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India's Act East Policy: Walking the Talk¹

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Introduction

During the post-independence period, greater focus on deepening manufacturing base and the foreign exchange constraint forced the country to adopt the policy of import-substitution. As a result, inclination towards trade promotion remained limited until eighties. A major proportion of India's trade during this period was directed towards the western and Soviet bloc economies, while the importance of the Asian partners in overall trade basket were only moderate. In particular, while India's path crossed with the Southeast and East Asian economies through international forums like the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a long-term strategic partnership in trade sphere was broadly missing. Although India became a party to Bangkok Agreement in 1975, which involved China, South Korea, Lao PDR and Mongolia from the East, the actual level of trade integration through tariff reform remained limited.

After the Gulf war, the adverse growth scenario led to introduction of economic liberalization policies in India from 1991 onwards. As a result of embracing the export-promotion led growth model, the need to identify the potential target markets were strongly felt. In this background, the country adopted the 'Look East Policy' (LEP) during nineties with a two-track approach in mind. While on one hand, Japan, Singapore and South Korea were considered as appropriate sources of advanced technology and investment, high growth rates in several economies of East and Southeast Asia were instrumental in considering them as high potential export markets. India subsequently strengthened its ties with the 'East' by becoming Sectoral Dialogue Partner of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1992, covering trade, tourism, investment and science and technology. In the new millennium, the ties with the region has been strengthened through a number of regional trade agreements (RTAs), namely, India-Singapore Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) (2005), India-South Korea Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) (2009), India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (FTA) (2010), India-Japan CEPA (2011), India-Malaysia CECA (2011). Also negotiation on other preferential agreements involving East Asian and Pacific economies are presently going on. These initiatives signify the growing recognition of the region's importance in India's development path.

India's engagement with the region has deepened further through the introduction of the 'Act East Policy' (AEP) that has come into effect when Prime Minister Mr. Narendra Modi at his maiden visit to ASEAN-India Summit in 2014 emphasized on practicing more action-oriented policy towards ASEAN and the wider East Asia. In technical terms, AEP may not be considered

¹ The views expressed by the authors are personal and do not represent the same of their respective organizations.

as a strict foreign policy shift. It can be termed as continuation and further deepening of the LEP launched in the past decade. However, the significance of this initiative with renewed focus on the region comes from two aspects. First, while in nineties, India merely looked at the 'East' as a lucrative market, the urge to link up with the international production networks (IPNs) prevalent in East and Southeast Asia, particularly for sourcing quality raw materials and parts and components, is far stronger in the recent period. In addition, investment expectations from the region, particularly from Australia, Japan, South Korea and Singapore have also played a key role in formulation of AEP. Second, while India's engagement with Southeast Asia continue to focus on deepening trade-investment interrelationship, under the present NDA government, the country has emerged as the net security provider of the region. In 2015, the Prime Minister visited five East Asian countries at various occasions and the discussions covered both economic and security dimensions. There have been other high level diplomatic visits to the 'East', subsequently followed by the appropriate diplomatic channels. In line with the ongoing engagement, India's Republic Day celebration in 2018 was marked with the presence of all ten ASEAN head of states (Roche, 2018). Therefore, AEP has brought a great sense of speed and priority in engaging with the East Asian countries in general and Southeast Asia in particular.

The current paper examines the opportunities that this new narrative offers for India-East Asia relations in days to come, especially in the current geo-political set-up. At the end, it attempts to seek answers to India's drive towards greater linkages with this Asian sub-region, both in economic and strategic platforms.

Emerging Trade Engagements and Expectations

The existing literature indicates that enhanced trade relationship through agreements facilitate deeper integration between partners. Over time India's trade dependence with East and Southeast Asia has deepened significantly, particularly China emerging as a major trade partner. ASEAN-India FTA (2010) has come into force as the biggest trade engagement of the country so far. India's RTA engagements with ASEAN countries started with launching of the Early Harvest Programme (EHP) under the Indo-Thai FTA (2004) and subsequent signing of the Indo-Singapore CECA (2005). In addition, the Indo-Malaysia CECA (2011) has been implemented after 2010 and Indo-Indonesia CECA is being negotiated. In recognition of the underlying economic advantage, Indian infrastructure augmentation initiatives over the last couple of years has attempted to improve connectivity with ASEAN countries (Bhattacharyya and Chakraborty, 2011: 114-115).

Received wisdom suggested that once the ASEAN-India FTA in merchandise trade is launched, negotiations for the Indo-ASEAN CECA (covering both trade in services and investment flows) would begin. However, differences witnessed during the negotiations over several issues, namely - sequencing of tariff reforms, coverage of negative list and sensitive items (particularly in agriculture), rules of origin (ROO) provisions, lowering tariff on primary commodities like refined palm oil (Chakraborty and Sengupta, 2010: 221-22), caused both sides to move slowly on that front.

The obstacles in moving towards a successful CECA with ASEAN countries so far remain a challenge, as inclusion of trade in services is expected to help India to capitalize its inherent

advantages. The country has a moderately high export complementarity index in services trade with the ASEAN countries, and the formation of the CECA is likely to benefit Indian service exporters considerably (Chakraborty and Bhattacharyya, 2014: 32). In addition, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows from ASEAN countries in the post-bloc period, notably from Singapore, was anticipated to play a key role in transferring latest technologies. Similar undercurrents played a role in entering Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with Japan and South Korea as well. For instance, Japan is set to support a number of key infrastructure initiatives like Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, Chennai-Bangalore Industrial Corridor, while similar participation in India's North-Eastern states would be preferred (Rajendram, 2014: 7). The aforesaid economic corridors are expected to significantly influence maturity of the recently launched 'Make in India' initiative, and crucially augment India's exports both to the 'East' as well as the 'West'.

