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Sex and the Business Cycle

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Abstract

This paper estimates the differences between the sexes in the depths, lengths, timing, and overall effects of recessions in the United States. I find that, prior to the mid-1980s, recessions had roughly the same effects on male and female employment growth, but that male employment stayed in recession for longer. Since then, however, recessions have hit male employment much harder per month, although female employment suffered longer recessions. Accounting for the sex-specific timing of recessions, as well as for forgone employment growth, (1) the negative effects of recessions on both male and female employment are much larger than is usually found and (2) male employment is hit relatively harder by recessions, although the difference between the sexes is much smaller than the previous literature indicates.

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I. Introduction

This paper estimates and examines the differences in the aggregate employment patterns of men and women over the business cycle. The economics literature has long recognized that fluctuations in the business cycle can have different aggregate effects on men and women. In particular, studies have found that recessions tend to affect male employment much more than female employment, hence the term "man-cession" coined by University of Michigan-Flint economist Mark Perry. What most distinguishes my results from the previous literature is that I allow for the employment cycles of men and women to have different peaks and troughs.[1] Specifically, I use a Markov-switching model to separate aggregate male and female employment growth into sex-specific recession and expansion phases. Using these results, I obtain new estimates of the relative effects of recessions on female and male employment.

The most-similar papers in terms of my objective are Engemann and Wall (2010) and Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller (2012). Both papers use household employment for the US to calculate the changes in employment between the peaks and troughs of recessions for several demographic categories, and both apply the same peaks and troughs to all categories.[2] Their results are typical in finding that recessions have had much larger negative effects on male employment relative to female employment: According to Engemann and Wall (see their Table 2), the average employment loss across the six recessions between 1974 and 2009 was 2.9 percent for men and 0.7 percent for women. For the Great Recession of 2007-2009, the employment declines were 6.4 percent for men and 2.6 percent for women.

Several papers have focused specifically on the relative the effects of the Great Recession. Rubery and Rafferty (2013) look at the UK, paying particular attention to the relative effects of the policy responses following the recession. Fodor and Nagy (2014), Nyberg (2014),

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[1] Studies usually assume that recessions begin and end at the same times for men and women, making the calculations a simple matter of comparing employment between the common peaks and troughs. These peaks and troughs are either the official NBER recession dates or the local max and min of aggregate employment.

[2] Engemann and Wall use a Markov-switching model applied to aggregate employment to determine the beginnings and ends of the six recessions between 1974 and 2009. Hoynes, Miller, and Schaller use the local maximums and minimums of aggregate employment for the dual-recession period starting in 1980 and the Great Recession of 2007-09.

and Duvvury and Finn (2014) look at Central and Eastern Europe Sweden, and Ireland, respectively. Christensen (2014) takes issue with the entire notion that the recession was worse for men in the US if other factors, such as occupational placement, relative wages, and financial responsibilities for children, are considered.

Recent papers also have looked beyond the raw calculations of the employment effects of recessions on men and women. Razzu and Singleton (2016), for example, examine how the flows among the three labor-market states—employment, unemployment, and out of the labor force—are affected by recessions. And, consistent with my attention to the differing timing and lengths of recessions for men and women, Peiro, Belaire-Franch, and Gonzalo (2012) and Bredemeier and Winkler (2017) show how the effects of shocks are stronger and more-persistent for male employment.

Following Rubery (1988), the literature has tended to focus on three hypothesis to explain how the business cycle might affect men and women differently. Under the *buffer hypothesis*, because women are not as attached to the labor force as men, they will tend to be the first to leave employment when a recession hits, and will be rehired first during recovery. Consequently, the effects of recession on female employment growth should be worse relative to male employment, but recovery from the recession should be stronger. According to the *segmentation hypothesis*, differences in female and male employment growth during recessions are driven by their respective representation across industries and occupations. For example, because men tend to be concentrated in recession-sensitive industries such as manufacturing, male employment should be hit harder by a recession. Finally, according to the *substitution hypothesis* the employment of women workers can rise during recessions as firms seek out lower-cost types of labor or through an *added worker effect* through which (usually) married women enter the labor force following their partners' job losses (Bryan and Longhi, 2017).

