of capital or technology cannot succeed much. The benefits of investment are marred by inefficiency and corruption while inflation and inequalities are amplified. Big push may also lead to dependency on external forces affecting socio-political freedom. In view of such possible consequences, an authoritarian regime with a wise and benevolent/liberal ruler remains to be the only condition for development. There are empirical instances in support of this line of thinking. China, Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan

have had authoritarian governments. However, those governments could see through the benefits of welcoming multi-national corporations, foreign investment, advance technologies and apt management as their means to foster development. As the governments in those countries were authoritarian, they could also curb populist ranting, rent-seeking and the opposition to developmental activities effectively. They could make fast and firm decisions and implement them, resulting into rapid growth in those countries. On the other hand, India, a democratic country, lagged behind and possibly showed up the signs of being a soft state. For different reasons and in spite of a massive international aid, Pakistan, oscillating between weak democracy and authoritarian regime as well as lacking a benevolent or liberal government, could not fast attain development. These empirical instances indicate that leadership quality and not the regime or the type of government make or mar socio-economic progress. It reminds us of the 'philosopher king' of Plato (Bloom, 1968; Reeve, 1988). This conclusion is also akin to the one found in Kautilya's *sutras* wherein he points out that governance leading to order, efficiency, opulence and welfare lies in ruler's being altruistic, humble and wise (the attributes of a sage-king) which attributes are cultivated only if he listens to the well-meaning advice of the wise ministers (Kangle, 1969).

5. The Lee Thesis: Lee Kuan Yew, who was the first Prime Minister of Singapore and governed the country for three decades, was a development-minded and inspired authoritarian, albeit accused of promoting a culture of elitism among Singapore's ruling class. Lee, in liaison with a handful of other British-educated ethnic Chinese that he met in his Cambridge days, founded People's Action Party that monopolized the entire process of selecting and grooming of future political and economic talents in Singapore. He promoted nepotism and did not spare his critics. Lee also discriminated against non-ethnic Chinese citizens although he projected a multi-ethnic and cosmopolitan image of Singapore (Barr, 2014). In spite of all these, his economic policies were insightful and fruit-bearing. To fight against the unemployment problem and to promote economic development he created an atmosphere that attracted American, Japanese and European entrepreneurs and professionals to set up base in Singapore. His policies made Singapore an ace exporter of electronic goods and an international financial centre. Under his leadership, Singapore succeeded in moving from the third world economy to first world economy in a single generation.

To safeguard and glorify his authoritarian image Lee held that the ultimate test of a political system is not in whether it is democratic or authoritarian, but in whether it improves the standard of living for the majority of people. For Lee, political freedom was secondary while economic prosperity was primary. Lee also promoted the thesis of 'Asian values' that had an incompatibility with the democratic practices. He argued, therefore, that democracy hurts economic development. This hotly debated argument has taken up the name 'the Lee thesis' (Sen, 1999). Yet, it is true that one must consider the urgency of bread over freedom although man does not live by bread alone.

6. Empirical relationship between political regime and development and Lee's thesis: The issue has elicited many research studies. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) provide an extensive survey of literature on the topic up to the year 1992. We reproduce the summary of their literature survey (p. 61) arranged according to the association of the type of political regime and development.

Where authoritarian government performed better than the democratic government: Huntington and Dominguez (1975) studied 35 poor nations during the 1950s and found that authoritarian countries grew faster. Marsh (1979) studied 98 countries during 1955-1970 and found that

authoritarian countries grew faster. Weede (1983) studied 124 countries during 1960-1974 and found that authoritarian countries grew faster. Landau (1986) studied 65 countries during 1960-1980 and found that authoritarian countries grew faster. Kohli (1986) studied 10 underdeveloped during 1960-1982 and found that in the 1960s regimes did not matter for development, but in the 1970s authoritarian regimes performed slightly better than democratic countries. Helliwell (1992) studied 90 countries during 1960-1985 and found that democracy has a negative, but statistically insignificant, effect on growth.

Where democratic government performed better than the authoritarian government: Dick (1974) studied 59 underdeveloped countries for the period 1959-1968 and found that democratic countries developed slightly faster. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) studied 47 countries during 1950-1977 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Pourgerami (1988) studied 92 countries during 1965-1984 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Scully (1988; 1992) studied 115 countries during 1960-1980 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Barro (1989) studied 72 countries during 1960-1985 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Pourgerami (1991) studied 106 less developed countries in 1986 and found that democratic countries grew faster. Remmer (1990) studied 11 Latin American countries during 1982-1988 and found that democratic countries grew faster, but results were statistically insignificant.

Where regime type conditionally, ambivalently or inconclusively affected development: Przeworski (1966) conducted a study on 57 countries for the period 1949-1963 and found that dictatorships helped the countries at medium level of development to grow faster. Adelman and Morris (1967) studied 74 underdeveloped countries (including communist bloc) for the period 1950-1964 and found that authoritarianism helped less and medium developed countries. Sloan and Tedin (1987) studied 20 Latin American countries during 1960-1979 and found that bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes do better than democracy while traditional dictatorships do worse. Marsh (1988) studied 47 countries during 1965-1984 and found that there was no difference between regimes with regard to their impact on development. Grier and Tullock (1989) studied 59 countries during 1961-1980 and found that democracy performed better in Africa and Latin America while regime type did not make a difference in the development of Asian countries.

Przeworski and Limongi (1993) concluded that we do not know whether democracy fosters or hinders economic growth. This inconclusiveness may be attributed to the problems of categorization (since all types of democratic or authoritarian governments are not identical). Barro (1997, p.50) points out that as evidenced by history dictators come in two types: one whose personal objectives often conflict with growth promotion and another whose interests dictate a preoccupation with economic development. Accordingly, an authoritarian government with the two opposite types of the leadership may have diametrically opposite effects on development. Measurement, modelling and mediation by or conditionality on other factors may also be responsible for blurring the relationship between regime type and development.

A Lack of conclusiveness in the direct (immediate) relationship between regime type and development turned the interest of researchers to investigate into a triadic relationship between the regime type and the conditions that promote development and in turn into those conditions leading to development, although a quest of direct relationship between regime type and development continued. Leblang (1997), Halperin et al. (2005) and Knutsen (2008a; 2008b) found that democratic

countries perform better at economic growth. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) show that the relationship between development and political regime is not a direct one. When political competition is limited and also when the power of the political elites (rulers) is threatened, they would block development (political replacement effect). Political elites are unlikely to block development when there is a high degree of political competition or when they are highly entrenched. Political replacement effect may be there in any type of regime. Boix (2003) and Knutsen (2007) found a positive effect of democracy on protection of property rights and rule of law. Knutsen (2008b) and Hegre and Fjelde (2008) found that democratic governments perform better on control of corruption. Rodrik (1998) found that democracy increases consumption through increasing wages. As Myrdal (1972: p. 54) pointed out, increased consumption by workers in the underdeveloped countries may have efficiency-promoting effects leading to development which may more than compensate the opportunity cost of increased wages. Summarizing the empirical findings on the relationship between the regime type and development Knutsen (2010) observed that globally, authoritarian regimes are associated with lower growth rates and higher levels of corruption. Even in Asia (for which the Lee's thesis was purported to be valid) the thesis that authoritarian government will necessarily promote development cannot be generalized for all countries. The thesis is valid only for those countries that perchance had the authoritarian regime with development priorities. However, if we accept authoritarian government as a path to development, there is no way to ensure that the rulers would have development priorities or they would be altruistic and wise or they would have well-meaning and wise ministers. Przeworski (2004) concluded that "there is not a single reason to sacrifice democracy at the altar of development."

7. Globalization as a mediating factor between regime and development: Until the World War-II, there were only two worlds, the capitalist and the socialist. Following the War, many countries that were colonies earlier assumed nationhood and those countries were categorised as those belonging to the third world. The third world countries were in an immediate need to politically consolidate them as well as to develop their economies. The countries of the first two worlds were deeply involved in the cold war for their politico-economic supremacy that also had an ideological basis. The countries of the third world mostly joined the Non-Aligned Movement keeping themselves at some comfortable and politically appropriate distance from the two power blocs. The countries of the first bloc took upon themselves the moral responsibility of finding out the methods or the path, possibly with the economic and intellectual assistance of the first world countries, that would develop the economies of the third world countries through democratic means (without turning to authoritarian socialism). In that process, the gamut of the theories of economic development prospered. Meantime, some counties with authoritarian government forged a cooperative link with the first world countries to promote their economic development through integrating their economies with the world market and altering their domestic policies to suit such cooperation. Nevertheless, until the dissolution of the USSR (the central force of the Socialist Bloc) most of the third world countries were resistant or cautiously open to integrate their economies with the world market. However, after 1991 (when the USSR disbanded), most of the third world countries began increasingly allowing the flow of goods, services, capital, management, people, ideas and cultures across the national boundaries and removing obstacles to such flow. This integration with the world market and permeability to socio-economic forces may be considered as a mediating factor between regime type and development, making a triad. In the pre-globalization era, the governments in the third world countries had the responsibilities of mobilising the capital, adopting the appropriate

technologies and managing the economic activities or projects instrumental to development. After globalization, these responsibilities have been at least partly shifted to international market forces. Now, with the growing impact of globalization, the concern of the governments is more streamlined or possibly limited to retaining political sovereignty and correcting the market forces and the obnoxious effects of globalization such as income inequality, aberrative effects of socio-cultural misalliance, etc. In this sense, too, globalization is a mediating factor between regime and development. Therefore, it is interesting to investigate how regime types deal with globalization.

8. A quest for empirical relationship between regime type and extent of globalization: Democracy and authoritarianism are at the two poles in the realm of political management of the society and they are heterogeneous, qualitative, multi-dimensional categories. Each one of them has its own history, society and culture behind it. Similarly, globalization is a multi-dimensional concept that has its economic, social and political aspects. Our objective in this investigation is to carry out a quantitative analysis that requires these qualitative multidimensional concepts to be represented quantitatively. This venture has its own limitations and risk factors as well as its own attractiveness.

A quantitative measure of regime type: Attempts have been made to quantify the regime types along a scale called Democracy Index with authoritarianism at the bottom and democracy at the top. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), a British business within the Economist Group that provides forecasting and advisory services through research and analysis, has published the Democracy Index for 2006, 2008 and 2011 and for every year afterwards. The index measures the state of democracy in 167 countries, of which 166 are sovereign states and 165 are UN member states. The index is based on 60 indicators grouped in five different categories or dimensions of regime ranging from democracy to authoritarianism. These five categories are: Electoral process and pluralism (EPP), Functioning of government (FOG), Political participation (PPN), Political culture (PCL) and Civil liberties (CVL). Subsequently, these five measures of different aspects of democracy are suitably weighted and aggregated to yield an overall index (OSC, or the Index of Democracy with the score value in the range of zero to ten). On the basis of the score value (OSC) the political systems of different countries may be classified into Full democracies (score value in 8-10 range), Flawed democracies (score value in 6 to below-8 range), Hybrid regimes (score value in 4 to below-6 range) and authoritarian regimes (score value below 4).

A quantitative measure of the extent of globalization: A number of indices have been devised to measure the extent of globalization of different countries and also to study the trends in globalization over time. Samimi (2011) reviews a number of such indices. Among them the KOF index of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Dreher et al., 2008) has been constructed for many countries for 45 years (1970-2014) on an annual basis. It visualizes three aspects of globalization; economic, social and political. The economic dimension (E) of globalization takes into account: (1) E1 - actual economic flows such as trans-border trade, direct investment and portfolio investment, and (2) E2 - restrictions on trans-border trade as well as capital movement by means of taxation, tariff, etc. They are synthesized to make E. The social dimension (S) takes into account: (1) S1 - trans-border personal contacts such as degree of tourism, telecom traffic, postal interactions, etc., (2) S2 - flow of information, and (3) S3 - cultural proximity. They are synthesized to make S. The political dimension has only one aspect, P. At the second stage, E, S and P are synthesized (by a weighted aggregation achieved through the Principal Component Analysis) to give the KOF Index of globalization (Mishra, 2017b). However, Mishra (2016; 2017a) argued in favour construction of a composite index by using Shapley values of the constituent variables to the composite index and called it Almost Equi-

Marginal Contribution (AEMC) composite index. In this study we have used the AEMC index of globalization, though retaining the KOF (2017) index of globalization for the sake of comparison.

Some details on our analysis: Our study includes 116 countries for which globalization data are available for 45 years (1970-2014). This choice is important in view of the fact that the KOF index of globalization uses all data (for 45 years and 207 countries), with or without adjustments as the availability of data permits. This option puts different countries on different footings (some countries could not opt for globalization before the dissolution of the USSR and some other countries were deficient in recording information or rendering them). Since KOF uses the Principal Component Analysis for deriving weights by subjecting all data for statistical analysis, this 'footing effect' is carried to the values of the overall index. In view of this, we have constructed the AEMC index (for 118 countries) for which all the data for 45 years (1970-2014) are made available by the KOF. However, among these 118 countries, the Democracy index values for two countries (Barbados and Seychelles) were not available on the EIU site. Under these constraints, we have proceeded only with 116 countries.