During the Indo-ASEAN FTA negotiation, Indian policymakers had to focus upon the potential implications of imports from ASEAN on several sensitive sectors, namely, fisheries, plantations, oilseeds, automobiles etc. India expected to compensate the potential adverse effects of imports on domestic sector through rising exports to ASEAN on one hand, and deepen participation in Asian international production networks (IPNs) with the parts and components imports from ASEAN, on the other (Chakraborty, 2014: 262). This in turn would help large Indian manufacturing firms to augment their competitiveness in the global market. Conversely, strategically located Indian Small and Micro Enterprises (SMEs) would incrementally be able to join the ASEAN production networks as suppliers, by proving their efficiency in terms of price and quality parameters.

Within ASEAN the IPNs are already deep-rooted, with individual countries increasingly specializing in narrow set of product lines as per their comparative advantage. For instance, in automobile products Thailand specializes in engine and electronic parts, Philippines specializes in fuel system and suspension parts, Malaysia specializes in bumper and drive shaft, while Indonesia specializes in engine valves and steering handle (WTO, 2011: 16), making the final assembled automobile products truly regional (i.e., 'ASEAN') in nature. After the initial processing of the raw material in the country of origin to reduce bulkiness, the intermediate products are brought to the country with best capabilities for speedy and cost-efficient assembling (for instance, Thailand), and also from where the product can be exported outside ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with greater ease. The expansion of the ASEAN IPNs have crucially benefitted from the AFTA tariff liberalizations as intra-region trade flows in semi-finished and final products increased through zero percent tariff on partner exports (UNESCAP, 2011), and the deepened connectivity linkages by land, sea and air routes (ADB, 2009: 8-10). As a result, multinational enterprises (MNEs) from Japan and South Korea have benefitted from fragmentation of their production process in sequential production blocks, which is spread across ASEAN partners (Lim and Kimura, 2015: 143-48). In addition to the general rise in trade flows, such fragmentation has significantly contributed to the cross-border technology spillover.

The production integration of two partner countries across sectors can be identified with the help of Intra-Industry Trade (IIT) index. Comparing the indices for 2011 and 2013, Chakraborty (2016: 51-52) notes that intra-ASEAN trade is becoming increasingly integrated as the IIT index is rising for most of the country-pairs over 2011 to 2013. The IITs are particularly high for

Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. The result indicates that the firms located within these economies are increasingly trading among themselves in semi-finished products and parts and components, essentially to exploit the labour cost and raw material availability related advantages, ease of exporting etc. However, there is considerable scope for expanding participation of Indian firms in ASEAN IPNs Chakraborty (2016: 51-52). The success of AEP on economic front would be reflected through India's success in enhancing its participation level at the ASEAN IPNs.

ASEAN's IPNs also involve six of their bilateral regional trade partners, namely - Australia, New Zealand, China, India, Japan and South Korea, through closer integration in trade and investment sphere. Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was launched in 2012, involving ASEAN and these six countries. The underlying objective has been to ensure seamless flow of goods, services and investment in a wider region of South, East and Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Most of the RCEP countries are already partnering each other through bilateral arrangements, e.g., India-Korea CEPA, India-Japan CEPA, Australia-Japan FTA, Australia-Korea FTA etc. Also several bilateral negotiations are going on (e.g. India-Australia FTA, Japan-Korea FTA, China-Japan FTA), while Australia-China FTA has been signed and will come into effect subsequently. It is expected that the participation by India in RCEP would enhance trade in general and IIT type trade in particular, thereby deepening India's presence in regional value chains (Das and Dubey, 2014: 26). The potential for IPN participation is particularly high for India in sectors like textiles, leather, footwear and food products etc. (Palit, 2014a: 35). It is further expected that the deepened IPN integration through RCEP and consequent welfare enhancement would enable member countries to effectively implement a strong trade facilitation agreement (Palit, 2014a: 35).

Fulfillment of India's AEP agenda would crucially depend on effective addressing of several RCEP related challenges in coming days. First and foremost, the coverage of the agreement and future reform agenda under RCEP, which crucially depend on the political economy, is an important consideration from Indian perspective. China, given its orientation towards export of both high and low-tech manufacturing products, is interested to focus on liberalization of trade in goods. However Japan, as a major provider of FDI to the East and Southeast Asia, understandably wants the reform agendas to include trade-investment and intellectual property rights (IPR) related provisions as well. If these two non-trade areas are included in the reform agenda, Japan would be able to put China in a defensive position (Hamanaka, 2014: 10). While India is open to the question of including trade-investment related provisions in trade agreements (Chakraborty and Kedia, 2014), the country would prefer to ensure that in the IPR agreement no 'TRIPS-Plus' provision is included. Second, in comparison among all the six bilateral trade agreements of ASEAN, the liberalizations under the India-ASEAN FTA in merchandise products is relatively less deeper due to the presence of a large negative list and 'sensitive' products. As the other five countries have already expanded the level of market access in their FTAs with ASEAN, the pressure on India to implement relatively greater liberalisation measures in course of RCEP reforms will be intense (Palit, 2014b: 3). India in particular also needs to ensure survival of its SME firms, spread across manufacturing segment, as onslaught of more competitive Chinese firms may pose a serious challenge to their operation.

