Country Concepts and the Rational Actor Trap - Limitations to Strategic Management of International NGOs

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Abstract: Growing criticism of inefficient development aid demanded new planning instruments of donors, including international NGOs (INGOs). A reorientation from isolated project-planning towards holistic country concepts and the increasing rationality of a result-orientated planning process were seen as answer. However, whether these country concepts – newly introduced by major INGOs too - have increased the efficiency of development cooperation is open to question. Firstly, there have been counteracting external factors, like the globalization of the aid business, that demanded structural changes in the composition of INGO portfolios towards growing short-term humanitarian aid; this was hardly compatible with the requirements of medium-term country planning. Secondly, the underlying vision of rationality as a remedy for the major ills of development aid was in itself a fallacy. A major change in the methodology of planning, closely connected with a shift of emphasis in the approach to development cooperation, away from project planning and service delivery, towards supporting the socio-cultural and political environment of the recipient communities, demands a reorientation of aid management: The most urgent change needed is by donors, away from the blinkers of result-orientated planning towards participative organizational cultures of learning.

Key words: foreign aid, aid effectiveness, INGOs, planning policy, development management, participation, Africa; globalization

JEL classification: F35 - Foreign Aid; L31 - Nonprofit Institutions, NGOs; L33 - Comparison of Public and Private Enterprises; O2 – Development Planning and Policy

1 GIGA – German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of African Affairs, Hamburg. - An earlier version of the paper had been presented to the annual conference of the Research Committee for Developing Countries / Verein für Socialpolitik, Cologne, July 2 to 3, 2004. The paper draws from my cross-sectoral evaluation of the German international NGO German Agro Action (Deutsche Welthungerhilfe, DWHH; cf. Kohnert 2002). - Thanks for valuable suggestions go to Rolf Hofmeier, Rolf Langhammer, Friedrich Mühlenberg, Hans J. Preuss, the participants of the conference mentioned above, and last but not least, the staff and board members of DWHH, as well as its counterparts overseas. The responsibility for any fallacies or inaccuracies in the paper remains of course with the author.
1. Changing conditions demand new NGO-management concepts

The world of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has changed considerably since the advent of the second wind of change in the late 1980s, which allowed for more involvement of non-state actors in development issues. Local NGOs mushroomed, notably in Africa (cf. Charlton/May 1995). In many cases they had to fill the gaps created by the deregulation and privatisation of their countries economies, enforced by structural adjustment programs in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the NGO boom was regarded as a mixed blessing in many parts of the world. Although hardly anybody doubted that most of them had honourable intentions, it was open to question whether they were more efficient than public aid agencies, or whether they did any good at all (cf. Doh/Teegen 2003; Edwards/Hulme 1996; Hulme 1997; MacDonald 1995; Weiss/Gordenker 1996; Salih 2001; Schmitz 2001). NGOs are different, but not necessarily better than market- or state-organizations. Many local NGOs were dependent on funds from public and private aid agencies at national or international level, for whom they acted as intermediaries or representatives of target-groups. On the other hand, their donors were dependent on local counterparts, as they had no direct access to the beneficiaries. This situation created uneasy patronage relationships. Since the 1980s an increasing number of national NGOs of major donor countries have transformed themselves from activist partisan movements into international NGOs (INGOs) with the same corporate structures as other international key players. They began to wield considerable political power in international relations, like Oxfam, Human Rights Watch or Greenpeace. Their voice carries weight, not only in relations with their partners, but also with governments, big international aid institutions and multinational enterprises.

Whereas, still in the early 1990s, NGOs, including the big INGOs, had been portrayed as dependent rather than independent variables in Third World Development, as aid agencies defined by the demands of isolated project-related activities (cf. Charlton/May 1995:238), some of the most prolific INGOs profiled themselves in the meantime as global players, as a model of ‘good governance without government’ in the public interest (cf. Nelson/Dorsey

Endnotes:

Depending on one’s definition, the number of INGOs today ranges from 5,000 to 40,000. The Yearbook of International Organizations listed entries on 29,495 organizations active in 289 countries and territories in 2000. It profiled 24,326 international non-governmental and about 5,900 inter-governmental organizations (IGOs). Cf. website: www.uia.org/organizations/home.php, 29.04.04; the number of additional local or national NGOs in Africa was estimated at several 10,000, which compared favorably with the more than 10,000 in Latin America. – INGOs spend up to $ 10 Mrd. annually and even displaced governments as the...
Notably international advocacy networks of NGOs were regarded as intermediary between world markets and ODA-hierarchies, as a potential ‘third way’ or a counter-hegemonic force, linking marginalized groups in the South to political actors in the North. Undoubtedly, a great deal of control of this agenda setting rests with more powerful INGOs who wish to generate knowledge which serves also their own interest (cf. Henry et al 2004:842, 848-49; Evans 2000)\(^3\). Political pluralism and administrative pluralism, implemented through a governance role for INGOs, could under certain conditions be complementary, rather than competitive or antagonistic. They could strengthen state performance and legitimacy, notably of ‘failing states’ in Sub-Saharan Africa. In any case, this is an overtly political process which has also be misused to foster Western values and methods poorly adapted to local socio-cultural conditions (cf. Henry et al 2004: 847).

Certainly, even weak states, which may have lost its former powers as monopolistic gatekeepers of aid intervention on the local level, remain important mediators of transnational social networks and INGOs (cf. Kassimir 2001:109-11). But the insistence on maintaining the state as the principal actor in development cooperation in general, and in international peace efforts in particular, is open to question. State actors are neither the only nor necessarily the most important actors. Non-state actors are also playing central roles in international responses to conflicts attracting international attention — from the crucial role of civilians in the UN mission in Cambodia to the front-line humanitarian role of NGOs in Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda, Zaire, El Salvador, and other conflict prone regions around the world. NGOs are located at the interface between societal and state actors and therefore occupy a strategically important position in conflict situations (cf. Bush 1997).

