Optimal Capital Taxation in an Economy with Innovation-Driven Growth

Ping-ho Chen and Angus C. Chu and Hsun Chu and Ching-Chong Lai

Academia Sinica, Fudan University, Tunghai University, Academia Sinica

February 2019

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92319/
MPRA Paper No. 92319, posted 24 February 2019 07:45 UTC
Abstract

This paper examines whether the Chamley-Judd result of a zero optimal capital tax rate is valid in an innovation-driven growth model. We examine how the optimal capital tax rate varies with externalities associated with R&D and innovation. Our results show that the optimal capital tax rate is higher when (i) the “stepping on toes effect” is smaller, (ii) the “standing on shoulders effect” is stronger, or (iii) the extent of creative destruction is greater. By calibrating our model to the US economy, we find that the optimal capital tax rate is positive, at a rate of around 11.9 percent. We also find that a positive optimal capital tax rate is more likely to be the case when there is underinvestment in R&D.

Keywords: Optimal capital taxation, R&D externalities, innovation

JEL classification: E62, O31, O41

Acknowledgement: We would like to thank Been-lon Chen, Fu-sheng Hung, and Ming-fu Shaw for helpful comments regarding an earlier version of this paper. The usual disclaimer applies.
1 Introduction

Capital income is taxed worldwide. The estimated effective average tax rates on capital income are around 40% in the United States and 30% in EU countries. In some countries, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, the capital income tax rates are even up to nearly 60%. From the perspective of welfare maximization, whether these capital tax rates are too high or too low is an important policy question.

Despite the fact that capital taxes are commonly levied in the real world, a striking theory put forth by Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986) suggests that the government should only tax labor income and leave capital income untaxed in the long run. A number of subsequent studies, including Chari et al. (1994), Jones et al. (1997), Atkeson et al. (1999), and Chari and Kehoe (1999), relax key assumptions in Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), and find their result to be quite robust. The idea of a zero optimal capital tax has then been dubbed the Chamley-Judd result, which turns out to be one of the most well-established and important results in the optimal taxation literature.

In this paper, we revisit the Chamley-Judd result in an innovation-driven growth model. There are several reasons as to why we choose this environment to study optimal taxation. First, as stressed by Aghion et al. (2013), it appears that the consideration of growth does not play much of a role in the debate on the Chamley-Judd result. However, given that the recent empirical evidence suggests that the tax structure has a significant impact on economic growth (e.g., Arnold et al., 2011), it is more plausible to bring the role of growth into the picture. Second, along the line of the optimal taxation literature, production technology is treated as exogenously given. The role of endogenous technological change driven by R&D has thus been neglected in previous models. In view of the fact that innovation is a crucial factor in economic development as well as in the improvement of human well-being, overlooking this element could lead to a suboptimal design of tax policies. Our study thus aims to fill this gap. Third, as pointed out by Domeij (2005), a key premise in early contributions supporting the Chamley-Judd result is that there exist no inherent distortions and externalities in the economy. If market failures are present, the optimal capital income tax might be different from zero. Thus, we introduce an innovation market that features various R&D externalities put forth by Jones and Williams (2000). Within this framework we can study how the optimal capital taxation and R&D externalities interact in ways not so far understood.

By calibrating the model to the US economy, our numerical analysis shows that the
optimal capital income tax is significantly positive at a rate of 12 percent. The reason for a positive optimal capital income tax in our R&D-based growth model can be briefly explained as follows. In essence, the Chamley-Judd result involves a tax shift between capital income tax and labor income tax. The basic rationale behind a zero optimal capital tax is that taxing capital generates more distortion than taxing labor, because taxing capital creates a dynamic inefficiency for capital accumulation. In our R&D-based growth model, by contrast, innovation requires R&D labor, as typically specified in standard R&D-based growth models (e.g., Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995; Acemoglu, 1998). Under such a framework, taxing labor has a detrimental effect on the incentives for innovation and growth. This introduces a justification for taxing capital income instead of labor income. On these grounds, it might be optimal to have a non-zero capital income tax rate.

The main contribution of this study is that it links optimal capital taxation to features of the innovation process. We vary the parameters capturing important R&D externalities and see how the optimal capital income tax changes in response. Our main findings can be briefly summarized as follows. First, under most circumstances, the positive optimal capital income tax still holds. Second, when knowledge spillovers are large or R&D duplication externalities are small (thereby increasing the chances of an underinvestment in R&D), it is more likely that a positive optimal capital income tax rate will result. Third, when creative destruction is more important in the R&D process, the optimal capital income tax rate should be higher (lower) if the monopolistic markup is constrained (unconstrained) by the degree of creative destruction. Fourth, a higher government spending ratio pushes toward a positive optimal capital income tax.

It is well-known in existing studies (e.g., Aiyagari, 1995; Judd, 1997, 2002; Coto-Martínez et al., 2007) that when the intermediate firms are imperfectly competitive, capital investment is too low compared to the socially optimal level. Accordingly, the government should subsidize capital income to induce a higher level of capital investment, implying that the optimal capital income tax tends to decrease when the monopolistic markup increases. This effect is present in our model, but our model also features another effect. As a result, the optimal capital income tax and the markup display an inverted-U shaped relationship. In our model, the markup is inversely determined by the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. A reduction in the substitution elasticity that raises the markup amplifies the productivity of differentiated varieties in the production of final goods and hence increases the social value of R&D. In this case, the government is inclined to subsidize labor by taxing capital given that the R&D sector uses labor. Thus, the optimal capital tax rate eventually
becomes decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (or increasing in the markup). In considering this effect, an increase in the monopolistic markup is not necessarily accompanied by a lower optimal capital income tax.

Our study is related to a vast literature that attempts to overturn the Chamley-Judd result and obtain a positive optimal capital income tax (e.g., among others, Chamley, 2001; Erosa and Gervais, 2002; Domeij, 2005; Golosov et al., 2006; Conesa et al., 2009; Aghion et al., 2013; Chen and Lu, 2013; Piketty and Saez, 2013; Straub and Werning, 2018). This paper contributes to the literature by introducing the role of endogenous technological change. Two papers studying the optimal factor tax within the framework of an endogenous growth model are closely related to the present paper.\footnote{Another paper by Zeng and Zhang (2002) also introduces factor taxes into an innovation-driven growth model. Their study, however, focuses on the long-run growth effects of various taxes, instead of focusing on the normative analysis of the optimal capital taxation.} Chen and Lu (2013) consider a human capital-based endogenous growth model developed by Lucas (1988), and find that a switch from labor income taxes to capital income taxes always enhances growth and welfare. Thus, the government should tax capital income to a maximum level of 99%. Aghion et al. (2013) also introduce R&D-based growth into the debate of the Chamley-Judd result. However, our paper differs from Aghion et al. (2013) in the following ways. First, Aghion et al. (2013) consider a Schumpeterian quality-ladder growth model, whereas we adopt an expanding-variety R&D model (Romer, 1990) while allowing for creative destruction as in Jones and Williams (2000). Second, Aghion et al. (2013) consider a lab-equipment innovation process (i.e., R&D uses final goods as inputs) whereas we assume a knowledge-driven innovation process (i.e., R&D uses labor as inputs). Under our setting, the welfare cost of taxing labor is larger than that in their model. Third, in Aghion et al. (2013), a positive optimal capital income tax arises only when the government spending to output ratio exceeds about 38%, which is much larger than the empirical value. In our analysis, by contrast, the optimal capital income tax is positive even if the government spending ratio is quite small (around 14%, which is empirically more realistic). Finally, Aghion et al. (2013) do not examine how the optimal capital income tax responds to various R&D externalities, which is the main focus of our analysis.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the R&D-based growth model featuring creative destruction and various types of R&D externalities elucidated by Jones and Williams (2000). In Section 3 we analyze how capital tax changes affect the economy in the long run. In Section 4 we quantify the optimal capital income tax rate and
examine how its value depends on various R&D externalities. Section 5 concludes.

2 The model

Our framework builds on the scale-invariant R&D-based growth model in Jones and Williams (2000). The main novelty of the Jones-Williams model is that it introduces a variety of R&D externalities into the original variety-expanding R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990). In this paper, we extend their model by incorporating (i) an elastic labor supply and (ii) factor income taxes, namely, capital and labor income taxes. To conserve space, the familiar components of the Romer variety-expanding model will be briefly described, while new features will be described in more detail.