For establishing the relationship between the Democracy Index and the Globalization Index we have used globalization index values only for the period 2006-2014. We have obtained two vectors, the one that contains (for all 116 countries) the measures of globalization corresponding the maximal overall globalization index value scored by a particular country during 2006-2014 and the other that contains (for all 116 countries) the measures of globalization corresponding the minimal overall globalization index value scored by a particular country during 2006-2014. Symbolically, let Γ_{it} be the value of the overall globalization index for the i^{th} country ($i=1, 2, \dots, 116$) and t^{th} year, $t=2006, 2007, \dots, 2014$. From Γ_{it} we have chosen two vectors, say $G^H = G_{ik \in t}^{\max} = \max_t(\Gamma_{it})$ and $G^L = G_{ik \in t}^{\min} = \min_t(\Gamma_{it})$. These two vectors together represent the range in which the globalization measured by the overall globalization index has been attained by the i^{th} country. Then, we carry out canonical correlation analysis for Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL)₂₀₀₆ and globalization measures G^{\max} $\{[E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P]^{\max}$ for G^{\max} or G^H corresponding to the year (Year-H) in which the overall globalization index was maximum]. Similarly, canonical correlation analysis has been carried out for Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL)₂₀₀₆ and globalization measures G^{\min} $\{[E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P]^{\min}$ for G^{\min} or G^L corresponding to the year (Year-L) in which the overall globalization index was minimum]. A special variant of canonical correlation analysis has been used. We have also done a similar analysis with Democracy measures (EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL)₂₀₁₆.

9. Empirical basis (data) and findings of our analysis: In Table-1 we present the scores obtained by different countries on the quantitative assessment of democratic characteristics in different dimensions (compiled by the UK-based company the Economist Intelligence Unit). The OSC (Overall score of Democracy index) and its constituents (EPP=Electoral process and pluralism, FOG=Functioning of government, PPN=Political participation, PCL=Political culture and CVL=Civil liberties) are for the years 2006 and 2016.

In Table-2.1 we present the measures of globalizations in three different dimensions, economic, social and political, as visualized by KOF. As pointed out earlier, the economic dimension has two measures, E1 and E2. The social dimension comprises S1, S2 and S3. The political dimension has only one measure, P. The overall indices of globalization are KOF (measured by KOF) and AEMC,

constructed by using Almost Equi-Marginal Contribution principle (Mishra, 2016; 2017a). The values (E1, E2 though KOF and AEMC) reported in the row against each country under study pertain to Year-H (G^{\max} for Year-H) in which the AEMC index is highest during 2006-2014. These values present the optimistic or upper side attainment of globalization. In Table-2.2 we present the measures of globalization in the same manner as in Table-2.1, except that the numbers (for E1, E2 though KOF and AEMC) reported in the row against each country under study pertain to Year-L (G^{\min} for Year-L) in which the AEMC index is lowest during 2006-2014. These values present the pessimistic or lower side attainment of globalization.

Table-1. Scores Obtained by Countries on the Measures in Different Dimensions of Democracy													
SL	Country	Dimensions of Democracy - 2006						Dimensions of Democracy - 2016					
		OSC	EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	OSC	EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL
1	Albania	5.91	7.33	5.07	4.44	5.63	7.06	5.91	7.00	4.36	5.56	5.00	7.65
2	Argentina	6.63	8.75	5.00	5.56	5.63	8.24	6.96	9.17	5.00	6.11	6.88	7.65
3	Australia	9.09	10.00	8.93	7.78	8.75	10.00	9.01	9.58	8.93	7.78	8.75	10.00
4	Austria	8.69	9.58	8.21	7.78	8.75	9.12	8.41	9.58	7.86	8.33	6.88	9.41
5	Azerbaijan	3.31	3.08	0.79	3.33	3.75	5.59	2.65	0.50	2.14	3.33	3.75	3.53
6	Burundi	4.51	4.42	3.29	3.89	6.25	4.71	2.40	0.33	0.79	3.89	5.00	2.65
7	Belgium	8.15	9.58	8.21	6.67	6.88	9.41	7.77	9.58	8.57	5.00	6.88	8.82
8	Benin	6.16	6.83	6.43	3.89	6.88	6.76	5.67	6.50	5.36	5.00	5.63	5.88
9	Burkina_Faso	3.72	4.00	1.79	2.78	5.63	4.41	4.70	4.42	4.29	4.44	5.63	4.71
10	Bulgaria	7.10	9.58	5.71	6.67	5.00	8.53	7.01	9.17	6.07	7.22	4.38	8.24
11	Bolivia	5.98	8.33	5.71	4.44	3.75	7.65	5.63	7.00	5.36	5.00	3.75	7.06
12	Brazil	7.38	9.58	7.86	4.44	5.63	9.41	6.90	9.58	6.79	5.56	3.75	8.82
13	Bhutan	2.62	0.08	4.64	1.11	3.75	3.53	4.93	8.33	5.36	2.78	4.38	3.82
14	Botswana	7.60	9.17	7.86	5.00	6.88	9.12	7.87	9.17	7.14	6.11	7.50	9.41
15	C._Afr_Rep	1.61	0.42	1.43	1.67	1.88	2.65	1.61	1.75	0.36	1.11	2.50	2.35
16	Canada	9.07	9.17	9.64	7.78	8.75	10.00	9.15	9.58	9.64	7.78	8.75	10.00
17	Switzerland	9.02	9.58	9.29	7.78	8.75	9.71	9.09	9.58	9.29	7.78	9.38	9.41
18	Chile	7.89	9.58	8.93	5.00	6.25	9.71	7.78	9.58	8.57	4.44	6.88	9.41
19	China	2.97	0.00	4.64	2.78	6.25	1.18	3.14	0.00	4.64	3.33	6.25	1.47
20	Cote_d'Ivoire	3.38	1.25	2.86	3.33	5.63	3.82	3.81	3.42	2.86	3.33	5.63	3.82
21	Cameroon	3.27	0.92	3.21	2.78	5.63	3.82	3.46	2.00	3.21	3.89	4.38	3.82
22	Congo_Rep.	2.76	4.58	0.36	2.78	3.75	2.35	2.91	1.67	2.86	3.33	3.75	2.94
23	Colombia	6.40	9.17	4.36	5.00	4.38	9.12	6.67	9.17	7.14	4.44	4.38	8.24
24	Costa_Rica	8.04	9.58	8.21	6.11	6.88	9.41	7.88	9.58	7.14	6.11	6.88	9.71
25	Cyprus	7.60	9.17	6.79	6.67	6.25	9.12	7.65	9.17	6.43	6.67	6.88	9.12
26	Germany	8.82	9.58	8.57	7.78	8.75	9.41	8.63	9.58	8.57	7.78	7.50	9.71
27	Denmark	9.52	10.00	9.64	8.89	9.38	9.71	9.20	9.58	9.29	8.33	9.38	9.41
28	Domin_Rep	6.13	9.17	4.29	3.33	5.63	8.24	6.67	8.75	5.71	5.00	6.25	7.65
29	Algeria	3.17	2.25	2.21	2.22	5.63	3.53	3.56	2.58	2.21	3.89	5.00	4.12
30	Ecuador	5.64	7.83	4.29	5.00	3.13	7.94	5.81	8.25	4.64	5.00	4.38	6.76
31	Egypt	3.90	2.67	3.64	2.78	6.88	3.53	3.31	2.58	3.93	3.33	3.75	2.94
32	Spain	8.34	9.58	7.86	6.11	8.75	9.41	8.30	9.58	7.14	7.22	8.13	9.41
33	Ethiopia	4.72	4.00	3.93	5.00	6.25	4.41	3.60	0.00	3.57	5.56	5.63	3.24
34	Finland	9.25	10.00	10.00	7.78	8.75	9.71	9.03	10.00	8.93	7.78	8.75	9.71
35	Fiji	5.66	6.50	5.21	3.33	5.00	8.24	5.64	4.58	5.71	6.67	5.63	5.59
36	France	8.07	9.58	7.50	6.67	7.50	9.12	7.92	9.58	7.14	7.78	6.25	8.82
37	Gabon	2.72	0.50	3.21	2.22	5.63	2.06	3.74	2.58	2.21	4.44	5.63	3.82
38	U.K.	8.08	9.58	8.57	5.00	8.13	9.12	8.36	9.58	7.14	7.22	8.75	9.12
39	Ghana	5.35	7.42	4.64	4.44	4.38	5.88	6.75	8.33	5.71	6.11	6.25	7.35
40	Guinea	2.02	1.00	0.79	2.22	3.75	2.35	3.14	3.50	0.43	4.44	4.38	2.94
41	Gambia	4.39	4.00	4.64	4.44	5.63	3.24	2.91	1.75	3.21	2.22	5.00	2.35
42	Greece	8.13	9.58	7.50	6.67	7.50	9.41	7.23	9.58	5.36	6.11	6.25	8.82
43	Guatemala	6.07	8.75	6.79	2.78	4.38	7.65	5.92	7.92	6.07	3.89	4.38	7.35
44	Guyana	6.15	8.33	5.36	4.44	4.38	8.24	6.25	8.33	5.36	6.11	4.38	7.06
45	Honduras	6.25	8.33	6.43	4.44	5.00	7.06	5.92	9.17	5.71	3.89	4.38	6.47
46	Haiti	4.19	5.58	3.64	2.78	2.50	6.47	4.02	5.17	2.21	2.22	3.75	6.76
47	Hungary	7.53	9.58	6.79	5.00	6.88	9.41	6.72	9.17	6.07	4.44	6.88	7.06
48	Indonesia	6.41	6.92	7.14	5.00	6.25	6.76	6.97	7.75	7.14	6.67	6.25	7.06
49	India	7.68	9.58	8.21	5.56	5.63	9.41	7.81	9.58	7.50	7.22	5.63	9.12
50	Ireland	9.01	9.58	8.93	7.78	8.75	10.00	9.15	9.58	7.86	8.33	10.00	10.00
51	Iceland	9.71	10.00	9.64	8.89	10.00	10.00	9.50	10.00	8.93	8.89	10.00	9.71

