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The causes of political misperceptions: Suggestions for research

Jürgen R. Grote and Vladimir Popov

Abstract

The extent of misperceptions of political events and developments is assumed to be largely determined by the rate of press freedom characterizing each country (Reporters sans frontiers, RSF, 2018). Following that argument, only about one third of all countries worldwide would turn out to be in a good (Scandinavia, Germany) or satisfactory (the US, the UK, Canada and Australia) situation (see *Appendix*). Recent research on misperceptions suggests that the freedom of press may be a necessary but not necessarily a sufficient condition of measurement. More decisive than freedom of press are two further factors, namely deep-rooted ideological inclinations and worldviews as formed during primary (family) and subsequent (school) phases of socialization on the one hand, and the structure of media ownership on the other hand. In what follows, we present some recent evidence on how the ownership of the media (state/public/private) is influencing misperceptions. It is argued that state and private media distort public opinion more than the media under public control.

1. Public misperceptions of politics

There is much debate about whether citizens are sufficiently knowledgeable to participate meaningfully in politics. While knowledge hinges on the quality and the amount of information, the sources, the clout, and the trustworthiness of information are themselves a highly controversial matter. There is indeed an important distinction between being uninformed and being misinformed (see: Kuklinski et.al. 2000: 792). We subscribe to the claim made by Flynn et.al (Flynn et.al., 2017). *“While standards of democratic competence vary, empirical research in public opinion yields a relatively simple answer to the question of how much people typically know about politics: not very much. However, the meaning and significance of citizens’ inability to provide correct answers to factual survey questions can vary dramatically”*. Among the most important distinctions concerning the relationship between knowledge and the ability to come up with reliable answers in surveys is the one between being uninformed and being misinformed. Public ignorance about politics is one thing – factual beliefs that are false or contradict the best available evidence are quite another. Such misperceptions can distort people’s opinions about some of the most consequential issues in politics and in other relevant fields. They may originate internally because of cognitive biases and they may be demonstrably false or unsubstantiated and unsupported by evidence. As many have argued, the most important external factor, however, has been the media. For instance, analysing a nationally representative online survey, Cacciatore et.al. (2014) found that one in five Americans still believe president Barack Obama to be a Muslim. *“Although race, political ideology, and ‘born-again’ or evangelical Christian status were the primary drivers of misperceptions about Obama’s faith, media use had a more crucial role”* in this (ibid.).

There is a large pool of comparative data on misperceptions across countries. For instance, Flynn et.al. discuss misperceptions in terms of estimates regarding foreign born populations across countries in Western Europe and find that Europeans greatly over estimate the number of foreign-born residents in their countries. The percentage of the perceived foreign born and actual foreign-born residents is 10 and 14 per percent in Denmark respectively and between 9 and 30 per cent in Italy.

The 2016 Ipsos MORI Index of Ignorance (reference) is based on a survey covering 40 countries where participants were asked a number of questions about their society, including their country's population, healthcare spending, home ownership and the proportion of Muslims living in their country. Only considering the last of these questions, the results are embarrassing. As an average across the surveyed countries, respondents thought 16 per cent of the population was Muslim, whereas the correct average is only 3 per cent. The unemployment rate was also overestimated by a factor of three. The average guess was 30 per cent, in contrast to the actual rate of 9 per cent. In the general index of ignorance produced by Ipsos MORI, Italy, the US and South Korea lead the ranking as the most ignorant countries while Sweden, Germany and Japan figure close to the bottom of ignorance.

We are interested though not in ignorance per se, but in misperceptions concerning the sensitive issues of domestic and world politics. These misperceptions can be caused by general and genuine ignorance, by stereotypes obtained during primary socialization or created by biased school and university education, and by media bias and other factors such as the dissemination of fake news by prominent elite figures. As argued by Flynn et.al. (2017: 29) *"little is known [...] about how elites exploit misinformation for strategic purposes or what effects misleading media coverage has on public opinion"*. In what follows, we wish to focus exactly on these aspects responsible for creating misperceptions of all sorts.