2.1 Households

We consider a continuous-time economy that is inhabited by a representative household. At time $t$, the population size of the household is $N_t$, which grows at an exogenous rate $n$. Each member of the household is endowed with one unit of time that can be used to supply labor to a competitive market or enjoy leisure. The lifetime utility function of the representative household is given as:\footnote{Here we assume that household welfare depends on per capita utility. See, e.g., Chu and Cozzi (2014) for a similar specification.}

$$U = \int_0^\infty e^{-\beta t} [\ln c_t + \chi \ln(1 - l_t)] \, dt, \quad \beta > 0, \quad \chi \geq 0,$$  

where $c_t$ is per capita consumption and $l_t$ is the supply of labor per capita. The parameters $\beta$ and $\chi$ denote, respectively, the subjective rate of time preference and leisure preference. The representative household maximizes (1) subject to the following budget constraint:

$$\dot{k}_t + \dot{e}_t = [(1 - \tau_K) r_{K,t} - n - \delta] k_t + (r_{e,t} - n) e_t + (1 - \tau_{L,t}) w_t l_t - c_t,$$  

where a dot hereafter denotes the derivative with respect to time, $k_t$ is physical capital per capita, $\delta$ is the physical capital depreciation rate, $e_t$ is the value of equity shares of R&D owned by each member, $r_{K,t}$ is the capital rental rate, $r_{e,t}$ is the rate of dividend, and $w_t$ is the wage rate. The policy parameters $\tau_K$ and $\tau_{L,t}$ are respectively the capital and labor
Solving the dynamic optimization problem yields the following first-order conditions:

\[
\frac{1}{c_t} = q_t, \quad (3)
\]

\[
(1 - \tau_{L,t})w_t(1 - l_t) = \chi c_t, \quad (4)
\]

\[
r_{e,t} = (1 - \tau_K)r_{K,t} - \delta. \quad (5)
\]

where \( q_t \) is the Hamiltonian co-state variable on eq. (2). Equations (3) and (4) are respectively the optimality conditions for consumption and labor supply, and eq. (5) is a no-arbitrage condition which states that the net returns on physical capital and equity shares must be equalized. We denote the common net return on both assets as \( r_t \) (i.e., \( r_t = r_{e,t} = (1 - \tau_K)r_{K,t} - \delta \)). The typical Keynes-Ramsey rule is:

\[
\frac{\dot{c_t}}{c_t} = r_t - n - \beta. \quad (6)
\]

### 2.2 The final-goods sector

A perfectly-competitive final-good sector produces a single final output \( Y_t \) (treated as the numéraire) by using labor and a continuum of intermediate capital goods, according to the CES technology:

\[
Y_t = L_{Y,t}^{-1 - \alpha} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{A_t} x_t^{\alpha\rho}(i) \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho}}, \quad 1 > \alpha > 0, \quad 1/\alpha > \rho > 0, \quad (7)
\]

where \( L_{Y,t} \) is the labor input employed in final goods production, \( x_t(i) \) is the \( i \)-th intermediate capital good, and \( A_t \) is the number of varieties of the intermediate goods.

Profit maximization yields the following conditional demand functions for the labor input and intermediate goods:

\[
w_t = (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{L_{Y,t}}, \quad (8)
\]

\[
p_t(i) = \alpha L_{Y,t}^{-1 - \alpha} \left( \sum_{i=1}^{A_t} x_t^{\alpha\rho}(i) \right)^{\frac{1}{\rho} - 1} x_t^{\alpha\rho-1}(i), \quad (9)
\]

\footnote{We drop the subscript \( t \) for \( \tau_K \) because it is treated as an exogenous policy parameter throughout the paper.}
where \( p_t(i) \) is the price of the \( i \)-th intermediate good.

### 2.3 The intermediate-goods sector

Each intermediate good is produced by a monopolistic producer that owns a perpetually protected patent for that good. The producer uses one unit of physical capital to produce one unit of intermediate goods; that is, the production function is \( x_t(i) = v_t(i) \), where \( v_t(i) \) denotes the capital input employed by monopolistic intermediate firm \( i \). Accordingly, the profit of intermediate goods firm \( i \) is:

\[
\pi_{x,t}(i) = p_t(i)x_t(i) - r_{K,t}v_t(i). \tag{10}
\]

Let \( \eta_t(i) \) denote the gross markup that the \( i \)-th intermediate firm can charge over its marginal cost; that is:

\[
p_t(i) = \eta_t(i)r_{K,t}. \tag{11}
\]

Then, the profit of the \( i \)-th intermediate firm can be obtained as:

\[
\pi_{x,t}(i) = \frac{\eta_t(i) - 1}{\eta_t(i)} \frac{Y_t}{A_t}. \tag{12}
\]

In subsection 2.5, we will elucidate how \( \eta_t(i) \) is determined.

### 2.4 The R&D sector

R&D creates new varieties of intermediate goods for final-good production. In line with Romer (1990) and Jones (1995), we assume that new varieties are developed using the labor input (i.e., R&D scientists and engineers). The production technology is given as:

\[
(1 + \psi)A_t = \zeta_tL_{A,t}, \quad \psi \geq 0, \tag{13}
\]

where \( L_{A,t} \) is the labor input used in the R&D sector, and \( \zeta_t \) is the productivity of R&D which the innovators take as given. The parameter \( \psi \) represents the size of the innovation clusters.\(^4\)

\(^4\)In the later analysis, we will provide a more detailed explanation for this parameter.

We follow Jones (1995) to specify that the productivity of R&D takes the following
where $\zeta$ is a constant productivity parameter. In addition to $\zeta$, eqs. (13) and (14) contain three parameters $\lambda$, $\phi$ and $\psi$. These parameters capture salient features of the R&D process, as proposed by Jones and Williams (1998).

First, the parameter $1 \geq \lambda > 0$ reflects a (negative) duplication externality or a congestion effect of R&D. It implies that the social marginal product of research labor can be less than the private marginal product. This may happen because of, for example, a patent race, or if two researchers accidentally work out a similar idea. Jones and Williams (1998) refer to this negative duplication externality as the *stepping on toes effect*. Notice that this effect is stronger with a smaller $\lambda$, and it vanishes when $\lambda = 1$.

Second, the parameter $1 > \phi > 0$ reflects a (positive) knowledge spillover effect due to the fact that richer existing ideas are helpful to the development of new ideas. A higher $\phi$ means that the spillover effect is greater. In his pioneering article, Romer (1990) specifies $\phi = 1$; however, Jones (1995) argues that $\phi = 1$ exhibits a scale effect which is inconsistent with the empirical evidence. We follow Jones (1995) and assume that $\phi < 1$ in order to remove this scale effect. The knowledge spillover effect is dubbed by Jones and Williams (1998) as the *standing on shoulders effect*.

Finally, the parameter $\psi \geq 0$ denotes the size of the innovation clusters, which captures the concept of creative destruction formalized in the Schumpeterian growth model developed by Aghion and Howitt (1992). The basic idea is that innovations must come together in clusters, some of which are new, while others simply build on old fashions. More specifically, suppose that an innovation cluster, which contains $(1 + \psi)$ varieties, has been invented. Out of these $(1 + \psi)$ varieties, only one unit of variety is entirely new and thus increases the mass of the variety of intermediate goods. The remaining portion, of size $\psi$, simply replaces the old versions. This portion captures the spirit of creative destruction since new versions are created with the elimination of old versions. However this part does not contribute to an increase in existing varieties. In other words, for $(1 + \psi)$ intermediate goods invented, the actual augmented variety is 1, while there are $\psi$ repackaged varieties.

Given $\zeta_t$, the R&D sector hires $L_{A,t}$ to create $(1 + \psi)$ varieties. Thus, the profit function is $\pi_{A,t} = P_{A,t}(1 + \psi)A_t - w_t L_{A,t}$. By assuming free entry in the R&D sector, we can obtain:

$$P_{A,t} = \frac{s_t (1 - \alpha)Y_t}{1 - s_t (1 + \psi)A_t},$$  (15)
where $s_t \equiv L_{A,t}/L_t$ is the ratio of research labor to total labor supply $L_t$. Moreover, the no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety is:

$$r_t P_{A,t} = \pi_{x,t} + \dot{P}_{A,t} - \psi \frac{\dot{A}_t}{A_t} P_{A,t}. \quad (16)$$

In the absence of creative destruction ($\psi = 0$), the familiar no-arbitrage condition reports that, for each variety, the return on the equity shares $r_t P_{A,t}$ will be equal to the sum of the flow of the monopolistic profit $\pi_{x,t}$ plus the capital gain or loss $\dot{P}_{A,t}$. When creative destruction is present, existing goods are replaced. Accompanied by $\dot{A}_t$ new varieties being invented, the amount of $\psi \dot{A}_t$ existing varieties will be replaced. Therefore, for each variety, the expected probability of being replaced is $\psi \dot{A}_t/A_t$, which gives rise to the expected capital loss expressed by the last term in eq. (16).

### 2.5 The monopolistic markup

This subsection explains how the monopolistic markup $\eta_t(i)$ is determined. As identified by Jones and Williams (2000), there are two scenarios in which the markup is decided. The first is the “unconstrained” case. In this case, the monopolistic intermediate firm freely sets the price by maximizing eq. (10) subject to the production function $x_t(i) = v_t(i)$ and eq. (9), which yields the pricing rule $p_t(i) = \frac{1}{\rho_\alpha} r_{K,t}$. We refer to $\frac{1}{\rho_\alpha}$ as the “unconstrained” markup. The second case is the “constrained” case, which may occur if the new designs are linked together in the innovation cluster. Specifically, a larger size of innovation clusters $\psi$ serves as a constraint that controls the magnitude of the monopolistic markup. The intuition underlying this idea requires a more detailed explanation. Consider that the current number of varieties is $A_t$. Now an innovation cluster with size $(1+\psi)$ is developed. This increases the mass of varieties to $A_t+1$; at the same time it also replaces old-version varieties by $\psi$ units. Subsequently, the final-good firm faces two choices. It can either adopt the new innovation cluster and then use $A_t+1$ intermediate goods priced at a markup, or part with the new innovation cluster and still use $A_t$ intermediate goods in the production process. If the final-good firm chooses the latter, since $\psi$ varieties have now been displaced, the final-good firm only needs to purchase $A_t - \psi$ units of intermediate goods at a markup price, while the other $\psi$ units of displaced intermediate goods can be purchased at a lower (competitive) price. When the size of an innovation cluster is high (a large value of $\psi$), the final-good firm will not tend to adopt the new innovation cluster because sticking to old clusters is cheaper.
a result, the intermediate-good firms have to set a lower price so as to attract the final-good firm to adopt the new innovation cluster. This adoption constraint explains why an increase in the size of the innovation clusters reduces the markup.