Of course, all three of these hypotheses can hold at the individual level and all affect aggregate female employment at the same time. In addition, governments tend to have vigorous policy responses to recessions and these policies can affect female and male employment

differently (Bredemeier, Juessen, and Winkler, 2017). In any event, it is beyond the scope and data limitations of this study to separate the various effects from one another. My present purposes are to document the relative experiences of aggregate employment growth for men and women during their recessionary phases, and to provide new calculations of the relative costs of recessions in terms of lost employment. Nevertheless, I do examine the potential role of the segmentation hypothesis.

II. Empirical model

Figures 1 and 2 motivate my approach using seasonally adjusted data from the Current Employment Survey of payroll employment for January 1964 through April 2015. Figure 1 presents quarterly growth of total employment over the period relative to the occurrence of official NBER recessions.[3] Two characteristics of the data are of most interest presently: NBER recessions are associated with periods of negative employment growth that sometimes lag the starts of recessions; and, beginning with the 1990-91 recession, total employment growth does not turn positive until at least several quarters after the end of the recession (i.e., "jobless" recoveries).

While it is well-know that the peaks and troughs of employment growth have not always lined up with official recessions, it has not been recognized that the peaks and troughs of male and female employment recessions differ from those of official recessions in their own ways. Figure 2 presents quarterly employment growth rates for males and females relative to NBER recessions. Note that for most quarters, whether during recession or expansion, employment grew faster for females than for males and the gap between the two was larger prior to 1990 when female labor force participation was rising steadily. Since then, however, the two growth rates have differed substantially *only* during recessions.

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[3] Note that NBER dates very closely aligned with the occurrence of negative real GDP growth.

Something not obvious from Figure 2 is the extent to which the timing in upturns and downturns has differed between men and women. For this I turn to the Markov-switching model of Hamilton (1989).[4] Put simply, the Markov-switching model is a way to filter a time series into recession and expansion phases by estimating the average growth rates during the two phases. By comparing the observed growth rate to the estimated expansion and recession growth rates, the model determines for each period the probability that the series is in recession. With distinct enough phases, the probability of recession will periodically switch from being close to 0 to being close to 1 (from expansion to recession), and vice versa.

In the Hamilton model, cyclical phases arise as the data series switches over time between recession and expansion, each with its own mean growth rate.[5] Let μ_0 be the mean growth rate of employment when the series is in expansion, and let μ_1, which is normalized to be negative, be the difference between the mean growth rates. In general, therefore, the growth rate of employment, y_t, is

$$y_t = \mu_0 + \mu_1 S_t + \varepsilon_t. \tag{1}$$

In equation (1), the switching between recession and expansion is governed by a state variable, $S_t = \{0,1\}$, and deviations from the mean growth rates are due to the stochastic disturbance, $\varepsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$. When S_t switches from 0 to 1, the growth rate switches from μ_0 to $\mu_0 + \mu_1$ (from expansion to recession), and vice versa.[6]

I estimate the model using the multi-move Gibbs-sampling procedure for Bayesian estimation of Markov-switching models implemented by Kim and Nelson (1999), and apply the Markov-switching model independently to the monthly growth rates of total employment, female employment, and male employment.[7] Because of the aforementioned differences between the

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[4] See Chauvet and Piger (2013) for a discussion of aggregate employment cycles and Markov-switching.
[5] See Piger (2009) for a discussion of the basic Markov-switching models and their extensions.
[6] Assume that the process for S_t is a first-order two-state Markov chain so that the probability process driving S_t is captured by the transition probabilities That is, the value of S_t summarizes any persistence from the previous period.
[7] See Chauvet and Piger (2013) for a full description of the estimation procedure.

first and second halves of the time period, I use a version of the model that selects one endogenous break between 1979 and 1990 for each series.[8]