In Table 1, India's merchandise trade scenario with the 'East' over 2001-17 has been summarized. For understanding the evolving trade pattern, the entire period is divided in three sub-periods, namely, 2001-05, 2006-10 and 2011-17. A couple of interesting observations emerges from the table. First, Indian trade balance is in surplus only with respect to seven partners – Cambodia, Hong Kong, North Korea, Mongolia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. The list includes a number of smaller economies, which requires the attention of the policymakers. Second, apart from Singapore, India is having negative trade balance with all other 'comprehensive' trade partners (i.e., Japan, Malaysia and South Korea). In other words, the inclusion of trade in services and investment in the agreement have not improved the merchandise trade scenario so far, through the much-expected technology spillover effect. Third, vis-à-vis ASEAN partners, India is having trade surplus only with Cambodia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. Trade deficit with all the other six countries is widening over the period, which is another major area of concern. This implies that while post-2010, India's exports to ASEAN has increased, the imports have grown at a higher rate. The finding underlines the need to conduct a detailed competitiveness analysis for Indian exports vis-à-vis the ASEAN partners. Also the tariff and non-tariff barriers imposed by ASEAN on Indian exports needs to be investigated. Finally, it can be observed that India's trade balance with respect to the proposed RCEP members, i.e., the five bilateral FTA partners of ASEAN, is in deficit and widening over the period. The quantum of the deficit is growing particularly sharply for China. The past experience of moderate export success through tariff reforms in the 'East' and the ASEAN market in particular, is perhaps playing a role behind the cautious approach adopted by India at the ongoing RCEP negotiations.

As noted earlier, one of the major expectation for India from the integration with ASEAN is to develop a deeper association with the IPNs located in these economies. In Tables 2-6, the regional production contribution in five select industries is compared over 2002-2011 by drawing data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Trade in Value-Added (TIVA) database on origin of value added in gross exports. While exporting a final product, a country may source the necessary raw materials and the parts and components either from within the nation or from abroad and undertake the necessary value addition on them before export. Rise in the domestic value added (i.e., rise in percentage contribution of a country in own exports) implies strengthening of the domestic supplier network (backward integration) and hence competitiveness, while a decline in the same implies that the exporters are increasingly relying on the imported raw materials, parts and components and service link supports from abroad. The latter then indicates greater integration with regional IPNs. The Indian export scenario is compared here with seven 'Eastern' economies (China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand), and the source of value addition for their exports in five product categories provides interesting insights.

Table 2 shows the scenario for the basic metal and fabricated metal products. It is observed that domestic contribution has increased in China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore while the same has declined in the other four countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports have increased for India and Thailand, while integration within ASEAN have deepened for India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea.

Table 3 indicates the scenario for computer, electronic and optical equipment. It is seen that domestic contribution has increased in China, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore while the same has declined in the other four countries. Contribution of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries in total exports have increased for India, while integration within ASEAN have deepened for Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore.

Table 4 reveals the scenario for electrical machinery and apparatus. It is noted that domestic contribution has increased in China, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand while the same has declined in the other four countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports have increased for India and Thailand, while integration within ASEAN have deepened for Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand.

Table 5 depicts the scenario for textiles, leather and footwear products. It is observed that domestic contribution has increased in China and Indonesia while the same has declined in the other six countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports have increased for India while integration within ASEAN have deepened for China and Indonesia.

Table 6 summarizes the scenario for the transport equipment sector. It can be seen that domestic contribution has increased in China, Indonesia and Singapore while the same has declined in the other five countries. Contribution of OECD countries in total exports have increased for India, while integration within ASEAN have deepened for India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea.

A couple of general observations can also be drawn from the value addition dynamics at the sectoral level in the selected countries. First, the percentage value contribution of Japan is declining in almost all the country's exports in the selected sectors. Second, the percentage value contribution of China is rising in nearly all cases. These two observations clearly explains why Japan is interested to incorporate investment and IPR provisions within RCEP, while China is not so excited with this idea. Third, the contribution of EU and US in the export of the select East and Southeast Asian countries is generally going down over the period under consideration. A similar scenario is noted for the OECD countries as well. Fourth, for India the contribution of the OECD countries as well as the same from the EU and US have however increased in several product categories (e.g., textile, leather and footwear), which goes against the trend for 'East' countries. This signifies that while the production integration in most the 'East' economies are witnessing integration within the region, for India the value addition from economies in the 'West' are still important for its exports. The linkage is particularly important because of the fact that while the East and Southeast Asian countries have significantly benefitted from the Japanese 'Flying Geese' type investment in the past, which deepened the production network among the recipient countries (Hayter and Edgington, 2004). India on the other hand has received significant amount of FDI from European countries and US in the manufacturing sectors, which has facilitated a closer link with them instead.