In an appendix, Jones and Williams (2000) demonstrate that the constrained markup is negatively related to both the size of the innovation clusters and the elasticity of substitution between capital goods. Specifically, they demonstrate that, in order to attract the final-good firm to adopt the new innovation cluster, the intermediate-good firms cannot set a markup that is higher than \([1 + \psi/\psi]^{1/\rho\alpha - 1}\). A profit-maximizing firm thus always tends to set the highest price \(p_t(i) = [(1 + \psi)/\psi]^{1/\rho\alpha - 1}r_{K,t}\). We refer to \([(1 + \psi)/\psi]^{1/\rho\alpha - 1}\) as the "unconstrained" markup. By combining the constrained markup pricing with the unconstrained markup pricing rule mentioned earlier (i.e., \(p_t(i) = \frac{1}{\rho\alpha}r_{K,t}\)), we can conclude that the equilibrium markup is:

\[\eta_t(i) = \min \left\{ \frac{1}{\rho\alpha}, \left(\frac{1 + \psi}{\psi}\right)^{1/\rho\alpha - 1} \right\}, \quad (17)\]

which is independent of \(i\) and \(t\). Combining eqs. (10) and (17) implies that all intermediate-good firms are symmetric. Hence, the notation \(i\) can be dropped from now on.

### 2.6 The government and aggregation

The government collects capital income taxes and labor income taxes to finance its public spending. The balanced budget constraint faced by the government is:

\[N_t(r_{K,t}k_t + \tau_{L,t}l_t) = G_t, \quad (18)\]

where \(G_t\) is the total government spending. We assume that government spending is a fixed proportion of final output, i.e., \(G_t = \zeta Y_t\), where \(\zeta \in (0, 1)\) is the ratio of government spending to output. Now let us define the aggregate capital stock as \(K_t = N_t k_t\), aggregate consumption \(C_t = N_t c_t\), and total labor supply \(L_t = N_t l_t\). After some derivations, we can obtain the following resource constraint in the economy: \(\dot{K}_t = Y_t - C_t - G_t - \delta K_t\).

### 2.7 The decentralized equilibrium

The decentralized equilibrium in this economy is an infinite sequence of allocations \(\{C_t, K_t, A_t, Y_t, L_t, L_{A,t}, x_t, v_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\), prices \(\{w_t, r_{K,t}, r_t, p_t, P_{A,t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}\), and policies \(\{\tau_{K}, \tau_{L,t}\}\), such
that at each instant of time:

a. households choose \( c_t, k_t, e_t, l_t \) to maximize lifetime utility, eq. (1), taking prices and policies as given;

b. competitive final-good firms choose \( x_t, L_{Y,t} \) to maximize profit taking prices as given;

c. monopolistic intermediate firms \( i \in [0, A_t] \) choose \( v_t, p_t \) to maximize profit taking \( r_{K,t} \) as given;

d. the R&D sector chooses \( L_{A,t} \) to maximize profit taking \( P_{A,t}, w_t \) and the productivity \( \zeta_t \) as given;

e. the labor market clears, i.e., \( N_t l_t = L_{A,t} + L_{Y,t} \);

f. the capital market clears, i.e., \( N_t k_t = A_t v_t \);

g. the stock market for variety clears, i.e., \( N_t e_t = P_{A,t} A_t \)

h. the resource constraint is satisfied, i.e., \( \dot{K}_t = Y_t - C_t - G_t - \delta K_t \);

i. the government budget constraint is balanced, i.e., \( N_t (\tau_{K,t} r_{K,t} k_t + \tau_{L,t} w_t l_t) = G_t \).

3 Balanced growth path

In this section, we explore the balanced growth path along which each variable grows at a constant rate, which can be zero. We denote the growth rate of any generic variable \( Z \) by \( g_Z \), and drop the time subscript to denote any variable in a steady state. The steady-state growth rates of varieties and output are given by (see Appendix A):

\[
g_A = \frac{\phi}{1 - \lambda} n, \quad g_Y = \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \left( \frac{1}{\rho} - \alpha \right) g_A + n. \quad (19a)
\]

Moreover, in order to obtain stationary endogenous variables, it is necessary to define the following transformed variables:

\[
\begin{align*}
\hat{k}_t &= \frac{K_t}{N_t^\sigma}, \quad \hat{c}_t = \frac{C_t}{N_t^\sigma}, \quad \hat{y}_t = \frac{Y_t}{N_t^\sigma}, \quad \hat{a}_t = \frac{A_t}{N_t^{\lambda / (1 - \phi)}},
\end{align*}
\]
where $\sigma \equiv 1 + \frac{(1/\rho - \alpha)\lambda}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \phi)} > 0$ is a composite parameter. For ease of exposition, in line with Eicher and Turnovsky (2001), $\hat{k}, \hat{c}, \hat{y},$ and $\hat{a}$ are dubbed the scale-adjusted capital, consumption, output, and R&D varieties, respectively. Based on the transformed variables and the equilibrium defined in subsection 2.5, the economy in the steady state can be described by the following set of equations:

\begin{align*}
    r &= (1 - \tau_K) r_K - \delta = \beta + g_Y, \quad (20a) \\
    s &= \frac{1 - \frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (1 + \psi) g_A}{r - g_Y + \left(1 + \frac{1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right) (1 + \psi) g_A}, \quad (20b) \\
    \frac{\hat{k}}{\hat{y}} &= \frac{\alpha}{\eta} \hat{K}, \quad (20c) \\
    (1 - \zeta) \frac{\hat{y}}{k} &= \frac{\hat{c}}{\hat{k}} + g_Y + \delta, \quad (20d) \\
    \hat{y} &= \hat{a}^{1/\rho - \alpha} \hat{k}^{\alpha} ((1 - s)l)^{1 - \alpha}, \quad (20e) \\
    g_A &= \frac{1}{1 + \psi} \frac{\zeta (sl)^{\lambda}}{\hat{a}^{1 - \phi}}, \quad (20f) \\
    \frac{\chi}{(1 - l)} &= \frac{(1 - \tau_L)(1 - \alpha) \hat{y}}{(1 - s) \hat{c}}, \quad (20g) \\
    \tau_L &= \frac{1 - s}{1 - \alpha} \left(\zeta - \tau_K \frac{\alpha}{\eta}\right), \quad (20h)
\end{align*}

in which eight endogenous variables $r, s, \hat{c}, \hat{k}, \hat{a}, \hat{y}, l, \tau_L$ are determined.

Of particular note, our main focus is on the examination of the capital tax. By holding the proportion of the government spending constant, an increase in the capital income tax will be coupled with a reduction in the labor income tax. Therefore, the literature on the Chamley-Judd result generally assumes that the labor income tax endogenously adjusts to balance the government budget. This approach has been dubbed as “tax shifting” or “tax swap” in the literature. Our analysis follows this standard approach in the literature.

### 3.1 Comparative static analysis

In this section, we analyze the effects of capital taxation on the R&D share $s$ of labor, the endogenous labor income tax rate, labor supply, and other scale-adjusted variables: $\hat{a}, \hat{k}, \hat{c},$
The long-run R&D labor share, \( s \), is given by

\[
s = \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (1 + \psi) g_A \left( r - g_Y + \left( 1 + \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right) (1 + \psi) g_A \right).
\]  

(21a)

It follows from the above equation that, in the steady state, a change in the capital income tax rate (21a) does not affect the R&D labor share (i.e., \( \partial s / \partial \tau_K = 0 \)). The intuition underlying \( \partial s / \partial \tau_K = 0 \) can be grasped as follows. The non-arbitrage condition between physical capital and R&D equity reported in (20a) requires that the return on physical capital be equal to the return on R&D equity. Given that the return on R&D equity, \( r = \beta + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha} \left( \frac{1}{\rho} - \alpha \right) g_A + n \), is independent of the capital tax rate, the capital income tax rate does not affect the return on R&D equity and the R&D labor share. Therefore, our analysis does not rely on capital taxation having a direct effect on the allocation of R&D and production labor. Instead, our analysis is based on the trade-off between labor supply and capital investment as in the standard Chamley-Judd setting.

From (20h), we have:

\[
\tau_L = \frac{1 - s}{1 - \alpha} \left( \zeta - \tau_K \frac{\alpha}{\eta} \right),
\]  

(21b)

Based on (21a), we have:

\[
\frac{\partial \tau_L}{\partial \tau_K} = - \frac{1 - s}{\eta} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} < 0.
\]  

(21c)

The above equation shows that an increase in the capital income tax rate is coupled with a reduction in the labor income tax rate.

Given a constant capital income tax rate \( \tau_K \), labor supply in the steady state is given by:

\[
l = 1 - \frac{\chi}{\chi + \frac{1}{[(1 - \zeta) - (\delta + g_Y) \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}{\eta(\beta + s + g_Y)}](1 - \tau_L)(1 - \alpha)}}.
\]  

(22a)

\(^5\)We solve the dynamic system in Appendix B, and a detailed derivation of the comparative static analysis is presented in Appendix C.
It is straightforward from eq.(22a) to infer the following result:

\[
\frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} = \frac{\alpha \beta (1-\frac{1}{\gamma}) (1-\zeta + \frac{n-1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha (\delta + g_Y)}{g_A}) (1-l)l}{\eta (\beta + \delta + g_Y) (1-\tau_L) (1-\zeta - (\delta + g_Y) \frac{\alpha (1-\tau_K)}{\eta (\beta + \delta + g_Y)})} > 0. \tag{22b}
\]

Equation (22b) indicates that, when taxes shift from a labor income tax to a capital income tax, a rise in the capital income tax rate leads to an increase in labor supply. The intuition underlying this result can be explained as follows. In response to a rise in the capital income tax rate, the following effect emerges. Raising the capital tax rate reduces the labor income tax rate (see eq. (21b)) and raises the after-tax wage income, thereby exerting a positive effect on labor supply. Therefore, a rise in the capital income tax rate is accompanied by an increase in labor supply.

