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Information Acquisition with Endogenously Determined Cost in Cournot Markets with Stochastic Demand

Catilina, Eliane (2019): Information Acquisition with Endogenously Determined Cost in Cournot Markets with Stochastic Demand.

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Abstract

This paper presents a model of information acquisition in Cournot Market with stochastic demand where the acquisition cost is endogenously determined. The novelty is to consider the possibility of cost reducing alliances to be formed in the first-stage of a two-stage acquisition game. This paper encompasses the main assumptions found in the current literature on information acquisition regarding the role of information and how it affects firms’ profits in a two stage the game. However, we argue that by adding natural assumptions regarding the choices and trade-offs between cost reduction and loss of strategic value we provide a better prediction for the outcome of information acquisition games and welfare implications.

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