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A Note on Stable Cartels

Mao, Liang (2017): A Note on Stable Cartels.

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In non-cooperative open membership cartel formation games, it is usually assumed that cartel members will maximize their joint payoffs. Through an example, this note shows that this assumption is problematic, because it imposes some unnecessary restrictions on cartel members' actions. We recommend that the cartel agreement should be endogenously determined in future studies.

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