2. The role of the media

The role of the media in the naissance of misperceptions can have serious effects on international politics and situations of conflict. Certain cognitive mechanisms and pernicious myths *"foster ethnic and nationalist stereotypes and negative or false images about others or create false assumptions and beliefs about the nature of international politics, the causes of war and peace, and one's own and other's national interests."* (Mendeloff, 2001). They may cause significant national misperceptions that lead to conflictual policies. A prominent example is the first Iraq war. As Kull et.al. (2004) have found in a regression analysis, *"the presence of misperceptions was the most powerful factor predicting support for the war (...)"*. It appeared *"that it would have been significantly more difficult for the President to elicit and maintain support for the decision to go to war if the public had not held such misperceptions."* (Kull et.al. 2004). Rather than challenging the sources of misperceptions and mitigate their negative effects, the media has not been very helpful in that respect. *"The fact that viewers of some media outlets had far lower levels of misperceptions than did others (...) suggests that not all were making the maximal effort to counter the potential for misperception"* (ibid.).

As noted by Flynn et.al. (2017), media coverage of events is shaping the flow of false claims to the public both directly in its coverage, and indirectly via its influence on elite behaviour. Recent decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in the number and type of news programs

available to media. Prior (2007) has been among the first to draw attention on how the expansion of media choice has exacerbated inequalities in political knowledge. Lewendusky (2013) and Jamieson and Capella (2010) have underlined that partisan media programs on cable television often feature false and/or exaggerated claims about political opponents.

In a period characterized by an ever-growing amount of fake news and biased information, it can be taken for granted that *“in many situations the news media have been persuaded, manipulated, or even coerced to follow political (or military) views on international affairs. Disinformation campaigns, financial incentives, subtle threats, or retaliation may combine with consensual political outlooks among journalists and politicians in the construction of preferred interpretations of the current political situation in the world”* (Van Dijk, 1995).

Overall, however, scholars do know little about the extent to which the media actually increases misperceptions among consumers, many of whom are highly ideological anyway and may already be caught in cages of misperceptions. More experimental research is needed to determine whether certain types of media and of ownership structures actually increase the likelihood of misperceptions among consumers.

3. Forms of media ownership

While there can be no doubt about the potential impact of pernicious information on the emergence of popular misperceptions, that influence is likely to be different relative to the control, the ownership, and the quality of the media. The main distinction here is between privately owned and the public media. In countries where the bulk of media outlets is controlled by private entities, owners are typically families, media enterprises, private holdings, or employees. Private media normally operates on a for-profit basis.

It is extremely difficult to alter stereotypes in the public consciousness. One study (Gentzkow, Shapiro, 2010) argues that the press bias is explained by electoral preferences rather than the political orientation of a newspaper owner. In the traditionally Republican constituencies, for example, newspapers hold a Republican orientation because readers prefer to find confirmation (rather than refutation) of their views, while press earnings (advertising revenues) depend on circulation. So, this creates a vicious circle: conservative voters like information that confirms their views, media concerned with larger circulation are eager to provide this information, and voters are even more confirmed in their conservative views...

Public media are more difficult to classify. A distinction must be made between public service media on the one hand and state and government media on the other hand. Public service media typically uses public money to broadcast in the interests of the public as a whole. They are often established by law, but they are non-partisan, not supporting a particular party including the incumbent ruling party. Public service media are not-for-profit and free from political influence and pressures from commercial forces. According to the UNESCO, *“when guaranteed with pluralism, programming diversity, editorial independence, appropriate funding, accountability and transparency, public service broadcasting can serve as a cornerstone of democracy”*. Typical examples are the British BBC or German TV broadcasting outlets linked to ARD and ZDF. On the other hand, state and government media lean on state authorities or on the government of the day. It is financed out of public money but is controlled by state authorities. It may either perform a public service function or it may be a

propaganda instrument of the state. State and government media is also generally not-for-profit. In some cases, one would additionally need to distinguish between state and political party ownership.

Table 1: Shares of privately owned and of publicly owned media in % (only TV)

<i>Regional average</i>	<i>Public ownership</i>	<i>Private ownership</i>
Africa	.84	.16
Americas (including US)	.11	.85
Asian Pacific	.70	.30
Middle East/North Africa	.94	.06
CEE and transition countries	.73	.27
Western Europe	.55	.45

Source: Table 5 of the Appendix.

In a comprehensive study on media ownership structures, Djankov et.al. (2003) have scrutinized a total of 97 countries in terms of public ownership media and private media structures (see *Table 1*; full data see Appendix). Concerning the first of these categories, the authors do not distinguish between public service media and state and government-controlled media which would actually be necessary in order to find out whether or not information is biased in favour of governments (state and government media) or is relatively independent (public service media).