Moreover, the scale-adjusted R&D varieties \( \hat{a} \) is given by:

\[
\hat{a} = \left[ \frac{\zeta}{(1 + \psi)g_A} \right]^{1/(1-\phi)} (sl)^{\lambda/(1-\phi)}, \tag{23a}
\]

where \( s \) and \( l \) are reported in eqs. (21a) and (22a). With \( \partial s/\partial \tau_K = 0 \), it is quite easy from eq. (23a) to derive that:

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{a}}{\partial \tau_K} = \frac{\lambda \hat{a}}{(1-\phi)l} \frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} > 0. \tag{23b}
\]

Equation (23b) indicates that a rise in the capital income tax rate boosts scale-adjusted R&D varieties. The intuition is clear. Following a rise in the capital income tax rate that is coupled with a decline in the labor income tax rate, the household is motivated to increase its labor supply. This in turn increases labor input allocated to the R&D sector \( (L_A = Nsl) \). Then, as reported in eq. (23a), given that scale-adjusted R&D varieties \( \hat{a} \) is increasing in the R&D labor input \( sNl \), \( \hat{a} \) will increase in response to a rise in \( \tau_K \).

From eqs. (20a), (20c), (20d), (23a), and (20e), we can infer that:

\[
\hat{y} = \left[ \frac{\zeta}{(1 + \psi)g_A} \right]^{1/\alpha(1-\alpha)} (sl)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \frac{\lambda}{1-\alpha} \left[ \alpha (1-\tau_K) \right]^{\frac{\alpha}{\eta (\beta + \delta + g_Y)}} (1-s)l, \tag{24a}
\]

where

\[
\frac{\partial \hat{y}}{\partial \tau_K} = \left[ -\frac{\alpha}{(1-\alpha) (1-\tau_K)} + \frac{\sigma}{l} \frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} \right] \hat{y} > 0. \tag{24b}
\]
Equation (24b) indicates that a rise in the capital income tax rate has ambiguous effects on the scale-adjusted output $\hat{y}$. As shown in eq. (24b), two conflicting effects emerge following a rise in the capital income tax rate. First, a rise in the capital income tax rate shrinks capital investment, which in turn generates a negative impact on output. Second, a rise in the capital income tax rate is accompanied by a fall in the labor income tax rate, which motivates the household to provide more labor supply. This increase in labor supply implies that more labor input is available for the R&D sector and in turn boosts R&D varieties, thereby contributing to a positive effect on output. If labor supply is exogenous ($\chi = 0$), the second positive effect is absent ($\partial l/\partial K = 0$), and a higher capital income tax rate lowers output. However, if labor supply is endogenous ($\chi > 0$), the two opposing effects are present, and the output effect of capital income taxation depends upon the relative strength between these two effects.

From eqs. (20a), (20c), and (20d), we have:

$$\hat{k} = \frac{(1 - \tau_K)\Phi}{(\delta + g_Y)} \hat{y},$$ (25a)
$$\hat{c} = [(1 - \zeta) - (1 - \tau_K)\Phi]\hat{y},$$ (25b)

where $\Phi \equiv \frac{\alpha(\delta + g_Y)}{\eta(\delta + \delta + g_Y)}$ is a composite parameter. Based on eqs. (25a) and (25b), the effects of $\tau_K$ on $\hat{k}$ and $\hat{c}$ can be expressed as:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{k}}{\partial \tau_K} = - \frac{\Phi}{(\delta + g_Y)} \hat{y} + \frac{(1 - \tau_K)\Phi}{(\delta + g_Y)} \frac{\hat{y}}{\partial \tau_K}$$ (26a)
$$= \left[\frac{\sigma}{l} \frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} - \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_K)} \right] (1 - \tau_K)\Phi \frac{\hat{y}}{\partial \tau_K} > 0,$$
$$\frac{\partial \hat{c}}{\partial \tau_K} = \Phi \hat{y} + [(1 - \zeta) - (1 - \tau_K)\Phi] \frac{\hat{y}}{\partial \tau_K}$$ (26b)
$$= \{\Phi + [(1 - \zeta) - (1 - \tau_K)\Phi][\sigma] - \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_K)}\} \frac{\hat{y}}{\partial \tau_K} < 0.$$

The intuition behind eqs. (26a) and (26b) can be explained as follows. It is clear in eq. (25a) that capital income taxation affects scale-adjusted capital $\hat{k}$ through two channels. The first channel is the capital-output ratio $\hat{k}/\hat{y} = \frac{(1 - \tau_K)\Phi}{(\delta + g_Y)}$, and the second channel is the level of scale-adjusted output $\hat{y}$. The first term after the first equality in eq. (26a) indicates that the first channel definitely lowers the level of $\hat{k}$. Moreover, as shown in eq. (24b),
the second channel may either raise or lower the level of $\hat{k}$ since capital taxation leads to an ambiguous effect on $\hat{y}$. As a consequence, the net effect of capital taxation on the scale-adjusted capital stock $\hat{k}$ is still uncertain. Similarly, as indicated in eq. (25b), capital income taxation also affects $\hat{c}$ through two channels. The first channel is the consumption-output ratio $\hat{c}/\hat{y} = [(1 - \zeta) - (1 - \tau_K)\Phi]$], and the second channel is the level of scale-adjusted output $\hat{y}$. The first channel definitely boosts the level of $\hat{c}$, while the second channel may either raise or lower the level of $\hat{c}$ since capital taxation leads to an ambiguous effect on $\hat{y}$. As a consequence, the net effect of capital taxation on scale-adjusted consumption $\hat{c}$ remains ambiguous.

4 Quantitative results

In this section, we simulate the transitional dynamic effects of capital taxation and compute the optimal capital tax rate by performing a quantitative analysis. We calibrate the parameters of our theoretical model based on US data to quantify the optimal capital tax. Then we explore how the optimal capital tax responds to important parameters that feature R&D externalities and the government size.

By dropping the exogenous terms, the life-time utility of the representative household reported in eq. (1) can be expressed as:

$$U = \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\beta t} [\ln \hat{c}_t + \chi \ln(1 - l_t)] \, dt,$$

in which $\hat{c}_t$ and $l_t$ are functions of $\tau_K$. The optimal capital tax that takes into account the welfare effects including transitional dynamics is the one that maximizes eq. (27).

4.1 Calibration

To carry out a numerical analysis, we first choose a baseline parameterization, as reported in Table 1. Our model has eleven parameter values to be assigned. These parameters are either set to a commonly used value in the existing literature or calibrated to match some empirical moments in the US economy. We now describe each of them in detail. In line with Andolfatto et al. (2008) and Chu and Cozzi (2018), the labor income share $1 - \alpha$ and the discount rate $\beta$ are set to standard values 0.4 and 0.05, respectively. The population growth

---

6We describe the dynamic system of the model in Appendix B.
rate \( n \) is set to 0.011 as used by Conesa et al. (2009). The physical capital depreciation rate is set to 0.0318 so that the initial capital-output ratio is 2.5 as in Lucas (1990). The initial capital tax rate \( \tau_K \) is set to 0.3 based on the average US effective tax rate estimated by Carey and Tchilingurian (2000). A similar value of the capital income tax rate has been adopted in Domeij (2005) and Chen and Lu (2013). As for the government size (the ratio of government spending to output), data for the US indicate that this is around 20 percent (Gali, 1994), and has slightly increased in recent years. We therefore set \( \zeta \) to be 0.22, which is the average level during 2001-2013, to reflect its increasing trend. The parameter for leisure preference \( \chi \) is chosen as 1.5901 to make hours worked around one third of total hours.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1. Benchmark Parameterization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Definition</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor income share</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discount rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population growth rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial capital tax rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government size</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leisure preference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R&amp;D productivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing on toes effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substitution parameter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standing on shoulders effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Size of innovation cluster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical capital depreciation rate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our parameterization regarding the R&D process basically follows the approach in Jones and Williams (2000). First, we normalize the R&D productivity \( \varsigma \) to unity. The value of the parameter for the standing on toes effect \( \lambda \) is somewhat difficult to calibrate because, as argued by Stokey (1995), the empirical literature does not provide much guidance on such a parameter. In our analysis, we thus choose an intermediate value \( \lambda = 0.5 \) as a benchmark, but we will allow it to vary over the whole interval from 0 to 0.564.\(^8\) The substitution parameter \( \rho \) is closely related to the markup of the intermediate firms. We set \( \rho \) to be 2.2727 such that, given \( 1 - \alpha \), the (unconstrained) markup in our economy is 1.1, which lies

\(^7\)Our results are independent of the value of \( \varsigma \).

\(^8\)If the value of \( \lambda \) is over 0.564, the second-order condition of the government’s maximization with respect to \( \tau_K \) will not be satisfied.
within the reasonable range estimated for US industries (e.g., Laitner and Stolyarov, 2004; Yang, 2018). Next, we use the output growth rate to calibrate the extent of the standing on shoulders effect $\phi$. In our model we have:

$$ g_Y = \left( \frac{1}{\rho} - \alpha \right) g_A + n. \quad (28) $$

Given that $g_A = \phi n/(1 - \lambda)$ and that we have already assigned values to $1 - \alpha$, $\rho$, $n$ and $\lambda$, we can then choose $\phi$ to target the empirical level of the output growth rate in the US, which is around 2%. This results in $\phi = 0.9593$ as our baseline value. Finally, as a benchmark we choose the size of the innovation cluster $\psi = 0.25$ by following Comin (2004). In this case the markup is not bound by the adoption constraint. If the value of $\psi$ is large, the markup will then be constrained and determined by this parameter. In subsection 4.3 we will run $\psi$ from 0 to 0.515 as a robustness check.

### 4.2 The optimal capital tax with transitional dynamics

Under our benchmark parameterization, Figure 1 plots the relationship between the level of welfare and the rate of capital income tax, which exhibits an inverted-U shaped relationship. Of particular note, the optimal capital tax is positive, and its value is around 11.9%. The Chamley-Judd result of zero capital tax does not hold in our R&D-based growth model.