III. Empirical results

A. Growth rates and structural breaks

For each series, the estimation results that are relevant for present purposes are the break dates and the expansionary and recessionary growth rates for the pre- and post-break periods. Look first at the results for total employment in the first column of results in Table 1. A structural break is found to have occurred in November 1984, and the sample mean growth rates before and after this date are 0.205 and 0.106, respectively.[9] During the pre-break period the estimated expansion growth rate was 0.278 and the recession growth rate was -0.228, indicating that recessions typically meant about a half-point drop in monthly employment growth (i.e., a "Recession gap" of 0.5). Post-break, the expansionary and recessionary growth rates were, respectively, 0.166 and -0.137, for a recession gap of about 0.3. In short: recessionary growth, expansionary growth, and the recession gap moderated dramatically after the mid-1980s break.

Underlying the performance of total employment growth are the very different experiences for male and female employment. Note first that the breaks in total employment growth and male employment growth were within a year of one another, whereas the break in female employment growth occurred five years later, which is coincident with the slowdown of women's entry into the labor force. In addition, the pre-break average growth rate for female employment was about three times that for male employment. Following their breaks, however, average male and female employment growth did not differ nearly as much, primarily because of a softening of the monthly effect of recessions on female employment.

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[8] It has been typical to find breaks during the mid-1980s for a number of macroeconomic time series, usually associated with the so-called Great Moderation that meant lower variance in growth during the post-break period.
[9] The data are adjusted for the spikes in Federal government employment growth during the periods in which the decennial census is done. Specifically, I take the changes between the pre-and post-spike levels of Federal employment and assume that the growth would have occurred at a constant rate over the period.

The most important drivers of the changes in the sample averages across the breaks are the changes in expansion growth rates: Monthly expansionary growth for female employment fell from 0.38 percent to 0.16 percent, while that for male employment fell from 0.22 percent to 0.15 percent. In contrast, the post-break recessionary growth rates were slightly higher for both sexes: female employment growth rose from -0.11 percent to -0.07 percent, and male employment growth was basically unchanged. Note also that the post-break recession gaps were much smaller for both sexes, falling by more than half for female employment, and by about a fifth and for male employment. In sum, relative to the pre-break period, employment growth in both phases moderated for both sexes. In addition, the female recession gap shrank considerably and became much smaller than that for male employment.

B. Recession timing and frequency

Monthly growth rates tell only part of the story because there were also significant differences between the sexes in the timing of the peaks and troughs of recessions. Recall that the switching model compares the actual monthly growth rate to the estimated phase growth rates and assigns a probability that the month is recessionary. That is, if the actual growth rate is close to or below the estimated recessionary growth rate, the model will determine that the probability of recession is approaching or equal to 1. Note that this probability accounts for persistence as well as the level of growth, so it doesn't move nearly as much as the growth series itself. Figures 3 and 4 provide the resulting recession probabilities over the sample period for total employment, female employment, and male employment, respectively. Note that the model works very well to separate all three series into the two phases of their cycles, i.e., the probability of recession is usually very close to, or equal to, 0 or 1.

Figure 3 shows how the overall employment cycle has tended to follow the general business cycle. The probability of recession rises rapidly around the same time as the overall economy switches into recession, and falls rapidly some time later. Most prominently, the

"jobless recoveries" since 1990 are indicated by the lag between the ends of the NBER recessions and the return of the employment recession probability to zero. Figure 4 shows how this pattern differs between female and male employment, with the most notable differences occurring during the post-break period. Note in particular that the probability of recession for female employment fell much later than for male employment, indicating longer jobless recoveries for women.

The model assumes that the business cycle has distinct phases and the convention is that a recession is indicated by a recession probability greater than 0.5. These phases are summarized by Figure 5 by assigning each month of recessionary eras as either expansionary or recessionary for each of total employment, female employment, and male employment. In the figure, a lightly shaded month is one for which the economy is in an NBER recession, whereas a darkly shaded month is one for which the respective employment series is, by my calculation, in recession. In terms of pre-break recession timing, the obvious takeaway from Figure 5 is that employment recessions usually began a few months after the start of an NBER-designated official recession, although recovery tended to begin within a month or two after the recovery for the economy as a whole. The most notable pre-break difference between male and female recessions was during the 1973-75 recession, when male employment was in recession for twice as many months as was female employment.