52	Israel	7.28	9.17	6.64	7.78	7.50	5.29	7.85	9.17	7.50	8.89	7.50	6.18
53	Italy	7.73	9.17	6.43	6.11	8.13	8.82	7.98	9.58	6.43	7.22	8.13	8.53
54	Jamaica	7.34	9.17	7.14	5.00	6.25	9.12	7.39	9.17	6.79	5.00	6.88	9.12
55	Jordan	3.92	3.08	3.79	3.89	5.00	3.82	3.96	4.00	4.29	3.89	4.38	3.24
56	Japan	8.15	9.17	7.86	5.56	8.75	9.41	7.99	8.75	8.21	6.67	7.50	8.82
57	Kenya	5.08	4.33	4.29	5.56	6.25	5.00	5.33	4.33	5.00	6.67	5.63	5.00
58	Cambodia	4.77	5.58	6.07	2.78	5.00	4.41	4.27	3.17	5.71	3.33	5.00	4.12
59	South_Korea	7.88	9.58	7.14	7.22	7.50	7.94	7.92	9.17	7.50	7.72	7.50	8.24
60	Kuwait	3.09	1.33	4.14	1.11	5.63	3.24	3.85	3.17	4.29	3.89	4.38	3.53
61	Lebanon	5.82	7.92	2.36	6.11	6.25	6.47	4.86	4.42	2.14	7.78	4.38	5.59
62	Lesotho	6.48	7.92	6.43	4.44	6.25	7.35	6.59	8.25	5.36	6.67	5.63	7.06
63	Luxembourg	9.10	10.00	9.29	7.78	8.75	9.71	8.81	10.00	8.93	6.67	8.75	9.71
64	Morocco	3.90	3.50	3.79	2.78	5.63	3.82	4.77	4.75	4.64	4.44	5.63	4.41
65	Moldova	6.50	9.17	4.29	6.11	5.00	7.94	6.01	7.92	4.29	6.11	4.38	7.35
66	Madagascar	5.82	5.67	5.71	5.56	6.88	5.29	5.07	5.92	3.57	5.56	5.63	4.71
67	Mexico	6.67	8.75	6.07	5.00	5.00	8.53	6.47	7.92	6.07	7.22	4.38	6.76
68	Mali	5.99	8.25	5.71	3.89	5.63	6.47	5.70	7.42	3.93	4.44	6.25	6.47
69	Malta	8.39	9.17	8.21	6.11	8.75	9.71	8.39	9.17	8.21	6.11	8.75	9.71
70	Myanmar	1.77	0.00	1.79	0.56	5.63	0.88	4.20	3.17	3.57	4.44	6.88	2.94
71	Montenegro	6.57	9.17	5.71	5.00	5.63	7.35	5.72	7.08	5.36	5.00	4.38	6.76
72	Mongolia	6.60	9.17	6.07	3.89	5.63	8.24	6.62	9.17	5.71	5.00	5.00	8.24
73	Mauritania	3.12	1.83	4.29	2.22	3.13	4.12	3.96	3.00	4.29	5.00	3.13	4.41
74	Mauritius	8.04	9.17	8.21	5.00	8.13	9.71	8.28	9.17	8.21	5.56	8.75	9.71
75	Malawi	4.97	6.00	5.00	3.89	4.38	5.59	5.55	6.58	4.29	4.44	6.25	6.18
76	Malaysia	5.98	6.08	5.71	4.44	7.50	6.18	6.54	6.92	7.86	6.11	6.25	5.59
77	Niger	3.54	5.25	1.14	1.67	3.75	5.88	3.96	4.75	2.21	2.22	3.75	6.76
78	Nigeria	3.52	3.08	1.86	4.44	4.38	3.82	4.50	6.08	4.29	3.33	4.38	4.41
79	Nicaragua	5.68	8.25	5.71	3.33	3.75	7.35	4.81	4.50	3.29	3.89	5.63	6.76
80	Netherlands	9.66	9.58	9.29	9.44	10.00	10.00	8.80	9.58	8.57	8.33	8.13	9.41
81	Norway	9.55	10.00	9.64	10.00	8.13	10.00	9.93	10.00	9.64	10.00	10.00	10.00
82	Nepal	3.42	0.08	3.57	2.22	5.63	5.59	4.86	4.33	4.29	4.44	5.63	5.59
83	New_Zealand	9.01	10.00	8.57	8.33	8.13	10.00	9.26	10.00	9.29	8.89	8.13	10.00
84	Pakistan	3.92	4.33	5.36	0.56	4.38	5.00	4.33	6.00	5.36	2.78	2.50	5.00
85	Panama	7.35	9.58	7.14	5.56	5.63	8.82	7.13	9.58	6.43	6.11	5.00	8.82
86	Peru	6.11	8.75	3.29	5.56	5.00	7.94	6.65	9.17	5.36	6.11	4.38	8.24
87	Philippines	6.48	9.17	5.36	5.00	3.75	9.12	6.94	9.17	5.71	7.22	4.38	8.24
88	Poland	7.30	9.58	6.07	6.11	5.63	9.12	6.83	9.17	5.71	6.67	4.38	8.24
89	Portugal	8.16	9.58	8.21	6.11	7.50	9.41	7.86	9.58	6.79	6.67	6.88	9.41
90	Paraguay	6.16	7.92	5.00	5.00	4.38	8.53	6.27	8.33	5.71	5.00	4.38	7.94
91	Romania	7.06	9.58	6.07	6.11	5.00	8.53	6.62	9.17	5.71	5.00	5.00	8.24
92	Rwanda	3.82	3.00	3.57	2.22	5.00	5.29	3.07	0.83	5.00	2.22	4.38	2.94
93	Saudi_Arabia	1.92	0.00	2.36	1.11	4.38	1.76	1.93	0.00	2.86	2.22	3.13	1.47
94	Senegal	5.37	7.00	5.00	3.33	5.63	5.88	6.21	7.92	5.36	4.44	6.25	7.06
95	Singapore	5.89	4.33	7.50	2.78	7.50	7.35	6.38	4.33	7.86	6.11	6.25	7.35
96	Sierra_Leone	3.57	5.25	2.21	2.22	3.75	4.41	4.55	6.58	1.86	2.78	6.25	5.29
97	El_Salvador	6.22	9.17	5.43	3.89	4.38	8.24	6.64	9.17	6.07	4.44	5.00	8.53
98	Sweden	9.88	10.00	10.00	10.00	9.38	10.00	9.39	9.58	9.64	8.33	10.00	9.41
99	Swaziland	2.93	1.75	2.86	2.22	3.13	4.71	3.03	0.92	2.86	2.22	5.63	3.53
100	Syr_Arab_Rep	2.36	0.00	1.79	1.67	6.88	1.47	1.43	0.00	0.00	2.78	4.38	0.00
101	Chad	1.65	0.00	0.00	0.00	5.00	3.24	1.50	0.00	0.00	1.11	3.75	2.65
102	Togo	1.75	0.00	0.79	0.56	5.63	1.76	3.32	3.58	1.14	2.78	5.00	4.12
103	Thailand	5.67	4.83	6.43	5.00	5.63	6.47	4.92	4.50	3.93	5.00	5.00	6.18
104	Trinidad&Tobago	7.18	9.17	6.79	6.11	5.63	8.24	7.10	9.58	7.14	5.56	5.00	8.24
105	Tunisia	3.06	0.00	2.36	2.22	6.88	3.82	6.40	6.00	6.07	7.78	6.25	5.58
106	Turkey	5.70	7.92	6.79	4.44	3.75	5.59	5.04	5.83	6.07	5.00	5.63	2.65
107	Tanzania	5.18	6.00	3.93	5.06	5.63	5.29	5.76	7.00	5.00	5.56	6.25	5.00
108	Uganda	5.14	4.33	3.93	4.44	6.25	6.76	5.26	5.25	3.57	4.44	6.88	6.18
109	Uruguay	7.96	10.00	8.21	5.00	6.88	9.71	8.17	10.00	8.93	4.44	7.50	10.00
110	U.S.A.	8.22	8.75	7.86	7.22	8.75	8.53	7.98	9.17	7.14	7.22	8.13	8.24
111	Venezuela_RB	5.42	7.00	3.64	5.56	5.00	5.88	4.68	5.67	2.50	5.56	4.38	5.29
112	Vietnam	2.75	0.83	4.29	2.78	4.38	1.47	3.38	0.00	3.21	3.89	6.88	2.94
113	Yemen_Rep.	2.98	2.67	2.71	2.78	4.38	2.35	2.07	0.00	0.00	4.44	5.00	0.88
114	South_Africa	7.91	8.75	7.86	7.22	6.88	8.82	7.41	7.92	7.86	8.33	5.00	7.94
115	Congo_D_Rep.	2.76	4.58	0.36	2.78	3.75	2.35	1.93	0.92	0.71	2.78	4.38	0.88
116	Zambia	5.25	5.25	4.64	3.33	6.25	6.76	5.99	7.08	5.36	3.89	6.88	6.76

OSC=Overall Score; EPP=Electoral Process and Pluralism; FOG=Functioning of Government; PPN=Political Participation; PCL=Political Culture; CVL=Political Liberties; REG=Regime (1-Full Democracy, 2- Flawed Democracy, 3-Hybrid Regime and 4-Authoritarian)

Table-2.1. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization in Different Countries

SL	Country	Year-H	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P	KOF	AEMC
1	Albania	2009	56.57	73.00	52.55	73.90	2.42	80.69	61.60	61.61
2	Argentina	2008	45.92	39.11	43.30	71.50	41.47	92.07	59.95	59.19
3	Australia	2007	74.79	81.24	73.40	87.55	94.03	89.71	83.80	84.03
4	Austria	2007	89.34	86.56	87.06	92.06	95.54	96.86	91.87	93.95
5	Azerbaijan	2007	67.38	63.70	37.92	77.61	34.96	54.01	57.02	54.69
6	Burundi	2014	23.53	33.37	21.02	37.22	3.10	62.17	35.04	34.79
7	Belgium	2007	96.71	82.81	81.94	96.39	91.22	97.67	92.41	93.75
8	Benin	2014	53.79	42.92	28.55	39.46	2.48	75.17	46.67	48.99
9	Burkina_Faso	2014	59.67	46.84	19.43	44.62	2.17	76.88	48.69	49.12
10	Bulgaria	2013	80.04	72.93	51.55	77.71	85.30	84.96	76.98	76.34
11	Bolivia	2006	62.03	59.79	39.52	51.01	3.78	75.69	54.42	56.38
12	Brazil	2014	51.77	52.82	24.46	70.50	39.58	94.30	61.40	58.16
13	Bhutan	2014	60.64	56.77	46.83	45.54	6.87	38.85	43.58	47.07
14	Botswana	2008	77.58	59.64	59.54	57.17	5.88	59.28	55.50	60.64
15	C._Afr_Rep	2014	49.56	28.29	13.44	40.71	2.24	58.39	36.34	37.27
16	Canada	2007	76.20	82.03	80.78	94.74	96.09	92.91	87.15	87.51
17	Switzerland	2014	95.02	70.51	91.77	87.57	94.47	93.40	88.79	93.18
18	Chile	2007	82.68	87.08	41.25	77.69	41.18	87.67	74.31	72.77
19	China	2014	43.49	62.19	18.71	65.65	78.37	84.26	62.02	56.85
20	Cote_d'Ivoire	2007	63.35	40.17	41.85	52.15	2.85	70.72	49.83	53.08
21	Cameroon	2014	44.96	38.31	16.91	52.02	2.24	73.16	44.20	42.75
22	Congo_Rep.	2014	96.24	41.58	35.45	43.93	1.25	63.67	51.83	57.31
23	Colombia	2013	58.32	57.38	33.46	69.69	38.12	79.65	60.15	58.23
24	Costa_Rica	2007	64.79	73.30	60.37	78.75	45.65	58.63	63.66	63.45
25	Cyprus	2008	93.50	84.06	88.10	95.69	93.84	78.36	87.32	89.36
26	Germany	2007	81.36	84.49	76.35	87.52	92.57	92.43	86.48	87.44
27	Denmark	2007	87.80	89.09	83.64	89.59	93.06	93.75	90.01	91.90
28	Domin_Rep	2014	64.15	59.56	53.70	64.97	79.14	73.31	66.45	67.20
29	Algeria	2006	55.36	52.55	32.39	64.92	1.93	80.65	54.00	53.32
30	Ecuador	2006	55.97	46.00	36.82	65.37	38.22	79.01	57.39	56.77
31	Egypt	2013	42.96	48.68	27.64	66.78	77.77	93.01	63.10	59.62
32	Spain	2007	78.33	81.36	74.93	87.72	90.22	95.93	85.92	86.71
33	Ethiopia	2014	24.93	28.39	19.32	33.17	2.85	82.51	39.33	39.87
34	Finland	2007	85.16	87.39	72.07	90.60	91.67	91.64	87.22	87.36
35	Fiji	2014	74.43	25.70	56.98	57.20	43.56	69.68	57.56	61.30
36	France	2007	76.99	87.19	80.56	88.36	91.79	97.96	88.23	89.36
37	Gabon	2014	75.55	42.75	52.22	63.44	2.36	72.30	55.96	59.46
38	U.K.	2006	81.91	89.75	79.57	90.54	93.30	94.90	89.06	89.91
39	Ghana	2014	62.30	54.48	27.85	45.77	3.96	85.72	54.17	55.67
40	Guinea	2014	57.21	31.29	21.72	41.38	2.73	76.19	44.40	46.82
41	Gambia	2006	70.76	49.68	45.63	57.79	6.31	61.86	51.78	54.92
42	Greece	2007	68.15	83.53	76.51	83.41	85.44	92.38	82.59	83.44
43	Guatemala	2014	48.00	74.96	26.23	57.23	42.95	83.01	60.42	57.71
44	Guyana	2006	80.52	62.07	56.43	55.51	44.10	43.34	56.44	59.99
45	Honduras	2014	74.61	71.19	28.45	58.46	39.51	71.84	61.42	60.57
46	Haiti	2010	34.21	62.93	28.71	50.84	1.00	45.88	39.36	38.47
47	Hungary	2009	92.14	85.86	65.93	89.31	89.62	91.47	86.99	87.02
48	Indonesia	2014	56.25	71.79	20.40	49.92	33.89	86.83	59.65	57.96
49	India	2014	43.78	44.93	14.10	45.12	32.98	91.23	52.38	50.87
50	Ireland	2014	99.52	89.78	89.37	91.72	91.88	90.47	92.15	95.20
51	Iceland	2008	89.32	64.89	81.47	80.36	91.88	70.11	77.86	81.39
52	Israel	2010	71.59	83.51	75.06	67.25	90.37	80.29	78.15	80.79
53	Italy	2007	68.17	83.24	70.46	78.72	86.52	97.92	82.85	83.57
54	Jamaica	2007	80.64	70.00	63.13	69.52	7.11	68.56	62.72	66.57
55	Jordan	2006	79.36	59.47	67.97	71.54	41.11	84.27	70.31	73.94
56	Japan	2014	50.41	76.54	43.39	75.59	87.91	88.10	72.26	68.81
57	Kenya	2007	27.19	46.79	29.61	46.02	3.72	82.92	46.46	45.80