![Figure 1: The level of welfare and the rate of capital income tax](image)

The intuition underlying this result is as follows. Given that the government is limited to
capital and labor taxation to finance a fix amount of the government expenditure, not taxing capital income implies that the labor income must be taxed at a higher rate. Although a zero capital tax efficiently leaves the capital market undistorted, a high labor tax distorts the labor market severely by decreasing the after-tax wage income and in turn reduces total labor supply. As a consequence, there is less labor devoted to the production in the R&D sector, which then results in fewer equilibrium varieties for the final-good production, and ultimately depresses the level of consumption and welfare. In short, to achieve the social optimum, it is necessary to balance both distortions in the capital and labor markets. This implies that an extreme case of the zero capital tax is often suboptimal.

4.3 Policy implications of R&D externalities

In this subsection, we investigate how the optimal capital tax responds to relevant parameters, in particular those related to the innovation process. More importantly, we shed some light on the roles of R&D externalities in the design of optimal tax policies. To this end, we provide a robustness check for whether the positive optimal capital tax still survives under various scenarios. In what follows, we propose some relevant parameters that need to be considered by the policy-makers. The results are depicted in Figures 2 to 6. Our robustness analysis generates several implications.

First, Figures 2 and 3 show that the optimal capital tax rate is increasing in \( \lambda \) (the stepping on toes effect) and \( \phi \) (the standing on shoulders effect). With sufficiently small values of \( \lambda \) and \( \phi \), the optimal capital income tax is negative. Notice that a higher \( \lambda \) implies
that the negative duplication externality is small, and a higher $\phi$ means that the positive spillover effect of R&D is relatively strong. Both cases imply a similar circumstance in which the innovation process is more productive, and in which underinvestment in R&D is more likely. Under such a situation, the welfare cost of depressing innovation by raising the labor income tax is larger. Therefore, the government is inclined to increase the capital tax while reducing the labor tax.

![Figure 3: The optimal capital tax rate and the standing on shoulders effect](image)

Figure 3: The optimal capital tax rate and the standing on shoulders effect

Second, Figure 4 shows that the optimal capital income tax and the substitution parameter $\rho$ exhibit an inverted-U shaped relationship. A lower $\rho$ is associated with a higher monopolistic markup $\eta$, regardless of whether the adoption constraint is binding or not. The substitution parameter mainly affects the optimal capital tax in three different ways. First, when $\eta$ is large (when $\rho$ is small), the degree of the intermediate firms’ monopoly power is strong. To correct this distortion, the government tends to subsidize capital to offset the gaps between price and the marginal cost; see Judd (1997, 2002). Second, when $\eta$ is large (when $\rho$ is small), the private value of inventions increases. As a result, equilibrium R&D increases, which in turn makes R&D overinvestment more likely. Therefore, the government tends to raise the tax on labor because R&D uses labor in our model. These two effects indicate that the optimal capital tax should be decreasing in the markup as in previous studies. Third, a small $\rho$ amplifies the productivity of varieties in final-good production and thus amplifies the effect of $g_A$ on $g_Y$ (see, eq. (28)). In this case, the government is inclined to subsidize labor by taxing capital since the R&D sector uses labor. This last effect indicates that the optimal capital tax rate is decreasing in the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods (or increasing in the markup). Figure 4 shows that the first two effects dominate
when \( \rho \) is small and the third effect dominants when \( \rho \) becomes sufficiently large. Thus the optimal capital tax reverses as \( \rho \) exceeds a threshold value.

![Figure 4: The optimal capital tax rate and the substitution parameter](image)

Third, Figure 5 shows that the optimal capital tax increases in response to a rise in the size of the innovation cluster (creative destruction). To explain the intuition, we first distinguish three effects that creative destruction may have on the incentive to engage in R&D. The first positive effect comes from the R&D firm being able to earn profits even for those of its products that do not really increase the variety of intermediate goods (note that \( \pi_{A,t} = P_{A,t}(1 + \psi)\dot{A}_t - w_tL_{A,t} \)). This is referred to as the “carrot” by Jones and Williams (2000). The second negative effect arises, as exhibited in eq. (15), from a higher \( \psi \) that decreases the equilibrium price of the products in the presence of free entry, even though it increases the products sold by the R&D firm. The third negative effect is associated with the no-arbitrage condition for the value of a variety, which is displayed in eq. (16). Due to creative destruction, existing goods have a probability of being replaced by new goods, and this probability increases with the degree of creative destruction. Therefore, creative destruction increases the expected capital loss in terms of the return on the equity shares, and in turn reduces the incentive to engage in R&D. Jones and Williams (2000) dub this effect as the “stick”. In the model, the first and second effects approximately offset each other, leaving the stick effect as the main influence of creative destruction on R&D. As a result, a higher \( \psi \) discourages R&D, and hence the government should increase the capital tax and reduce the labor tax in order to boost labor supply and R&D labor.

9The R&D firm can earn profits from its whole products \((1 + \psi)\dot{A}\), in which \(\psi\dot{A}\) does not contribute to the increase of varieties.
Finally, the optimal capital tax is increasing in the government spending ratio $\zeta$ (see Figure 6). This result is consistent with Aghion et al. (2013) and Lu and Chen (2015). When the need for public expenditure is sufficiently small, the government can collect labor tax revenues to finance the government spending and also to subsidize capital. Note that in this case the monopoly effect dominates the R&D effect so that the optimal capital tax rate becomes negative. As the size of government expenditure increases, it is not promising to rely solely on raising the labor tax, because the distortion to the R&D sector would be too strong. In this case, it becomes optimal to shift some of the tax burden to capital.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we have examined whether the Chamley-Judd result of zero optimal capital taxation is valid in a non-scale innovation-based growth model. By calibrating our model to the US economy, we find that the optimal capital income tax is positive, at a rate of around 11.9 percent. We also vary the magnitudes of R&D externalities to see how the optimal capital tax responds. A positive optimal capital income tax is valid in most cases.

Some extensions for future research are worth noting. First, since R&D investment usually has liquidity problems (Lach, 2002), it would be relevant to introduce a credit constraint

---

Lu and Chen (2015) show that in an exogenous growth model with a given share of government expenditure in output, the optimal capital income tax is positive and increasing with the the share of government expenditure. The intuition is that capital accumulation reduces the discounted net marginal product of next period's capital by way of increasing government expenditure. Thus, the government should tax capital to correct this distortion.
Figure 6: The optimal capital tax and the government size

on R&D investment into our model. Second, it would be interesting to examine the optimal capital tax in an endogenous growth model where both innovation and capital accumulation are the driving forces of economic growth (see, e.g., Iwaisako and Futagami, 2013; Chu et al., 2018). These directions will no doubt generate new insights into the debate on the Chamley-Judd result.
References


Lach, S., (2002), Do R&D subsidies stimulate or displace private R&D? Evidence from Israel,


Appendix A. Deriving the steady-state growth rate

To solve for the steady-state growth rate of the economy, from eqs. (13) and (14) we have:

\[
\frac{\dot{A}_t}{A_t} = \frac{\varsigma}{1 + \psi} \frac{L_{A,t}^{\lambda}}{A_t^{1-\phi}}. \tag{A1}
\]

where \(g_{A,t} = \dot{A}_t/A_t\). Let \(g_Z\) denote \(g_{Z,t} = \dot{Z}/Z\) the growth rate of any generic variable \(Z\), and drop the time subscript when referring to any variables in the steady state. The steady-state growth rate of varieties is given by:

\[
g_A = \frac{\varsigma}{1 + \psi} A_t^\lambda. \tag{A2}
\]

Moreover, the R&D labor share is \(s_t = L_{A,t}/(N_t l_t)\). In so doing, eq. (A2) can alternatively be expressed as:

\[
g_A = \frac{\varsigma}{1 + \psi} \frac{(sNl)^\lambda}{A_t^{1-\phi}}. \tag{A3}
\]

By taking logarithms of eq. (A3) and differentiating the resulting equation with respect to time, we have the following steady-state expression:

\[
g_A = \frac{\lambda}{1 - \phi} n. \tag{A4}
\]

Equipped with the symmetric feature \(x(i) = x\), the equilibrium condition for the capital market \(K = Av\), and the production in the intermediate-good sector \(x = v\), the aggregate production function can be rewritten as:

\[
Y_t = A_t^{\frac{1}{\rho} - \alpha} L_t^{\alpha} K_t^{1-\alpha}. \tag{A5}
\]

Taking logarithms of eq. (A5) and differentiating the resulting equation with respect to time, we can infer the following result:

\[
g_Y = \frac{(\frac{1}{\rho} - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha} g_A + n. \tag{A6}
\]

Inserting eq. (A4) into eq. (A6) yields:

\[
g_Y = \sigma n, \tag{A7}
\]
where $\sigma \equiv 1 + \frac{(1-\alpha)}{1-\theta} \frac{\lambda}{1-\phi}$ is a composite parameter.