The focusing on new rules, organizations, and structures by the international donor community corresponded to academic analyses, notably in political science, of the ‘failing state’ in Africa and elsewhere\(^4\), and on the crucial role of governmental and non-

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\(^3\) Examples are the famous advocacy campaigns of Oxfam against ‘Rigged rules and double standards – trade, globalization, and the fight against poverty’ (2002), and ‘White Gold’ Turns to Dust - Which Way Forward for Cotton in West Africa?’ (2004), the campaigns of the London based NGO Jubilee 2000 for debt cancellation for LDCs, of Human Rights Watch and others against ‘blood diamonds’, that of Greenpeace against Shell and Brant Spar, or its opposition to the exploitation of the Ogonis in the Niger Delta, etc.

\(^4\) Whereas one might accept the notion of ‘failed states’ as an ethic value judgment on certain post-colonial states like Afghanistan, Congo, Liberia or Somalia, the scientific concept of ‘failed states’, notably as applied to Africa, is questionable for several reasons. Prominent among these are a lack of historical considerations, biased western notions on the scope of a state, and a ‘cold-war’ bias in international political science (cf. Bilgin/Morton 2002; Clapham 2000; Kale 2001). There is little empirical evidence of the uniqueness of a *sui generis* (failing) African state (cf. Goldsmith 2000). Last, but not least, the concept of ‘failing states’ is misleading insofar as its proponents are often concerned with rather strong and violent state structures, which, unfortunately, have too many failures.
governmental organizations in promoting institutional, technical, administrative and political capacity, each embodying distinct challenges for responsible governments and aid institutions (cf. Grindle 1996:8-9, 180-84; Reno 1998; Scott 1998; Wunsch/Olowu 1990; Zartmann 1995). In view of the limited resources and capacities of ‘failing states’, ODA-agencies increasingly recognized the need to cooperate more closely with NGOs and other non-state actors in the late 1990s. In some cases, INGOs like the German Agro Action (DWHH), were even the only institutions, along with UN organizations, that could still provide relief in ‘failing states’, when the latter rejected interventions by foreign state agencies because of their alleged partisan or imperialist interests, like North-Korea. All this had a serious impact on the planning and management methods of the NGOs concerned on both sides, i.e. the donors (INGOs) and the intermediary NGOs, who were meant to cooperate in close partnership with one another.

Since the 1980s, a growing public criticism of inefficient development aid in general, and of failing or unsustainable development projects in particular, has resulted in political pressure to establish and confirm the legitimacy of aid, and in a consequent reorientation from isolated project-planning towards more rational and coordinated management of aid programs (cf. chapter 2). All the changes mentioned above have had strategic implications for INGOs. In view of the multitude of different aims and concepts of aid, Western donors called for a harmonization of aid strategies, including INGOs. Non-state actors were assigned a special role as partners in development planning. The case of the ACP Cotonou accord was a notable example in this respect (cf. DAC 2003; Morau 2003; Traub-Merz/Schildberg 2003). Among other benefits, it was envisaged that better planning and closer cooperation would produce synergy effects increase the market power exerted by donors, and enhance their influence on politics, human rights and structural adjustment in the recipient countries. Major INGOs were urged to adopt similar planning procedures as ODA-institutions, mainly for the following reasons:

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6 As example, see the slogan of the German Ministry for Cooperation (BMZ) ‘EZ aus einem Guss’, i.e. ‘development aid as a unified whole’; cf. Kenneweg 2000:238. – The EU adopted a standard framework for the elaboration of country strategy papers in May 1999, cf. Kloster 2000. - In February 2003 major donors adopted ‘DAC guidelines for harmonizing donor practices for effective aid delivery’ (OECD 2003), explicitly including NGOs, and promoting common country- and sector analyses (cf. Oswald et al 2004). - For similar concepts and calls for cooperation with NGOs cf. the Worldbank (WB 2003) and its country concepts, i.e. its Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF), introduced in 1999, as well as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), which were considered as an action plan for the CDF, meant to provide governments with the incentives to adopt CDF principles in their development planning and cooperation with donors (cf. WB 2003:12-13).
Firstly, to respond to the demands of co-funding state agencies for harmonization of planning procedures (cf. chapter 2).

Secondly, to be able to survive in the increasingly competitive international market. Respectable INGOs continued to put their mission and ideals in promoting welfare, human rights, or development first. Nevertheless, they had to pay growing attention to corporate objectives, such as increasing revenues and conquering strategic market positions to ensure their survival in the highly contested global aid and emergency relief market. Like any other big enterprise, they had to handle their production- and service delivery processes in accordance with internationally recognized standards and methods of corporate governance.

Thirdly, in reaction to mounting pressure on NGOs to establish their legitimacy in view of growing criticism of inefficient development aid in general, and of failing or unsustainable NGO-projects in particular, they had to honour obligations vis à vis their sponsors and the general public for enhanced sustainability, transparency and accountability.

These demands also impacted on local NGOs management policies, which mirrored the new requirements confronting their donors and partners. Despite the rhetoric of participation and ownership, asymmetrical power relationships determined the demand for control- and result-orientated management methods on the part of local NGOs (cf. Henry et al 2004: 849-52). National and international NGO networks introduced codes of conduct to allow for closer cooperation, more effective control, and a continuing flow of resources.

Nevertheless, the new dynamics of aid revealed a widening credibility gap between the promises and language of aid and development and the facts of increasing poverty, inequality and gross human rights violations, notably in those countries most affected by aid programs. In what follows, I should like to suggest some answers to the question, whether the new management methods, introduced to overcome the shortcomings of the aid business of non-state actors, are likely to deliver the promised results. The introduction of country strategy papers as strategic management instruments by INGOs may serve as an example to illustrate the points in question. The concentration on INGOs seems to be justified out of various

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reasons, but notably because of their strategically important position in humanitarian aid and conflict resolution mentioned above, and secondly, because they are often said to be the most likely of all aid agencies of the international donor community to honour the pious promises of aid efficiency, empowerment, partnership and transparency (cf. Nelson/Dorsey 2003).