58	Cambodia	2014	85.86	50.76	29.52	48.48	1.31	62.36	50.69	54.22
59	South_Korea	2014	62.52	63.76	43.81	73.55	42.42	89.58	67.03	66.05
60	Kuwait	2008	61.31	75.01	78.96	76.28	90.41	59.54	70.76	72.18
61	Lebanon	2006	86.92	62.30	70.38	81.04	43.26	74.55	70.50	74.20
62	Lesotho	2014	80.48	41.22	25.58	48.74	6.87	54.09	45.94	48.77
63	Luxembourg	2007	100.00	88.46	96.09	97.51	48.25	80.06	85.62	89.59
64	Morocco	2014	60.71	53.68	45.87	83.86	37.71	89.50	65.95	64.33
65	Moldova	2007	67.96	69.67	44.90	84.17	39.27	67.22	64.04	61.70
66	Madagascar	2014	62.47	36.71	11.21	48.02	2.73	65.10	42.90	42.98
67	Mexico	2014	63.45	68.45	44.30	68.92	40.12	71.72	62.29	61.61
68	Mali	2014	50.97	41.67	22.46	44.10	1.12	75.98	46.07	46.72
69	Malta	2009	99.76	87.06	83.18	96.04	49.74	52.58	76.16	78.24
70	Myanmar	2014	56.93	56.33	11.89	42.07	1.00	44.74	39.03	38.40
71	Montenegro	2010	81.65	79.55	72.69	94.41	5.08	56.33	65.48	66.92
72	Mongolia	2014	84.88	65.73	16.76	59.40	1.43	71.89	56.91	55.63
73	Mauritania	2014	79.30	58.16	19.77	51.82	1.37	66.99	51.45	52.55
74	Mauritius	2014	91.12	84.89	58.78	82.06	42.61	45.32	66.61	66.81
75	Malawi	2013	49.90	52.47	26.25	41.95	6.99	64.35	45.40	46.09
76	Malaysia	2010	89.03	69.62	64.71	75.92	87.52	83.17	79.12	81.07
77	Niger	2014	54.67	50.44	32.41	35.30	1.74	74.33	47.92	50.86
78	Nigeria	2009	65.10	47.51	12.39	52.93	3.47	89.37	54.36	52.53
79	Nicaragua	2012	61.15	61.69	34.97	56.57	40.24	57.38	53.99	53.56
80	Netherlands	2014	97.64	88.48	85.98	93.26	92.75	95.41	92.84	95.24
81	Norway	2013	80.32	72.93	81.74	85.52	91.68	92.27	84.48	86.83
82	Nepal	2013	13.26	39.95	24.97	44.85	2.79	70.69	38.18	36.70
83	New_Zealand	2008	76.62	90.04	79.32	91.46	50.44	80.05	79.17	80.12
84	Pakistan	2007	40.85	43.25	23.40	44.12	32.38	87.55	51.83	51.16
85	Panama	2009	89.59	71.32	50.84	81.17	47.74	60.74	67.70	67.56
86	Peru	2011	69.02	82.53	32.33	58.27	36.87	84.74	66.14	65.24
87	Philippines	2006	65.22	52.73	30.26	49.70	39.96	81.96	58.39	59.19
88	Poland	2014	77.73	76.38	57.40	92.23	89.22	88.82	81.32	79.32
89	Portugal	2007	82.71	87.10	76.48	91.10	88.73	93.85	87.61	88.21
90	Paraguay	2012	62.44	56.59	36.33	65.09	39.86	77.61	60.13	59.39
91	Romania	2014	60.67	83.22	48.07	82.02	82.39	89.82	76.51	73.36
92	Rwanda	2014	34.81	63.91	17.27	39.87	7.05	71.53	45.56	43.83
93	Saudi_Arabia	2009	62.95	76.19	69.00	71.18	83.25	60.43	68.43	69.75
94	Senegal	2012	57.58	47.32	29.33	58.91	3.53	87.90	54.64	54.59
95	Singapore	2009	99.01	95.35	92.18	88.25	96.12	71.77	88.27	91.52
96	Sierra_Leone	2011	69.70	46.89	19.84	38.92	3.16	65.10	45.90	48.29
97	El_Salvador	2007	61.06	72.79	49.35	64.68	40.80	75.40	63.79	64.02
98	Sweden	2007	88.33	86.26	80.84	84.38	94.73	96.03	89.41	91.73
99	Swaziland	2014	77.83	43.61	59.31	60.20	6.37	36.55	47.48	51.92
100	Syr_Arab_Rep	2011	53.48	55.43	51.94	65.49	1.00	52.73	48.93	50.02
101	Chad	2006	55.49	27.21	23.94	32.35	2.91	60.04	38.37	41.70
102	Togo	2014	78.62	46.54	25.04	57.99	3.72	73.38	53.70	54.25
103	Thailand	2012	83.87	59.54	42.90	72.93	80.93	81.22	72.06	71.71
104	Trinidad&Tobago	2012	86.13	68.86	58.65	67.24	41.73	53.54	63.09	65.62
105	Tunisia	2008	70.83	48.71	41.68	76.78	2.67	86.29	60.45	60.63
106	Turkey	2014	51.09	66.13	50.76	72.49	81.59	91.88	71.33	69.88
107	Tanzania	2007	35.61	53.20	16.78	31.93	3.04	55.74	37.71	37.42
108	Uganda	2013	44.01	58.02	21.59	37.01	4.52	70.23	45.48	45.69
109	Uruguay	2008	65.66	68.87	51.35	65.92	42.10	85.45	67.23	68.14
110	U.S.A.	2007	65.17	85.34	67.13	82.45	91.90	92.10	81.80	81.15
111	Venezuela_RB	2006	62.32	47.83	38.48	68.43	41.65	65.68	56.17	55.45
112	Vietnam	2014	80.26	49.28	16.43	63.78	31.92	71.13	56.69	54.98
113	Yemen_Rep.	2008	53.37	63.83	23.57	41.91	1.68	62.24	46.51	46.66
114	South_Africa	2014	72.64	65.18	41.53	61.39	41.93	88.04	66.72	67.54
115	Congo_D_Rep.	2013	69.13	37.26	6.23	43.38	1.00	62.03	41.67	42.31
116	Zambia	2007	64.24	63.96	27.92	45.69	4.09	73.93	52.96	54.04

E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-H when the overall index AEMC attained maximum (Gmax) during 2006-2014

Table-2.2. Economic, Social and Political Dimensions and Overall Indices of Globalization in Different Countries

SL	Country	Year-L	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P	KOF	AEMC
1	Albania	2006	35.89	58.68	52.56	69.39	2.24	67.63	51.18	50.86
2	Argentina	2012	41.13	30.68	43.54	72.69	40.54	92.83	57.89	57.09
3	Australia	2013	68.41	78.01	73.79	85.80	92.90	90.42	81.97	82.24
4	Austria	2013	85.52	76.50	86.51	91.31	95.46	96.36	89.09	91.36
5	Azerbaijan	2009	59.96	57.99	38.90	78.95	34.51	55.51	55.35	52.78
6	Burundi	2006	24.06	35.17	16.96	35.39	4.15	36.97	27.89	26.92
7	Belgium	2013	95.51	73.19	84.04	96.99	91.01	96.51	90.70	92.32
8	Benin	2006	28.32	40.26	28.88	35.40	2.54	71.83	40.22	41.61
9	Burkina_Faso	2006	16.39	50.78	32.95	36.90	3.90	71.57	40.68	41.27
10	Bulgaria	2010	71.76	74.41	50.21	82.83	40.81	83.13	70.59	69.36
11	Bolivia	2011	56.44	50.56	37.79	58.44	2.91	76.81	52.76	53.62
12	Brazil	2008	48.27	53.34	20.26	68.50	38.23	92.27	59.38	55.59
13	Bhutan	2007	34.97	56.40	46.37	41.28	5.32	21.18	33.12	35.44
14	Botswana	2012	60.07	53.50	56.45	55.16	4.95	39.77	45.21	49.05
15	C_Afr_Rep	2007	40.14	22.02	15.27	32.43	2.24	57.98	32.80	34.45
16	Canada	2013	74.03	77.68	81.23	92.24	94.97	92.94	85.60	86.39
17	Switzerland	2011	94.70	60.22	91.35	89.06	94.96	92.44	86.84	91.37
18	Chile	2013	77.71	75.92	38.21	76.16	40.69	88.74	71.11	69.54
19	China	2012	41.21	56.27	16.75	65.54	78.02	84.80	60.42	55.12
20	Cote_d'Ivoire	2013	56.86	36.44	29.24	53.69	2.61	74.19	47.92	48.82
21	Cameroon	2010	35.79	41.44	16.83	51.95	2.73	70.25	42.67	40.16
22	Congo_Rep.	2008	91.35	37.23	31.94	40.90	1.74	39.88	42.91	47.78
23	Colombia	2008	54.98	42.87	30.73	70.80	38.22	78.48	56.48	54.44
24	Costa_Rica	2013	62.90	66.25	55.31	81.31	45.89	59.43	62.05	61.03
25	Cyprus	2006	91.53	84.62	86.55	95.34	47.57	59.05	76.11	78.44
26	Germany	2013	75.94	73.34	79.32	85.40	92.01	91.93	83.41	85.16
27	Denmark	2013	84.52	80.70	81.47	88.35	93.53	91.65	86.99	88.85
28	Domin_Rep	2009	54.07	57.06	53.37	67.39	36.62	56.88	55.00	55.44
29	Algeria	2007	49.62	47.76	33.94	64.81	2.05	48.49	43.47	42.36
30	Ecuador	2014	40.55	36.53	34.14	62.25	38.21	80.97	52.78	51.64
31	Egypt	2012	41.62	46.07	22.45	66.66	35.94	93.45	56.99	53.67
32	Spain	2013	75.24	74.68	73.88	86.21	89.60	95.51	83.68	84.60
33	Ethiopia	2011	28.98	21.94	10.54	29.29	2.17	81.88	36.82	37.47
34	Finland	2009	77.81	86.19	72.26	88.86	91.36	90.25	85.08	85.04
35	Fiji	2009	64.73	25.64	56.01	50.18	43.87	66.56	53.75	57.81
36	France	2013	73.58	78.12	81.13	89.14	92.48	97.29	86.09	87.32
37	Gabon	2011	75.77	31.78	51.97	61.25	2.36	51.11	47.92	51.79
38	U.K.	2014	80.71	85.27	76.35	87.66	93.64	94.67	87.26	88.15
39	Ghana	2008	36.37	51.83	35.82	43.80	4.52	83.98	49.19	50.64
40	Guinea	2010	35.70	31.29	21.36	39.92	4.15	71.90	39.38	40.45
41	Gambia	2009	50.86	50.47	45.99	61.95	5.38	64.80	50.18	51.12
42	Greece	2012	61.28	77.37	75.14	84.24	84.42	91.33	79.82	80.21
43	Guatemala	2010	46.46	68.40	27.08	56.03	43.98	82.47	58.89	56.59
44	Guyana	2013	61.74	58.98	48.79	58.06	5.76	44.66	47.60	49.78
45	Honduras	2010	63.36	65.10	30.16	60.23	39.72	70.29	58.38	57.05
46	Haiti	2014	35.21	68.47	6.41	51.82	1.00	48.28	38.81	34.53
47	Hungary	2011	91.22	81.45	66.67	89.18	90.33	90.93	86.05	86.30
48	Indonesia	2008	49.64	69.02	17.85	47.95	33.79	84.05	56.64	54.53
49	India	2006	35.28	43.76	13.64	46.46	32.53	89.37	50.22	47.98
50	Ireland	2008	97.80	88.49	91.12	92.11	48.10	87.41	85.93	89.89
51	Iceland	2013	89.48	59.80	80.56	78.37	50.11	54.09	67.32	71.77
52	Israel	2011	69.88	76.98	75.38	66.87	90.37	65.01	72.46	75.13
53	Italy	2013	64.98	75.44	70.42	78.44	88.21	97.52	80.94	81.77
54	Jamaica	2014	73.94	51.72	57.00	67.13	6.93	72.58	58.43	62.05
55	Jordan	2013	72.22	61.91	52.07	69.51	42.37	86.09	67.93	69.18
56	Japan	2011	43.92	65.57	42.19	76.22	87.85	88.66	69.25	65.61
57	Kenya	2012	25.69	44.87	19.21	48.47	3.59	82.94	45.16	42.55

58	Cambodia	2011	70.40	50.86	26.14	44.44	2.17	59.93	46.83	49.02
59	South_Korea	2006	54.55	65.58	39.06	76.10	41.38	83.59	63.92	61.36
60	Kuwait	2013	53.45	65.47	70.68	73.63	89.69	60.31	66.44	67.03
61	Lebanon	2011	77.07	56.80	70.26	90.02	45.95	60.76	65.70	67.36
62	Lesotho	2006	59.43	37.57	24.70	45.45	6.68	33.39	35.69	36.96
63	Luxembourg	2006	99.72	87.43	96.37	96.87	48.06	60.97	80.05	83.89
64	Morocco	2006	49.22	40.66	35.46	67.40	37.20	87.73	57.63	56.51
65	Moldova	2014	60.52	63.40	40.67	84.06	37.77	69.00	61.39	58.36
66	Madagascar	2011	56.71	28.24	8.15	49.42	2.67	63.64	39.71	39.25
67	Mexico	2008	55.23	60.32	42.67	70.30	41.09	70.95	59.27	57.99
68	Mali	2007	44.08	41.64	20.96	36.32	2.17	73.60	43.06	44.06
69	Malta	2006	97.19	87.13	83.62	96.07	50.17	47.77	74.50	76.39
70	Myanmar	2009	47.20	49.84	9.82	27.94	1.00	36.00	31.86	32.04
71	Montenegro	2006	52.52	76.75	73.23	94.86	6.25	46.57	57.31	56.97
72	Mongolia	2006	54.54	60.02	19.54	57.15	2.05	65.31	48.72	46.41
73	Mauritania	2006	72.75	40.60	25.64	43.51	1.37	45.02	40.79	43.65
74	Mauritius	2006	57.62	70.87	59.49	85.06	40.57	57.79	61.85	60.47
75	Malawi	2009	32.32	44.30	27.07	39.17	6.74	61.73	39.76	40.16
76	Malaysia	2014	88.91	66.95	57.96	77.28	87.65	83.69	78.14	79.14
77	Niger	2007	24.17	37.19	32.59	30.52	1.68	71.94	38.88	41.05
78	Nigeria	2014	46.48	52.49	9.46	46.64	1.43	90.79	50.24	48.17
79	Nicaragua	2008	53.72	63.14	35.68	56.50	39.11	55.74	52.42	51.57
80	Netherlands	2009	95.28	88.51	84.91	90.53	92.90	93.23	91.35	93.78
81	Norway	2006	81.16	70.67	79.65	83.91	91.99	88.88	82.87	85.24
82	Nepal	2008	11.40	31.69	25.16	37.96	3.35	68.10	34.85	34.44
83	New_Zealand	2013	72.83	85.72	78.84	89.57	50.42	80.03	77.41	78.48
84	Pakistan	2014	33.87	45.27	19.22	48.01	32.32	87.30	51.02	48.64
85	Panama	2006	91.07	65.78	50.23	73.96	47.74	56.13	64.69	65.63
86	Peru	2006	66.78	67.15	32.70	54.46	37.01	84.09	62.39	62.50
87	Philippines	2014	58.47	49.32	24.22	54.23	41.28	82.83	56.84	55.98
88	Poland	2011	72.22	68.03	56.29	91.86	87.36	89.58	78.67	76.61
89	Portugal	2013	79.89	82.09	68.63	91.19	89.70	88.98	84.05	83.54
90	Paraguay	2008	53.18	57.92	36.26	60.83	37.09	75.13	57.14	56.32
91	Romania	2006	60.44	60.73	44.18	78.72	38.69	89.91	66.50	64.99
92	Rwanda	2006	19.54	34.11	23.81	38.03	4.27	60.31	34.49	34.22
93	Saudi_Arabia	2006	52.82	76.19	70.24	69.12	82.06	57.24	65.22	66.57
94	Senegal	2006	40.99	38.14	40.60	58.22	4.09	86.13	50.65	51.75
95	Singapore	2014	99.01	96.53	93.20	85.75	96.53	54.77	83.64	87.04
96	Sierra_Leone	2009	30.15	41.28	19.63	33.56	3.22	61.16	36.20	36.81
97	El_Salvador	2011	57.17	63.11	35.53	66.64	41.19	78.63	60.89	59.25
98	Sweden	2013	85.48	75.35	81.30	81.02	93.46	94.65	86.05	89.13
99	Swaziland	2007	63.20	36.36	61.97	54.71	6.37	33.68	42.40	47.23
100	Syr_Arab_Rep	2007	49.06	38.95	43.38	63.66	1.00	54.93	44.26	45.17
101	Chad	2011	50.22	28.12	19.94	36.74	2.91	58.55	37.11	39.14
102	Togo	2008	53.50	37.49	28.74	54.91	3.53	71.19	46.93	47.25
103	Thailand	2008	74.06	55.41	39.67	68.67	37.94	78.48	62.87	62.95
104	Trinidad&Tobago	2007	79.71	71.95	61.64	66.92	5.76	47.01	56.82	59.84
105	Tunisia	2011	68.94	42.49	40.06	78.34	2.48	83.92	58.35	58.22
106	Turkey	2006	46.77	69.54	40.93	72.69	78.12	89.96	69.07	65.92
107	Tanzania	2006	27.06	50.59	17.16	33.54	2.61	55.17	35.78	34.91
108	Uganda	2006	35.99	52.16	24.19	35.24	3.53	67.77	42.31	42.80
109	Uruguay	2012	60.28	67.75	52.98	69.97	42.11	84.09	66.43	66.74
110	U.S.A.	2009	59.05	78.48	66.91	81.46	91.77	91.43	79.14	78.47
111	Venezuela_RB	2010	40.82	37.04	38.46	70.34	40.30	66.51	50.75	48.92
112	Vietnam	2006	70.58	39.35	17.13	59.33	3.04	50.33	43.21	42.59
113	Yemen_Rep.	2014	35.99	54.18	26.38	44.10	1.12	65.01	42.99	42.64
114	South_Africa	2011	67.26	63.98	39.51	61.09	40.86	86.20	64.64	64.93
115	Congo_D_Rep.	2006	19.87	28.69	8.76	34.02	1.00	44.96	26.11	24.95
116	Zambia	2012	50.36	55.83	16.51	43.66	3.78	73.04	47.36	46.41

