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The revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly

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Abstract

The revelation principle asserts that for any indirect mechanism and equilibrium, there is a corresponding direct mechanism with truth as an equilibrium. Although the revelation principle has been a fundamental theorem in the theory of mechanism design for a long time, so far the costs related to strategic actions of agents have not been fully discussed. In this paper, we propose the notion of profit function, and claim that the definitions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism and Bayesian incentive compatibility should be based on the profit function instead of the utility function when strategies of agents are costly. After then, we derive two key results: (1) The strategic action of each agent in a direct mechanism is just to report a type, and each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect mechanism; (2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of revelation principle is wrong. We construct a labor model with one firm and two agents to show that a Bayesian implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable, which contradicts the revelation principle.

Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design.

1 Introduction

The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in mechanism design theory [1–3]. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (Page 884, Line 24 [3]): “*The implication of the revelation principle is ... to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully*

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implementable.” Put in other words, the revelation principle says: “*suppose that there exists a mechanism that implements a social choice function f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium*” (Page 76, Theorem 2.4, [4]). Relevant definitions about the revelation principle are given in Section 2, which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D of MWG’s textbook [3].

Generally speaking, agents may spend some costs when participating a mechanism. There are two kinds of costs possibly occurred in a mechanism: 1) *strategic costs*, which are possibly spent by agents when performing strategic actions¹; 2) *misreporting costs*, which are possibly spent by agents when reporting types falsely.² In the traditional literature of mechanism design, costs are usually referred to the former. Recently, some researchers began to investigate misreporting costs[6,7]. For every type θ and every type $\hat{\theta}$ that an agent might misreport, Kephart and Conitzer [7] defined a cost function as $c(\theta, \hat{\theta})$ for doing so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case where $c(\theta, \hat{\theta}) = 0$ everywhere, and partial verification is a special case where $c(\theta, \hat{\theta}) \in \{0, \infty\}$ [8,9]. Kephart and Conitzer [7] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless and misreporting is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold.

Despite these accomplishments, so far people seldom consider the two kinds of costs simultaneously. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the revelation principle holds or not when two kinds of costs are considered. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we propose the notion of profit function (see Note 1), and claim that the definitions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism and Bayesian incentive compatibility should be based on the profit function instead of the utility function when strategies of agents are costly (see Definition 23.D.1’ and Definition 23.D.3’). After then, we derive two key results:

- (1) Each agent’s strategy in a direct mechanism is just to report a type. Hence each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect mechanism (see Proposition 1);
- (2) When strategies of agents are costly, the proof of revelation principle in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see Proposition 2).

In Section 3, we construct a labor model with one firm and two agents, then define a social choice function f and an indirect mechanism, in which strategies of agents are costly. In Section 4, we prove f can be implemented by the indirect mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium (see Proposition 3). In Section 5, we show that f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium under some conditions (see Proposition 4), which contradicts the revelation principle. In the end, Section 6 draws conclusions.

¹ For example, agents spend education costs in a job market [5].

² It is usually assumed that each agent can report his true type with zero cost.

2 Analysis of strategic costs

In this section, we will investigate costs spent by agents when playing strategies in a mechanism. In the beginning, we cite some definitions from Section 23.B and Section 23.D of MWG's textbook [3] and make comments.

Consider a setting with I agents,³ indexed by $i = 1, \dots, I$. These agents make a collective choice from a set X of possible alternatives. Prior to the choice, each agent i privately observes his type θ_i that determines his preferences over the alternatives in X . The set of possible types for agent i is denoted as Θ_i . Each agent i is assumed to be an expected utility maximizer, whose Bernoulli utility function over the outcome $x \in X$ given his type θ_i is $u_i(x, \theta_i)$ (see Section 23.B, Page 858, [3]).

Note 1: Generally speaking, when an agent performs a strategic action in participating a game, he usually needs to spend some monetary costs (or make some efforts which can be quantified as monetary costs). Assume each agent's costs are only relevant to his strategic action and private type, and are independent of the game outcome.⁴

Formally, suppose each agent i with private type $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$ chooses a strategy s_i and performs a strategic action $s_i(\theta_i)$, then his strategic costs can be denoted as $c_i(s_i(\theta_i), \theta_i)$. Suppose the outcome is $x \in X$, then each agent i 's net profit can be denoted as a profit function:

$$p_i(x, s_i(\theta_i), \theta_i) = u_i(x, \theta_i) - c_i(s_i(\theta_i), \theta_i). \quad (1)$$

Discussion 1: Someone may argue that the utility function $u_i(x, \theta_i)$ already includes the strategic costs $c_i(s_i(\theta_i), \theta_i)$ spent by agent i in participating a game, thus it is not necessary to define the profit function. For example, In Section 13.C of MWG's book (Page 450, the fourth line from the bottom, [3]), the authors use $u(w, e|\theta)$ to denote the utility of a type θ agent who chooses education level e and receives wage w , and $u(w, e|\theta) = w - c(e, \theta)$.

