Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems

Valencia-Toledo, Alfredo and Vidal-Puga, Juan (2018): Reassignment-proof rules for land rental problems.

Abstract

We consider land rental problems where there are several communities that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary need all the available land. A rule should determine which communities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price. We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that satisfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency and continuity.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: land rental; non-manipulability; reassignment-proofness; land monotonicity; consistency
• Subjects: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C71 - Cooperative Games

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