The post-break picture is, in many ways, the reverse of the pre-break one. Total employment tended to go into recession at or about the same time as the overall economy, but tended to remain in recession long after the ends of NBER recessions (i.e., there were jobless recoveries). And, unlike the pre-break period, there were significant differences between the male and female employment cycles since the 1990-91 recession. That is, although male and female employment recessions began within a month of each other, female employment stayed in recession longer. Following the 2001 recession, female employment didn't enter into

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expansion until 16 months after male employment had, and following the 2008-09 recession female employment experienced nine additional months of recession. To a large extent, therefore, the jobless recoveries following the two most recent recessions have been a more significant feature of the female employment cycle.

The differences in the timing and lengths of male and female employment recessions, illustrated by Figure 5, add up to significant differences in the overall frequency of recessions. As summarized by Table 2, recession was much more frequent before 1985 than they have been since: The economy was in an official NBER recession 19.5 percent of the time during 1964-1984, but only 9.6 percent of the time from 1985-2015. Because of jobless recoveries during the latter period, however, employment recession was much more frequent: 15 percent versus 20 percent of the time. The differences in frequency between male and female employment recessions were even starker: Prior to 1985, female and male employment was in recession about as frequently as one another. Since 1985, however, female employment recession has been much more common, occurring for 22 percent of the months versus 15 percent of the months for male employment.

IV. The role of sectoral representation of women and men

As noted previously, according to the segmentation hypothesis, the differences in the average business cycle experiences between men and women are driven by the differences in the representation of the sexes across sectors of the economy: Men are much more prevalent in manufacturing and other hyper-cyclical sectors, whereas women prevail in less-cyclical sectors such as education and health. To check the relevance of the segmentation hypothesis, I reapply the model to sex-specific employment series trimmed of their most sex-dominant sectors. Specifically, trimmed female employment excludes Education and Health and Local Government, and trimmed male employment excludes Mining and Forestry, Construction, and

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Manufacturing.[10] If the business cycle patterns of the trimmed series differ from their untrimmed counterparts, we can conclude that segmentation plays a role. The results will not, however, indicate the precise importance of this role as they are simply a composition effect for sectors at a very high level of aggregation. Within the sectors are subsectors and industries with their own employment compositions and business cycle patterns, and the causal impacts of industry or sectoral shocks most certainly cross industry and sector boundaries.

The Markov-switching results for the trimmed series are provided by Table 3. Note first that for the pre- and post-break periods, trimmed female employment has a lower average growth rate than its untrimmed counterpart, whereas the opposite is true for male employment. That is, female-intensive sectors had higher-than-average growth while male-intensive sectors had lower-than-average growth. Note, however, that these are averages across business cycle phases and that the differences in average growth rates between trimmed and untrimmed employment are almost entirely due to differences in recession growth rates. Correspondingly, trimmed female employment has larger recession gaps than untrimmed female employment, and trimmed male employment has smaller recession gaps than untrimmed male employment. Put another way, female-intensive sectors have shallower-than-average recessions but male-intensive sectors have deeper-than-average recessions. We can conclude, therefore, the segmentation hypothesis has a role in explaining the differences between females and males in the per-period effects of recessions.

Segmentation plays a role in determining the timing of peaks and troughs also, as is evident from the probabilities of recession of the trimmed and untrimmed series provided by Figures 6 and 7. For female employment, the untrimmed series has several idiosyncratic spikes during the 1960s that are due to inadequate seasonal adjustment of the Local Government sector

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[10] Men accounted for 75 percent of employment in Mining and Forestry, Construction, and Manufacturing. Women accounted for 66 percent of employment in Education and Health and Local Government. For each sex the trimmed sectors accounted for about 30 percent of employment, on average.