Answer 1: In the setting of signaling given in Section 13.C of MWG's book, agent's utility function $u(w, e|\theta)$ contains three parameters: wage w (*i.e.*, the outcome received by the agent), education level e (*i.e.*, the strategy chosen by the agent) and agent's type θ . As a comparison, in the setting of mechanism design given in Section 23.B of MWG's book, agent's utility function $u_i(x, \theta_i)$ contains only two parameters: the outcome x and the type θ_i . Since there is no parameter in $u_i(x, \theta_i)$ to represent strategic costs, $u_i(x, \theta_i)$ does not include any

³ The agent is denoted as "He".

⁴ This assumption is used just to simplify the following formulations and can be cancelled.

strategic cost related to any strategy.⁵ Therefore, in the setting of mechanism design given in Section 23.B [3], the profit function $p_i(x, s_i(\theta_i), \theta_i)$ should be used to describe agent i 's net profit in participating a game.⁶ \square

Definition 23.B.1 [3]: A *social choice function* (SCF) is a function $f : \Theta_1 \times \cdots \times \Theta_I \rightarrow X$ that, for each possible profile of the agents' types $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I$, assigns a collective choice $f(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I) \in X$.

Definition 23.B.3 [3]: A *mechanism* $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$ is a collection of I strategy sets S_1, \dots, S_I and an outcome function $g : S_1 \times \cdots \times S_I \rightarrow X$. A mechanism can be viewed as an institution with rules governing the procedure for making the collective choice. The allowed actions of each agent i are summarized by the strategy set S_i , and the rule for how agents' actions get turned into a social choice is given by the outcome function $g(\cdot)$. The strategy of each agent i in the game induced by a mechanism is a function $s_i : \Theta_i \rightarrow S_i$. The mechanism combined with possible types $(\Theta_1, \dots, \Theta_I)$, the probability density $\phi(\cdot)$ over the possible realizations of $\theta \in \Theta_1 \times \cdots \times \Theta_I$, and utility functions (u_1, \dots, u_I) defines a Bayesian game of incomplete information.⁷

Definition 23.B.5 [3]: A *direct mechanism* is a mechanism $\Gamma' = (S'_1, \dots, S'_I, g'(\cdot))$ in which $S'_i = \Theta_i$ for all i and $g'(\theta) = f(\theta)$ for all $\theta \in \Theta_1 \times \cdots \times \Theta_I$.

Note 2: In a direct mechanism, each agent i 's strategy $s'_i : \Theta_i \rightarrow \Theta_i$ can be viewed as an oral and costless announcement: *i.e.*, the strategy of each agent i with private type θ_i is to choose a type $s'_i(\theta_i) \in \Theta_i$ to report, and $s'_i(\theta_i)$ does not need to be his private type θ_i . After the designer receives all reports $s'_1(\theta_1), \dots, s'_I(\theta_I)$, she must announce the outcome $f(s'_1(\theta_1), \dots, s'_I(\theta_I))$.

Definition 23.D.1 [3]: The strategy profile $s^*(\cdot) = (s_1^*(\cdot), \dots, s_I^*(\cdot))$ is a *Bayesian Nash equilibrium* of mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$ if, for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(g(s_i^*(\theta_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) | \theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(g(\hat{s}_i, s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) | \theta_i] \quad (2)$$

for all $\hat{s}_i \in S_i$.

⁵ Put differently, suppose that there are two cases where agent i with type θ_i has two different strategies to obtain the same outcome x , then there shall be two different kinds of strategic costs and utilities. But according to the utility function $u_i(x, \theta_i)$, these two different cases will lead to the same utility $u_i(x, \theta_i)$. The reason for this contradiction is that the definition of the utility function $u_i(x, \theta_i)$ omits the parameter representing agent's strategy, and hence cannot include the costs related to agent's strategy.

⁶ Note that the utility function $u(w, e | \theta) = w - c(e, \theta)$ given in Section 13.C [3] is just equivalent to the profit function defined here.

⁷ The mechanism designer is denoted as "She".

Note 3: In Definition 23.D.1, the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a game induced by an indirect mechanism is based on the utility function. Generally speaking, in an indirect mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$, each agent i 's strategy $s_i(\theta_i)$ is an action that requires some costs to be performed, *i.e.*, $c_i(s_i(\theta_i), \theta_i) > 0$. As pointed out in Answer 1, the utility function $u_i(x, \theta_i)$ of each agent i only describes his utility with respect to the outcome x but misses his strategic costs, hence cannot describe his net profit. Because it is the net profit that each rational agent really concerns in any game induced by any mechanism, the profit function should be used to define the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism.⁸ Formally, Definition 23.D.1 should be reformulated as follows:

Definition 23.D.1' The strategy profile $s^*(\cdot) = (s_1^*(\cdot), \dots, s_I^*(\cdot))$ is a *Bayesian Nash equilibrium* of mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$ if, for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[p_i(g(s_i^*(\theta_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), s_i^*(\theta_i), \theta_i)|\theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[p_i(g(\hat{s}_i, s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \hat{s}_i, \theta_i)|\theta_i] \quad (3)$$

i.e.,

$$\begin{aligned} E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(g(s_i^*(\theta_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) - c_i(s_i^*(\theta_i), \theta_i))|\theta_i] \geq \\ E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(g(\hat{s}_i, s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) - c_i(\hat{s}_i, \theta_i))|\theta_i] \end{aligned}$$

for all $\hat{s}_i \in S_i$, in which p_i is the profit of agent i given by Eq (1).