E1, E2, S1, S2, S3, P and KOF are for the Year-L when the overall index AEMC attained **minimum** (Gmin) during 2006-2014




Table-3.1. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions [Based on Maximum Values Gmin Attained during 2006-2014]


Regimes	Economic, Social and Political Sub-Indices of Globalizations						Overall Globalization	
	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P	KOF	AEMC
Full Democracy	82.4281	82.6881	76.6950	87.3912	81.5250	86.5373	83.4765	84.7481
Flawed Democracy	69.7478	66.4475	45.0997	67.1508	43.9486	77.3778	64.8567	65.0561
Hybrid Regime	57.9055	53.4373	36.8527	55.4082	23.4155	71.4786	53.8541	54.5705
Authoritarian	60.4478	49.8681	32.3872	54.7928	17.8891	69.0788	51.7016	52.3234

Table-3.2. Regime-Wise Mean Score of Globalization in Different Dimensions [Based on Minimum Values Attained during 2006-2014]

Regimes	Economic, Social and Political Sub-Indices of Globalizations						Overall Globalization	
	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P	KOF	AEMC
Full Democracy	78.0712	76.7454	76.0904	86.8815	78.0554	84.5658	80.5685	81.8246
Flawed Democracy	61.5794	60.9519	43.1203	66.7581	36.8533	73.6744	60.2900	60.0739
Hybrid Regime	47.6191	49.6445	34.3482	54.5545	21.3032	67.6200	49.6641	49.6182
Authoritarian	47.0003	43.6813	31.1909	51.4350	15.5306	62.9647	45.6419	45.9247

In Table-3.1 we present regime-wise mean scores of globalization (for different dimensions as well as overall globalization) on the optimistic side (maximum globalization during 2006-2014), while in Table-3.2 we present regime-wise mean scores of globalization on the pessimistic side (minimum globalization during 2006-2014). Fig-1.1 and Fig-1.2 present the same information graphically. We

observe that as one moves away from Full Democracy to an Authoritarian Regime the expected extent (mean) of globalization in all dimensions (as well as overall globalization) declines.



Canonical correlation of democracy and globalization: To dive deeper into the relationship between democracy and globalization, we have carried out representation constrained canonical correlation analysis of globalization sub-indices (E1 through P) with democracy sub-indices (EPP through CVL). Representation constrained canonical correlation analysis (Mishra, 2009) is slightly different from the classical correlation analysis. If $CCD=Xw$ is a composite index or score vector of democracy (while $X=[EPP,FOG,PPN,PCL,CVL]$; w =weight vector) and $CCG=Yv$ is a composite index or score vector of globalization (while $Y=[E1,E2,S1,S2,S3,P]$; v =weight vector), then the classical canonical correlation analysis maximized the squared Pearson's correlation, $r_{CCD,CCG}^2$, between CCD and CCG irrespective of how CCD represents the individual components of X and CCG represents the individual components of Y. The representation constrained canonical correlation strikes a balance between $r_{CCD,CCG}^2$ and representation of X by CCD ($r_{CCD,X}^2$) and Y by CCG ($r_{CCG,Y}^2$). Therefore, representation constrained canonical correlation analysis is a hybrid of the Classical Canonical Correlation Analysis and the Principal Component Analysis (Mishra, 2009; Hwang et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2017).

In Table-4.1 we present the canonical correlation scores obtained by different countries for democracy (CCD) in 2006 and those for globalization (CCG) during 2006-2014. The measures of democracy in 2006 have been correlated with the optimistic level (for Gmax) of globalization during 2006-2014 (left panel) as well as the pessimistic level (for Gmin) of globalization during 2006-2014 (right panel). Table-4.2 represents a similar picture as Table-4.1, except that CCD (democracy measures) is for the year 2016.

Table-4.1. Canonical Correlation Analysis of Democracy and Globalization in Different Countries for OSC-2006											
SL	Country	Optimistic (For Gmax during 2006-2014)					Pessimistic (For Gmin during 2006-2014)				
		CCD	CCG	OSC	KOF	AEMC	CCD	CCG	OSC	KOF	AEMC
1	Albania	0.7746	0.9761	5.91	61.60	61.61	0.7374	0.8294	5.91	51.18	50.86
2	Argentina	0.8658	0.8487	6.63	59.95	59.19	0.8247	0.8658	6.63	57.89	57.09
3	Australia	1.2790	1.4135	9.09	83.80	84.03	1.2194	1.4315	9.09	81.97	82.24
4	Austria	1.2273	1.6046	8.69	91.87	93.95	1.1686	1.5825	8.69	89.09	91.36
5	Azerbaijan	0.4031	0.8148	3.31	57.02	54.69	0.3887	0.8715	3.31	55.35	52.78
6	Burundi	0.6208	0.3075	4.51	35.04	34.79	0.5894	0.2638	4.51	27.89	26.92
7	Belgium	1.1058	1.6020	8.15	92.41	93.75	1.0554	1.6017	8.15	90.70	92.32
8	Benin	0.8415	0.5797	6.16	46.67	48.99	0.8002	0.5301	6.16	40.22	41.61
9	Burkina_Faso	0.4926	0.6128	3.72	48.69	49.12	0.4666	0.5661	3.72	40.68	41.27
10	Bulgaria	0.9162	1.2334	7.10	76.98	76.34	0.8736	1.2072	7.10	70.59	69.36
11	Bolivia	0.7349	0.7805	5.98	54.42	56.38	0.7018	0.8137	5.98	52.76	53.62
12	Brazil	0.9588	0.8802	7.38	61.40	58.16	0.9152	0.9005	7.38	59.38	55.59
13	Bhutan	0.3379	0.5531	2.62	43.58	47.07	0.3292	0.4627	2.62	33.12	35.44
14	Botswana	1.0241	0.8330	7.60	55.50	60.64	0.9763	0.7118	7.60	45.21	49.05
15	C._Afr_Rep	0.1523	0.3311	1.61	36.34	37.27	0.1505	0.3399	1.61	32.80	34.45
16	Canada	1.2856	1.4945	9.07	87.15	87.51	1.2280	1.5141	9.07	85.60	86.39
17	Switzerland	1.2749	1.5203	9.02	88.79	93.18	1.2160	1.5180	9.02	86.84	91.37
18	Chile	1.0479	1.2221	7.89	74.31	72.77	1.0011	1.1972	7.89	71.11	69.54
19	China	0.4549	0.8700	2.97	62.02	56.85	0.4329	0.8907	2.97	60.42	55.12
20	Cote_d'Ivoire	0.4794	0.6602	3.38	49.83	53.08	0.4599	0.6789	3.38	47.92	48.82
21	Cameroon	0.4655	0.5041	3.27	44.20	42.75	0.4472	0.5606	3.27	42.67	40.16
22	Congo_Rep.	0.3153	0.6923	2.76	51.83	57.31	0.2932	0.5886	2.76	42.91	47.78
23	Colombia	0.7966	0.8686	6.40	60.15	58.23	0.7608	0.8434	6.40	56.48	54.44
24	Costa_Rica	1.0869	0.9906	8.04	63.66	63.45	1.0369	1.0328	8.04	62.05	61.03
25	Cyprus	1.0176	1.5060	7.60	87.32	89.36	0.9715	1.3909	7.60	76.11	78.44
26	Germany	1.2456	1.4795	8.82	86.48	87.44	1.1869	1.4588	8.82	83.41	85.16
27	Denmark	1.3613	1.5696	9.52	90.01	91.90	1.2975	1.5450	9.52	86.99	88.85
28	Domin_Rep	0.7765	0.9941	6.13	66.45	67.20	0.7366	0.8752	6.13	55.00	55.44
29	Algeria	0.4327	0.7587	3.17	54.00	53.32	0.4112	0.6324	3.17	43.47	42.36
30	Ecuador	0.6793	0.7951	5.64	57.39	56.77	0.6511	0.7599	5.64	52.78	51.64
31	Egypt	0.5632	0.8841	3.90	63.10	59.62	0.5342	0.8449	3.90	56.99	53.67
32	Spain	1.1677	1.4643	8.34	85.92	86.71	1.1111	1.4603	8.34	83.68	84.60
33	Ethiopia	0.6625	0.3899	4.72	39.33	39.87	0.6305	0.3983	4.72	36.82	37.47
34	Finland	1.3038	1.4955	9.25	87.22	87.36	1.2430	1.5071	9.25	85.08	85.04
35	Fiji	0.7259	0.7562	5.66	57.56	61.30	0.6959	0.7625	5.66	53.75	57.81
36	France	1.1073	1.5287	8.07	88.23	89.36	1.0548	1.5235	8.07	86.09	87.32
37	Gabon	0.3941	0.7987	2.72	55.96	59.46	0.3755	0.7084	2.72	47.92	51.79
38	U.K.	1.1138	1.5469	8.08	89.06	89.91	1.0596	1.5503	8.08	87.26	88.15
39	Ghana	0.6720	0.7547	5.35	54.17	55.67	0.6381	0.7380	5.35	49.19	50.64
40	Guinea	0.2456	0.5161	2.02	44.40	46.82	0.2348	0.4965	2.02	39.38	40.45
41	Gambia	0.6047	0.7210	4.39	51.78	54.92	0.5736	0.7779	4.39	50.18	51.12
42	Greece	1.1147	1.4031	8.13	82.59	83.44	1.0625	1.3960	8.13	79.82	80.21
43	Guatemala	0.7495	0.8907	6.07	60.42	57.71	0.7134	0.9173	6.07	58.89	56.59
44	Guyana	0.7703	0.8084	6.15	56.44	59.99	0.7358	0.7531	6.15	47.60	49.78
45	Honduras	0.8026	0.9046	6.25	61.42	60.57	0.7635	0.9122	6.25	58.38	57.05
46	Haiti	0.4763	0.4717	4.19	39.36	38.47	0.4580	0.5433	4.19	38.81	34.53
47	Hungary	1.0066	1.4810	7.53	86.99	87.02	0.9587	1.5092	7.53	86.05	86.30
48	Indonesia	0.8712	0.8677	6.41	59.65	57.96	0.8305	0.8629	6.41	56.64	54.53
49	India	1.0072	0.6658	7.68	52.38	50.87	0.9624	0.6865	7.68	50.22	47.98
50	Ireland	1.2715	1.6213	9.01	92.15	95.20	1.2132	1.5885	9.01	85.93	89.89
51	Iceland	1.3990	1.2647	9.71	77.86	81.39	1.3332	1.1542	9.71	67.32	71.77
52	Israel	1.0136	1.2975	7.28	78.15	80.79	0.9575	1.2399	7.28	72.46	75.13
53	Italy	1.0720	1.4004	7.73	82.85	83.57	1.0193	1.3999	7.73	80.94	81.77
54	Jamaica	0.9716	1.0077	7.34	62.72	66.57	0.9267	0.9642	7.34	58.43	62.05
55	Jordan	0.5282	1.1230	3.92	70.31	73.94	0.5041	1.1252	3.92	67.93	69.18
56	Japan	1.1418	1.1331	8.15	72.26	68.81	1.0869	1.1151	8.15	69.25	65.61
57	Kenya	0.7132	0.5773	5.08	46.46	45.80	0.6802	0.6100	5.08	45.16	42.55