2. Rational, target-orientated concepts as panacea of the planning process?

Criticism of inefficient development aid in general, and of failing or unsustainable development projects in particular, resulted in a reorientation from isolated project-planning towards more rational and coordinated program-planning in the 1980s. Increasing rationality of the planning process was seen by aid agencies like the gtz or the Worldbank as panacea to prevent inefficient aid. Logical framework and target- or result-orientated planning (ZOPP and later on PCM) were introduced in the 1980s as major tools of planning, implementation and evaluation, to counteract inefficiency and a lack of transparency and accountability in development aid (cf. Kohnert/Preuß/Sauer 1992; Roberts 2002). In addition, globalisation of the aid business and the second wind of change allowed for the increasing, though controversial linkage of a more rational and coordinated planning process of ODA and political and economic conditionality by bilateral and multilateral donors since the late 1980s (cf. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), Comprehensive Development Frameworks (CDFs), Cotonou Accord, etc.) 9. Country strategy papers, supplemented by sector wide strategy concepts became a milestone in this rationalistic vision of a systematic chain of problem analyses and program proposals from the macro (national) level, via sector programs and projects, to aid-projects at meso- and micro level. Thus country concepts were introduced as major strategic management instruments of development agencies in the 1990s 10.

However, evaluations of country- and sector strategic planning concepts revealed major deficiencies for a variety of reasons. Target-orientated and results-based approaches are theoretically contested and hard to implement (cf. Berg 2000; Biggs/Smith 2003; Chapman...
Aid in Africa, for example, is abound of examples where conditionality was violated by donors and recipients alike. Both are so enmeshed at all levels of governance, agencies and individuals, that it is difficult to say, where the strength and weakness lie. Conditionality and aid dependency are in most cases no one-way road; there is strength in the weakness of the recipients, as well as weakness in the strength of the donors. Therefore, the standard critiques of the unequal power relationship between donors and recipients in Africa and elsewhere, captures only part of the truth (cf. Kanbur 2000: 5-8). Although this does not make the instrument of country concepts useless, it imposes severe restrictions on the scope of its application, and not only in the case of INGOs, notably for the following reasons.

Firstly, there are a multitude of competing planning and management tools among and even within aid agencies. Holistic concepts of country planning should have priority over sector concepts, but as strategic policy papers they are not operational and have to be supplemented by sector papers. Although these instruments were meant to fit into a coherent, hierarchically structured framework, at least within one and the same organization, they are often incoherent and mutually competitive (or even contradictory), rather than complementary.

In fact, even the underlying assumption that country programs can be evolved stringently and consistently from an analysis of the development potential and problems of national stakeholders, is highly questionable, both on theoretical and practical grounds. This applies especially to INGOs who, like their counterparts, are as a rule neither capable nor willing to combat poverty or marginalisation at a national level. A holistic nationwide country concept may, at the most, be workable in small priority countries, where big INGOs already exert a certain structural power in development issues on the grounds of proven competence (as in the case of DWHH emergency aid in Rwanda or Burundi). But even in such exceptional cases, country planning is likely to be restricted to the provincial level. Nevertheless, the claim of country concepts to define or develop priority areas of intervention from a background analysis of the political, social and economic setting, or from a holistic crisis analysis of the whole country, is justified and should be encouraged and further developed in close cooperation with the relevant partners. If, in view of these conditions, a target-orientated deduction of programs and projects from the country concept is not to be expected, the

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11 There are illustrative analyses based on the principal-agent concept, which show that the present aid-system as a whole is ineffective and inefficient (cf. Kapor 2000:6-8; Killick 1997; Pedersen 1997), but it is beyond the scope of this paper to go into it in detail.
question arises, whether there are other objective criteria for the selection of partners, priority sectors, regions and project proposals within a country. The lack of such criteria has been identified by DWHH desk-officers as one of the major drawbacks of its project planning. The call for superior management decisions or more rigid selection guidelines is understandable but counter productive in view of the existing workload relating to project implementation and monitoring (cf. IDS 2001:1). In the case of DWHH, an implicit restriction of choice has already been effected by its management’ s decision to concentrate on humanitarian and emergency aid (cf. below). In any case, there is no substitute for closer cooperation with stakeholders and more participative project planning (cf. below).

What needs to be considered in the case of INGOs, apart from their limited resources, are their strong historical, ideological or religious links to certain counterparts in their respective countries. An impersonal, target-orientated derivation of aid programs from the actual local social setting has at times been resented under such conditions as undue restriction of ones own ideological or religious convictions. This resentment has been reinforced by a hubris, common among many development experts, who are convinced that they best know the stakeholders’ real problems , and who subsequently fall for inappropriate technical solutions to social problems (cf. Kohnert 1995). Last but not least, even dedicated collaborators of NGOs value a close collaboration with trustworthy and reliable counterparts more than obedience to abstract administrative rules concerning target-orientated project planning. Country portfolios therefore, tend to reflect special relationships between INGO desk officers and their counterparts (cf. Preuss, 2000:246). The principal-agent approach of institutional economics (cf. Laffont 2002; Killick 1997; Pedersen 1997) can provide illustrative examples and insights on several levels of analysis of the problems in question. However, we should always bear in mind that its methodological approach of individual decision making is based on rational choice, and that the rationality of Western economists does not necessarily correspond to the rationality of the stakeholders in Africa and elsewhere (cf. below). In addition, individual agency based on rational choice may be limited by social rationalities which obey different rules, like in the case of altruistic reciprocity (cf. Diekmann 2004).