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(public school teachers) rather than to any real cyclical events. More important are the divergences between female trimmed and untrimmed employment during the post-break period. For male employment, the differences in recession probabilities for trimmed and untrimmed employment are obvious only during the pre-break period.

The differences between the trimmed and untrimmed series are more apparent in Figure 5, which shows how the months are divided into the distinct phases of the cycle. For men, much of the pre-break recessionary experience was accounted for by the male-intensive sectors: Trimmed employment did not experience recession at all in 1970 and it saw many fewer months of recession during 1973-75. The opposite was true post-break in that recessions were up to three months longer for the trimmed series. For female employment, the segmentation effect became prominent only after 1990. Female-intensive sectors shortened the 1990-91 and 2001 recessions, but lengthened it by a year and a half following the Great Recession, likely because local government revenues were particularly hard pressed in the wake of the recession so, unlike previous recessions, this sector suffered longer than others.

V. Calculating the employment costs of recessions

Because of the differences in the timing, length, and depths of male and female employment recessions, the usual comparisons of the effects of recession on the sexes are inadequate: They don't account for the large differences in the frequency of recession months or for the employment growth that would have happened if the economy had stayed in expansion. To illustrate these points, Table 4 presents four sets of calculations of the effects on employment for men and women of each of the seven national recessions since 1965. The first three sets differ according to the recession types from which the peaks and troughs are obtained: NBER recessions, recessions for total employment, and sex-specific recessions. Note that the first two sets of calculations are the usual ones done when comparing the effects of recession on

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employment. The fourth set uses the peaks and troughs from the sex-specific recessions along with the expansionary growth rates in Table 1 to calculate forgone employment—the percent difference at the trough between the actual level of employment and the employment that would have been realized in the absence of recession.

Using the dates of NBER recessions: (1) Female employment was reduced during only three of the seven recessions, and (2) the average recession meant 0.2 percent decrease in female employment and a 3.5 percent decrease in male employment. Using the peaks and troughs of recessions in total employment from Figure 5: (1) female employment was reduced by the recession for all but one case, and (2) on average, the effects of recessions on male employment was more than four times that on female employment. Overall, then, the traditional calculations of the aggregate effects of recession indicate that recessions are much more severe for men than for women.

The first step in moving from the traditional calculations of the effects of employment is to use peaks and troughs for the series of interest. Thus, the third set of calculations in Table 4 uses the sex-specific peaks and troughs provided by Figure 5. These calculations are more accurate because they are better at matching the sexes to the true peaks and troughs of their respective employment growth series. Nonetheless, the overall lesson does not changed very much. That is, although the employment losses for women are much larger than in the first two cases, but are still dwarfed by the losses for men: The average loss of employment for men was 3.2 times that for women.

A flaw common to all three sets of calculations described above is they don't account for the employment growth that would have occurred if there hadn't been a recession. That is, they assume implicitly that there would have been no growth from the pre-recession employment levels had the economy remained in expansion. To address this problem, I use the estimated expansion growth rates for female and male employment from Table 1 to estimate potential

employment levels. The effects of recession on employment are then the difference between the potential and actual employment levels at the trough of a recession, which I refer to as "forgone" employment. This method will obviously lead to higher numbers for the effects of recessions on employment. More relevant presently, however, is that the method will affect the calculations for men and women differently because employment growth during expansion is higher for women than for men. As such, the large differences between men and women in the aggregate effects of recessions obtained using traditional calculations are reduced considerably.

As shown in the final columns of Table 4, the effects of recessions in terms of forgone employment are substantially larger than those in terms of the simple percent change in employment. Because expansion growth was higher for women, the difference is much greater for women. As a result, the relative effects of recessions on men and women are quite different than are usually obtained. In fact, according to these results, the 2001 recession was actually worse in the aggregate for women than for men. On average, the effects of recessions on male employment were 40 percent greater than the effect on female employment, rather than several times the effect as would be obtained with traditional methods.