We now turn to solve the steady-state R&D labor share. In the long run, substituting $\dot{A}_t = g_A A_t$ and differentiating the resulting equation with respect to time gives rise to:

$$\frac{\dot{P}_A}{P_A} = g_Y - g_A$$  \hspace{1cm} (A8)

From eqs. (12), (15), (17), in the steady state we have:

$$\pi_x = \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{Y}{A}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A9)

$$P_A = \frac{s}{1 - s} \frac{(1 - \alpha)Y/A}{(1 + \psi)g_A}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A10)

$$r = \frac{\pi_x}{P_A} + \frac{\dot{P}_A}{P_A} - \psi g_A$$  \hspace{1cm} (A11)

Substituting eqs. (A8), (A9), and (A10) into eq. (A11) yields the result:

$$r = \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha Y/A}{s(1-\alpha)Y/A(1+\psi)g_A} + g_Y - (1 + \psi)g_A$$  \hspace{1cm} (A12)

Based on eq. (A12), we have the stationary R&D labor share $s$ as follows:

$$s = \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha(1 + \psi)g_A}{r - g_Y + (1 + \eta - 1)(1 + \psi)g_A}$$  \hspace{1cm} (A13)
Appendix B. Transition dynamics

This appendix solves the dynamic system of the model under tax shifting from labor income taxes to capital income taxes. The set of equations under the model is expressed by:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{1}{c_t} &= q_t, \quad (B1) \\
\chi &= q_t(1 - \tau_{L,t})w_t(1 - l_t), \quad (B2) \\
r_t &= (1 - \tau_K)r_{K,t} - \delta, \quad (B3) \\
\frac{c_t}{c_t} &= r_t - n - \beta, \quad (B4) \\
w_t &= (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{L_{Y,t}}, \quad (B5) \\
\eta r_{K,t} &= \alpha \frac{1}{A_t^{q-1}} L_{Y,t}^{1-\alpha} x_t^{\alpha-1}, \quad (B6) \\
r_{K,t}K_t &= \frac{\alpha}{\eta} Y_t, \quad (B7) \\
\pi_{x,t} &= \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{Y_t}{A_t}, \quad (B8) \\
r_tP_{A,t} &= \pi_{x,t} + \hat{P}_{A,t} - \psi \frac{\hat{A}_t}{A_t} P_{A,t}, \quad (B9) \\
G_t &= \zeta Y_t, \quad (B10) \\
G_t &= N_t(\tau_K r_{K,t} + \tau_{L,t}w_t l_t), \quad (B11) \\
Y_t &= A_t^{1/\rho - \alpha} L_{Y,t}^{1-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha}, \quad (B12) \\
\dot{K}_t &= Y_t - C_t - G_t - \delta K_t, \quad (B13) \\
\frac{\dot{A}_t}{A_t} &= \frac{\zeta}{1 + \psi A_t^{1-\phi}}, \quad (B14) \\
P_{A,t} &= \frac{s_t}{1 - s_t} (1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{\hat{A}_t}, \quad (B15) \\
N_t l_t &= L_{Y,t} + L_{A,t}. \quad (B16)
\end{align*}
\]

The above 16 equations determine 16 unknowns \{c_t, \eta, K_t, L_{Y,t}, x_t, r_{K,t}, \pi_{x,t}, r_t, G_t, \tau_L, Y_t, q_t, L_{A,t}, P_{A,t}, w_t\}, where \(q_t\) is the Hamiltonian multiplier, \(C_t = N_t c_t\), \(K_t = N_t k_t = A_t x_t\), and \(s_t = L_{A,t}/N_t l_t\). Based on \(K_t = N_t k_t = A_t x_t\), and eqs. (B1), (B2), (B5), and (B12), we can obtain:

\[
\chi = \frac{1}{c_t} (1 - \tau_{L,t})(1 - \alpha) \frac{Y_t}{L_{Y,t}}(1 - l_t). \quad (B17a)
\]
From eqs. (B5), (B7), and (B11), we have:

\[ \tau_{L,t} = (1 - s_t) \frac{\zeta - \frac{\alpha}{\eta} \tau_K}{1 - \alpha}. \]  (B17b)

Moreover, to solve the balanced growth rate, we define the following transformed variables:

\[ \hat{k}_t \equiv \frac{K_t}{N_t^\alpha}, \quad \hat{c}_t \equiv \frac{C_t}{N_t^\alpha}, \quad \hat{y}_t \equiv \frac{Y_t}{N_t^\alpha}, \quad \hat{a}_t \equiv \frac{A_t}{N_t^{\lambda/(1 - \phi)}}, \quad s_t \equiv L_{A,t}/N_t l_t. \]  (B18)

Based on eqs. (B16), (B15), (B17a), and the above definitions, we can obtain:

\[ \frac{\chi}{(1 - l_t)} = \frac{1}{\hat{c}_t}[1 - (1 - s_t) \frac{\zeta - \frac{\alpha}{\eta} \tau_K}{1 - \alpha}](1 - \alpha)\hat{a}_t^{1/\rho - \alpha} (\hat{k}_t) \alpha [1 - s_t] l_t]^{-\alpha}. \]  (B19a)

From eq. (B19a), we can infer the following expression:

\[ l_t = l_t(\hat{k}_t, \hat{a}_t, \hat{c}_t, s_t; \tau_K), \]  (B19b)

where

\[ \frac{\partial l_t}{\partial \hat{k}_t} = \frac{\alpha}{\hat{k}_t(\frac{l_t}{1 - l_t} + \alpha)}, \]  (B20a)

\[ \frac{\partial l_t}{\partial \hat{a}_t} = \frac{(1/\rho - \alpha)}{\hat{a}_t(\frac{l_t}{1 - l_t} + \alpha)} l_t, \]  (B20b)

\[ \frac{\partial l_t}{\partial \hat{c}_t} = \frac{l_t}{\hat{c}_t(\frac{l_t}{1 - l_t} + \alpha)}, \]  (B20c)

\[ \frac{\partial l_t}{\partial s_t} = \frac{\tau_{L,t}}{(1 - \tau_{L,t})} + \alpha \]  \[ \frac{l_t}{(1 - s_t)(\frac{l_t}{1 - l_t} + \alpha)} l_t, \]  (B20d)

\[ \frac{\partial l_t}{\partial \tau_K} = \frac{(1 - s_t) \frac{\alpha}{\eta(1 - \alpha)}}{(1 - \tau_{L,t})(\frac{l_t}{1 - l_t} + \alpha)} l_t. \]  (B20e)

Based on (B3), (B4), (B7), (B12), (B18), and \( C_t = N_t c_t \), we have:

\[ g_{\hat{c},t} \equiv \frac{d\hat{c}_t/dt}{\hat{c}_t} = (1 - \tau_K) \frac{\alpha}{\eta} (\hat{a}_t)^{1/\rho - \alpha} \left[ \frac{(1 - s_t) l_t(\hat{k}_t, \hat{a}_t, \hat{c}_t, s_t; \tau_K)}{\hat{k}_t} \right]^{1 - \alpha} - \delta - \beta - g_Y. \]  (B21)

From eqs. (B10), (B12), (B13), and (B18), we can directly infer:
\[ g_{k,t} \equiv \frac{d\hat{k}_t}{dt} = (1 - \zeta)(\hat{\alpha}_t)^{1/\rho - \alpha} \left[ \frac{(1 - s_t)\hat{l}_t(\hat{k}_t, \hat{\alpha}_t, \hat{c}_t, s_t; \tau_K)}{\hat{k}_t} \right]^{1 - \alpha} - \frac{\hat{c}_t}{\hat{k}_t} - \delta - g_Y. \]  \tag{B22}

According to eqs. (B14) and (B18), we can further obtain:

\[ g_{\hat{a},t} \equiv \frac{d\hat{\alpha}_t}{dt} = \frac{\zeta}{1 + \psi} \left[ s_t\hat{l}_t(\hat{k}_t, \hat{\alpha}_t, \hat{c}_t, s_t; \tau_K) \right]^\lambda - g_A. \]  \tag{B23}

In what follows, to simplify the notation we suppress those arguments of the labor supply function. From eq. (B18), taking logarithms of eqs. (B19a) and (B12) and differentiating the resulting equations with respect to time, we have:

\[ g_{\hat{y},t} = (1/\rho - \alpha)g_{\hat{a},t} + \alpha g_{k,t} + (1 - \alpha)(\hat{l}_t/l_t - \frac{\hat{s}_t}{1 - s_t}), \]  \tag{B24}

\[ \hat{l}_t/l_t = \{ (1/\rho - \alpha)g_{\hat{a},t} + \alpha g_{k,t} - g_{\hat{c},t} - [\alpha + \tau_{L,t}/(1 - \tau_{L,t})] \}/[\alpha + l_t/(1 - l_t)]. \]  \tag{B25}

Taking logarithms of eq. (B15) differentiating the resulting equation with respect to time, we obtain:

\[ \frac{\hat{P}_{A,t}}{P_{A,t}} = (1/\rho - \alpha - \phi)g_{\hat{a},t} + \alpha g_{k,t} + (1 - \lambda + \alpha \frac{s_t}{1 - s_t})\frac{\hat{s}_t}{s_t} + (1 - \lambda - \alpha)\frac{\hat{l}_t}{l_t} + g_Y - g_A. \]  \tag{B26}

Combining eqs. (B9), (B15), (B18), (B21), (B24), (B25), and (B26) together, we obtain:

\[ \frac{ds_t}{dt} = \{ \beta - \left[ \frac{(\eta - 1)\alpha(1 + \psi)(1 - s_t)}{(1 - \alpha)\eta s_t} - \psi \right] (g_A + g_{\hat{a},t}) + \phi g_{\hat{a},t} + g_A - \left[ 1 + \frac{1 - \lambda - \alpha}{\alpha + l_t/(1 - l_t)} \right] \}
\times \left[ (1/\rho - \alpha)g_{\hat{a},t} + \alpha g_{k,t} - g_{\hat{c},t} \right]/\left\{ 1 - \lambda + \alpha \frac{s_t}{1 - s_t} + \frac{1 - \lambda - \alpha}{\alpha + l_t/(1 - l_t)} \left( \alpha + \frac{\tau_{L,t}}{1 - \tau_{L,t}} \right) \right\}. \]  \tag{B27}

Note that \( r_t - g_Y - g_{\hat{c},t} = \beta \). As a result, in the steady state we have \( r - g_Y = \beta \).