Table 1: India's Trade Scenario with the 'East' (2001-2014) in US \$ Million

| Partner Name | Export | | | Import | | | Trade Balance | | |
|--|---------|----------|----------|---------|----------|----------|---------------|-----------|-----------|
| | 2001-05 | 2006-10 | 2011-17 | 2001-05 | 2006-10 | 2011-17 | 2001-05 | 2006-10 | 2011-17 |
| Australia | 586.26 | 1275.62 | 2694.19 | 2615.17 | 9566.07 | 10767.67 | -2028.91 | -8290.45 | -8073.48 |
| Brunei Darussalam | 4.21 | 23.39 | 155.82 | 0.45 | 296.37 | 682.02 | 3.77 | -272.97 | -526.20 |
| Cambodia | 17.18 | 49.88 | 118.97 | 0.55 | 3.68 | 24.59 | 16.63 | 46.20 | 94.38 |
| China | 3260.72 | 11045.02 | 12698.81 | 4856.17 | 28732.67 | 56780.43 | -1595.45 | -17687.65 | -44081.62 |
| Hong Kong, China | 3189.71 | 6751.56 | 12534.39 | 1336.59 | 4671.40 | 7805.86 | 1853.12 | 2080.16 | 4728.52 |
| Indonesia | 976.33 | 2793.48 | 4453.31 | 1911.30 | 6435.42 | 13786.48 | -934.97 | -3641.94 | -9333.17 |
| Japan | 1870.18 | 3542.52 | 5250.16 | 2580.31 | 6662.93 | 10210.33 | -710.13 | -3120.40 | -4960.17 |
| Korea, Democratic People's Republic of (North Korea) | 139.37 | 518.91 | 133.37 | 3.91 | 181.32 | 58.27 | 135.46 | 337.59 | 75.10 |
| Korea, Republic of (South Korea) | 846.68 | 3192.91 | 4018.46 | 2515.69 | 7366.46 | 12814.85 | -1669.01 | -4173.56 | -8796.39 |
| Lao People's Democratic Republic | 3.16 | 9.00 | 36.99 | 0.09 | 4.26 | 121.60 | 3.07 | 4.74 | -84.62 |
| Macao, China | 2.57 | 10.74 | 2.28 | 3.37 | 0.26 | 3.97 | -0.80 | 10.49 | -1.70 |
| Malaysia | 901.60 | 2659.21 | 4391.12 | 1805.52 | 5765.81 | 9234.02 | -903.93 | -3106.60 | -4842.90 |
| Mongolia | 0.98 | 9.61 | 16.40 | 0.34 | 6.82 | 8.11 | 0.65 | 2.79 | 8.29 |
| Myanmar | 87.63 | 200.99 | 754.45 | 392.67 | 944.40 | 1149.53 | -305.04 | -743.41 | -395.09 |
| New Zealand | 87.81 | 253.54 | 291.23 | 107.82 | 422.22 | 609.95 | -20.01 | -168.68 | -318.72 |
| Papua New Guinea | 8.61 | 16.05 | 38.38 | 31.77 | 182.24 | 167.64 | -23.16 | -166.19 | -129.26 |
| Philippines | 373.69 | 684.44 | 1287.27 | 141.29 | 269.47 | 475.31 | 232.39 | 414.97 | 811.96 |
| Singapore | 2570.46 | 7453.00 | 10817.40 | 2041.41 | 6759.14 | 7059.89 | 529.06 | 693.86 | 3757.51 |
| Taipei, Chinese | 525.39 | 1548.77 | 2243.91 | 851.12 | 2537.32 | 3889.77 | -325.73 | -988.55 | -1645.85 |
| Thailand | 797.47 | 1776.00 | 3218.59 | 655.14 | 2624.93 | 5391.02 | 142.33 | -848.94 | -2172.43 |
| Timor-Leste | 1.06 | 108.12 | 3.31 | 0.01 | 0.36 | 3.39 | 1.05 | 107.76 | -0.08 |
| Viet Nam | 413.91 | 1647.46 | 5290.29 | 55.92 | 424.20 | 2597.51 | 358.00 | 1223.26 | 2692.78 |

Source: Constructed by the authors from Trade Map database (undated)

**Table 2: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Basic metals and fabricated metal products
(in per cent)**

| Source Country | Exporting Countries | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| | 2000 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 61.41 | 0.40 | 1.56 | 0.61 | 1.78 | 2.22 | 1.98 | 1.53 |
| India | 0.25 | 75.33 | 0.63 | 0.06 | 0.65 | 0.68 | 0.24 | 0.39 |
| Indonesia | 0.55 | 0.14 | 66.79 | 0.58 | 1.58 | 3.18 | 0.98 | 0.78 |
| Japan | 7.83 | 0.74 | 6.04 | 88.81 | 16.50 | 11.90 | 7.14 | 11.99 |
| Malaysia | 0.53 | 0.22 | 1.13 | 0.25 | 41.69 | 3.17 | 0.55 | 1.07 |
| Philippines | 0.17 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.23 | 0.30 | 0.17 | 0.20 |
| Singapore | 0.37 | 0.19 | 1.51 | 0.08 | 2.49 | 46.78 | 0.22 | 0.79 |
| South Korea | 2.59 | 0.31 | 1.56 | 0.41 | 2.39 | 1.78 | 65.15 | 1.10 |
| Thailand | 0.38 | 0.12 | 0.59 | 0.11 | 1.25 | 1.03 | 0.15 | 56.54 |
| Vietnam | 0.23 | 0.02 | 0.27 | 0.06 | 0.43 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.27 |
| APEC | 85.47 | 5.18 | 86.39 | 94.55 | 82.50 | 84.95 | 85.91 | 82.77 |
| ASEAN | 2.27 | 0.70 | 70.41 | 1.22 | 47.76 | 54.71 | 2.34 | 60.02 |
| EU 28 | 5.12 | 4.95 | 4.11 | 1.25 | 8.05 | 8.94 | 3.73 | 5.13 |
| United States | 3.00 | 1.22 | 2.28 | 1.10 | 4.76 | 8.17 | 2.91 | 2.24 |
| OECD Members | 21.95 | 9.37 | 17.49 | 93.32 | 38.60 | 35.47 | 84.06 | 24.68 |
| | 2011 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 67.48 | 2.79 | 1.64 | 1.89 | 6.01 | 4.28 | 5.77 | 5.30 |
| India | 0.78 | 59.78 | 0.53 | 0.23 | 1.51 | 1.63 | 0.94 | 0.85 |
| Indonesia | 0.92 | 0.89 | 76.25 | 1.45 | 3.97 | 3.79 | 1.99 | 2.79 |
| Japan | 2.87 | 1.21 | 1.83 | 78.49 | 8.52 | 4.16 | 6.33 | 11.87 |
| Malaysia | 0.42 | 0.45 | 1.47 | 0.49 | 44.26 | 1.80 | 0.64 | 1.31 |
| Philippines | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.35 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.51 |
| Singapore | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.53 | 0.13 | 1.75 | 48.55 | 0.27 | 0.75 |
| South Korea | 1.20 | 0.73 | 0.80 | 1.02 | 2.29 | 1.24 | 49.72 | 2.54 |
| Thailand | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.40 | 0.23 | 1.32 | 0.61 | 0.26 | 37.23 |
| Vietnam | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.51 | 0.20 | 0.26 | 0.39 |
| APEC | 83.14 | 13.66 | 87.31 | 90.06 | 80.24 | 73.99 | 77.33 | 78.40 |
| ASEAN | 2.21 | 2.22 | 79.76 | 2.75 | 52.28 | 55.32 | 3.88 | 43.18 |
| EU 28 | 4.15 | 5.27 | 1.39 | 1.61 | 6.21 | 7.66 | 4.05 | 4.99 |
| United States | 1.72 | 1.76 | 0.66 | 1.13 | 3.22 | 4.20 | 2.54 | 2.83 |
| OECD Members | 15.40 | 13.05 | 6.26 | 85.63 | 25.77 | 21.31 | 69.32 | 31.12 |

Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated)

Table 3: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Computer, Electronic and optical equipment (in per cent)

| Source Country | Exporting Countries | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| | 2000 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 22.56 | 0.40 | 0.81 | 0.52 | 1.33 | 1.35 | 1.10 | 1.63 |
| India | 0.27 | 78.79 | 0.47 | 0.05 | 0.48 | 0.33 | 0.16 | 0.40 |
| Indonesia | 0.85 | 0.13 | 72.24 | 0.23 | 1.17 | 2.02 | 0.49 | 0.81 |
| Japan | 20.99 | 0.95 | 4.86 | 89.84 | 19.04 | 11.89 | 11.14 | 18.27 |
| Malaysia | 1.70 | 0.24 | 0.92 | 0.40 | 29.80 | 3.96 | 1.06 | 2.73 |
| Philippines | 0.62 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1.21 | 0.78 | 0.47 | 1.02 |
| Singapore | 1.57 | 0.27 | 1.79 | 0.28 | 5.02 | 47.14 | 0.98 | 2.92 |
| South Korea | 6.05 | 0.36 | 1.42 | 0.79 | 3.46 | 2.14 | 62.52 | 2.98 |
| Thailand | 0.93 | 0.13 | 0.55 | 0.18 | 1.23 | 1.06 | 0.30 | 39.09 |
| Vietnam | 0.14 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 0.03 | 0.21 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.25 |
| APEC | 78.42 | 5.62 | 89.62 | 96.80 | 83.92 | 86.93 | 91.16 | 86.16 |
| ASEAN | 5.84 | 0.82 | 75.72 | 1.33 | 38.67 | 55.07 | 3.42 | 46.95 |
| EU 28 | 16.23 | 5.14 | 5.53 | 1.77 | 11.30 | 8.93 | 4.84 | 8.21 |
| United States | 10.59 | 1.36 | 3.50 | 2.66 | 14.53 | 11.29 | 8.97 | 10.80 |
| OECD Members | 57.98 | 9.88 | 17.92 | 95.95 | 51.42 | 37.70 | 89.66 | 43.31 |
| | 2011 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 45.01 | 5.10 | 5.16 | 3.95 | 9.21 | 3.99 | 7.71 | 10.97 |
| India | 0.78 | 68.81 | 1.05 | 0.20 | 1.05 | 1.69 | 0.56 | 1.06 |
| Indonesia | 0.80 | 0.51 | 72.89 | 0.53 | 1.54 | 1.13 | 0.83 | 1.46 |
| Japan | 10.62 | 1.81 | 3.45 | 82.82 | 10.43 | 3.85 | 7.33 | 13.88 |
| Malaysia | 1.96 | 0.58 | 0.94 | 0.43 | 33.17 | 1.37 | 0.74 | 2.39 |
| Philippines | 0.89 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.67 | 0.54 | 0.42 | 0.85 |
| Singapore | 1.43 | 0.83 | 1.52 | 0.32 | 5.37 | 59.87 | 1.28 | 2.12 |
| South Korea | 6.35 | 1.12 | 1.61 | 0.99 | 3.15 | 1.65 | 57.77 | 2.81 |
| Thailand | 1.01 | 0.37 | 0.74 | 0.29 | 1.48 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 34.75 |
| Vietnam | 0.23 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.34 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 0.47 |
| APEC | 83.38 | 16.59 | 91.37 | 94.41 | 82.37 | 84.04 | 87.18 | 83.30 |
| ASEAN | 6.36 | 2.68 | 76.61 | 1.92 | 42.61 | 63.57 | 3.93 | 42.13 |
| EU 28 | 9.03 | 6.27 | 3.63 | 2.28 | 10.08 | 8.09 | 5.64 | 7.58 |
| United States | 5.51 | 2.89 | 1.89 | 2.31 | 10.22 | 6.49 | 5.21 | 5.89 |
| OECD Members | 35.52 | 14.52 | 12.30 | 90.03 | 37.18 | 23.52 | 78.97 | 34.76 |

Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated)