58	Cambodia	0.6188	0.6878	4.77	50.69	54.22	0.5869	0.6840	4.77	46.83	49.02
59	South_Korea	1.0849	1.0354	7.88	67.03	66.05	1.0307	1.0417	7.88	63.92	61.36
60	Kuwait	0.4295	1.1308	3.09	70.76	72.18	0.4100	1.1020	3.09	66.44	67.03
61	Lebanon	0.7752	1.1472	5.82	70.50	74.20	0.7338	1.1230	5.82	65.70	67.36
62	Lesotho	0.8638	0.5626	6.48	45.94	48.77	0.8217	0.4429	6.48	35.69	36.96
63	Luxembourg	1.2824	1.5214	9.10	85.62	89.59	1.2222	1.4866	9.10	80.05	83.89
64	Morocco	0.5289	1.0043	3.90	65.95	64.33	0.5021	0.8662	3.90	57.63	56.51
65	Moldova	0.8321	0.9816	6.50	64.04	61.70	0.7917	1.0004	6.50	61.39	58.36
66	Madagascar	0.8180	0.4773	5.82	42.90	42.98	0.7777	0.4861	5.82	39.71	39.25
67	Mexico	0.8558	0.9403	6.67	62.29	61.61	0.8170	0.9450	6.67	59.27	57.99
68	Mali	0.7765	0.5563	5.99	46.07	46.72	0.7358	0.5721	5.99	43.06	44.06
69	Malta	1.1786	1.2968	8.39	76.16	78.24	1.1233	1.3595	8.39	74.50	76.39
70	Myanmar	0.2561	0.4220	1.77	39.03	38.40	0.2402	0.3583	1.77	31.86	32.04
71	Montenegro	0.8530	1.0945	6.57	65.48	66.92	0.8094	1.0372	6.57	57.31	56.97
72	Mongolia	0.8490	0.8069	6.60	56.91	55.63	0.8072	0.7220	6.60	48.72	46.41
73	Mauritania	0.3808	0.7054	3.12	51.45	52.55	0.3690	0.5540	3.12	40.79	43.65
74	Mauritius	1.1108	1.0656	8.04	66.61	66.81	1.0588	1.0505	8.04	61.85	60.47
75	Malawi	0.6316	0.5581	4.97	45.40	46.09	0.6019	0.5237	4.97	39.76	40.16
76	Malaysia	0.8405	1.2848	5.98	79.12	81.07	0.7986	1.3119	5.98	78.14	79.14
77	Niger	0.4035	0.6192	3.54	47.92	50.86	0.3839	0.4977	3.54	38.88	41.05
78	Nigeria	0.4584	0.7116	3.52	54.36	52.53	0.4376	0.7151	3.52	50.24	48.17
79	Nicaragua	0.6883	0.7379	5.68	53.99	53.56	0.6560	0.8015	5.68	52.42	51.57
80	Netherlands	1.3996	1.6307	9.66	92.84	95.24	1.3349	1.6499	9.66	91.35	93.78
81	Norway	1.3452	1.4254	9.55	84.48	86.83	1.2854	1.4429	9.55	82.87	85.24
82	Nepal	0.4878	0.3943	3.42	38.18	36.70	0.4744	0.4035	3.42	34.85	34.44
83	New_Zealand	1.2565	1.3690	9.01	79.17	80.12	1.1990	1.3995	9.01	77.41	78.48
84	Pakistan	0.4849	0.6549	3.92	51.83	51.16	0.4624	0.7048	3.92	51.02	48.64
85	Panama	0.9599	1.0566	7.35	67.70	67.56	0.9152	1.0683	7.35	64.69	65.63
86	Peru	0.7759	1.0330	6.11	66.14	65.24	0.7381	0.9937	6.11	62.39	62.50
87	Philippines	0.7959	0.8145	6.48	58.39	59.19	0.7617	0.8386	6.48	56.84	55.98
88	Poland	0.9540	1.3383	7.30	81.32	79.32	0.9100	1.3318	7.30	78.67	76.61
89	Portugal	1.1172	1.5115	8.16	87.61	88.21	1.0649	1.4770	8.16	84.05	83.54
90	Paraguay	0.7785	0.8669	6.16	60.13	59.39	0.7454	0.8864	6.16	57.14	56.32
91	Romania	0.9081	1.2433	7.06	76.51	73.36	0.8657	1.0929	7.06	66.50	64.99
92	Rwanda	0.5013	0.5692	3.82	45.56	43.83	0.4808	0.3996	3.82	34.49	34.22
93	Saudi_Arabia	0.2533	1.0840	1.92	68.43	69.75	0.2422	1.1125	1.92	65.22	66.57
94	Senegal	0.6989	0.7559	5.37	54.64	54.59	0.6623	0.7566	5.37	50.65	51.75
95	Singapore	0.8371	1.5438	5.89	88.27	91.52	0.8021	1.5256	5.89	83.64	87.04
96	Sierra_Leone	0.4167	0.5642	3.57	45.90	48.29	0.3940	0.4458	3.57	36.20	36.81
97	El_Salvador	0.7687	0.9849	6.22	63.79	64.02	0.7321	0.9676	6.22	60.89	59.25
98	Sweden	1.4171	1.5470	9.88	89.41	91.73	1.3524	1.5115	9.88	86.05	89.13
99	Swaziland	0.3514	0.6192	2.93	47.48	51.92	0.3417	0.6222	2.93	42.40	47.23
100	Syr_Arab_Rep	0.3698	0.6721	2.36	48.93	50.02	0.3490	0.6486	2.36	44.26	45.17
101	Chad	0.2128	0.3724	1.65	38.37	41.70	0.2040	0.4417	1.65	37.11	39.14
102	Togo	0.2485	0.7210	1.75	53.70	54.25	0.2344	0.6608	1.75	46.93	47.25
103	Thailand	0.7749	1.0986	5.67	72.06	71.71	0.7432	1.0008	5.67	62.87	62.95
104	Trinidad&Tobago	0.9458	0.9655	7.18	63.09	65.62	0.9015	0.9718	7.18	56.82	59.84
105	Tunisia	0.4657	0.8987	3.06	60.45	60.63	0.4468	0.9225	3.06	58.35	58.22
106	Turkey	0.7074	1.1101	5.70	71.33	69.88	0.6723	1.1215	5.70	69.07	65.92
107	Tanzania	0.6923	0.3870	5.18	37.71	37.42	0.6575	0.4426	5.18	35.78	34.91
108	Uganda	0.7095	0.5661	5.14	45.48	45.69	0.6798	0.5805	5.14	42.31	42.80
109	Uruguay	1.0645	1.0544	7.96	67.23	68.14	1.0146	1.1097	7.96	66.43	66.74
110	U.S.A.	1.1680	1.3734	8.22	81.80	81.15	1.1119	1.3657	8.22	79.14	78.47
111	Venezuela_RB	0.7026	0.7682	5.42	56.17	55.45	0.6675	0.7335	5.42	50.75	48.92
112	Vietnam	0.3752	0.7605	2.75	56.69	54.98	0.3582	0.5886	2.75	43.21	42.59
113	Yemen_Rep.	0.3829	0.5997	2.98	46.51	46.66	0.3625	0.6098	2.98	42.99	42.64
114	South_Africa	1.0840	1.0248	7.91	66.72	67.54	1.0352	1.0427	7.91	64.64	64.93
115	Congo_D_Rep.	0.3153	0.4504	2.76	41.67	42.31	0.2932	0.2168	2.76	26.11	24.95
116	Zambia	0.7097	0.7416	5.25	52.96	54.04	0.6776	0.6740	5.25	47.36	46.41

SL	Country	Optimistic (for Gmax during 2006-2014)					Pessimistic (for Gmin during 2006-2014)				
		CCD	CCG	OSC	KOF	AEMC	CCD	CCG	OSC	KOF	AEMC
1	Albania	0.7271	1.0223	5.91	61.60	61.61	0.7578	0.9931	5.91	51.18	50.86
2	Argentina	0.8128	0.8888	6.96	59.95	59.19	0.8470	0.8634	6.96	57.89	57.09
3	Australia	1.2006	1.4803	9.01	83.80	84.03	1.2512	1.4380	9.01	81.97	82.24
4	Austria	1.1521	1.6804	8.41	91.87	93.95	1.2006	1.6324	8.41	89.09	91.36
5	Azerbaijan	0.3784	0.8533	2.65	57.02	54.69	0.3944	0.8289	2.65	55.35	52.78
6	Burundi	0.5827	0.3220	2.40	35.04	34.79	0.6073	0.3128	2.40	27.89	26.92
7	Belgium	1.0380	1.6777	7.77	92.41	93.75	1.0818	1.6298	7.77	90.70	92.32
8	Benin	0.7899	0.6071	5.67	46.67	48.99	0.8232	0.5898	5.67	40.22	41.61
9	Burkina Faso	0.4624	0.6417	4.70	48.69	49.12	0.4819	0.6234	4.70	40.68	41.27
10	Bulgaria	0.8600	1.2916	7.01	76.98	76.34	0.8963	1.2547	7.01	70.59	69.36
11	Bolivia	0.6899	0.8174	5.63	54.42	56.38	0.7190	0.7940	5.63	52.76	53.62
12	Brazil	0.9000	0.9218	6.90	61.40	58.16	0.9380	0.8955	6.90	59.38	55.59
13	Bhutan	0.3171	0.5793	4.93	43.58	47.07	0.3305	0.5627	4.93	33.12	35.44
14	Botswana	0.9613	0.8724	7.87	55.50	60.64	1.0018	0.8475	7.87	45.21	49.05
15	C. Afr_Rep	0.1430	0.3468	1.61	36.34	37.27	0.1490	0.3369	1.61	32.80	34.45
16	Canada	1.2068	1.5651	9.15	87.15	87.51	1.2577	1.5204	9.15	85.60	86.39
17	Switzerland	1.1968	1.5921	9.09	88.79	93.18	1.2472	1.5467	9.09	86.84	91.37
18	Chile	0.9837	1.2798	7.78	74.31	72.77	1.0252	1.2432	7.78	71.11	69.54
19	China	0.4270	0.9110	3.14	62.02	56.85	0.4450	0.8850	3.14	60.42	55.12
20	Cote_d'Ivoire	0.4500	0.6914	3.81	49.83	53.08	0.4690	0.6716	3.81	47.92	48.82
21	Cameroon	0.4369	0.5279	3.46	44.20	42.75	0.4554	0.5128	3.46	42.67	40.16
22	Congo_Rep.	0.2960	0.7249	2.91	51.83	57.31	0.3085	0.7043	2.91	42.91	47.78
23	Colombia	0.7477	0.9096	6.67	60.15	58.23	0.7793	0.8836	6.67	56.48	54.44
24	Costa_Rica	1.0203	1.0374	7.88	63.66	63.45	1.0633	1.0078	7.88	62.05	61.03
25	Cyprus	0.9552	1.5771	7.65	87.32	89.36	0.9955	1.5321	7.65	76.11	78.44
26	Germany	1.1692	1.5494	8.63	86.48	87.44	1.2185	1.5052	8.63	83.41	85.16
27	Denmark	1.2778	1.6437	9.20	90.01	91.90	1.3317	1.5968	9.20	86.99	88.85
28	Domin_Rep	0.7289	1.0411	6.67	66.45	67.20	0.7596	1.0114	6.67	55.00	55.44
29	Algeria	0.4062	0.7946	3.56	54.00	53.32	0.4233	0.7719	3.56	43.47	42.36
30	Ecuador	0.6377	0.8326	5.81	57.39	56.77	0.6646	0.8089	5.81	52.78	51.64
31	Egypt	0.5287	0.9258	3.31	63.10	59.62	0.5510	0.8994	3.31	56.99	53.67
32	Spain	1.0961	1.5334	8.30	85.92	86.71	1.1423	1.4896	8.30	83.68	84.60
33	Ethiopia	0.6218	0.4083	3.60	39.33	39.87	0.6481	0.3967	3.60	36.82	37.47
34	Finland	1.2238	1.5661	9.03	87.22	87.36	1.2755	1.5214	9.03	85.08	85.04
35	Fiji	0.6814	0.7919	5.64	57.56	61.30	0.7102	0.7693	5.64	53.75	57.81
36	France	1.0394	1.6009	7.92	88.23	89.36	1.0833	1.5552	7.92	86.09	87.32
37	Gabon	0.3699	0.8364	3.74	55.96	59.46	0.3855	0.8125	3.74	47.92	51.79
38	U.K.	1.0455	1.6200	8.36	89.06	89.91	1.0896	1.5737	8.36	87.26	88.15
39	Ghana	0.6308	0.7903	6.75	54.17	55.67	0.6574	0.7677	6.75	49.19	50.64
40	Guinea	0.2306	0.5405	3.14	44.40	46.82	0.2403	0.5251	3.14	39.38	40.45
41	Gambia	0.5676	0.7551	2.91	51.78	54.92	0.5915	0.7335	2.91	50.18	51.12
42	Greece	1.0464	1.4694	7.23	82.59	83.44	1.0905	1.4274	7.23	79.82	80.21
43	Guatemala	0.7036	0.9328	5.92	60.42	57.71	0.7333	0.9062	5.92	58.89	56.59
44	Guyana	0.7230	0.8465	6.25	56.44	59.99	0.7535	0.8224	6.25	47.60	49.78
45	Honduras	0.7534	0.9473	5.92	61.42	60.57	0.7851	0.9202	5.92	58.38	57.05
46	Haiti	0.4471	0.4940	4.02	39.36	38.47	0.4659	0.4799	4.02	38.81	34.53
47	Hungary	0.9449	1.5510	6.72	86.99	87.02	0.9847	1.5067	6.72	86.05	86.30
48	Indonesia	0.8178	0.9087	6.97	59.65	57.96	0.8523	0.8827	6.97	56.64	54.53
49	India	0.9455	0.6972	7.81	52.38	50.87	0.9853	0.6773	7.81	50.22	47.98
50	Ireland	1.1935	1.6978	9.15	92.15	95.20	1.2439	1.6494	9.15	85.93	89.89
51	Iceland	1.3132	1.3244	9.50	77.86	81.39	1.3686	1.2866	9.50	67.32	71.77
52	Israel	0.9515	1.3588	7.85	78.15	80.79	0.9916	1.3200	7.85	72.46	75.13
53	Italy	1.0062	1.4666	7.98	82.85	83.57	1.0487	1.4247	7.98	80.94	81.77
54	Jamaica	0.9121	1.0553	7.39	62.72	66.57	0.9505	1.0252	7.39	58.43	62.05
55	Jordan	0.4958	1.1760	3.96	70.31	73.94	0.5167	1.1425	3.96	67.93	69.18
56	Japan	1.0718	1.1865	7.99	72.26	68.81	1.1170	1.1527	7.99	69.25	65.61