The ever-increasing flood of planning guidelines makes the whole planning process not only excessively bureaucratic, but also heavily biased towards hierarchical control. This bias endangers the major goal of any development planning, i.e. the promotion of the mutual understanding of all stakeholders concerned. This applies to both the ODA-agencies and
INGOs, like the DWHH or the British ActionAid. The quest for rational planning reaches its limits in the human factor, i.e. the partisan interests of implementing units or personnel and their counterparts, regardless whether this is an NGO, like the DWHH (cf. Kohnert 2002: 12-14, 29-31; Kohnert/Preuss 2003), or a governmental aid organization. Even the Worldbank complained in a recent evaluation of its Comprehensive Development Framework (country planning) papers: ‘...most donor agencies and recipient governments do not have internal structures that encourage cross-sectoral dialogue or easy integration of multi-sector interventions. In addition, ‘silo’ thinking and intersectoral / departmental competition in donor agencies can exacerbate inter-ministerial competition in client countries.’ (WB, 2003: xix) Preliminary results of an internal evaluation of Priority Strategy Papers (PSP)-papers of the German Ministry for Development Cooperation (BMZ), as well as recent evaluation reports on the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) of the World Bank and IMF (cf. WB 2004; IMF 2004) point in the same direction. Apart from an insufficient systematic linkage to sector-orientated planning instruments, like Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs), PSP, PRSPs or Social Development Sector Strategy Paper (SSP), country strategy papers have been criticized for their insufficient general orientation, unrealistic assumptions, avoidance of sensitive issues or deficits (e.g. in governance on both sides), and biased problem analyses, sometimes dominated by the partisan interests of implementing aid agencies (like the WB, gtz or KfW) (cf. GTZ 2001). The present tendency for harmonization of aid programs, and the related program-orientated basket financing by several donors, complicate the matter even further. They make isolated country concepts by individual donors increasingly superfluous in so far as the country portfolio of a specific donor agency is dominated by co-financed programs and the weight of an external dominant donor.

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12 The evaluation unit of the DWHH edited more than 40 guidelines since 1984, about a quarter of which could be regarded as sector concepts; not all of them were compatible with the DWHH country strategy papers; cf. Kohnert 2002: 24, annex 2. - cf. similar ActionAid: ‘A growing concern voiced by staff and local partners in recent years has been the disproportionate amount of time and effort that is going into meeting ActionAid’s planning and reporting requirements. If it were only a question of wrong priorities, the problem could be easily rectified by reordering time allocation. The bigger risk is the spread of a culture of bureaucratization and disempowerment of staff, partners and ultimately the poor people that we work with. ALPS aims to liberate staff and partners from the tyranny of filling endless forms and writing lengthy, beautifully presented plans and reports that mostly adorn some shelf or archive … by fostering a culture where staff and partners do not have the comfort of relying on rules and procedures but have to use their own initiative to achieve our common mission.’ (ActionAid 2000: Introduction, n. p.)

13 On the appraisal of the Worldbank driven SSP on the impact of social dimensions within important Bank macro processes such as the CAS and PRSPs cf. already-completed and ongoing self- and independent evaluations; available on the website: www.worldbank.org/oed/sdstudy, 26.04.04

14 According to the declared aims, BMZ country strategy papers, for example, are complemented, by Priority Strategy Papers (PSP) as ‘fine-tuned management and steering instruments that enable it to monitor country-specific implementation of its development-policy goals’ (GTZ-Glossary, www.gtz.de/glossar/englisch/…; 21.04.04), as well as by PRSP programs, and cross-sectoral strategies. In principle, these latter apply to all development programs, as does, for instance, the paper on participatory development cooperation.
A second major conceptual limitation of country concepts reveals itself in cases of planning under extremely uncertain conditions, like in cases of humanitarian or emergency aid and crisis resolution (cf. Klingebiel 1999). These cases are per definition beyond the scope of middle-term target-orientated country planning, because, as a rule, emergencies and crises are not predictable. To cope with such problems of planning, aid agencies have used mixed strategies, including reactive as well as preventive elements. Both strategies, however, are process-orientated rather than the result of explicit strategic planning (cf. Klingebiel 1999). Only in countries with a predictable conflict potential, specific measures of conflict prevention can be embedded into a country concept.\(^{15}\)

For these reasons, a greater reliance on country portfolios, granted on the base of more general global criteria of political conditionality of aid (cf. above), as a substitute for country concepts has been suggested and discussed, albeit controversially.\(^{16}\) As a matter of fact, most big aid agencies already have informal (but nevertheless binding) country- or at least regional quotas as guidelines for the distribution of their aid money. This also holds for the INGOs; the DWHH for example reserved the bulk of its own aid money in 2001 for sub-Saharan Africa (40 per cent) and one-third each for Asia and Latin America.\(^{17}\)

These problems of ‘planning without facts’ (Stolper 1966) have been amplified in the case of INGOs by the growing tendency to concentrate aid, in view of their limited own resources on emergencies and crisis resolution (cf. Rutherford/Brem/Matthew 2003; Smillie 1993). INGOs are especially liable to opt for humanitarian or emergency aid because of their comparative advantages over official aid agencies, e. g. greater flexibility and lesser exposure to diplomatic restrictions, but also because this provides a profitable niche for growing business. Hence, the profit of the so-called Non-Profit Organizations will not be reaped only in heaven; analogies with the moral history of agricultural productive cooperative societies in

\(^{15}\) The DWHH, for example, elaborated country concepts for an initial 20 out of 30 priority countries between 1999 and 2001. For ten priority countries there are at present no country concepts, because political conditions are judged to be too unstable to allow even for short-term planning and forecasts. Whether this is a convincing argument is open to question; it can be argued that at least framework planning, specifically designed to address imponderables and to identify a variety of contingent planning options, should be possible (cf. Kohnert/Preuss 2003: 381).

\(^{16}\) There is related controversial proposal to gradually substituting program aid by budget aid in the case of recipient countries with proven capacity in ‘good government’, or in the case of corresponding recipients in the sphere of non-state actors, by the partnership funds. This is, for instance, already being practiced by Misereor. However, this whole complex falls beyond the scope of this paper.

\(^{17}\) In 2001 the own resources (donations) of the DWHH were distributed as follows: Country group (LG) 1 Latin America: 18 per cent; LG 2, Central America and Caribbean: 12 per cent; LG 3, South-East Asia: 10 per cent; LG 4, south-East Asia: 14 per cent; LG 5, Central Asia: 6 per cent; LG 6, West Africa: 7 per cent; LG 7, East Africa and Great Lake Region: 11 per cent; LG East Africa and Horn of Africa: 10 per cent; LG9, Southern Africa: 12 per cent. (cf. Kohnert 2002:29).
Europe might not be far fetched. Thus the DWHH in 1998 made a deliberate corporate decision to extend its rehabilitation and emergency programs which constituted already two thirds of its overall aid budget only two years later\(^\text{18}\).