Definition 23.D.2 [3]: The mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$ *implements the social choice function $f(\cdot)$ in Bayesian Nash equilibrium* if there is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ , $s^*(\cdot) = (s_1^*(\cdot), \dots, s_I^*(\cdot))$, such that $g(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$ for all $\theta \in \Theta$.

Definition 23.D.3 [3]: The social choice function $f(\cdot)$ is *truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium* (or *Bayesian incentive compatible*) if $s_i'^*(\theta_i) = \theta_i$ for all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$ and $i = 1, \dots, I$ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism $\Gamma' = (S'_1, \dots, S'_I, g'(\cdot))$, in which $S'_i = \Theta_i$, $g' = f$. That is, if for all $i = 1, \dots, I$ and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(f(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i)|\theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(f(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i)|\theta_i], \quad (23.D.1)$$

for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$.

⁸ In most of practical cases, strategies of agents are costly actions. Only in very limited cases (*e.g.*, where strategies of agents are purely oral announcements) can strategies be viewed costless, and by Eq (1) the utility function is equal to the profit function. Thus, the traditional definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium based on the utility function holds only in these limited cases.

Note 4: In the direct mechanism $\Gamma' = (S'_1, \dots, S'_I, g'(\cdot))$, for each agent i with private type θ_i , there are two cases as follows:

1) If he reports truthfully, *i.e.*, $s'_i(\theta_i) = \theta_i$, then $c_i(\theta_i, \theta_i) = 0$ by Footnote 2, and $p_i(x, s'_i(\theta_i), \theta_i) = u_i(x, \theta_i)$ by Eq (1).

2) If he reports falsely, *i.e.*, $s'_i(\theta_i) = \hat{\theta}_i \neq \theta_i$, then there may exist misreporting costs $c_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_i)$, and $p_i(x, s'_i(\theta_i), \theta_i) = u_i(x, \theta_i) - c_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_i)$ by Eq (1).

Similar to Note 3, the profit function should be used to define the notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility. Following Definition 23.D.1', Definition 23.D.3 should be reformulated as follows:

Definition 23.D.3' The social choice function $f(\cdot)$ is *truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium* (or *Bayesian incentive compatible*) if $s_i^*(\theta_i) = \theta_i$ for all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$ and $i = 1, \dots, I$ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism $\Gamma' = (S'_1, \dots, S'_I, g'(\cdot))$, in which $S'_i = \Theta_i$, $g' = f$. That is, if for all $i = 1, \dots, I$ and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(f(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) | \theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(f(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) - c_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_i) | \theta_i], \quad (4)$$

for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$, in which $c_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_i)$ is the cost for agent i with private type θ_i to misreport $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$.⁹

Proposition 1: The strategy of each agent i in the direct mechanism $\Gamma' = (S'_1, \dots, S'_I, g'(\cdot))$ is just to report a type from Θ_i . Each agent i does not need to take any other action to prove himself that his reported type is truthful, and should not play any strategic action as specified in any indirect mechanism. Hence, *in a direct mechanism, each agent does not need to spend any strategic cost related to strategic actions specified in any indirect mechanism.*

Proof: By Definition 23.B.5, in the direct mechanism Γ' , the strategy set $S'_i = \Theta_i$, thus the strategy s'_i chosen by agent i with private type θ_i is just to choose a type from Θ_i to report, *i.e.*, $s'_i(\theta_i) \in \Theta_i$. Obviously, the designer cannot enforce each agent to report truthfully, and *each agent does not need to take any action to prove himself that his reported type is truthful.*¹⁰

Hence, each agent i with true type θ_i will misreport another type $s'_i(\theta_i) \neq \theta_i$ whenever doing so is worthwhile. After the designer receives $s'_1(\theta_1), \dots, s'_I(\theta_I)$, she has no way to verify whether these reports are truthful or not. What the

⁹ If the misreporting cost $c_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_i) = 0$ for each agent i , then Definition 23.D.3' will be reduced to Definition 23.D.3.

¹⁰ Otherwise, assume to the contrary that each agent i has to prove himself that his reported type is truthful. Then *there will be no information disadvantage from the viewpoint of the designer*: the agents' types are no longer their private information, and the designer can directly specify her favorite outcome $f(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I)$ after receiving agents' reports $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I$. This case contradicts the basic framework of mechanism design, therefore the assumption does not hold.

designer can do is just to announce $f(s'_1(\theta_1), \dots, s'_I(\theta_I))$ as the outcome. Thus, *it is wrong to assume that in a direct mechanism the designer can require each agent perform any strategic action specified in any indirect mechanism*. As a result, in a direct mechanism, each agent i does not need to spend any strategic cost related to strategic actions specified in any indirect mechanism. \square

Discussion 2: Someone may disagree with Proposition 1. For a given social choice function f , suppose there is an indirect mechanism Γ that implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Consider this equilibrium, there is a mapping from vectors of agents' types into outcomes. Now we take the mapping to be a revelation game, *i.e.*, each agent chooses a type to report to the designer, and the designer suggests each agent an action which he would take in Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the indirect mechanism Γ . Then no type of any agent can benefit by deviating from reporting his true type and performing the suggested action. As a result, the notion of direct mechanism is extended and each agent spends the same strategic costs in the “extended direct mechanism” as what he would spend in the indirect mechanism.