VI. Conclusions

This paper is a reassessment of the relative effects of recessions on the aggregate employment of women and men. By allowing the sexes to have different employment cycles I obtain a new picture of how the business cycle can affect female employment at different times and strengths relative to male employment. Specifically,

- Prior to the mid 1980s, female employment recessions tended to be 1-2 months shorter than male employment recessions. Since then, however, female employment recessions have tended to be longer than male employment recessions.

- Although female employment growth was often positive through a recession prior to 1990, the monthly effects of recession on female and male employment growth were very similar (i.e., they had similar recession gaps). Since then, however, the male recession gap has been significantly larger than the female recession gap.

- With the exception of the 2001 recession, recessions have had larger negative effects on male employment than on female employment. On average, forgone male employment was about 1.4 times forgone female employment.

These differences between the sexes are partly due to the relative distribution of the men and women across sectors: Female-intensive sectors have tended to have relatively shallow recessions, whereas male-intensive sectors have tended to have relatively deep recessions. Finally, although my results verify the result that recessions hit men harder than women (i.e., man-cessions are the norm), the differences I find are significantly smaller than indicated by previous research and alternative measurements.

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Table 1. Estimation Results: Breaks and Monthly Growth Rates

		Total Employment	Female Employment	Male Employment
Structural-break date (month)		1984.11 (1979.05, 1985.09)	1989.01 (1988.03, 1989.04)	1983.10 (1979.05, 1984.11)
Pre-Break	Sample average	0.205	0.337	0.113
	Expansion (μ_0)	0.278 (0.21, 0.34)	0.378 (0.30, 0.45)	0.219 (0.13, 0.29)
	Recession ($\mu_0+\mu_1$)	-0.228 (-0.32, -0.14)	-0.110 (-0.21, -0.02)	-0.276 (-0.42, -0.17)
	Recession gap (μ_1)	-0.506	-0.488	-0.494
Post-Break	Sample average	0.106	0.106	0.088
	Expansion (μ_0)	0.166 (0.13, 0.19)	0.159 (0.13, 0.19)	0.149 (0.11, 0.19)
	Recession ($\mu_0+\mu_1$)	-0.137 (-0.20, -0.09)	-0.071 (-0.11, -0.03)	-0.260 (-0.36, -0.17)
	Recession gap (μ_1)	-0.303	-0.230	-0.409

The numbers in parentheses are the extremes of the 95 percent confidence bands.

Table 2. Recession Frequencies

	NBER	Total Employment	Female Employment	Male Employment
Recession frequency, 1964-1984	0.195	0.152	0.120	0.131
Recession frequency, 1985-2015	0.096	0.199	0.222	0.146

Recession frequency is the number of recessionary months divided by the total number of months.

Table 3. Estimation Results: Breaks and Monthly Growth Rates for Trimmed Employment

		Trimmed Female Employment	Trimmed Male Employment
Structural-break date (month)		1989.12 (1986.01, 1990.04)	1979.08 (1978.07, 1981.04)
Pre-Break	Sample average	0.325	0.194
	Expansion (μ_0)	0.392 (0.1, 0.47)	0.220 (0.12, 0.31)
	Recession ($\mu_0+\mu_1$)	-0.220 (-0.33, -0.12)	-0.151 (-0.32, -0.02)
	Recession gap (μ_1)	-0.613	-0.371
Post-Break	Sample average	0.062	0.114
	Expansion (μ_0)	0.146 (0.11, 0.18)	0.172 (0.14, 0.20)
	Recession ($\mu_0+\mu_1$)	-0.192 (-0.25, -0.14)	-0.114 (-0.18, -0.04)
	Recession gap (μ_1)	-0.337	-0.287

Trimmed female employment is total female employment net of Education and Health and Local Government. Trimmed male employment is total male employment net of Mining, Construction, and Manufacturing. The numbers in parentheses are the extremes of the 95 percent confidence bands.

