Tavares, Tiago (2015): The Role of International Reserves in Sovereign Debt Restructuring under Fiscal Adjustment.
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Abstract
Highly indebted developing economies commonly also hold large external reserves. This behavior seems puzzling given that governments in these countries borrow with an interest rate penalty to compensate lenders for default risk. Reducing debt to the same extent as reserves would maintain net liabilities constant while decreasing interest payments. However, holding reserves can have insurance benefits in a financial crisis. To rationalize the levels of international reserves and external debt observed in the data, a standard dynamic model of equilibrium default is extended to include distortionary taxation and debt restructuring. This paper shows that fiscal adjustments induced by sovereign default can generate large demand for reserves if taxation is distortionary. At the same time, a non-negligible position in reserves modifies the debt restructuring negotiations upon default. A calibrated version of the model produces recovery rate schedules that are increasing with reserves, as seen in the data, being also able to replicate large positions of reserves and debt to GDP. Finally, I study how both mechanisms play a key quantitative role to generate such result, in fact, not including them, produces a counterfactual demand for reserves that is close to zero.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | The Role of International Reserves in Sovereign Debt Restructuring under Fiscal Adjustment |
English Title: | The Role of International Reserves in Sovereign Debt Restructuring under Fiscal Adjustment |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Sovereign default, international reserves, distortionary taxation, external debt, sudden stops, debt renegotiation |
Subjects: | E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F32 - Current Account Adjustment ; Short-Term Capital Movements F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance > F34 - International Lending and Debt Problems F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance > F41 - Open Economy Macroeconomics |
Item ID: | 87423 |
Depositing User: | Tiago Tavares |
Date Deposited: | 16 Jun 2018 13:26 |
Last Modified: | 02 Oct 2019 12:56 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/87423 |