Answer 2: It should be noted that behind the revelation game, there actually exists an underlying assumption: *Each agent i is willing to inform the designer his strategy $s_i(\cdot)$ chosen in the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game induced by the indirect mechanism Γ* . Only when this assumption holds can the designer know which action she should suggest to each agent i after receiving an arbitrary profile of agents' reported types, since the suggested action for each agent i is just what he would take in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

However, the strategy of each agent i is his *private* function $s_i : \Theta_i \rightarrow S_i$, which describes his individual strategic action $s_i(\theta_i)$ for each possible type $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$ [3]. In the framework of mechanism design, the designer is ALWAYS at the information disadvantage: she does not know neither the private type θ_i of each agent i , nor the strategy function $s_i(\cdot)$ that describes how each agent i acts strategically.¹¹ What the designer knows from each agent i are only one result, *i.e.*, $s_i(\theta_i)$. Therefore, it is *wrong* to imagine that each agent i will voluntarily reveal his private strategy $s_i(\cdot)$ to the designer (or a virtual mediator) *without obtaining any more profit*.¹²

To sum up, the logic of the extended direct mechanism is *circular*: At first, each agent i is assumed to be willing to reveal his one part of private information (*i.e.*, private strategy $s_i : \Theta_i \rightarrow S_i$) to the designer. Then, each agent i “finds

¹¹ Otherwise, assume to the contrary that the designer knows each agent i 's strategy function $s_i(\cdot)$, then she can easily infer each agent i 's private type θ_i from $s_i(\theta_i)$, which is the input parameter of the outcome function. This case contradicts the basic framework of mechanism design and does not hold.

¹² The notion of direct mechanism defined in MWG's book does not need the so-called assumption (see Definition 23.B.5, [3])

it optimal” to reveal his another part of private information (*i.e.*, private type θ_i) to the designer, and obey the suggested action $s_i(\theta_i)$ sent by the designer. Obviously, this circular reasoning is invalid. Hence, the so-called extended direct mechanism does not hold. \square

Proposition 2: Given an indirect mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$, if each strategic action $s_i(\theta_i)$ is costly, *i.e.*, $c_i(s_i(\theta_i), \theta_i) > 0$, then the proof of the revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong.

Proof: According to the proof of Proposition 23.D.1 (see Appendix), suppose that there exists an indirect mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$ that implements the social choice function $f(\cdot)$ in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists a profile of strategies $s^*(\cdot) = (s_1^*(\cdot), \dots, s_I^*(\cdot))$ such that the mapping $g(s^*(\cdot)) : \Theta_1 \times \dots \times \Theta_I \rightarrow X$ from a vector of agents’ types $\theta = (\theta_1, \dots, \theta_I)$ into an outcome $g(s^*(\theta))$ is equal to the desired outcome $f(\theta)$, *i.e.*, $g(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$ for all $\theta \in \Theta_1 \times \dots \times \Theta_I$. By Definition 23.D.1’, for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$\begin{aligned} E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(g(s_i^*(\theta_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) - c_i(s_i^*(\theta_i), \theta_i)) | \theta_i] \geq \\ E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(g(\hat{s}_i, s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) - c_i(\hat{s}_i, \theta_i)) | \theta_i] \end{aligned}$$

for all $\hat{s}_i \in S_i$. Thus, for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$\begin{aligned} E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(g(s_i^*(\theta_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) - c_i(s_i^*(\theta_i), \theta_i)) | \theta_i] \geq \\ E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(g(s_i^*(\hat{\theta}_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) - c_i(s_i^*(\hat{\theta}_i), \theta_i)) | \theta_i] \end{aligned}$$

for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$.

Since $g(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$ for all θ , then for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(f(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) - c_i(s_i^*(\theta_i), \theta_i)) | \theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[(u_i(f(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) - c_i(s_i^*(\hat{\theta}_i), \theta_i)) | \theta_i], \quad (5)$$

for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$. Note that this inequality *cannot* infer the inequality in Definition 23.D.3’, which represents the sufficient condition of Bayesian incentive compatibility. Consequently, the proof of the revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong. \square

3 A labor model and a social choice function f

Here we construct a labor model to show revelation principle does not always hold. The labor model uses ideas from the first-price sealed auction model in Example 23.B.5 [3] and the signaling model [3,5]. There are one firm (*i.e.*, the designer) and two agents. Agent 1 and Agent 2 differ in the number of units of output that they produce if hired by the firm, which is denoted by private

productivity type. The firm chooses wage $w > 0$ and wants to hire an agent with productivity as high as possible, and the two agents compete for this job.

For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:

- 1) The possible productivity type θ_i of each agent i ($i = 1, 2$) is θ_L or θ_H , where $\theta_H > \theta_L > 0$. Each agent i 's productivity type is his private information.
- 2) There is a certificate that the firm can publicly announce as a hire criterion. If each of (or neither of) two agents has the certificate, then each agent will be hired with probability 0.5. The education level corresponding to the certificate is $e_H > 0$. Each agent decides by himself whether to get the certificate or not, hence the possible education level e_i of each agent $i = 1, 2$ is e_H or 0. The education level does nothing for an agent's productivity.
- 3) The strategic cost of obtaining education level e_i for agent i ($i = 1, 2$) with productivity type θ_i is given by a function $c_i(e_i, \theta_i) = e_i/\theta_i$. That is, the strategic cost is lower for a higher productivity agent to obtain the certificate.
- 4) The misreporting cost for an agent with low productivity to report the high productivity type θ_H is a fixed value $c_{mis} \geq 0$. In addition, a high-productivity agent can report the low-productivity type θ_L with zero costs.