Table 4. Sex-Specific Employment Effects of Recessions

Peak/Trough	NBER			Total Employment			Sex-Specific			Sex-Specific		
Effect Type	% Change			% Change			% Change			% Forgone		
Sex	Female	Male	M/F	Female	Male	M/F	Female	Male	M/F	Female	Male	M/F
1969-70	0.5	-2.1	-4.5	-0.1	-2.1	32.3	-0.1	-2.1	32.3	-3.0	-3.8	1.2
1973-75	1.8	-3.6	-2.1	-1.4	-3.5	2.5	-2.0	-3.9	2.0	-4.2	-6.4	1.5
1980	0.2	-2.1	-11.4	-0.4	-2.0	4.8	-0.4	-2.1	5.2	-1.9	-3.4	1.8
1981-82	-0.5	-5.0	9.7	-0.4	-5.1	12.5	-0.7	-5.1	7.7	-6.1	-8.5	1.4
1990-91	0.1	-2.0	-16.9	0.4	-2.7	-6.7	-0.1	-2.4	17.5	-1.6	-4.1	2.6
2001	-0.3	-2.0	6.0	-0.8	-3.0	3.7	-1.0	-2.6	2.6	-5.3	-4.5	0.8
2008-09	-3.1	-7.5	2.4	-3.9	-8.6	2.2	-4.0	-8.6	2.1	-8.8	-11.6	1.3
Mean	-0.2	-3.5	17.1	-0.9	-3.8	4.1	-1.2	-3.8	3.2	-4.4	-6.0	1.4

Official Recession (row label spanning 1969-70 through 2001)

Employment changes are calculated using the peaks and troughs of each recession type. "% Change" is the simple percent change between the relevant peak and trough. "% Forgone" is the percent difference between actual employment and employment that would have been realized in the absence of recession, calculated at the trough.

Figure 1. Quarterly Growth of Payroll Employment, 1964-2015

NBER Recession — Total Employment

Figure 2. Quarterly Growth of Payroll Employment by Sex, 1964-2015

NBER Recession — Female Employment ---- Male Employment

18

Figure 3. Employment-Recession Probability vs. NBER Recessions

NBER Recession   Recession Probability: Total Employment

Figure 4. Male and Female Recession Probabilities vs. NBER Recessions

NBER Recession   Female Employment   Male Employment

Figure 5. Employment Recessions Associated with NBER Recessions: Total vs. Female vs. Male
(NBER recessions are indicated by a light gray background. An employment recession is indicated by dark gray)

1970 and 1973-75 Recessions

	1969.11	1969.12	1970.1	1970.2	1970.3	1970.4	1970.5	1970.6	1970.7	1970.8	1970.9	1970.10	1970.11	1970.12	1971.1		1973.10	1973.11	1973.12	1974.1	1974.2	1974.3	1974.4	1974.5	1974.6	1974.7	1974.8	1974.9	1974.10	1974.11	1974.12	1975.1	1975.2	1975.3	1975.4	1975.5	1975.6	1975.7	1975.8
Total Employment																																							
Female Employment																																							
Male Employment																																							

1980 and 1981-82 Recessions

	1979.12	1980.1	1980.2	1980.3	1980.4	1980.5	1980.6	1980.7	1980.8	1980.9	1980.10	1980.11	1980.12	1981.1	1981.2	1981.3	1981.4	1981.5	1981.6	1981.7	1981.8	1981.9	1981.10	1981.11	1981.12	1982.1	1982.2	1982.3	1982.4	1982.5	1982.6	1982.7	1982.8	1982.9	1982.10	1982.11	1982.12	1983.1	1983.2
Total Employment																																							
Female Employment																																							
Male Employment																																							

1990-91 Recession

	1990.5	1990.6	1990.7	1990.8	1990.9	1990.10	1990.11	1990.12	1991.1	1991.2	1991.3	1991.4	1991.5	1991.6	1991.7	1991.8	1991.9	1991.10	1991.11	1991.12	1992.1
Total Employment																					
Female Employment																					
Male Employment																					

