Political and Institutional Determinants of Fiscal Policy Persistence in West Africa

Umoh, O. J. and Onye, Kenneth U. and Atan, Johnson A. (2018): Political and Institutional Determinants of Fiscal Policy Persistence in West Africa. Forthcoming in:

Abstract

This study investigates the political economy of fiscal policy making in West Africa by relying on a two-fold estimation technique, namely – the Instrumental variable regression model which accounts for potential endogeneity issue in the data and the Generalized Least Square regression model. The analysis covered 14 West African countries and spans over the period 1980 to 2016. The key results are as follows. First, we find evidence that fiscal policy has been more persistence in the region. This suggests that the governments of West African economies are either unwilling or just unable to adequately implement counter-cyclical fiscal policy. Second, fiscal policymaking has generally been drivenby political and institutional factor rather than on the basis of sound economic considerations. And third, the core politico-institutional factors determining fiscal persistence include corruption, government effectiveness and rule of law.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Fiscal Persistence, political stability, Corruption, West Africa
• Subjects: E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E6 - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook > E62 - Fiscal Policy; H - Public Economics > H3 - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

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