The high degree of external co-funding by ODA-agencies makes of these programs especially attractive from a management point of view, because they may provide for exceptional growth rates in aid budgets. At the same time, this could make participating NGOs especially vulnerable to external political pressures. To the degree that NGOs increasingly cooperate with state agencies, it becomes open to question whether they may still be considered as advocates of the poor, as the British secretary of state for development cooperation, Claire Short, warned as long as three years ago in relation to OXFAM \(^\text{19}\). The delicate new strategic alliances between selected multinationals and INGOs, like Nike and Global Alliance, Carrefour and FIDH, Lafarge and WWF, complicate the matter even more \(^\text{20}\). Although the underlying corporate decisions were as a rule perfectly compatible with the mandate of these NGOs, emergency aid came increasingly under fire from aid critics, who said that it may have caused more harm than good in the medium to long run in countries like Rwanda, Sudan or Somalia (cf. Anderson 1999; Neubert 2004; 1997; Elwert 1999, Albala-Bertrand 2000) as long ago as 1994, big INGOs agreed therefore upon a Code of Conduct for emergency programs, concentrating on sustainability and adaptation of activities to local conditions. Nevertheless, aid organizations, like OXFAM and *Médecins sans Frontières* have for years openly admitted that their emergency operations may have strengthened the warlords and aggravated the conflicts under certain conditions (cf. Allen 1999:199). However, they maintain that there is no ethically responsible alternative to humanitarian aid.

\(^{18}\) The volume of DWHH emergency aid increased in just two years from DM 68,3 Mio. (1998) to DM 93 Mio. (2000) and constituted 62,4 per cent of overall aid (cf. Preuss 2000). 88 per cent of emergency aid had been co-financed – overwhelmingly by ODA-institutions – thus indicating a notably high degree of dependence on external finance, although the DWHH applied a kind of self-restriction, by introducing a structural limitation of emergency aid in an administrative provision, stipulating that at least 20 per cent of total emergency aid had to be met by its own resources (cf. Kohnert 2002:19).

\(^{19}\) Cf. Alain Beattie, ‘Campaigners offer moral integrity for influence’, Financial Times, 17.07.01. – The principal-agent approach of institutional economics (cf. Laffont 2002; Killick 1997) provides illustrative examples and insights on several levels of analysis of the problems in question, e.g. on the difficult process of interaction in cases of asymmetric information between donors and governments of recipient countries with vested interest to sideline political conditioning of aid concerning poverty alleviation (cf. Pedersen 1997), or between local NGOs or governments as agents and their principal (e.g. donors, including INGOs). But the case of INGOs as agents of their principals, i.e. sponsors or members, where the former have hidden information and/or pursue a hidden agenda *vis à vis* the latter, could be of equal importance. It might result in growing alienation between both, as well as in an increasing diversion from their common original aims. This might be accompanied and accelerated by a gradual substitution (sponsors vs. state) of the principal of those INGOs involved in the delicate relationship of co-financing humanitarian aid. Again, this is beyond of the scope of the study.

\(^{20}\) cf. ‘ONG et multinationales tentent de s’approvisionner’, Le Monde, 18./19.01.2004, p. 17
The consequences of this vicious circle for strategic country planning are still open to question. However, an undeniable tendency has been observed for INGOs to ‘streamline’ their country evaluation and problem analysis in crisis-prone countries like Angola or Rwanda in order to forestall undue criticism from their counterparts, competing aid agencies, or the general public (cf. Kohnert 2002:20). A simple answer to this problem would be to split country concepts for public consumption (e.g. for fund raising and window-dressing purposes) from more explicit but confidential internal planning documents. However, this can hardly be considered as a sustainable solution, as it would counteract the overriding principle of participative development, and contradict the overall aim of all development planning, namely to encourage the mutual understanding between all stakeholders. For this reason, such a separation was rejected by (among others) the DWHH. The present trend of decentralization in major aid institutions (like gtz or DWHH), not only in the field of project implementation, but also in program planning, could be a first step in the right direction, provided that decentralized planning and implementation are based on participatory planning methods (cf. Kohnert 2002: 21-3; cf. chapter 3 below).

In summary, the quest for rational, target-orientated planning in general, and for viable country concepts as strategic management instruments of NGOs in particular, has had ambiguous effects. A major aim behind the exercise, i.e. the due consideration of the political, socio-cultural and socio-economic setting of a country in delimitating aid programs, is justified and constitutes an advance over the low methodological standards of isolated project-planning of past decades; it should therefore be further developed in a process-orientated manner. Those INGOs who introduced country concepts as central planning tools in the 1990s, generally intensified the dialogue with their partners on priorities of future aid projects as well as on planning, monitoring and evaluation procedures; this is commendable and should also be continued. However, quite a number of counterparts and staff members resented the new result-orientated planning concepts as an imposed additional work load, or as a means of control in an unequal partnership, without any tangible benefits (cf. Kohnert/Preuss, 2003:381-2). Despite all the rhetoric about partnership on both sides, the principal group of stakeholders, the poor and marginalized, have so far been scarcely involved in the planning process, at best indirectly through partner organizations, but mostly only as objects of planning processes. This still constitutes a major bottleneck of country planning (cf. chapter 3).
Whether the country concepts have increased the overall rationality of INGO planning processes and their implementation is open to question. Firstly, there have been counteracting external factors, like the globalisation of the aid business, that demanded structural changes in the composition of INGO portfolios towards growing short-term humanitarian aid; this was hardly compatible with the requirements of medium-term country planning. Secondly, the underlying vision of rationality as a remedy for the major ills of development aid was in itself a fallacy. Some three centuries ago, Francisco Goya chastised a similar form of hubris in his famous Capricho ‘The dream [sleep] of reason produces monsters’ 21. On the one hand the Cartesian ideal of rationalism is valid: if reason sleeps (is not vigilant), monsters like corruption, misappropriation of funds, politically instrumentalised xenophobia (witch-hunts against foreigners, like in the Côte d’Ivoire under the pretext of Ivorité), and other violent conflicts caused by inappropriate aid may arise. On the other hand, the dream of social, economic and political structures, based on the hubris of rational behaviour, may result in ‘white elephants’, growing inequality and ensuing social and political conflicts. One only needs to point to the evils caused by the terrible excesses of ill-advised structural adjustment programs of multinational donors up to the early 1990s, e.g. in the case of Rwanda (cf. Barré/Shearer/Uvin 1999; Storey 1999:15; Uvin 1998), and to the double talk of propagated unlimited rule of free markets over developing economies without due regard to major industrialized countries (cf. OXFAM 2002). The dangers incorporated in the hubris of rationalism in development planning go far beyond the age-old controversy about the validity of the concept of the homo oeconomicus or of culture-specific rationalities. The ongoing debate on brain research shows that rational behaviour is influenced by deep-seated emotions at least as much as by empirical knowledge and rational reasoning. In fact, human beings cannot act rationally without moving emotions 22. But even more importantly in this context,