Nevertheless, the authors’ results are illuminating. As shown by *Table 1*, it appears that there is a wide variety of ownership structures across the world. Figures range between 94 (Middle East/North Africa) and 11 (the Americas) per cent in case of public media and between 85 (the Americas) and 0.6 (Middle East/ North Africa) per cent in case of privately owned media.

In general, “countries that are poorer, more autocratic, with lower levels of primary school enrolment, and with higher levels of state intervention in the economy also have greater state ownership of the media” (ibid.). These countries also have less free press, fewer political rights for citizens, lower levels of good governance, less developed capital markets, and inferior health conditions.

4. The impact of media ownership structures on the degree of misperceptions

Should the authors have included a further distinction, namely the one between public service and state-controlled media, this verdict would likely need modification since countries belonging to the first category, such as Britain, Germany, Austria and many others, are clearly neither poor nor void of political rights but still exhibit a high share of public ownership. Overall, however, the results by the authors suggest that media ownership is likely to have a substantial impact on the degree of political misperceptions hold by consumers and citizens.

In order to study this in more detail, we advocate constructing a more fine-grained list of media ownership able to take account of the differences between public service on the one hand and state-controlled media outlets on the other. The following seems advisable: countries where TV ownership is high on state control (>50%) and where press ownership is

very high on state control (close to 100%) are classified as government controlled. Countries where TV ownership is relatively low on state control (<50%) and press ownership is equally low on state control (<50%) are classified as controlled by and accountable to the public. All other countries fall into the category of privately owned media.

The following preliminary hypotheses appear to be reasonable:

- H1:** It is the structure of media ownership which mainly determines the variance in misperceptions.
- H2:** it is a combination of media ownership and level/type of education which determines the variance.
- H3:** The frequency of misperception is highest in state and government dominated media countries, average in private media dominated countries, and lowest in public service media dominated countries.
- H4:** It is the political orientation of the residents that determines the level of misperceptions and their preferences for specific media outlets.

If media creates certain stereotypes, which are then reinforced by the public supporting the media of certain orientation, then it appears to be a vicious circle. That circle could be broken either by reforms from above banning big business involvement in the media and the political process (certain European countries – specifically the Scandinavian countries, with their public funding of political parties and the media – have come closer to this system than others), or by revolutions occurring when the gap between the stereotypes in the public consciousness (opportunities for enrichment) and the reality (impoverishment) reaches a critical level.

Table 2 measures the degree of misperceptions in residents’ views on the percentage of migrants and the percentage of Muslims in total population depending on media ownership structures. Misperceptions are defined as the difference between the share of Muslim/immigrant population according to the respondents answers and the actual share. *Figure 1* exhibits the relationship between the share of TV media controlled by the state and misperceptions regarding the percentage of Muslim immigrants per country. The relationship, most likely, is non-linear, if any, but there are too few points to make reliable conclusions.

Table 2. The share of TV media controlled by the state and the degree of misperceptions in residents’ views on the percentage of migrants and percentage of Muslims in total population


Country	<i>State</i>	<i>Private</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Misperception on the % of Immigrants, p.p.</i>	<i>Misperceptions on the % of Muslims, p.p.</i>
Italy	0.61	0.39	0	23	16
US	0	1	0	19	14
South Korea	0.77	0.23	0	8	5
Poland	0.57	0.43	0	12	5
Hungary	0.2	0.8	0	14	7
France	0.43	0.57	0	18	23
Canada	0.34	0.66	0	14	18
Belgium	0.41	0.59	0	19	23
Australia	0.17	0.83	0	7	16

UK	0.6	0.4	0	11	16
Spain	0.43	0.57	0	11	14
Japan	0.39	0.61	0	8	4
Germany	0.61	0.39	0	10	13
Sweden	0.51	0.49	0	7	12

Misperceptions are defined as the difference between the share of Muslim/immigrant population according to the respondents answers and the actual share.

Source: Djankov et.al. (2003).


Figure 1. The share of TV media controlled by the state and the degree of misperceptions in residents' views on the percentage of migrants and percentage of Muslims in total population



Source: Author's figure based on data by Djankov et.al. (2003).

Figure 2 represents the ratio between state-run TV outlets and the predominance of creationist versus evolutionary convictions. It turns out that the share of respondents holding the evolutionist views increases as the state ownership of the TV stations goes up from 0 to 50% and then declines as it continues to increase from 50 to 100%. One possible interpretation of the result is here is an optimal combination of private and state media (half and half) that ensures the lowest degree of misperceptions.

