Bergantiños, Gustavo and Massó, Jordi and Neme, Alejandro (2019): Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous.
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Abstract
We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric singlepeaked on the set of possible allotments. The two rules are in addition envyfree, but they differ on wether envyfreeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (i) the constrained equal losses rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies justified envyfreeness on losses and (ii) the constrained equal awards rule is the unique individually rational and efficient rule that satisfies envyfreeness on awards.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous 
English Title:  Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  Division problem; Singlepeaked preferences; Individual rationality; Efficiency; Strategyproofness; Envyfreeness 
Subjects:  C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7  Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78  Bargaining Theory ; Matching Theory 
Item ID:  97136 
Depositing User:  Gustavo Bergantiño 
Date Deposited:  05 Dec 2019 14:26 
Last Modified:  05 Dec 2019 14:26 
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URI:  https://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/97136 
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Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous. (deposited 08 Feb 2019 10:39)
 Individually Rational Rules for the Division Problem when the Number of Units to be Allotted is Endogenous. (deposited 05 Dec 2019 14:26) [Currently Displayed]