Inserting eq. (B18) into eq. (B17b) yields:
\[ \tau_{L,t} = \frac{(1 - s_t) \zeta - \frac{\alpha}{\eta} \tau_K}{1 - \alpha}. \quad (B28) \]

Based on eqs. (B21), (B22), (B23), (B27), and (B28), the dynamic system can be expressed as:

\[
\begin{align*}
\frac{d\hat{k}_t}{dt} &= (1 - \zeta)(\hat{a}_t)^{1/\rho-\alpha}\left[\frac{(1 - s_t)l_t}{k_t}\right]^{-\alpha} - \frac{\hat{c}_t}{k_t} - \delta - g_Y, \\
\frac{d\hat{a}_t}{dt} &= \frac{\zeta}{1 + \psi}\left(\frac{s_t}{\hat{a}_t^{1-\varphi}}\right)^\lambda - g_A, \\
\frac{d\hat{c}_t}{dt} &= (1 - \tau_K)^{\alpha}\left(\frac{d_{\hat{c}_t}}{\hat{c}_t}\right)^{1/\rho-\alpha}\left[\frac{(1 - s_t)l_t}{k_t}\right]^{-\alpha} - \beta - g_Y, \\
\frac{ds_t}{dt} &= \{\beta - \left[\frac{(\eta - 1)\alpha(1 + \psi)(1 - s_t)}{(1 - \alpha)\eta s_t}ight] - \psi\}(g_A + g_{\hat{a}_t,t}) + \phi g_{\hat{a}_t,t} + g_A - \left[1 + \frac{1 - \lambda - \alpha}{\alpha + l_t/(1 - l_t)}\right] \\
&\quad \times [(1/\rho - \alpha)g_{\hat{a}_t,t} + \alpha g_{\hat{b}_t,t} - g_{\hat{c}_t,t}]/\{1 - \lambda + \alpha s_t/1 - s_t + 1 - \lambda - \alpha/\alpha + l_t/(1 - l_t)\} + \frac{\tau_{L,t}}{1 - \tau_{L,t}} \frac{s_t}{1 - s_t}\}. \quad (B29d)
\end{align*}
\]

Linearizing eqs. (B29a), (B29b), (B29c), and (B29d) around the steady-state equilibrium yields:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\frac{d\hat{k}_t}{dt} \\
\frac{d\hat{a}_t}{dt} \\
\frac{d\hat{c}_t}{dt} \\
\frac{ds_t}{dt}
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
b_{11} & b_{12} & b_{13} & b_{14} \\
b_{21} & b_{22} & b_{23} & b_{24} \\
b_{31} & b_{32} & b_{33} & b_{34} \\
b_{41} & b_{42} & b_{43} & b_{44}
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
\hat{k}_t - \hat{k} \\
\hat{a}_t - \hat{a} \\
\hat{c}_t - \hat{c} \\
s_t - s
\end{pmatrix} +
\begin{pmatrix}
b_{15} \\
b_{25} \\
b_{35} \\
b_{45}
\end{pmatrix} d\tau_K, \quad (B30)
\]

where

\[
\begin{align*}
b_{11} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \hat{k}_t}, & b_{12} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \hat{a}_t}, & b_{13} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \hat{c}_t}, & b_{14} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial s_t}, & b_{15} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \tau_K}, \\
b_{21} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial k_t}, & b_{22} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial a_t}, & b_{23} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial c_t}, & b_{24} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial s_t}, & b_{25} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \tau_K}, \\
b_{31} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \hat{k}_t}, & b_{32} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \hat{a}_t}, & b_{33} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \hat{c}_t}, & b_{34} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial s_t}, & b_{35} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \tau_K}, \\
b_{41} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial k_t}, & b_{42} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial a_t}, & b_{43} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial c_t}, & b_{44} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial s_t}, & b_{45} &= \frac{\partial(\hat{d}_t/dt)}{\partial \tau_K}.
\end{align*}
\]

Due to the complicated calculations, we do not list the analytical results for \(b_{ij}\), where \(i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}\) and \(j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}\).

Let \(\ell_1\), \(\ell_2\), \(\ell_3\), and \(\ell_4\) be the four characteristic roots of the dynamic system. Due to the complexity involved in calculating the four characteristic roots, we do not try to prove the saddle-point stability analytically. Instead, via a numerical simulation, we show that
the dynamic system has two positive and two negative characteristic roots. For expository convenience, in what follows let $\ell_1$ and $\ell_2$ be the negative root, and $\ell_3$ and $\ell_4$ be the positive roots. The general solution is given by:

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\dot{k}_t \\
\dot{a}_t \\
\dot{c}_t \\
s(t)
\end{pmatrix} =
\begin{pmatrix}
\dot{k}(\tau_K) \\
\dot{a}(\tau_K) \\
\dot{c}(\tau_K) \\
s(\tau_K)
\end{pmatrix} +
\begin{pmatrix}
1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\
h_{21} & h_{22} & h_{23} & h_{24} \\
h_{31} & h_{32} & h_{33} & h_{34} \\
h_{41} & h_{42} & h_{43} & h_{44}
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
D_1e^{\ell_1 t} \\
D_2e^{\ell_2 t} \\
D_3e^{\ell_3 t} \\
D_4e^{\ell_4 t}
\end{pmatrix}.
\tag{B31a}
\]

where $D_1$, $D_2$, $D_3$, and $D_4$ are undetermined coefficients and

\[
\Delta_j = \begin{vmatrix}
  b_{12} & b_{13} & b_{14} \\
  b_{22} - \ell_j & b_{23} & b_{24} \\
  b_{32} & b_{33} - \ell_j & b_{34}
\end{vmatrix} ; \ j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, \tag{B31b}
\]

\[
h_{2j} = \begin{vmatrix}
  \ell_j - b_{11} & b_{13} & b_{14} \\
  -b_{21} & b_{23} & b_{24} \\
  -b_{31} & b_{33} - \ell_j & b_{34}
\end{vmatrix} / \Delta_j ; \ j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, \tag{B31c}
\]

\[
h_{3j} = \begin{vmatrix}
  b_{12} & -b_{11} & b_{14} \\
  b_{22} - \ell_j & -b_{21} & b_{24} \\
  b_{32} & -b_{31} & b_{34}
\end{vmatrix} / \Delta_j ; \ j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}, \tag{B31d}
\]

\[
h_{4j} = \begin{vmatrix}
  b_{12} & b_{13} & \ell_j - b_{11} \\
  b_{22} - \ell_j & b_{23} & -b_{21} \\
  b_{32} & b_{33} - \ell_j & -b_{31}
\end{vmatrix} / \Delta_j ; \ j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4\}. \tag{B31e}
\]

The government changes the capital tax rate $\tau_K$ from $\tau_K0$ to $\tau_K1$ at $t=0$. Based on eqs. (B31a)-(B31e), we employ the following equations to describe the dynamic adjustment of $\dot{k_t}$, $\dot{a}_t$, $\dot{c}_t$ and $s_t$:  

\[
\text{The government changes the capital tax rate $\tau_K$ from $\tau_K0$ to $\tau_K1$ at $t=0$. Based on eqs. (B31a)-(B31e), we employ the following equations to describe the dynamic adjustment of $\dot{k_t}$, $\dot{a}_t$, $\dot{c}_t$ and $s_t$:}
\]
\[\dot{k}_t = \begin{cases} \dot{k}(\tau K_0); & t = 0^- \\ \dot{k}(\tau K_1) + D_1 e^{\ell t} + D_2 e^{\ell t} + D_3 e^{\ell t} + D_4 e^{\ell t}; & t \geq 0^+ \end{cases} \] (B32a)

\[\dot{a}_t = \begin{cases} \dot{a}(\tau K_0); & t = 0^- \\ \dot{a}(\tau K_1) + h_{21} D_1 e^{\ell t} + h_{22} D_2 e^{\ell t} + h_{23} D_3 e^{\ell t} + h_{24} D_4 e^{\ell t}; & t \geq 0^+ \end{cases} \] (B32b)

\[\dot{c}_t = \begin{cases} \dot{c}(\tau K_0); & t = 0^- \\ \dot{c}(\tau K_1) + h_{31} D_1 e^{\ell t} + h_{32} D_2 e^{\ell t} + h_{33} D_3 e^{\ell t} + h_{34} D_4 e^{\ell t}; & t \geq 0^+ \end{cases} \] (B32c)

\[s_t = \begin{cases} s(\tau K_0); & t = 0^- \\ s(\tau K_1) + h_{41} D_1 e^{\ell t} + h_{42} D_2 e^{\ell t} + h_{43} D_3 e^{\ell t} + h_{44} D_4 e^{\ell t}; & t \geq 0^+ \end{cases} \] (B32d)

where 0\(^-\) and 0\(^+\) denote the instant before and instant after the policy implementation, respectively. The values for \(D_1, D_2, D_3\) and \(D_4\) are determined by:

\[\dot{k}_0^- = \hat{k}_0^+, \quad \hat{a}_0^- = \hat{a}_0^+, \quad D_3 = D_4 = 0. \] (B33a)

Equations (B33a) and (B33b) indicate that both \(\dot{k}_t = \frac{\dot{k}_t}{N_t}\) and \(\hat{a}_t = \frac{\hat{a}_t}{N_t}(1-\phi)\) remain intact at the instant of policy implementation since \(K_t, A_t,\) and \(N_t\) are predetermined variables. Equation (B33c) is the stability condition which ensures that all \(\dot{k}_t, \hat{a}_t, \hat{c}_t\) and \(s_t\) converge to their new steady-state equilibrium. By using eqs. (B33a) and (B33b), we can obtain:

\[D_1 = \frac{[\dot{k}(\tau K_0) - \dot{k}(\tau K_1)]h_{22} - [\hat{a}(\tau K_0) - \hat{a}(\tau K_1)]}{h_{22} - h_{21}}, \] (B34a)

\[D_2 = \frac{[\hat{a}(\tau K_0) - \hat{a}(\tau K_1)] - [\dot{k}(\tau K_0) - \dot{k}(\tau K_1)]h_{21}}{h_{22} - h_{21}}. \] (B34b)