The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y_1, y_2) , where y_i denotes the probability that agent i gets the job. Recall that the firm does not know the exact productivity types of two agents, and its aim is to hire an agent with productivity as high as possible. This aim can be represented by a social choice function $f(\theta) = (y_1(\theta), y_2(\theta))$, in which $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2)$.

$$f(\theta) = (y_1(\theta), y_2(\theta)) = \begin{cases} (1, 0), & \text{if } \theta_1 > \theta_2 \\ (0.5, 0.5), & \text{if } \theta_1 = \theta_2 \\ (0, 1), & \text{if } \theta_1 < \theta_2 \end{cases}. \quad (6)$$

In order to implement the above social choice function $f(\theta)$, the firm designs an indirect mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, S_2, g)$ as follows: Each agent $i = 1, 2$, conditional on his type $\theta_i \in \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$, chooses his education level as a bid $e_i : \{\theta_L, \theta_H\} \rightarrow \{0, e_H\}$. The strategy set S_i is the set of agent i 's all possible bids, and the outcome function g is defined as:

$$g(e_1, e_2) = (g_1, g_2) = \begin{cases} (1, 0), & \text{if } e_1 = e_H, e_2 = 0 \\ (0.5, 0.5), & \text{if } e_1 = e_2 \\ (0, 1), & \text{if } e_1 = 0, e_2 = e_H \end{cases}, \quad (7)$$

where g_i ($i = 1, 2$) is the probability that agent i gets the job. ¹³

Let u_1, u_2 be the utilities of agent 1, 2, and p_1, p_2 be the profits of agent 1, 2

¹³ For the case of $e_i < e_j$, $i, j = 1, 2$, $i \neq j$, agent i has no chance to get the job.

from participating the indirect mechanism Γ respectively. For $i, j = 1, 2, i \neq j$,

$$u_i(e_i, e_j; \theta_i) = \begin{cases} w, & \text{if } e_i > e_j \\ 0.5w, & \text{if } e_i = e_j, \\ 0, & \text{if } e_i < e_j \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

$$p_i(e_i, e_j; \theta_i) = u_i(e_i, e_j; \theta_i) - c_i(e_i, \theta_i) = u_i(e_i, e_j; \theta_i) - e_i/\theta_i. \quad (9)$$

The item “ e_i/θ_i ” in Eq (9) denotes the strategic costs spent by agent i with type θ_i when he obtains the education level e_i . Suppose the reserved utilities of agent 1 and agent 2 are both zero, then the individual rationality (IR) constraints are: $p_i(e_i, e_j; \theta_i) \geq 0, i = 1, 2$.

4 f is Bayesian implementable

Proposition 3: If $w = 2e_H/\theta_H$, then the social choice function $f(\theta)$ given in Eq (6) is Bayesian implementable, *i.e.*, it can be implemented by the indirect mechanism Γ given by Eq (7) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Proof: Consider a separating strategy, *i.e.*, agents with different productivity types choose different education levels,

$$e_1(\theta_1) = \begin{cases} e_H, & \text{if } \theta_1 = \theta_H \\ 0, & \text{if } \theta_1 = \theta_L \end{cases}, \quad e_2(\theta_2) = \begin{cases} e_H, & \text{if } \theta_2 = \theta_H \\ 0, & \text{if } \theta_2 = \theta_L \end{cases}. \quad (10)$$

Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Assume $e_j^*(\theta_j)$ ($j = 1, 2$) takes this form, *i.e.*,

$$e_j^*(\theta_j) = \begin{cases} e_H, & \text{if } \theta_j = \theta_H \\ 0, & \text{if } \theta_j = \theta_L \end{cases}, \quad (11)$$

then we consider agent i 's problem ($i = 1, 2, i \neq j$). For each $\theta_i \in \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$, agent i solves a maximization problem: $\max_{e_i} h(e_i, \theta_i)$, where by Eq (9) and Footnote 13, the object function is

$$h(e_i, \theta_i) = (w - e_i/\theta_i)P(e_i > e_j^*(\theta_j)) + (0.5w - e_i/\theta_i)P(e_i = e_j^*(\theta_j)), \quad (12)$$

where $P(\cdot)$ returns value 1 if the input condition is true, and value 0 otherwise. We discuss this maximization problem in four different cases:

1) Suppose $\theta_i = \theta_j = \theta_L$, then $e_j^*(\theta_j) = 0$ by Eq (11).

$$\begin{aligned} h(e_i, \theta_i) &= (w - e_i/\theta_L)P(e_i > 0) + (0.5w - e_i/\theta_L)P(e_i = 0) \\ &= \begin{cases} w - e_H/\theta_L, & \text{if } e_i = e_H \\ 0.5w, & \text{if } e_i = 0 \end{cases}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $0 < w < 2e_H/\theta_L$, then $w - e_H/\theta_L < 0.5w$, *i.e.*, $h(e_H, \theta_L) < h(0, \theta_L)$, which means the optimal level of $e_i(\theta_L)$ is 0. In this case, $e_i^*(\theta_L) = 0$.