2001 Recession

	2001.1	2001.2	2001.3	2001.4	2001.5	2001.6	2001.7	2001.8	2001.9	2001.10	2001.11	2001.12	2002.1	2002.2	2002.3	2002.4	2002.5	2002.6	2002.7	2002.8	2002.9	2002.10	2002.11	2002.12	2003.1	2003.2	2003.3	2003.4	2003.5	2003.6	2003.7	2003.8	2003.9	2003.10
Total Employment																																		
Female Employment																																		
Male Employment																																		

2008-2009 Recession

	2007.11	2007.12	2008.1	2008.2	2008.3	2008.4	2008.5	2008.6	2008.7	2008.8	2008.9	2008.10	2008.11	2008.12	2009.1	2009.2	2009.3	2009.4	2009.5	2009.6	2009.7	2009.8	2009.9	2009.10	2009.11	2009.12	2010.1	2010.2	2010.3	2010.4	2010.5	2010.6	2010.7	2010.8	2010.9	2010.10	2010.11
Total Employment																																					
Female Employment																																					
Male Employment																																					

20

Figure 6. Female Recession Probability, Total vs. Trimmed Employment


Figure 7. Male Recession Probability, Total vs. Trimmed Employment

Figure 8. Employment Recessions and Sex-Dominant Sectors: Total vs. Trimmed
(NBER recessions are indicated by a light gray background. An employment recession is indicated by dark gray)

1970 and 1973-75 Recessions

	1969.11	1969.12	1970.1	1970.2	1970.3	1970.4	1970.5	1970.6	1970.7	1970.8	1970.9	1970.10	1970.11	1970.12	1971.1		1973.10	1973.11	1973.12	1974.1	1974.2	1974.3	1974.4	1974.5	1974.6	1974.7	1974.8	1974.9	1974.10	1974.11	1974.12	1975.1	1975.2	1975.3	1975.4	1975.5	1975.6	1975.7	1975.8
Total Female																																							
Trimmed Female																																							
Total Male																																							
Trimmed Male																																							

1980 and 1981-82 Recessions

	1979.12	1980.1	1980.2	1980.3	1980.4	1980.5	1980.6	1980.7	1980.8	1980.9	1980.10	1980.11	1980.12	1981.1	1981.2	1981.3	1981.4	1981.5	1981.6	1981.7	1981.8	1981.9	1981.10	1981.11	1981.12	1982.1	1982.2	1982.3	1982.4	1982.5	1982.6	1982.7	1982.8	1982.9	1982.10	1982.11	1982.12	1983.1	1983.2
Total Female																																							
Trimmed Female																																							
Total Male																																							
Trimmed Male																																							

1990-91 Recession

	1990.5	1990.6	1990.7	1990.8	1990.9	1990.10	1990.11	1990.12	1991.1	1991.2	1991.3	1991.4	1991.5	1991.6	1991.7	1991.8	1991.9	1991.10	1991.11	1991.12	1992.1
Total Female																					
Trimmed Female																					
Total Male																					
Trimmed Male																					

2001 Recession

	2001.1	2001.2	2001.3	2001.4	2001.5	2001.6	2001.7	2001.8	2001.9	2001.10	2001.11	2001.12	2002.1	2002.2	2002.3	2002.4	2002.5	2002.6	2002.7	2002.8	2002.9	2002.10	2002.11	2002.12	2003.1	2003.2	2003.3	2003.4	2003.5	2003.6	2003.7	2003.8	2003.9	2003.10
Total Female																																		
Trimmed Female																																		
Total Male																																		
Trimmed Male																																		

2008-2009 Recession

	2007.11	2007.12	2008.1	2008.2	2008.3	2008.4	2008.5	2008.6	2008.7	2008.8	2008.9	2008.10	2008.11	2008.12	2009.1	2009.2	2009.3	2009.4	2009.5	2009.6	2009.7	2009.8	2009.9	2009.10	2009.11	2009.12	2010.1	2010.2	2010.3	2010.4	2010.5	2010.6	2010.7	2010.8	2010.9	2010.10	2010.11
Total Female																																					
Trimmed Female																																					
Total Male																																					
Trimmed Male																																					