Figure 2. Market share of the state TV stations and the percentage of respondents accepting the idea of evolution



Source: Miller et al. (2006); Djankov et al. (2003).

It may be also possible to classify newspapers and TV channels into left and right and ask the question where from people get their news. Following that procedure, particular media would likely be responsible for the creation of more misperceptions than others. The example is the following survey (see Table 3) that asked three questions about the Gulf War of 1990-91: on weapons of mass destruction, on Al-Qaida links, and on support for the Gulf War in the world. It turned out that 45% viewers of FOX news had misperceptions with respect to these questions as compared to 11% of the listeners/viewers of the NPR and PBS.

Table 3: Average of three misperception rates among viewers and listeners: WMD Found, Evidence of al Qaeda Link, and World Majority Support for War (percentages)

<i>News Source</i>	<i>Average Rate per Misperception</i>
Fox	45
CBS	36
CNN	31
ABC	30
NBC	30
Print Media	25
NPR/PBS	11

Source: Kull et.al. (2004).

Apart from the standard questions asked in the World Values Survey on age, gender, income level, education, political orientation, etc., the following additional questions might be inserted with a view to identify the extent of ignorance, of ideological bias, and of political misperceptions.

5. Potential questions:

General knowledge and misperceptions:

- Do you believe that the human being was created by God or as a result of the evolution of the animal world?
- The sun rotates around the Earth.

Misperceptions on history and politics:

- The average income of citizens in my country is higher/equal/lower than the average income of EU citizens.
- More than one third/half/two thirds of the tax revenues collected by my country's authorities goes to military expenditures.
- The tax rate in my country far exceeds the rates of most other European countries.
- The share of foreign born citizens of my country is clearly beyond 20/30/40 per cent.
- More than 30/50/70 per cent of immigrants seeking asylum in my country are of Muslim origin.
- The crime rate in my country has clearly increased substantially since the first major wave of immigration around the turn of the millennium. In any case, the murder rate in my country is the highest it's been in 45 years.
- Climate change is a natural phenomenon that has always been with us. It has no man-made causes.
- The financial EU contributions made by my country are far higher than what we get out of it in terms of subsidies and support for less developed regions, sectors, and parts of the population.
- In my country, the share of people with a university degree is at about 30/50/70 per cent.
- Religion was prohibited in the Soviet Union and churches were closed.
- The Russian defence budget is higher than that of the US.
- Under Putin, the Russian living standards substantially declined as compared to the period of Yeltsin.
- In the Second World War Stalin and Hitler were allied and fighting against a large Western coalition including Britain and the US.
- Life expectancy in communist Cuba was not increasing after Fidel Castro took power in 1959

6. Distinguishing between lack of knowledge and misperception

As mentioned above, answers clearly deviating from common sense and/or acquired knowledge do not need to necessarily reflect a misperception by default. Such answers may simply reflect a lack of knowledge. There is a straightforward method that helps to distinguish between the two. It rests on what is called the *Certainty of Response Index* (CRI) originally developed for measuring knowledge performance in high school class tests., The CRI is frequently used in the social sciences, particularly in surveys, where a respondent is requested to provide the degree of certainty she has in her own ability to select and utilize well-established knowledge, concepts, or laws to arrive at the answer (see: Hasan et.al. 1999). The

procedure is usually based on some scale such as, for instance, a six-point scale (0-5) in which 0 implies no knowledge (total guess) of methods or laws required for answering a particular question while 5 indicates complete confidence in the knowledge of the principles and laws required to arrive at the selected answer. When a student is asked to provide a CRI along with each answer, we are in effect requesting her to provide her own assessment of the certainty she has in her selection of the laws and methods utilized to get the answer.

Irrespective of whether the answer was correct or wrong, a low CRI value indicates guessing, which, in turn, implies a lack of knowledge. If the CRI is high (CRI of 3–5), then the respondent has a high degree of confidence in her choice of the laws and methods used to arrive at the answer. In this situation (CRI of 3–5), if the student arrived at the correct answer, it would indicate that the high degree of certainty was justified. However, if the answer was wrong, the high certainty would indicate a misplaced confidence in her knowledge of the subject matter. This misplaced certainty in the applicability of certain laws and methods to a specific question is an indicator of the existence of misconceptions. The requested CRI, used in conjunction with the answer to a question, enables the researcher to differentiate between a lack of knowledge and a misconception.