57	Kenya	0.6695	0.6046	5.33	46.46	45.80	0.6977	0.5873	5.33	45.16	42.55
58	Cambodia	0.5809	0.7203	4.27	50.69	54.22	0.6054	0.6997	4.27	46.83	49.02
59	South_Korea	1.0184	1.0843	7.92	67.03	66.05	1.0613	1.0533	7.92	63.92	61.36
60	Kuwait	0.4031	1.1843	3.85	70.76	72.18	0.4201	1.1504	3.85	66.44	67.03
61	Lebanon	0.7277	1.2014	4.86	70.50	74.20	0.7583	1.1671	4.86	65.70	67.36
62	Lesotho	0.8108	0.5891	6.59	45.94	48.77	0.8450	0.5723	6.59	35.69	36.96
63	Luxembourg	1.2038	1.5933	8.81	85.62	89.59	1.2545	1.5478	8.81	80.05	83.89
64	Morocco	0.4964	1.0517	4.77	65.95	64.33	0.5174	1.0217	4.77	57.63	56.51
65	Moldova	0.7811	1.0280	6.01	64.04	61.70	0.8140	0.9986	6.01	61.39	58.36
66	Madagascar	0.7678	0.4998	5.07	42.90	42.98	0.8002	0.4856	5.07	39.71	39.25
67	Mexico	0.8033	0.9847	6.47	62.29	61.61	0.8372	0.9566	6.47	59.27	57.99
68	Mali	0.7290	0.5826	5.70	46.07	46.72	0.7597	0.5660	5.70	43.06	44.06
69	Malta	1.1064	1.3581	8.39	76.16	78.24	1.1530	1.3193	8.39	74.50	76.39
70	Myanmar	0.2403	0.4419	4.20	39.03	38.40	0.2505	0.4293	4.20	31.86	32.04
71	Montenegro	0.8007	1.1463	5.72	65.48	66.92	0.8344	1.1135	5.72	57.31	56.97
72	Mongolia	0.7970	0.8451	6.62	56.91	55.63	0.8306	0.8209	6.62	48.72	46.41
73	Mauritania	0.3575	0.7388	3.96	51.45	52.55	0.3726	0.7177	3.96	40.79	43.65
74	Mauritius	1.0427	1.1160	8.28	66.61	66.81	1.0866	1.0841	8.28	61.85	60.47
75	Malawi	0.5928	0.5845	5.55	45.40	46.09	0.6178	0.5678	5.55	39.76	40.16
76	Malaysia	0.7890	1.3454	6.54	79.12	81.07	0.8222	1.3070	6.54	78.14	79.14
77	Niger	0.3788	0.6484	3.96	47.92	50.86	0.3947	0.6299	3.96	38.88	41.05
78	Nigeria	0.4302	0.7452	4.50	54.36	52.53	0.4484	0.7240	4.50	50.24	48.17
79	Nicaragua	0.6461	0.7727	4.81	53.99	53.56	0.6733	0.7507	4.81	52.42	51.57
80	Netherlands	1.3137	1.7077	8.80	92.84	95.24	1.3692	1.6590	8.80	91.35	93.78
81	Norway	1.2627	1.4928	9.93	84.48	86.83	1.3160	1.4502	9.93	82.87	85.24
82	Nepal	0.4578	0.4129	4.86	38.18	36.70	0.4771	0.4011	4.86	34.85	34.44
83	New_Zealand	1.1794	1.4338	9.26	79.17	80.12	1.2292	1.3928	9.26	77.41	78.48
84	Pakistan	0.4552	0.6858	4.33	51.83	51.16	0.4744	0.6662	4.33	51.02	48.64
85	Panama	0.9011	1.1065	7.13	67.70	67.56	0.9390	1.0750	7.13	64.69	65.63
86	Peru	0.7283	1.0818	6.65	66.14	65.24	0.7590	1.0508	6.65	62.39	62.50
87	Philippines	0.7471	0.8529	6.94	58.39	59.19	0.7786	0.8286	6.94	56.84	55.98
88	Poland	0.8955	1.4015	6.83	81.32	79.32	0.9332	1.3615	6.83	78.67	76.61
89	Portugal	1.0487	1.5829	7.86	87.61	88.21	1.0929	1.5377	7.86	84.05	83.54
90	Paraguay	0.7308	0.9078	6.27	60.13	59.39	0.7616	0.8819	6.27	57.14	56.32
91	Romania	0.8524	1.3020	6.62	76.51	73.36	0.8884	1.2649	6.62	66.50	64.99
92	Rwanda	0.4705	0.5961	3.07	45.56	43.83	0.4903	0.5790	3.07	34.49	34.22
93	Saudi_Arabia	0.2377	1.1352	1.93	68.43	69.75	0.2478	1.1028	1.93	65.22	66.57
94	Senegal	0.6561	0.7916	6.21	54.64	54.59	0.6837	0.7690	6.21	50.65	51.75
95	Singapore	0.7857	1.6168	6.38	88.27	91.52	0.8188	1.5706	6.38	83.64	87.04
96	Sierra_Leone	0.3912	0.5909	4.55	45.90	48.29	0.4077	0.5740	4.55	36.20	36.81
97	El_Salvador	0.7216	1.0314	6.64	63.79	64.02	0.7520	1.0019	6.64	60.89	59.25
98	Sweden	1.3302	1.6201	9.39	89.41	91.73	1.3863	1.5738	9.39	86.05	89.13
99	Swaziland	0.3299	0.6485	3.03	47.48	51.92	0.3438	0.6300	3.03	42.40	47.23
100	Syr_Arab_Rep	0.3471	0.7039	1.43	48.93	50.02	0.3617	0.6838	1.43	44.26	45.17
101	Chad	0.1998	0.3900	1.50	38.37	41.70	0.2082	0.3789	1.50	37.11	39.14
102	Togo	0.2332	0.7551	3.32	53.70	54.25	0.2430	0.7335	3.32	46.93	47.25
103	Thailand	0.7274	1.1505	4.92	72.06	71.71	0.7581	1.1176	4.92	62.87	62.95
104	Trinidad&Tobago	0.8878	1.0111	7.10	63.09	65.62	0.9253	0.9823	7.10	56.82	59.84
105	Tunisia	0.4371	0.9411	6.40	60.45	60.63	0.4555	0.9143	6.40	58.35	58.22
106	Turkey	0.6641	1.1625	5.04	71.33	69.88	0.6921	1.1294	5.04	69.07	65.92
107	Tanzania	0.6499	0.4053	5.76	37.71	37.42	0.6773	0.3937	5.76	35.78	34.91
108	Uganda	0.6660	0.5929	5.26	45.48	45.69	0.6941	0.5759	5.26	42.31	42.80
109	Uruguay	0.9992	1.1042	8.17	67.23	68.14	1.0414	1.0726	8.17	66.43	66.74
110	U.S.A.	1.0964	1.4383	7.98	81.80	81.15	1.1426	1.3972	7.98	79.14	78.47
111	Venezuela_RB	0.6595	0.8044	4.68	56.17	55.45	0.6873	0.7815	4.68	50.75	48.92
112	Vietnam	0.3522	0.7964	3.38	56.69	54.98	0.3671	0.7737	3.38	43.21	42.59
113	Yemen_Rep.	0.3594	0.6281	2.07	46.51	46.66	0.3746	0.6101	2.07	42.99	42.64
114	South_Africa	1.0176	1.0732	7.41	66.72	67.54	1.0605	1.0425	7.41	64.64	64.93
115	Congo_D_Rep.	0.2960	0.4716	1.93	41.67	42.31	0.3085	0.4581	1.93	26.11	24.95
116	Zambia	0.6662	0.7766	5.99	52.96	54.04	0.6943	0.7544	5.99	47.36	46.41


In Table-5.1 we present the weights assigned to different measures of democracy and also those of globalization in constructing CCD and CCG (reported in Table-4.1). It also reports the Pearson's correlation of different measures of democracy (EPP through CVL) with CCD and the Pearson's correlation of different measures of globalization (E1 through P) with CCG. The weights and correlations are presented for optimistic as well as pessimistic attainments of globalization during 2006-2014. The representation correlation of democracy (Regime) for the optimistic globalization is 0.8839 while that for the pessimistic globalization is 0.8838. This correlation measures how best the CCD represents its constituents (EPP through CVL). The representation correlation of globalization for the optimistic globalization is 0.8053 while that for the pessimistic globalization is 0.7966. This correlation measures how best the CCG represents its constituents (E1 through P). For the optimistic globalization, the representation constrained canonical correlation between CCD and CCG is 0.7879. This correlation measures how CCD and CCG are vary together. The classical canonical correlation is 0.8106. The representation constrained canonical correlation loses only slightly (is reduced from 0.8106 to 0.7879) for a better representation of democracy measures by CCD and globalization measures by CCG. Similarly for pessimistic globalization as well, only a little is lost (0.7966 in place of 0.81495) for a better representation.

Globalization	Weights and Correlation	Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006					Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014					
		EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P
Gmax	Weight	0.1779	0.3011	0.3383	0.3967	0.2334	0.3112	0.3746	0.3366	0.1932	0.1608	0.3711
	Correln	0.8738	0.9296	0.9168	0.7954	0.9038	0.6884	0.8717	0.8852	0.9201	0.8806	0.5857
Gmin	Weight	0.1469	0.2933	0.3294	0.3665	0.2442	0.2988	0.3924	0.3431	0.2212	0.1453	0.3987
	Correln	0.8723	0.9307	0.9165	0.7941	0.9055	0.7818	0.8651	0.8712	0.9157	0.8834	0.5716
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.8106)												
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8838; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8148; Canonical Correlation=0.7966(0.81495)												

A similar analysis is presented in Table-5.2 while the democracy measures pertain to the year 2016. There, too, representation is high as well as canonical correlation between CCD and CCG is high. The loss of correlation for better representation is very small. All these results indicate that democracy and globalization are concordant with each other. A perusal of Table-5.1 and Table-5.2 also reveals that the correlation of Functioning of Government (FOG) bears strongest correlation with CCG and Flow of Information (S2) bears the strongest relationship with CCD. Political Participation (PPN) and Trans-border Personal Contacts (S1) are the second most important aspects that join democracy and globalization. The measure of Political dimension of globalization (P) is the weakest of all variables.

It is fairly likely that democracy (as measured by EPP, FOG, PPN, PCL and CVL) in 2006 promotes globalization (as measured by E1, E2, S1, S2 and P) in the later years. However, it would be a little far-fetched to assert that globalization in 2006-2014 (or min/max values of the overall globalization) promoted democracy witnessed in 2016. The coefficient of response to change in democracy index to the change in globalization is -0.002, which is not different from zero. The scatter of change in democracy index to change in globalization index is presented in Fig-3.

Globalization	Weights and Correlation	Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2016					Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014					
		EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P
Gmax	Weight	0.1671	0.2827	0.3175	0.3724	0.2191	0.3259	0.3923	0.3526	0.2024	0.1684	0.3886
	Correln	0.8738	0.9296	0.9168	0.7953	0.9038	0.6884	0.8717	0.8852	0.9201	0.8806	0.5857
Gmin	Weight	0.1740	0.2946	0.3310	0.3880	0.2283	0.3166	0.3810	0.3425	0.1966	0.1636	0.3775
	Correln	0.8738	0.9296	0.9168	0.7953	0.9038	0.6884	0.8717	0.8852	0.9201	0.8806	0.5857
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.8106)												
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8839; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8053; Canonical Correlation=0.7879(0.81063)												



10. A closer analysis of Asian and African countries: One of the arguments apparently supporting the Lee thesis was that democracy and Asian values have an inherent incompatibility and, therefore, especially in the East-Asian countries, democratic governments would not succeed in fostering development, while authoritarian governments would do. This might also be true for all Asian countries. This conclusion appears to be supported if we cursorily look at the mean levels of the indicators of democracy vis-à-vis the indicators of globalization during 2006-2014. We present such mean levels of indicators (continent-wise) in Table-6.1 (optimistic view of globalization) and Table-6.2 (pessimistic view of globalization). Asian countries perform poorly (vis-à-vis African countries) at the measures of democracy and yet they have performed better than African countries.

