Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency

Gao, Pingyang (2007): Keynesian Beauty Contest, Accounting Disclosure, and Market Efficiency. Forthcoming in: Journal of Accounting Research


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This paper examines the market efficiency consequences of accounting disclosure in the context of stock markets as a Keynesian beauty contest, an influential metaphor originally proposed by Keynes (1936) and recently formalized by Allen, Morris, and Shin (2006). In such markets, public information plays an additional commonality role, biasing stock prices away from the consensus fundamental value toward public information. Despite this bias, I demonstrate that provisions of public information always drive stock prices closer to the fundamental value. Hence, as a main source of public information, accounting disclosure enhances market efficiency, and transparency should not be compromised on grounds of the Keynesian-beauty-contest effect.

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