Three-sided matchings and separable preferences

Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Three-sided matchings and separable preferences.

Abstract

In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory

References

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