Table-6.1. Mean Level of Indicators of Democracy and Globalization (Optimistic view) in Different Continents- 2006-2014

	OSC	EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P	KOF	AEMC
Asia	3.15	2.88	1.75	3.06	4.07	3.97	60.38	63.77	30.75	59.76	18.32	58.13	51.77	50.68
Africa	4.88	4.84	3.97	3.61	6.25	5.74	43.89	48.67	24.47	41.46	3.60	68.05	44.00	44.42
Others	8.66	9.38	8.40	7.50	8.75	9.27	69.98	83.29	70.27	85.00	92.97	90.91	82.80	82.59
Total	6.37	6.59	5.58	5.56	7.50	6.62	44.35	59.36	44.08	59.84	47.50	77.14	58.42	57.97

Table-6.2. Mean Level of Indicators of Democracy and Globalization (Pessimistic view) in Different Continents- 2006-2014

	OSC	EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P	KOF	AEMC
Asia	3.15	2.88	1.75	3.06	4.07	3.97	47.98	56.09	32.64	61.53	17.82	60.26	49.17	47.71
Africa	4.88	4.84	3.97	3.61	6.25	5.74	37.21	45.50	16.74	39.53	3.97	55.01	37.63	36.67
Others	8.66	9.38	8.40	7.50	8.75	9.27	63.73	78.25	70.35	83.63	92.34	90.93	80.56	80.36
Total	6.37	6.59	5.58	5.56	7.50	6.62	41.56	56.83	41.94	58.43	47.96	64.20	53.52	52.70

However, it has been empirically observed that democratic states often earn fewer monopoly rents and produce a higher level of services than autocracies and, therefore, democracy has real and substantively important effects on the daily lives and well-being of individuals around the globe (Lake and Baum, 2001). It also causes growth and investment to rise (Rock, 2009). The imports of 'Asian Values' and the Lee thesis go all against such facts. Furthermore, Sen (1997; 1999) has questioned the existence or prevalence of any such values (supporting authoritarianism and downplaying freedom, democratic intents, tolerance, etc.) that could be said to be characteristically Asian or shared by all Asian countries in common. 'Asian values', whatever they are, may have a role but it would be wrong to suggest that they are the determining factor in the outcomes. If a case could ever be made for 'Asian values', it would not be as a coherent, ahistorical, monolithic bloc (Takashi. and Newman, 1997; Barr, 2000). So much divergence in views calls for an empirical examination of the status of globalization (as a path to development) of Asian countries vis-à-vis the regime type. We must go beyond the averages and look into co-movement and correlation. In Table-7 we present the findings of (representation constrained) canonical correlation analysis for 26 Asian countries included in our study. Eurasian countries (such as Azerbaijan, Turkey) are included in Asia since geographically they are more a part of Asia than Europe. We find that the sub-indices of globalization and the sub-indices of democracy are highly correlated even if we take a pessimistic view of globalization attained during 2006-2014.

Table-7. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization (Asia#)												
Globalization	Weights and Correlation	Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006					Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014					
		EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P
Gmax	Weight	0.1834	0.3015	0.3725	0.3366	0.2085	0.3019	0.4197	0.2045	0.2032	0.0612	0.4752
	Correln	0.8986	0.8090	0.8810	0.6428	0.8446	0.6112	0.7991	0.7481	0.8524	0.8444	0.5162
Gmin	Weight	0.2241	0.3174	0.3897	0.3793	0.2590	0.2754	0.3818	0.2152	0.2271	0.0755	0.4012
	Correln	0.9032	0.8061	0.8784	0.6381	0.8530	0.7089	0.8287	0.7454	0.8661	0.8225	0.3919
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8152; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7285; Canonical Correlation= 0.6386 (0.8612)												
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8158; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7273; Canonical Correlation=0.5880(0.7379)												
# : Includes 26 countries in Asia (and Eurasia).												

A similar analysis for 38 African countries (see Table-8) reveals that democracy supports globalization although the role of the political dimension of globalization (P) is faltering and exhibits a negative correlation, but only for the optimistic view of globalization. Thus, the political aspect of globalization is a drag on other dimensions of globalization in African countries.

Table-8. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization (Africa#)												
Globalization	Weights and Correlation	Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006					Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014					
		EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P
Gmax	Weight	0.2070	0.4038	0.2182	0.3151	0.3413	0.1999	0.4500	0.2890	0.1713	0.3280	-0.2606
	Correln	0.8491	0.9473	0.8198	0.6578	0.9064	0.6192	0.7462	0.8044	0.7481	0.5712	-0.2467
Gmin	Weight	0.1481	0.3115	0.2837	0.3194	0.3108	0.2706	0.5132	0.2714	0.2332	0.2969	0.2215
	Correln	0.8345	0.9408	0.8372	0.6787	0.8940	0.4636	0.7436	0.6703	0.8396	0.7565	0.3302
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8361; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.6226; Canonical Correlation=0.4396(0.7062)												
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8371; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.6340; Canonical Correlation=0.5025(0.7120)												
#: Includes 38 countries in Africa.												

Table-9. Canonical Correlation Analysis between Dimensions of Democracy/Regime and Extent of Globalization (Others)												
Globalization	Weights and Correlation	Dimensions of Democracy/Regime-2006					Dimensions of Globalization 2006-2014					
		EPP	FOG	PPN	PCL	CVL	E1	E2	S1	S2	S3	P
Gmax	Weight	0.3241	0.1465	0.2229	0.4022	0.1970	0.3658	0.3337	0.3789	0.2676	0.2496	0.3171
	Correln	0.8360	0.9069	0.8722	0.9393	0.9004	0.7702	0.7620	0.8905	0.8979	0.8286	0.6578
Gmin	Weight	0.3549	0.1969	0.2508	0.4372	0.2497	0.3247	0.2843	0.4227	0.2356	0.1844	0.2539
	Correln	0.8349	0.9123	0.8688	0.9371	0.9051	0.8125	0.7369	0.8849	0.8759	0.8401	0.5958
Gmax (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8910; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.8012; Canonical Correlation=0.8914(0.9159)												
Gmin (2006-2014): Own Correlations (Regime)=0.8916; Own Correlation (Globalization)=0.7910; Canonical Correlation=0.8933(0.9200)												
Others include 52 Non-Asian, Non-African and Non-Eurasian countries, i.e. the countries in Australia/Oceania, the Americas and Europe.												

A similar type of analysis for other countries (in Australia/Oceania, Americas and Europe) suggests that the (representation constrained) canonical correlation between globalization and democracy is more than in Asia and Africa (Table-9). A summary of the coefficients of canonical correlation analysis is presented in Table-10. There is a clear indication that as we move from African countries to non-African and non-Asian countries (i.e. Australian/Oceanian, American and European countries), the concordance between political regime and globalization increases.

View of Globalization	African countries (38)	Asian Countries (26)	Other Countries (52)	All Countries (116)
Optimistic (Gmax)	0.4396	0.6386	0.8914	0.7879
Pessimistic (Gmin)	0.5025	0.5880	0.8933	0.7966

11. Distribution of countries by regime type and globalization score: In Table-11 we present the countries classified according to the regime type and the overall globalization index (score). Of 116 countries, 25 are full democracies and 34 are flawed democracies. Full democracy countries have globalization score 60 and above. Flawed democracies mostly obtain globalization score 40 to 60, although Hungary and Italy are highly globalized while Lesotho is only poorly globalized.

	GI 80 and above	GI from 60 to <80	GI from 40 to <60	GI less than 40
Democracy index (OSC) 8 and above (Full Democracy)	Australia, Austria,, Belgium, Canada, Switzerland, Germany , Denmark, Spain, Finland France, U.K., Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden (18 countries)	Costa Rica, Iceland, Japan, Malta, Mauritius, New_Zealand, U.S.A. (7 countries)	Nil	Nil
Democracy index (OSC) 6 to < 8 (Flawed Democracy)	Hungary, Italy (2 countries)	Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus, Israel, Jamaica, South Korea, Panama, Peru, Poland, Romania, Uruguay, South Africa (12 countries)	Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Botswana, Colombia, Dominic Republic, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Moldova, Mexico, Montenegro, Mongolia, Philippines, Paraguay, El_Salvador, Trinidad &Tobago (19 countries)	Lesotho (1 country)
Democracy index (OSC) 4 to < 6 (Hybrid Regime)	Singapore (1 country)	Lebanon, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey (4 countries)	Albania, Bolivia, Ecuador, Fiji, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya, Cambodia, Mali, Malawi, Nicaragua, Senegal, Uganda,Venezuela, Zambia (15 countries)	Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar, Tanzania (5 countries)
Democracy index (OSC) Less than 4 (Authoritarian Regime)	Nil	Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia (3 countries)	Azerbaijan, Burkina Faso, China, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Congo Rep, Algeria, Egypt, Gabon, Guinea, Morocco, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Rep, Togo, Tunisia, Vietnam, Yemen Rep. (21 countries)	Bhutan, Central_Afric Rep, Myanmar, Nepal, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Chad, Congo Democrat Rep. (8 countries)

On the other hand, 25 countries have hybrid regimes and the majority of them (15 countries) score 40 to 60 score of the globalization index. Only Singapore scores high on globalization index. Four countries (Lebanon, Malaysia, Thailand and Turkey) score between 60 and 80 on the globalization index. Five countries (Burundi, Ethiopia, Haiti, Madagascar and Tanzania) score poorly on globalization index. Among 32 countries that have authoritarian government, only three countries (Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia) score 60 to 80 on the globalization index and other 29 countries score 60 or less. This simple classification scheme also suggests that democratic countries have higher degree of concordance with globalization.

Let f_{ij} be the elements of an observed frequency matrix, $F(n, n)$, $F_i = \sum_{j=1}^n f_{ij}$ and $F_j = \sum_{i=1}^n f_{ij}$. Similarly, let $\phi_{ij} = F_i \times F_j / \sum_{i=1}^n F_i$ be the elements of expected frequency matrix, $\Phi(n, n)$, $\Phi_i = \sum_{j=1}^n \phi_{ij}$ and $\Phi_j = \sum_{i=1}^n \phi_{ij}$. Let $D(n, n)$ be the matrix of normalized squared difference between F and Φ such that $d_{ij} = (f_{ij} - \phi_{ij})^2 / \phi_{ij}$. Then, $\delta = \sum_{i=1}^n \sum_{j=1}^n d_{ij}$ is the sum of squared deviations of f_{ij} from ϕ_{ij} normalized by ϕ_{ij} . This can be decomposed into two parts: the sum of the diagonal elements of $D(n, n)$, $\delta_d = \sum_{i=1}^n d_{ii}$ (which is the trace of D) and the sum of off-diagonal elements of $D(n, n)$, $\delta_{od} = \sum_{i,j=1}^n d_{ij:i \neq j}$. With δ , δ_d and δ_{od} we may define $r_d = \delta_d / \delta$ and $r_{od} = \delta_{od} / \delta = 1 - r_d$. In this accounting δ_{od} weakens the relationship. Larger is the value of r_d higher is the correlation between the attributes measured along the rows and the columns of F. This analysis of association of Regime type with (optimistic) extent of Globalization attained by different countries during 2006-2014 has been presented in Table-12. We find that $r_d = \delta_d / \delta = 0.57192 = 47.89981475/83.75227$. It shows a weak positive relationship between regime type and globalization, but strong enough to reject the hypothesis that authoritarianism induces higher degree of globalization. This exercise also suggests that any analysis at the gross level (using averages or frequencies) might be weak and possibly misleading as well. A more sensitive technique like canonical correlation analysis delves deeper into such investigations.

Table-12. Analysis of Association of Regime Type with Observed (optimistic) extent of Globalization during 2006-2014															
DI and GI	Frequencies in DI, GI Cells of F(4,4)					Expected Frequencies in DI, GI Cells of $\Phi(4,4)$					Normalized Squared Differences D(4,4)				
	GI1	GI2	GI3	GI4	Total	GI1	GI2	GI3	GI4	Total	GI1	GI2	GI3	GI4	Total
DI1	18	7	0	0	25	4.53	5.60	11.85	3.02	25	40.11	0.35	11.85	3.02	55.33
DI2	2	12	19	1	34	6.16	7.62	16.12	4.10	34	2.81	2.52	0.51	2.35	8.18
DI3	1	4	15	5	25	4.53	5.60	11.85	3.02	25	2.75	0.46	0.84	1.30	5.34
DI4	0	3	21	8	32	5.79	7.17	15.17	3.86	32	5.79	2.43	2.24	4.43	14.89
Total	21	26	55	14	116	21	26	55	14	116	51.46	5.75	15.44	11.10	83.75

DI classified into DI1 = Full Democracy; DI2 = Flawed Democracy; DI3 = Hybrid Regime; DI4 = Authoritarian.
GI classified into GI1 = [80-100]=Very high; GI2 = [60-80]=High ; GI3 = [40-60] = Moderate; GI4 = [0-40] = Low or Poor.

12. Concluding Remarks: In this study we have made an attempt to investigate into the relationship between political regime type (that ranges from authoritarian to democratic) and the extent of globalization which of late has been considered as a path to development. We have made use of the Democracy index (and its constituent indicators) provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit and the globalization index (and its constituent indicators) as provided by the KOF. Applying canonical

correlation analysis on the data we have made an attempt to look into the response of globalization to the quantitative measures of democratic (versus authoritarian) practices of the governments in 116 countries distributed over Asia, Africa, Australia/Oceania, Europe and the Americas. We have also tested the Lee thesis in the context of globalization as a path to development. Our findings indicate that the empirical support to Lee's thesis if extended to globalization as a path to development is superficial and does not withstand critical analysis. Contrary to Lee's thesis, democracy promotes globalization. In African countries political discordance (at the national as well as international level) is not much favourable while in the Asian countries, political will, irrespective of regime type, is more or less in concordance with globalization. Therefore, rather illusively, it so appears that democracies thwart development as well as globalization as a means to development by implication, while the reality is very different.

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