22 In contrast to the Descartian postulate on the fundamental separation of body and soul (cogito, ergo sum), human decision making, by its very biological structure, is never determined by rational reasoning alone, but guided by emotions grown on, and deeply embedded, in the respective culture of the actor (Damasio, 1994:325-28). One may go even one step further in discussing the relevance of Gerald Edelman’s (1992:232-36) hypothesis that the biological self, at least vital parts of the human brain, have been conditioned and structured in the course of human genesis by basic values needed for survival; thus, the evolution of mankind provided for the acceptance of basic human value-systems guiding its actions; possibly Edelman’s thesis even sheds new light on the controversy concerning the existence of universal human rights. According to recent neuro-physiological theories on cognition, the perception of the world in the human brain is being directed through the filter of positive and negative sentiments from birth. There is a close neuro-biological link between feeling and thinking, which makes the existence of emotions (based on the respective socio-
the neuro-biological linkage of ratio and emotions, born out of and developed within specific
d socio-cultural settings, is of immediate relevance for the resolution of pressing social needs
and conflicts typically addressed by development cooperation (cf. Damasio, 1994:326-29,
344-52). And finally, if particular manners of reduction of complexity, based on culture-
specific emotional structures, and not different rationalities are a major distinction between
African and Western rational reasoning (cf. Kohnert 2004), then generations of social
anthropologists since Evans-Pritchard are right in stressing (apparently without much effect)
that Western-educated development experts and politicians should be particularly careful not
to cultivate the hubris of rationality in their dialogue with stakeholders deeply rooted in
foreign cultures.

3. Participation, Empowerment, Ownership – A rational, target-orientated
continuum?

The major change in the planning methods and instruments of aid agencies in the 1990s was
closely connected with a shift of emphasis in the approach of development cooperation, away
from project planning and service delivery towards supporting the socio-cultural and political
environment of the recipient communities.

Culture is not inherently good or bad, but under certain conditions its propensity to change
and to influence perceptions of power and values can induce important improvements in well-
being 23. Even seemingly static cultural factors such as custom, tradition or ethnicity, often
said to be barriers to economic growth in Africa, have been adapted to the changing
requirements of societies. Regarding the impact of culture on development, little attention has
been paid to the informal sector, though it is still predominant in the social, economic and
political setting of most African countries. In view of the failure of past development efforts,
there is a tendency in development policy and research to favour external stimuli to bring
about cultural innovations. Promoting the competition between cultures and ideas is certainly
better than the temptation to ban any foreign influence, although, notably in the African
context, we have to tackle the serious problem of asymmetric power relations in a globalised

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23 On the cultural turn in developing economics and its effect on development planning cf. Douglas 2002; OECD
world (cf. Sen 2002: 18-19). However, the aid syndrome, or, as James Scott (1998) called it, the hubris of the ‘high modernist’ ideology of technocrats, politicians and researchers alike, does incorporate the well-known inherent dangers of ethnocentricity and top-down approaches; this holds especially for the import of foreign cultural innovations. In addition, it diverts attention from exploring and promoting indigenous innovations, and, even worse, it may undermine their very base, the informal structure from which they are being generated. In this respect we should always bear in mind that culture, even within one distinct entity, is neither static, nor a homogeneous block but characterized by an amazing range of different historical traits. Deviant voices, if not suppressed by dominant ideologies or powers, more often than not come from the inside rather than the outside (cf. Sen 2002:8). It is more likely that sustainable development will be initiated when new policies are drafted on the base of ‘common sense’, the practical knowledge and aspirations of the person-on-the-spot (cf. Scott 1998:309-41). This, however, is often ignored or considered to be exotic, irrelevant or irrational by policy makers and by the proponents of formal ahistoric epistemological knowledge (cf. Rao/Walton 2002:5; Scott 1998). The cultural heritage of African countries, for example, frequently labelled ‘traditional culture’ or ‘traditional institutions’, is habitually regarded in a simplistic and deterministic manner as a customary barrier to economic growth, and hence summarily dismissed as ‘informal constraints’ (North 1990:37) 24. This dualistic concept of culture (modern vs. traditional) ignores the reality of a universe of different co-existing, and frequently competing cultures within a society, as well as the development potential of indigenous cultural innovations. Not only is this view based on analytic oversimplification it is also ethically and politically irresponsible (cf. Sen 2002:2, 9-11; Douglas 2002; Hountondji 2001; Odhiambo 2002:2-3).

The basic insight, that there is no sustainable development without the stakeholders themselves being concerned about it, led to the proposition of new forms of cooperation to empower the target groups to care for themselves. Their greater participation in development programs of the donors, capacity building to empower stakeholders to articulate their concerns and to increase their policy influence, was meant to lead finally to their ownership of the development process. NGOs were proud to be seen at the forefront of this participative approach, being closely linked to their partners by common visions and ideals. However, towards the close of the 1990s, after a decade of rather disappointing experiences with the

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new language of aid, it was realized that there was still a considerable gap between words and actions, good intentions and disappointing results, even among those INGOs, that counted among the harshest critics of these double standards (cf. ids 2001; Kohnert 2002).