2) Suppose $\theta_i = \theta_L$, $\theta_j = \theta_H$, then $e_j^*(\theta_j) = e_H$ by Eq (11).

$$\begin{aligned} h(e_i, \theta_i) &= (w - e_i/\theta_L)P(e_i > e_H) + (0.5w - e_i/\theta_L)P(e_i = e_H) \\ &= \begin{cases} 0.5w - e_H/\theta_L, & \text{if } e_i = e_H \\ 0, & \text{if } e_i = 0 \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $0 < w < 2e_H/\theta_L$, then $0.5w - e_H/\theta_L < 0$, *i.e.*, $h(e_H, \theta_L) < h(0, \theta_L)$, which means the optimal level of $e_i(\theta_L)$ is 0. In this case, $e_i^*(\theta_L) = 0$.

3) Suppose $\theta_i = \theta_H$, $\theta_j = \theta_L$, then $e_j^*(\theta_j) = 0$ by Eq (11).

$$\begin{aligned} h(e_i, \theta_i) &= (w - e_i/\theta_H)P(e_i > 0) + (0.5w - e_i/\theta_H)P(e_i = 0) \\ &= \begin{cases} w - e_H/\theta_H, & \text{if } e_i = e_H \\ 0.5w, & \text{if } e_i = 0 \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $w > 2e_H/\theta_H$, then $w - e_H/\theta_H > 0.5w$, *i.e.*, $h(e_H, \theta_H) > h(0, \theta_H)$, which means the optimal level of $e_i(\theta_H)$ is e_H . In this case, $e_i^*(\theta_H) = e_H$.

4) Suppose $\theta_i = \theta_j = \theta_H$, then $e_j^*(\theta_j) = e_H$ by Eq (11).

$$\begin{aligned} h(e_i, \theta_i) &= (w - e_i/\theta_H)P(e_i > e_H) + (0.5w - e_i/\theta_H)P(e_i = e_H) \\ &= \begin{cases} 0.5w - e_H/\theta_H, & \text{if } e_i = e_H \\ 0, & \text{if } e_i = 0 \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if $w > 2e_H/\theta_H$, then $0.5w - e_H/\theta_H > 0$, *i.e.*, $h(e_H, \theta_H) > h(0, \theta_H)$, which means the optimal level of $e_i(\theta_H)$ is e_H . In this case, $e_i^*(\theta_H) = e_H$.

From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage $w \in (2e_H/\theta_H, 2e_H/\theta_L)$, then the strategy $e_i^*(\theta_i)$ of agent i ($i = 1, 2$)

$$e_i^*(\theta_i) = \begin{cases} e_H, & \text{if } \theta_i = \theta_H \\ 0, & \text{if } \theta_i = \theta_L \end{cases} \quad (13)$$

will be the optimal response to the strategy $e_j^*(\theta_j)$ of agent j ($j \neq i$) given in Eq (11). Obviously, for a rational designer, she shall choose the minimal boundary of the wage range $(2e_H/\theta_H, 2e_H/\theta_L)$, *i.e.*, $w = 2e_H/\theta_H$.¹⁴ As a result, the strategy profile $(e_1^*(\theta_1), e_2^*(\theta_2))$ is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game induced by Γ .

¹⁴ In principle, the designer shall choose the wage a little bit larger than $2e_H/\theta_H$. However, we omit this tiny difference here.

Now let us investigate whether the wage $w = 2e_H/\theta_H$ satisfies the individual rationality (IR) constraints or not. Following Eq (9) and Eq (13), the (IR) constraints are changed into: $0.5w - e_H/\theta_H \geq 0$. Therefore, $w = 2e_H/\theta_H$ satisfies the (IR) constraints.

In summary, if $w = 2e_H/\theta_H$, then by Eq (7) and Eq (13), for any $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2)$, where $\theta_1, \theta_2 \in \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$, there holds:

$$g(e_1^*(\theta_1), e_2^*(\theta_2)) = \begin{cases} (1, 0), & \text{if } \theta_1 > \theta_2 \\ (0.5, 0.5), & \text{if } \theta_1 = \theta_2, \\ (0, 1), & \text{if } \theta_1 < \theta_2 \end{cases} \quad (14)$$

which is the social choice function $f(\theta)$ given in Eq (6). Thus, f can be implemented by the indirect mechanism Γ in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. \square

5 The Bayesian implementable f is not truthfully implementable

In this section, we will show by the following proposition that a Bayesian implementable social choice function is not truthfully implementable, which means that *the revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly*.

Proposition 4: If the misreporting cost $c_{mis} \in [0, 0.5w)$, then the social choice function f given in Eq (6) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism $\Gamma' = (\Theta_1, \Theta_2, f(\theta))$, in which $\Theta_1 = \Theta_2 = \{\theta_L, \theta_H\}$, $\theta = (\theta_1, \theta_2) \in \Theta_1 \times \Theta_2$. The strategy of each agent i ($i = 1, 2$) with private type θ_i is to strategically report a type $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$ to the firm¹⁵. Then the firm performs the outcome function $f(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2)$ as specified in Eq (6).