Inserting eqs. (B33c), (B34a), and (B34b) into eqs. (B32a)-(B32d) yields:
\[
\begin{align*}
\dot{k}_t &= \begin{cases}
\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}); & t = 0^- \\
\hat{k}(\tau_{K1}) + \frac{[\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{22} - [\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})]}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{1t} & t \geq 0^+ \\
&+ \frac{[\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})] - [\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{21}}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{2t} \\
\end{cases} \\
\dot{\hat{a}}_t &= \begin{cases}
\hat{a}(\tau_{K0}); & t = 0^- \\
\hat{a}(\tau_{K1}) + \frac{[\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{22} - [\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})]}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{1t} & t \geq 0^+ \\
&+ \frac{[\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})] - [\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{21}}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{2t} \\
\end{cases} \\
\dot{\hat{c}}_t &= \begin{cases}
\hat{c}(\tau_{K0}); & t = 0^- \\
\hat{c}(\tau_{K1}) + \frac{[\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{22} - [\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})]}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{1t} & t \geq 0^+ \\
&+ \frac{[\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})] - [\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{21}}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{2t} \\
\end{cases} \\
\dot{s}_t &= \begin{cases}
\hat{s}(\tau_{K0}); & t = 0^- \\
\hat{s}(\tau_{K1}) + \frac{[\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{22} - [\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})]}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{1t} & t \geq 0^+ \\
&+ \frac{[\dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K0}) - \dot{\hat{a}}(\tau_{K1})] - [\hat{k}(\tau_{K0}) - \hat{k}(\tau_{K1})]h_{21}}{h_{22} - h_{21}} e_{2t} \\
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]
Appendix C. Proof of comparative statics

From eqs. (B29a)-(B29d), we have:

\[
\frac{d\hat{k}_t}{d\hat{k}_t} = (1 - \zeta)(\hat{\alpha}_t)^{1/\rho - \alpha}\left(\frac{\hat{l}_t}{\hat{k}_t}\right)^{1-\alpha} - \hat{\alpha}_t - \delta - g_Y, \quad (C1a)
\]

\[
\frac{d\hat{\alpha}_t}{d\hat{\alpha}_t} = \frac{\varsigma}{1 + \psi} \left[\frac{\hat{l}_t(\hat{\alpha}_t, \hat{\beta}_t, \hat{\gamma}_t, \tau_K)}{\hat{\alpha}_t}\right]^{\alpha - 1} - g_A, \quad (C1b)
\]

\[
\frac{d\hat{\beta}_t}{d\hat{\beta}_t} = (1 - \tau_K)^{1/\rho - \alpha}\left(\frac{\hat{l}_t}{\hat{k}_t}\right)^{1-\alpha} - \delta - \beta - g_Y, \quad (C1c)
\]

\[
\frac{ds_t}{dt} = \left\{\beta - \frac{(\eta - 1)\alpha(1 + \psi)(1 - s_t)}{(1 - \alpha)\eta s_t} - \psi\right\}(g_A + g_{\alpha,t}) + \phi g_{\alpha,t} + g_A - \left[1 + \frac{1 - \lambda - \alpha}{\alpha + l_t / (1 - l_t)}\right]
\times\left[(1/\rho - \alpha)g_{\alpha,t} + \alpha g_{k,t} - g_{c,t}\right]/\left\{1 - \lambda + \alpha s_t + \frac{1 - \lambda - \alpha}{\alpha + l_t / (1 - l_t)} \left(\alpha + \frac{\tau_{L,t}}{1 - \tau_{L,t}}\right) s_t\right\}. \quad (C1d)
\]

In the steady state \( \frac{d\hat{k}_t}{d\hat{k}_t} = \frac{d\hat{\alpha}_t}{d\hat{\alpha}_t} = \frac{d\hat{\beta}_t}{d\hat{\beta}_t} = \frac{ds_t}{dt} = 0 \), we then have the following steady-state results:

\[
\frac{\hat{c}_t}{\hat{k}_t} = (1 - \zeta)(\hat{\alpha})^{1/\rho - \alpha}\left(\frac{1 - s}{\hat{k}_t}\right)^{1-\alpha} - \delta - g_Y, \quad (C1e)
\]

\[
g_A = \frac{\varsigma}{1 + \psi} \frac{(s\lambda)^{\lambda}}{\hat{\alpha}_t^{1-\lambda}}, \quad (C1f)
\]

\[
\beta = (1 - \tau_K)^{1/\rho - \alpha}\left(\frac{1 - s}{\hat{k}_t}\right)^{1-\alpha} - \delta - g_Y, \quad (C1g)
\]

\[
0 = \beta - \frac{(\eta - 1)\alpha(1 + \psi)(1 - s)}{(1 - \alpha)\eta s} - \psi\right\}(g_A + g_{A,t}) \quad (C1h)
\]

Based on eq. (C1h), we have:

\[
s = \frac{\frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}(1 + \psi)g_A}{\beta + \left(1 + \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta} \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right)(1 + \psi)g_A}. \quad (C2)
\]

From eqs. (B3) and (C1g), we can obtain

\[
r - g_Y = \beta > 0. \quad (C3)
\]
Equation eq. (C1g) can be rearranged as:

$$\frac{\dot{y}}{\dot{k}} = (\hat{a})^{1/\rho - \alpha} [\left( \frac{1 - s}{\hat{k}} \right)^{1 - \alpha} = \frac{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)}{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}. \quad (C4a)$$

Substituting eq. (C4a) into eq. (C1e) gives rise to:

$$\frac{\dot{c}}{\dot{y}} = \left\{ (1 - \zeta) \frac{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)}{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)} - \delta - g_Y \right\} \frac{\dot{k}}{\dot{y}} = (1 - \zeta) - (\delta + g_Y) \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)}. \quad (C5a)$$

To ensure that the steady-state consumption-output ratio $\dot{c}/\dot{y}$ is positive, we impose the restriction $(1 - \zeta) - (\delta + g_Y) \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)} > 0$ for all values of the time preference rate $\beta$. As a consequence, $\lim_{\beta \to 0} \dot{c}/\dot{y} > 0$ implies:

$$(1 - \zeta) - \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}{\eta} > 0. \quad (C5b)$$

From eq (C1f), we can derive:

$$\hat{a} = \left[ \frac{\zeta}{(1 + \psi)g_A} \right]^{1/(1 - \phi)} (sl)^{\lambda/(1 - \phi)}. \quad (C6)$$

Based on eq. (B28), we can infer the following expression:

$$\tau_L = (1 - s) \frac{\zeta - \frac{\alpha \tau_K}{\eta}}{1 - \alpha}, \quad (C7a)$$

where

$$\frac{\partial \tau_L}{\partial \tau_K} = -(1 - s) \frac{\alpha}{\eta(1 - \alpha)} < 0. \quad (C7b)$$

Equipped with eqs. (B1), (B2), (B5), and $L_Y = N(1 - s)l$, we can obtain:

$$\frac{l}{1 - l} \chi = \frac{\dot{y}}{\dot{c}} \frac{(1 - \tau_L)(1 - \alpha)}{(1 - s)}. \quad (C8)$$

Inserting eqs. (C5a) and (C7a) into eq. (C8) yields:

$$l = \left\{ \begin{array}{ll}
1 - \frac{\chi}{\chi} & : \chi > 0 \\
\chi & : \chi > 0 \\
\frac{\chi}{\chi} & : \chi = 0 \\
\frac{\chi}{\chi} & : \chi = 0 \\
\frac{\chi}{\chi} & : \chi = 0 \\
\frac{\chi}{\chi} & : \chi = 0
\end{array} \right. \quad (C9a)$$

where
Combining eqs. (C2), (C6), and (C9b) together, we can derive

\[ \hat{a} = \left[ \frac{\xi}{(1 + \psi)g_A} \right]^{1/(1-\phi)} (s l)^{\lambda/(1-\phi)}, \]  

where

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{a}}{\partial \tau_K} = \frac{\lambda}{(1-\phi)} \hat{a} \frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} > 0. \]  

Based on eqs. (C4a), (C9b), (B12), and (B18), we have:

\[ \hat{y} = \hat{a}^{1/\rho - \alpha} \left[ \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} (1 - s) l, \]  

where

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{y}}{\partial \tau_K} = \left[ \sigma \frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} - \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_K)} \right] \hat{y} > 0, \quad \sigma \equiv 1 + \frac{1/\rho - \alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{\lambda}{1 - \phi}. \]  

According to eqs. (C4a), (C5a), and (C11b), we obtain:

\[ \hat{k} = \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)} \hat{y}, \]  
\[ \hat{c} = [(1 - \zeta) - (\delta + g_Y) \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)}] \hat{y}, \]  

Inserting eq. (C11a) into (C12a) and (C12b), we can derive the following comparative statics:

\[ \frac{\partial \hat{k}}{\partial \tau_K} = \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K) \hat{y}}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)} \left\{ \sigma \frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} - \frac{1}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_K)} \right\} > 0, \]  
\[ \frac{\partial \hat{c}}{\partial \tau_K} = \left\{ \frac{\alpha(\delta + g_Y)}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)} + [(1 - \zeta)] - \frac{\alpha(1 - \tau_K)(\delta + g_Y)}{\eta(\beta + \delta + g_Y)} \left[ \sigma \frac{\partial l}{\partial \tau_K} - \frac{\alpha}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \tau_K)} \right] \right\} \hat{y} > 0. \]