7. Tentative conclusions

Political misperceptions are believed to result from either deeply-rooted ideological inclinations or from low levels of freedom of press. While we do not generally question these hypotheses, our claim is that such misperceptions are more than anything else triggered by factors related to the share of private versus public media outlets. Albeit not everywhere to the same extent, private ownership tends to furnish the distribution of fake news and, hence, of deliberate attempts to influence public opinion. Public ownership, at least when controlled by democratic public institutions and not directly by state authorities, tends to decrease the likelihood of misperceptions. It would be worthwhile testing these hypotheses by way of large-scale international comparison. In case some readers should feel appealed by this request, the authors would much welcome any suggestion for possible joint activities.

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9. Appendix:

Table 4: Press freedom ranking 2018 (random selection; total number of countries: 180)

Norway	7.63
Switzerland	11.27
Austria	14.04
Germany	14.39
Slovakia	20.26
France	21.87
United Kingdom	23.25
United States	23.73
Poland	26.59
Hungary	29.11
Bulgaria	35.22
India	43.24
Pakistan	43.24
Russia	49.96
Iraq	56.56
Uzbekistan	60.84
Saudi Arabia	63.13
China	78.29
North Korea	88.87

Source: Reporters sans frontiers 2018.

Table 5: Media ownership distribution worldwide

OWNERSHIP DISTRIBUTION: TOP FIVE DAILY NEWSPAPERS AND TOP FIVE TELEVISION STATIONS

COUNTRY	PRESS, BY COUNT			PRESS, BY SHARE			TELEVISION, BY COUNT			TELEVISION, BY SHARE		
	State	Private	Other	State	Private	Other	State	Private	Other	State	Private	Other
Angola	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Benin	.20	.60	.20	.31	.50	.19	.50	.50	.00	.71	.29	.00
Burundi	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Cameroon	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Chad	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Cote d'Ivoire	.40	.20	.40	.64	.11	.24	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Ethiopia	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Gabon	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Ghana	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	.33	.67	.00	.55	.45	.00
Kenya	.00	.80	.20	.00	.88	.12	.20	.80	.00	.45	.55	.00
Malawi	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Mali	.20	.80	.00	.33	.67	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Niger	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Nigeria	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.20	.80	.00	.25	.75	.00
Senegal	.33	.67	.00	.51	.49	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
South Africa	.00	.60	.40	.00	.70	.30	.75	.00	.25	.90	.00	.10
Tanzania	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.20	.80	.00	.07	.93	.00
Togo	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Uganda	.50	.50	.00	.58	.42	.00	.25	.50	.25	.61	.39	.00
Zambia	.67	.33	.00	.74	.26	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Zimbabwe	.67	.33	.00	.60	.40	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Average, Africa	.57	.37	.06	.61	.35	.04	.78	.19	.02	.84	.16	.00
Argentina	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.20	.80	.00	.04	.96	.00
Brazil	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	.80	.20	.00	.89	.11
Canada	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.34	.66	.00
Chile	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.20	.60	.20	.30	.41	.28
Colombia	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.50	.50	.00	.27	.73	.00
Mexico	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00
Peru	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00
United States	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00
Venezuela	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.25	.75	.00	.03	.97	.00
Average, Americas	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.17	.78	.04	.11	.85	.04
Australia	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.17	.83	.00
China	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
India	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.88	.12	.00
Indonesia	.00	.80	.20	.00	.85	.15	.20	.80	.00	.23	.77	.00
Japan	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.20	.80	.00	.39	.61	.00
Korea, Democratic Republic	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Korea, Republic	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.80	.20	.00	.77	.23	.00
Laos, People's Democratic Republic	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Malaysia	.00	.60	.40	.00	.60	.40	.40	.60	.00	.47	.53	.00
Myanmar	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
New Zealand	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.50	.50	.00	.71	.29	.00
Pakistan	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Philippines	.40	.60	.00	.44	.56	.00	.60	.40	.00	.18	.83	.00
Singapore	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Sri Lanka	.40	.60	.00	.29	.71	.00	.40	.60	.00	.81	.19	.00
Taiwan, China	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.40	.20	.63	.37	.00
Thailand	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.80	.20	.00	.60	.40	.00
Average, Asia-Pacific	.28	.68	.04	.28	.69	.03	.65	.34	.01	.70	.30	.00
Algeria	.40	.60	.00	.57	.43	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Bahrain	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Egypt	.80	.00	.20	.94	.00	.06	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00