According to Proposition 1, in the direct mechanism Γ' , each agent i only reports a type and does not spend any strategic cost. The only possible cost for agent i is the misreporting cost c_{mis} for a low-productivity agent to falsely report the high-productivity type θ_H . For agent i ($i = 1, 2$), if his private type

¹⁵ Here $\hat{\theta}_i$ may not be equal to θ_i .

is $\theta_i = \theta_L$, then by Eq (9) his profit will be as follows:

$$p'_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j; \theta_i = \theta_L) = \begin{cases} w - c_{mis}, & \text{if } (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j) = (\theta_H, \theta_L) \\ 0.5w - c_{mis}, & \text{if } (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j) = (\theta_H, \theta_H) \\ 0.5w, & \text{if } (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j) = (\theta_L, \theta_L) \\ 0, & \text{if } (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j) = (\theta_L, \theta_H) \end{cases}, \quad i \neq j. \quad (15)$$

If agent i 's private type is $\theta_i = \theta_H$, then by Eq (9) his profit will be as follows:

$$p'_i(\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j; \theta_i = \theta_H) = \begin{cases} w, & \text{if } (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j) = (\theta_H, \theta_L) \\ 0.5w, & \text{if } (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j) = (\theta_H, \theta_H), \text{ or } (\theta_L, \theta_L), \quad i \neq j. \\ 0, & \text{if } (\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j) = (\theta_L, \theta_H) \end{cases} \quad (16)$$

Note that the item " e_i/θ_i " occurred in Eq (9) disappears in Eq (15) and Eq (16), because each agent i does not spend any strategic cost in the direct mechanism. Following Eq (15) and Eq (16), we will discuss the profit matrix of agent i and j ($i \neq j, i, j = 1, 2$) in four cases as follows. The first and second entry in the parenthesis denote the profit of agent i and j after reporting types $\hat{\theta}_i, \hat{\theta}_j$ to the firm respectively.

Case 1: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are $\theta_i = \theta_H, \theta_j = \theta_H$.

$\theta_i = \theta_H \backslash \theta_j = \theta_H$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_L$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_L$	$(0.5w, 0.5w)$	$(0, w)$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H$	$(w, 0)$	$(0.5w, 0.5w)$

It can be seen that the dominant strategy for agent i and j is to truthfully report, *i.e.*, $\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H, \hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$. Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_H, \theta_H)$.

Case 2: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are $\theta_i = \theta_L, \theta_j = \theta_H$.

$\theta_i = \theta_L \backslash \theta_j = \theta_H$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_L$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_L$	$(0.5w, 0.5w)$	$(0, w)$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H$	$(w - c_{mis}, 0)$	$(0.5w - c_{mis}, 0.5w)$

It can be seen that the dominant strategy for agent j is still to truthfully report $\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$; and if the misreporting cost $0 \leq c_{mis} < 0.5w$, the dominant strategy for agent i is to falsely report $\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H$, otherwise agent i would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of $c_{mis} \in [0, 0.5w)$, the unique Nash equilibrium is $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_H, \theta_H)$.

Case 3: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are $\theta_i = \theta_H, \theta_j = \theta_L$.

$\theta_i = \theta_H \backslash \theta_j = \theta_L$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_L$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_L$	$(0.5w, 0.5w)$	$(0, w - c_{mis})$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H$	$(w, 0)$	$(0.5w, 0.5w - c_{mis})$

It can be seen that the dominant strategy for agent i is still to truthfully report $\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H$; and if the misreporting cost $0 \leq c_{mis} < 0.5w$, the dominant strategy for agent j is to falsely report $\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$, otherwise agent j would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of $c_{mis} \in [0, 0.5w)$, the unique Nash equilibrium is $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_H, \theta_H)$.

Case 4: Suppose the private types of agent i and j are $\theta_i = \theta_L, \theta_j = \theta_L$.

$\theta_i = \theta_L \backslash \theta_j = \theta_L$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_L$	$\hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_L$	$(0.5w, 0.5w)$	$(0, w - c_{mis})$
$\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H$	$(w - c_{mis}, 0)$	$(0.5w - c_{mis}, 0.5w - c_{mis})$

It can be seen that if the misreporting cost $0 \leq c_{mis} < 0.5w$, the dominant strategy for both agent i and agent j is to falsely report, *i.e.*, $\hat{\theta}_i = \theta_H, \hat{\theta}_j = \theta_H$, otherwise both agents would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of $c_{mis} \in [0, 0.5w)$, the unique Nash equilibrium is $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_H, \theta_H)$.

To sum up, under the condition of $c_{mis} \in [0, 0.5w)$, the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the direct mechanism Γ' is to fixedly report $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_H, \theta_H)$, and the unique outcome of Γ' is that each agent has the same probability 0.5 to get the job offer. Consequently, the truthful report $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_1, \theta_2)$ (for all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i, i = 1, 2$) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism. By Definition 23.D.3', the Bayesian implementable social choice function $f(\theta)$ given in Eq (6) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium under the conditions of $w = 2e_H/\theta_H$ and $c_{mis} \in [0, 0.5w)$, which means that *the revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly*. \square

Discussion 3: Someone may argue that the labor model is not fundamentally different from an auction where making a bid is costly in the sense that the bidder has to pay the bid amount if he wins the object. The difference is that in the labor model, the education cost is not paid to the firm. However, this difference is immaterial since the payment of the education cost is verifiable by the firm.