**Table 4: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Electrical machinery and apparatus
(in per cent)**

| Source Country | Exporting Countries | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| | 2000 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 31.80 | 0.38 | 1.06 | 0.47 | 1.53 | 1.81 | 1.20 | 2.16 |
| India | 0.34 | 80.51 | 0.69 | 0.04 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 0.43 |
| Indonesia | 0.96 | 0.12 | 68.79 | 0.23 | 1.60 | 3.46 | 0.38 | 0.94 |
| Japan | 15.23 | 0.86 | 5.36 | 92.51 | 16.01 | 10.27 | 7.20 | 15.20 |
| Malaysia | 0.97 | 0.21 | 1.15 | 0.23 | 39.38 | 3.24 | 0.53 | 1.94 |
| Philippines | 0.31 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 0.10 | 0.67 | 0.46 | 0.20 | 0.54 |
| Singapore | 0.78 | 0.25 | 2.02 | 0.14 | 3.71 | 45.64 | 0.48 | 2.07 |
| South Korea | 4.99 | 0.33 | 1.46 | 0.45 | 2.67 | 1.38 | 73.08 | 1.87 |
| Thailand | 0.82 | 0.12 | 0.82 | 0.16 | 1.43 | 1.81 | 0.28 | 45.87 |
| Vietnam | 0.18 | 0.02 | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.06 | 0.87 |
| APEC | 77.25 | 5.19 | 88.12 | 97.22 | 83.79 | 82.44 | 91.32 | 82.30 |
| ASEAN | 4.07 | 0.74 | 73.03 | 0.91 | 47.09 | 54.80 | 1.97 | 52.39 |
| EU 28 | 13.15 | 4.82 | 5.34 | 1.35 | 10.24 | 12.62 | 4.92 | 10.59 |
| United States | 7.23 | 1.31 | 3.73 | 1.62 | 9.23 | 8.84 | 5.05 | 4.77 |
| OECD Members | 45.94 | 9.20 | 18.68 | 96.72 | 42.44 | 37.05 | 92.23 | 35.79 |
| | 2011 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 51.38 | 3.52 | 3.53 | 3.24 | 8.07 | 6.38 | 6.58 | 7.94 |
| India | 1.04 | 66.04 | 1.07 | 0.20 | 1.45 | 1.48 | 0.93 | 0.88 |
| Indonesia | 0.82 | 0.58 | 74.23 | 0.67 | 3.12 | 3.96 | 1.01 | 1.89 |
| Japan | 7.98 | 1.39 | 2.71 | 84.49 | 9.20 | 4.72 | 5.76 | 10.42 |
| Malaysia | 0.94 | 0.43 | 1.14 | 0.34 | 37.78 | 2.28 | 0.51 | 1.91 |
| Philippines | 0.42 | 0.13 | 0.17 | 0.23 | 0.47 | 0.59 | 0.23 | 0.66 |
| Singapore | 0.66 | 0.46 | 1.22 | 0.19 | 3.03 | 47.45 | 0.44 | 0.93 |
| South Korea | 3.68 | 0.89 | 1.42 | 0.86 | 2.65 | 1.66 | 61.71 | 2.20 |
| Thailand | 0.67 | 0.34 | 1.00 | 0.35 | 1.93 | 0.87 | 0.32 | 46.58 |
| Vietnam | 0.20 | 0.09 | 0.16 | 0.17 | 0.44 | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.43 |
| APEC | 79.44 | 14.11 | 90.39 | 94.50 | 80.15 | 78.89 | 85.33 | 83.06 |
| ASEAN | 3.75 | 2.08 | 78.09 | 2.01 | 46.86 | 55.48 | 2.84 | 52.50 |
| EU 28 | 10.49 | 6.09 | 3.01 | 2.09 | 8.68 | 10.80 | 5.01 | 7.19 |
| United States | 3.96 | 2.29 | 1.78 | 1.65 | 5.86 | 6.10 | 3.33 | 3.24 |
| OECD Members | 31.83 | 13.87 | 10.90 | 90.66 | 31.20 | 27.17 | 79.63 | 27.66 |

Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated)

Table 5: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear (in per cent)

| Source Country | Exporting Countries | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| | 2000 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 61.82 | 0.32 | 0.96 | 3.24 | 2.52 | 4.69 | 2.91 | 1.44 |
| India | 0.55 | 90.40 | 0.49 | 0.14 | 1.35 | 1.67 | 0.68 | 0.57 |
| Indonesia | 0.65 | 0.10 | 78.15 | 0.31 | 2.54 | 5.31 | 0.87 | 0.51 |
| Japan | 7.26 | 0.30 | 2.65 | 88.72 | 6.61 | 3.93 | 3.35 | 3.27 |
| Malaysia | 0.51 | 0.13 | 0.69 | 0.15 | 55.86 | 7.66 | 0.37 | 0.58 |
| Philippines | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.07 | 0.06 | 0.23 | 0.22 | 0.07 | 0.09 |
| Singapore | 0.39 | 0.16 | 1.09 | 0.09 | 3.06 | 44.83 | 0.26 | 0.74 |
| South Korea | 6.47 | 0.24 | 2.75 | 0.82 | 2.04 | 2.51 | 76.06 | 1.16 |
| Thailand | 0.50 | 0.11 | 0.53 | 0.20 | 1.83 | 1.74 | 0.27 | 78.26 |
| Vietnam | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 0.12 | 0.33 | 0.42 | 0.12 | 0.18 |
| APEC | 90.21 | 2.97 | 92.79 | 96.28 | 87.18 | 84.74 | 90.15 | 92.09 |
| ASEAN | 2.27 | 0.53 | 80.67 | 0.95 | 63.91 | 60.86 | 2.04 | 80.48 |
| EU 28 | 4.85 | 1.96 | 2.86 | 2.20 | 6.50 | 8.66 | 3.89 | 3.64 |
| United States | 3.78 | 0.72 | 2.30 | 1.56 | 4.95 | 6.07 | 3.41 | 2.60 |
| OECD Members | 24.61 | 4.00 | 12.23 | 93.94 | 23.02 | 24.01 | 88.41 | 12.23 |
| | 2011 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 73.52 | 2.57 | 2.80 | 9.88 | 10.61 | 11.91 | 6.29 | 3.76 |
| India | 0.86 | 80.17 | 0.57 | 0.37 | 2.23 | 2.40 | 0.82 | 1.14 |
| Indonesia | 0.66 | 0.39 | 81.75 | 0.68 | 2.66 | 3.41 | 1.25 | 0.91 |
| Japan | 2.62 | 0.65 | 1.04 | 76.03 | 4.25 | 2.43 | 3.64 | 2.38 |
| Malaysia | 0.45 | 0.30 | 0.78 | 0.30 | 50.76 | 2.88 | 0.47 | 0.77 |
| Philippines | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0.11 | 0.10 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.19 |
| Singapore | 0.35 | 0.51 | 0.75 | 0.18 | 2.28 | 44.23 | 0.40 | 0.88 |
| South Korea | 2.08 | 0.49 | 1.94 | 0.72 | 1.34 | 1.27 | 64.66 | 0.84 |
| Thailand | 0.58 | 0.32 | 0.52 | 0.34 | 1.82 | 1.00 | 0.37 | 74.13 |
| Vietnam | 0.28 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 0.35 | 0.79 | 0.46 | 0.51 | 0.30 |
| APEC | 87.93 | 9.51 | 93.23 | 92.55 | 83.94 | 75.44 | 85.59 | 89.28 |
| ASEAN | 2.49 | 1.73 | 84.29 | 2.05 | 58.72 | 52.34 | 3.32 | 77.24 |
| EU 28 | 4.72 | 3.99 | 1.64 | 3.28 | 6.73 | 13.73 | 4.64 | 3.71 |
| United States | 2.82 | 2.14 | 0.94 | 1.86 | 3.67 | 3.53 | 3.38 | 1.90 |
| OECD Members | 14.63 | 8.91 | 6.76 | 83.43 | 18.99 | 24.06 | 79.49 | 10.91 |

Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated)

Table 6: Origin of Value Added in Gross Export from Transport Equipment Sector (in per cent)

| Source Country | Exporting Countries | | | | | | | |
|----------------|---------------------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| | 2000 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 57.38 | 0.40 | 0.87 | 0.43 | 1.14 | 1.04 | 1.24 | 1.16 |
| India | 0.18 | 80.81 | 0.32 | 0.04 | 0.45 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.37 |
| Indonesia | 0.38 | 0.11 | 72.54 | 0.21 | 1.06 | 1.53 | 0.54 | 0.70 |
| Japan | 10.18 | 1.04 | 6.34 | 91.72 | 12.20 | 8.77 | 7.45 | 21.50 |
| Malaysia | 0.52 | 0.19 | 0.95 | 0.18 | 53.69 | 1.94 | 0.50 | 1.22 |
| Philippines | 0.15 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.25 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 1.01 |
| Singapore | 0.48 | 0.26 | 2.04 | 0.12 | 2.46 | 56.23 | 0.39 | 1.32 |
| South Korea | 2.48 | 0.32 | 0.92 | 0.41 | 3.20 | 3.93 | 70.97 | 1.39 |
| Thailand | 0.39 | 0.12 | 0.38 | 0.15 | 0.95 | 0.50 | 0.18 | 48.75 |
| Vietnam | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.20 | 0.02 | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.26 |
| APEC | 84.95 | 5.72 | 89.60 | 96.53 | 87.42 | 88.56 | 90.33 | 85.70 |
| ASEAN | 2.05 | 0.71 | 76.26 | 0.80 | 58.63 | 60.54 | 1.92 | 53.41 |
| EU 28 | 9.76 | 4.52 | 3.00 | 2.08 | 7.58 | 8.04 | 4.52 | 8.14 |
| United States | 5.56 | 1.75 | 2.80 | 1.98 | 7.32 | 10.98 | 5.00 | 3.94 |
| OECD Members | 31.03 | 9.33 | 14.90 | 96.98 | 33.82 | 33.84 | 90.87 | 37.76 |
| | 2011 | | | | | | | |
| | China | India | Indonesia | Japan | Malaysia | Singapore | South Korea | Thailand |
| China | 70.03 | 3.67 | 3.04 | 2.37 | 6.61 | 3.47 | 5.70 | 5.46 |
| India | 0.52 | 68.00 | 0.72 | 0.18 | 1.22 | 1.15 | 0.68 | 0.98 |
| Indonesia | 0.45 | 0.52 | 75.91 | 0.57 | 2.74 | 0.92 | 0.89 | 2.33 |
| Japan | 5.16 | 1.49 | 4.50 | 85.77 | 8.28 | 2.57 | 6.27 | 13.48 |
| Malaysia | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.69 | 0.28 | 46.79 | 1.05 | 0.44 | 1.30 |
| Philippines | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.27 | 0.19 | 0.38 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 1.04 |
| Singapore | 0.38 | 0.51 | 0.92 | 0.17 | 2.01 | 60.73 | 0.39 | 1.22 |
| South Korea | 2.01 | 0.99 | 1.11 | 0.65 | 2.10 | 4.17 | 62.04 | 2.23 |
| Thailand | 0.33 | 0.32 | 1.65 | 0.31 | 2.24 | 0.26 | 0.29 | 45.12 |
| Vietnam | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.47 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 0.34 |
| APEC | 86.27 | 13.89 | 92.52 | 94.17 | 81.84 | 84.38 | 84.89 | 82.97 |
| ASEAN | 1.89 | 1.98 | 79.65 | 1.69 | 54.69 | 63.32 | 2.49 | 51.47 |
| EU 28 | 7.94 | 6.38 | 3.05 | 2.57 | 9.07 | 9.40 | 6.39 | 6.78 |
| United States | 2.77 | 2.41 | 1.83 | 1.66 | 4.61 | 7.73 | 3.81 | 3.03 |
| OECD Members | 20.86 | 14.19 | 12.15 | 92.10 | 27.84 | 26.71 | 82.02 | 30.68 |