COUNTRY	PRESS, BY COUNT			PRESS, BY SHARE			TELEVISION, BY COUNT			TELEVISION, BY SHARE		
	State	Private	Other	State	Private	Other	State	Private	Other	State	Private	Other
Iran, Islamic Republic	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Israel	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.25	.75	.00	.36	.64	.00
Jordan	.60	.40	.00	.83	.17	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Kuwait	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Morocco	.40	.00	.60	.41	.00	.59	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Saudi Arabia	.40	.60	.00	.51	.49	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Syrian Arab Republic	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Tunisia	.20	.40	.40	.23	.50	.27	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Average, Middle East and North Africa	.44	.45	.11	.50	.42	.08	.93	.07	.00	.94	.06	.00
Armenia	.20	.40	.40	.27	.45	.27	.20	.80	.00	.53	.47	.00
Azerbaijan	.20	.80	.00	.10	.90	.00	.20	.80	.00	.31	.69	.00
Belarus	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Bulgaria	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.50	.50	.00	.75	.25	.00
Croatia	.50	.25	.25	.29	.33	.38	.75	.25	.00	.97	.03	.00
Cyprus	.00	.80	.20	.00	.89	.11	.40	.60	.00	.23	.77	.00
Czech Republic	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.50	.50	.00	.34	.66	.00
Estonia	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.25	.75	.00	.29	.71	.00
Georgia	.20	.80	.00	.06	.94	.00	.40	.60	.00	.66	.34	.00
Hungary	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.20	.80	.00
Kazakhstan	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Kyrgyz Republic	.50	.25	.25	.35	.35	.30	.33	.67	.00	.69	.31	.00
Lithuania	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.20	.80	.00	.23	.77	.00
Moldova	.20	.80	.00	.12	.88	.00	.20	.80	.00	.44	.56	.00
Poland	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.57	.43	.00
Romania	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.37	.63	.00
Russian Federation	.20	.80	.00	.15	.85	.00	.80	.20	.00	.96	.04	.00
Slovak Republic	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.35	.65	.00
Slovenia	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.40	.20	.54	.45	.01
Turkey	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00
Turkmenistan	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00
Ukraine	.40	.40	.20	.15	.77	.07	.40	.60	.00	.14	.86	.00
Uzbekistan	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.00	.80	.20	.00	.73	.27	.00
Average, Central/Eastern Europe and transition	.28	.67	.06	.24	.71	.05	.48	.52	.01	.53	.46	.00
Austria	.00	.80	.20	.00	.86	.14	.40	.60	.00	.78	.22	.00
Belgium	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.41	.59	.00
Denmark	.00	.40	.60	.00	.37	.63	.60	.40	.00	.80	.20	.00
Finland	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.50	.50	.00	.48	.52	.00
France	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.43	.57	.00
Germany	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.60	.40	.00	.61	.39	.00
Greece	.00	.60	.40	.00	.68	.32	.20	.80	.00	.08	.92	.00
Ireland	.00	.80	.20	.00	.79	.21	.60	.40	.00	.68	.32	.00
Italy	.00	.80	.20	.00	.83	.17	.60	.40	.00	.61	.39	.00
Netherlands	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.60	.40	.00	.57	.43	.00
Norway	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.47	.53	.00
Portugal	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.38	.62	.00
Spain	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.43	.57	.00
Sweden	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.40	.60	.00	.51	.49	.00
Switzerland	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.60	.40	.00	.89	.11	.00
United Kingdom	.00	1.00	.00	.00	1.00	.00	.60	.40	.00	.60	.40	.00
Average, Western Europe	.00	.90	.10	.00	.91	.09	.48	.52	.00	.55	.45	.00
Average, total sample	.29	.65	.06	.29	.66	.05	.60	.39	.01	.64	.36	.01

NOTE.—The category "private" comprises family ownership, widely held firms, and employee-owned media outlets. The category "other" includes trade unions, political parties, churches, not-for-profit foundations, and business associations.

Source: Djankov et al. (2003: 358-361) based on data by the World Bank, UNESCO; Freedom House, UNDP, WHO, and others.