Answer 3: In the label model, after the firm announces the outcome function (see Eq (7)), each agent i individually chooses his education level e_i to be 0 or e_H (*i.e.*, decides whether to undergo the education and produce the certifi-

cate). For each agent i , it is the observable education level e_i rather than the private education cost $c_i = e_i/\theta_i$ that acts as his bid. Thus, the labor model is fundamentally different from the standard auction in that each agent i 's bid e_i *only reflects what his strategic action is* (i.e., whether to obtain the certificate or not), *but does not reflect how much he pays for his action* (i.e., the value of his education cost is not observable and verifiable to the firm). Hence, the argument does not hold. \square

Discussion 4: Someone may argue that the labor model considers two different economic environments:

- 1) In the case in which the social choice function is Bayesian implementable (Proposition 3), each agent needs to get some education before working at the firm and has to spend the cost of obtaining an education level.
- 2) On the other hand, in the case in which the social choice function is not truthfully implementable (Proposition 4), each agent does not need to get any education to work at the firm and hence there is no education cost.

The difference between these two cases might be interpreted as the difference in sets of feasible outcomes rather than that in mechanisms the firm uses.

Answer 4: This argument omits the reason why there are these two different cases.

- 1) In the former case, the agents participate the indirect mechanism. Each agent i with type θ_i is required by the indirect mechanism to choose an education level, and thus needs to spend the education cost e_H/θ_i if his education level $e_i = e_H$.
- 2) In the latter case, the agents participate the direct mechanism. According to the direct mechanism, the only legal action for each agent is just to report a type, and he does not need to spend any education cost except for possible misreporting costs.

Thus, the difference in two sets of feasible outcomes is just from the difference in two different mechanism the firm uses. \square

6 Conclusions

This paper investigates strategic costs and misreporting costs possibly spent by agents in a mechanism. We propose the notion of profit function, and claim that *the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of mechanism should be based on the profit function instead of the utility function when strategies of agents are costly*. We emphasize that each agent's strategy in a direct mechanism is just to report a type and he does not need to spend any strategic cost occurred in any indirect mechanism (see Proposition 1). The definitions of Bayesian Nash equilibrium and Bayesian incentive compatibility should be revised using the profit function (see Definition 23.D.1' and Definition 23.D.3', Section 2).

This is the key point why the proof of revelation principle given in Proposition 23.D.1 [3] is wrong (see Proposition 2). Since strategies of agents are usually costly actions in many practical cases (see Footnote 8), the revelation principle holds only in very limited cases where strategies of agents can be viewed costless.

In Section 3, we propose a labor model with one firm and two agents. Section 4 and Section 5 give detailed analysis about the labor model:

- 1) In the indirect mechanism, the profit of each agent is given by Eq (9), and the separating strategy profile $(e_1^*(\theta_1), e_2^*(\theta_2))$ given by Eq (13) is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium when wage $w = 2e_H/\theta_H$. Thus, the social choice function f can be implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
- 2) In the direct mechanism, the profit of each agent is revised from Eq (9) to Eq (15) and Eq (16). Under the condition of $c_{mis} \in [0, 0.5w)$, the unique equilibrium of the game induced by the direct mechanism is to fixedly report $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_H, \theta_H)$, and the truthful report $(\hat{\theta}_1, \hat{\theta}_2) = (\theta_1, \theta_2)$ is no longer the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, which means that the revelation principle does not hold in this case.
- 3) Different from Kephart and Conitzer [7], the revelation principle can fail to hold even when misreporting cost $c_{mis} = 0$ (see Proposition 4).

Appendix

Proposition 23.D.1 [3]: (*The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilibrium*) Suppose that there exists a mechanism $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$ that implements the social choice function $f(\cdot)$ in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then $f(\cdot)$ is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Proof: If $\Gamma = (S_1, \dots, S_I, g(\cdot))$ implements $f(\cdot)$ in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there exists a profile of strategies $s^*(\cdot) = (s_1^*(\cdot), \dots, s_I^*(\cdot))$ such that $g(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$ for all θ , and for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(g(s_i^*(\theta_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) | \theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(g(\hat{s}_i, s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) | \theta_i], \quad (23.D.2)$$

for all $\hat{s}_i \in S_i$. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(g(s_i^*(\theta_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) | \theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(g(s_i^*(\hat{\theta}_i), s_{-i}^*(\theta_{-i})), \theta_i) | \theta_i], \quad (23.D.3)$$

for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$. Since $g(s^*(\theta)) = f(\theta)$ for all θ , (23.D.3) means that, for all i and all $\theta_i \in \Theta_i$,

$$E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(f(\theta_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) | \theta_i] \geq E_{\theta_{-i}}[u_i(f(\hat{\theta}_i, \theta_{-i}), \theta_i) | \theta_i], \quad (23.D.4)$$

for all $\hat{\theta}_i \in \Theta_i$. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1)¹⁶, the condition for $f(\cdot)$ to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. \square

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¹⁶ The condition (23.D.1) is given in Definition 23.D.3, Section 2.