In order to provide for effective and lasting participation of the stakeholders in development programs, donors had to overcome the isolated project approach. The wealth of experience with different participatory methods in the context of target-orientated project planning and implementation proved that these methods were hardly effective and difficult to implement because of operational problems and problems of legitimacy\(^{25}\). Participation may succeed for specific kinds of programs in favourable circumstances, but it may fail for others, were local conditions make co-operative and collective action difficult or were local partners manipulate it because of counteracting vested interests (cf. Brett 2003). What would be required beyond the participation of target-groups in specific development projects, was a stronger regard for the socio-cultural and political dimension of participation. Empowerment, i.e. the promotion of general, institutionalised forms of participation at the local level, became the new vision of development planning, where participation could be seen as being both the means and the end of the process (cf. Blackburn/Holland 1998; Rauch 2002:512; Williams 2004).

According to the concept of *structured participation*, a sustainable institutionalised and active involvement presupposes a minimum level of organization on the part of local communities or stakeholders, as well as specific forms of decision-sharing, depending on the context and stage of the planning process. Universal recommendations for a one-size-fits-all ‘tool kit’ for participation in development projects are therefore not feasible. Even so, certain minimal requirements of participation have been delimited: Firstly, information of all stakeholders well in advance of the decision-making process on actions and programs; secondly, a minimum delay in stakeholders' own decision-making- and articulation processes; and thirdly, an institutionalised right of co-determination in the relevant decision structures (cf. Rauch 2002:520-21). Participation requires a process, based on a bottom-up approach of delimitating targets and programs, as well as on mutual respect and reciprocal accountability. Partaking in project planning and implementation does not automatically lead to empowerment of the target groups, neither do measures to increase the accountability and

transparency of counterparts. One of the major fallacies of NGOs’ development efforts is the illusion that, because of shared ideals and small size, such NGOs represent a homogenous group of beneficiaries, e.g. the poor and marginalized. Even within these groups, more often than not, strong, structural or ideological differences do exist. Promoting the concept of structured participation may reveal covert social and economic conflicts between the representatives of local NGOs and their beneficiaries, as well as within the stakeholder groups (notably gender specific differences). Nevertheless, common aims as well as conflicting interest have to be discussed and resolved; there is a need to elaborate choices and arbitrate between them, not necessarily with the ultimate aim of a consensus but rather of a sound compromise, in order that the development efforts may become sustainable and be owned by the beneficiaries (cf. Maxwell 2003:15-16).

All these are particularly sensitive questions for INGOs, as most of them share the same convictions, ideals or ideologies with their partner organizations, who are meant to represent the beneficiaries. On one hand, this makes for stronger mutual trust between donors and partners as compared to state agencies; but on the other hand, INGOs often turn a blind eye to the question, whether their partners can really be considered as the legitimate voice of the target groups, and whether the aid has reached the latter as intended (cf. Carothers 2000:21; Encarnación 2002:125). The partnership ideology is especially virulent with INGOs of a religious orientation, and – for various reasons – this is one of the major causes for failures in reaching the target groups (cf. Kohnert et al 1992:57-64). The new request of INGOs for institutionalised participation could be interpreted by their partners as a sign of mistrust, or as indicative of the intention to by-pass them, and thereby undermine the trust relationship between both. In addition, the commitment to partnership runs the risk of degrading into covert conditionality in view of the unequal partnership structures and asymmetric accountability (cf. Maxwell 2003:19; ids 2001; Pender 2001). Even more importantly, if the building up of real partnership takes time and resources, the institutionalisation of participation by stakeholders requires even more. This will be a major bottleneck in promoting capacity-building and structural participation through INGOs and local NGOs alike: Firstly, because they are usually under pressure to deliver prompt results in view of the limited size of their projects and the greater and more direct dependency on legitimacy vis-à-vis their sponsors, compared with state agencies. Secondly, sponsors and activists supporting NGOs are reluctant to spend their money on institutional changes because these have the onus
of ineffective bureaucratic measures. In the third place, INGOs are increasingly forced by globalisation to focus on emergency aid (cf. above), but the very nature of this business often does not allow for sufficient time for capacity building. All this underlines once more the need for INGOs to honour their overall aim to promote sustainable development (cf. Clay 2004; Donner 2004). With respect to humanitarian aid, this involves the serious effort to transform short-term emergency aid into effective and lasting programs of reconstruction and crisis prevention. Without such an effort, INGOs may unwittingly contribute to recapitalizations of emergencies and crisis. Since the history of failed participation concepts shows that words alone do not count, INGOs have to develop more robust structural means and management tools to ensure this transformation. Capacity-building for the structural participation by stakeholders is therefore a key (cross-sectoral) task to be enshrined in INGOs’ country concepts.

4. The most radical change needed is by donors – From result-orientated planning to participative organizational cultures of learning

One basic assumption of actor-centered participation approaches as formulated by Robert Chambers and others is ‘the primacy of the personal’, i.e. the power of personal choice, or the view that the most effective way to promote the empowerment of stakeholders under conditions of unequal power relations lies in voluntary personal transformation (cf. Kapoor 2002:110-11; Chambers 1997:14, 231-34; ids 2001). Chambers recognized that individual power can be exerted (and misappropriated) in multiple domains, including politics and the economy, social and geographical spaces, professions, age, and sex, and last but not least within institutions. He maintains that the misuse of power can be minimized by dialogue and negotiated relationships. But the onus for such personal transformation clearly lies with the ‘uppers’, i.e. powerful and dominant individuals, who are confronted with the weak and subordinate. Thus, some of the large INGOs and multilateral aid agencies were embracing the idea of becoming a learning organization (cf. Pettit et al 2003; Senge et al 1994). The powerful would have to be convinced and trained to step-down, to give up something, for the reward of the personal satisfaction of achieving ethical aims and more efficient and target-orientated results in their work. These propositions of the actor-centered approach to

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26 The stipulation of DWHH to restrict humanitarian aid programs by administrative means to a maximum level of 80 per cent external funding (cf. chapter 2) seems to be a first, though minor step in the right direction.
participation have a pronounced voluntaristic and ethical, if not ideological bias. It is difficult to see how, for example, a training program for powerful development managers or aid workers in listening to and learning from the powerless could be successfully implemented at any level, without whichever supporting and generally accepted rules of compliance or enforcement (cf. Kapoor 2002: 111-14). In fact, what has been demanded from the ‘uppers’ would be similar to a ‘cultural revolution’ in the headquarters of aid agencies, merely guided by the right incentives. This is certainly a weak proposition, and, if at all, a second-best solution. Yet, the question remains, whether there are any realistic alternatives which do not interfere with the right of self-determination, which the international community, and notably the INGOs, concede to all partners and stakeholders.