Source: Constructed by the authors from OECD TIVA database (undated)

Maritime Security Cooperation

In addition to the economic determinants, greater focus by India through the AEP initiative would balance China's growing influence in the Asia-Pacific region. With growing volume of exports and economic clout, China has over the last decade maintained an assertive standpoint to control the maritime trade routes. The assertion has particularly been reflected in terms of its border disputes with neighbouring countries, where through a 'salami-slicing' strategy it is increasingly making maritime territorial claims in both East China and South China Sea since late 2013 (O'Rourke, 2015: 24-26). In particular, the US, Japan and other countries have often objected to the Chinese practice of reclamation and construction of reefs and artificial islands at locations of military and strategic significance in South China Sea, that complicates the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region (Dolven *et al.*, 2015: 2). The neighbouring ASEAN countries have expressed both sense of insecurity generated by such actions and concerns over destruction of marine environment (Quintos, 2015: 9).

While India is generally supportive of the existing maritime order, the Chinese action and policies often destabilize the same (Rehman, 2017). Apart from the muscle flexing in East and South China Seas, China has also enhanced its presence in Indian Ocean over the last decade, through deepened cooperation with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives etc. (Rajendram, 2014: 4) under the 'Maritime Silk Road' agenda. It has heavily invested in maritime infrastructure of partner countries, which gained prominence as 'string of pearls' strategy, to contain India. The recipients of Chinese investment include Myanmar, deep-sea port of Chittagong in Bangladesh, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan etc. (Marantidou, 2014: 6).

India in the past has attempted not to follow a confrontationist approach against China and been careful not to send any signal to this effect. For instance, it earlier preferred not to pronounce its views on the South China Sea situation (Rajendram, 2014: 5). However, the Chinese approach, if goes undeterred, would considerably hurt Indian interests in long run. In recognition of this fact, India is revisiting its perspective on Southeast Asia. For instance in recent past, India and Vietnam decided to undertake oil exploration in South China Sea, which was strongly protested by China on the ground of infringement on their territorial claims (Jacob and Patil, 2011). However, ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL) chose to conduct oil exploration in offshore block 128 despite Chinese protests (Airy and Jacob, 2012). In addition, during US President Barak Obama's visit to India in January 2015, the joint statement mentioned the issue of freedom of navigation, especially in South China Sea, much to the displeasure of China (Bajpayee, 2015: 122). The country has also increasingly participated in joint naval exercises with several countries (e.g., Singapore, Japan) as well as in search and rescue operations with Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia since 1997 (Bajpayee, 2015: 125). It has also included Japan in the 'Malabar' naval exercises, jointly conducted with the United States earlier, despite China's strong objections (PTI, 2015).

The Indian attempts to deepening maritime security collaborations with willing partners in the 'East' is often termed as a strategy for creating 'diamond necklace' against Chinese 'string of pearls' in the South China Sea (Scott, 2013: 60). For instance, given the tense relationship with China, Vietnam has entered into a strategic partnership with India in November 2007 and in 2011 the 'Indian Navy offered Vietnamese forces facilities for training and capacity building,

reportedly in return for berthing rights at Nha Trang' (Rajendram, 2014: 8). In addition, the cooperation discussions also involve possible import of Brahmos supersonic cruise missiles by Vietnam from India (Scott, 2013: 61). Indian Navyships also regularly visit Philippines and the first meeting of the Joint Defence Cooperation Committee between the two countries has been conducted in January 2012 (MEA, 2013: 3). In 2012 a trilateral mechanism involving South Korea and Japan has been set up (Scott, 2013: 62). Recently in January 2018, during the visit of ten ASEAN members' leaders in New Delhi for India's Republic Day celebration, maritime cooperation under both traditional and non-traditional sphere in a rule-based maritime domain received a strong emphasis (Roy Chaudhury, 2018).

It becomes clear from the discussion so far that India is going to play a key role to ensure regional stability in Asia and the Pacific in days to come. The process to deepen maritime security collaborations with like-minded partners initiated in the new millennium would receive a particular boost through the AEP initiative recently launched. The visits by Indian Prime Minister Mr. Modi in Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka in 2015 and the promise to deliver military and civilian assistance to them is therefore in line with the broader vision of balancing China's deepening influence in Indian Ocean region (Pant, 2015).

Concluding remarks

Growing linkages with the East and Southeast Asian and the Pacific countries is mutually beneficial for both India and the partners. On economic front, the benefits are derived from three channels. First, India's integration with the Asian production network is on the rise, which is a crucial step for enhancing the competitiveness of the domestic manufacturing sector. The success of the recent initiatives like 'Make-in-India', 'Skill India' are therefore crucial in this context. Second, there is considerable scope for augmenting export of key services to the 'East', given the existing trade complementarities. Finally, the FDI inflows from Japan, South Korea and Australia are likely to bring in modern technology, thereby creating a technology spillover effect, and consequently enhancing industry performance. On maritime security front, India is gradually progressing from ship visits and naval exercises with friendly nations to an elevated stage of collaborating in defense procurement, including through funding, technology, and technology transfers. New Delhi under the Modi government is eventually eyeing for defense exports under the aegis of 'Make in India' campaign at home. It is undoubtedly boosting Indian Navy's operational deployment and expanding its reach beyond its shore thereby impinging India's interest firmly in Southeast and East Asia. The AEP is therefore actively engaging New Delhi in the growth story of the East Asian landmass, in addition to giving a growth impetus to the domestic manufacturing sector.

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