The quest for structured and institutionalised participation was meant to cure this deficit of the voluntaristic participation approach in the recipient countries. In following the logic of the actor-centered approach of the primacy of transformation of the powerful, it would be consistent to ask, whether any similar structures of participation could be installed in donor countries, thereby breaking the ‘cartel of good intentions’. That would be important, because ‘despite the good intentions, altruism, and genuine professional dedication of the individuals involved’, this cartel is ‘suppressing critical feedback and learning from the past, suppressing competitive pressure to deliver results, and suppressing identification of the best channel of resources for different objectives’ (Easterly 2002:64). The normative approach of the ‘learning organization’ with its commitment to valuing different kinds of knowledge, encouraging teamwork and dialogue and the exploration of differences in aims and experiences (cf. Roper/Pettit 2003:2-3) is laudable but probably not sufficient to effect this ‘cultural revolution’ within INGOs.

The obstacles to change in planning cultures of aid agencies are legion. They have been analysed in detail by others (cf. Biggs/Smith 2003; Chapman 2002; Easterly 2002; Berg 2000; ids 2001, Kohnert/Preuss/Sauer 1992; Lancaster 1999; Mosse 2004; Pettit et al 2003; Rossi 2004; Schönhuth 2002), and it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss them further. Here, it may suffice to underline that the rationalistic view of a results-based planning approach as panacea for the major ills of development planning is based on illusions. Up to the 1990s, target orientated development planning had been advocated by major aid organizations as prime instrument of strategic planning and management. In the meantime this concept has been questioned out of theoretical and operational reasons (cf. chapter 2). New results-orientated rules and instruments of development planning, like country concepts, are still
needed in a modified form \(^{27}\), but they will be effective only if accompanied by a radical change of attitudes on the part of those who apply them; this hold for all aid agency, governmental and non-governmental alike \(^{28}\). The new consensus on strategic planning assumes that effective organizational learning counts as least as much as results (cf. Beckwith et al 2003:206; Senge et al 1994). Certainly, this personal transformation and the change of aid agencies organizational culture can neither be imposed nor engineered (cf. ids 2001). Therefore, immersion-, exposure-, or dialogue-programs, aimed at bringing agency staff in direct contact with the live and perspectives of the poor they want to assist, can be extremely helpful. This has been proved already by several immersion-programs of governmental- and non-governmental aid organizations, like the Grass Roots Immersion Program (GRIP) of the World Bank, or similar instruments of the German GTZ, the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the British Department of International Development (DFID), or ActionAid (cf. IDS 2004; Irvine et al 2004; Jupp 2004) \(^{29}\). But additional structural changes, including effective reward structures, providing for the genuine participation by stakeholders in the development process, and for the collegial equality of partner organizations, are required for any tangible advancement towards more effective development planning.

It has therefore been acknowledged that the first, and most radical change is demanded from the donors (cf. Maxwell 2003; ids 2001; 2004; Kohnert/Preuss 2003, WB 2003: viii). INGOs should be at the forefront in effecting this adjustment, as they have to defend their reputation of a close and special relationship with their partners overseas, not just for moral reasons but for economic gain too (cf. chapter 1). Change may be effected by different groups, even simultaneously and in a coordinated way, if the incentives are right, but the greatest responsibility for the transformation lies with those in power, within aid agencies and between agencies and their partners. This has been recognized only recently by multilateral aid institutions like the Worldbank (WB 2003: viii), as well as by INGOs like Oxfam or

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\(^{27}\) For recommendations on adapted country concepts for INGOs as well as examples of best practices cf. Kohnert 2002.

\(^{28}\) Cf. the evaluation report of the PRSP by the World Bank Evaluation Unit: ‘implementation of the CDF principles requires difficult changes in the behaviors and practices of both donors and recipients.’ (WB 2004:vii); and Mosse (2004:667): ‘most agencies are bound to a managerial view of policy which makes them resolutely simplistic about (or ignorant of) the social and political life of their ideas.’

\(^{29}\) Cf. also the Exposure and Dialogue Program of the Association for the Promotion of North-South Dialogue, its aims, organisation and fields of application, as developed by the program ‘Development has got a face’ by the German Catholic INGO ‘Justice and Peace’, available at the website: http://www.exposure-nsd.de/Publications.htm; 01.09.04
ActionAid, and by representatives of non-state actors, like the German Bishop Conference. The latter recently published a policy paper of the expert group ‘World economy and Social Ethics’, demanding greater responsibility of the donors and reciprocity of conditionality.

Last but not least, the group demanded that donors be held responsible for the cost of the repercussions of their failed development projects. Once again a just, but pious wish, given the absence of means for its implementation.

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‘A growing concern voiced by staff and local partners in recent years has been the disproportionate amount of time and effort that is going into meeting ActionAid’s planning and reporting requirements. If it were only a question of wrong priorities, the problem could be easily rectified by reordering time allocation. The bigger risk is the spread of a culture of bureaucratization and disempowerment of staff, partners and ultimately the poor people that we work with. ALPS aims to liberate staff and partners from the tyranny of filling endless forms and writing lengthy, beautifully presented plans and reports that mostly adorn some shelf or archive … by fostering a culture where staff and partners do not have the comfort of relying on rules and procedures but have to use their own initiative to achieve our common mission.’ ActionAid 2000: Introduction, n. p

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