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Leaders' Foreign Travel and Democracy

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Abstract

This paper investigates whether the number of trips by a country's leader to the United States allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace better democratic practices. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the United States of America from 1960-2015. The baseline results show that the number of leaders' trips to the United States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that these foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance. These results are robust even after the inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors of democracy, and after controlling for outliers.

JEL Code : H11, D72

Keywords : Executive, Democracy, Leader Foreign Travel.

"It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."

George W. Bush in his inaugural address after his swearing-in ceremony of 2005.

1. Introduction

This paper examines the effect of the number of trips by the leader of a country or the head of a government to the United States on democratic governance in their home country. To be specific, we investigate whether foreign travel by a country's leader to the United States allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace better democratic practices. This is the first attempt in the literature to consider the number of trips by heads of state as a determinant of democracy.

In this context, we focus on the United States since American foreign policy typically swings between two approaches. The first is to stand for the promotion of democracy, political freedoms, and human rights. The second is to safeguard American strategic interests even if it entails fostering alliances with totalitarian regimes.

This dichotomy implies that, on one hand, there is an ideological position that considers democracy promotion in the core of a national security doctrine. Accordingly, some American administrations elevate democratic imperatives, and voice concern whenever they encounter serious violations to democratic practices or human rights. These Administrations attempt to pressure governments to embrace democratic systems of governance through the carrot of foreign aid or debt relief or the stick of sanctions, censure or isolation. One of the adopted ways to cajole countries into democratic transition is to persuade or to pressure leaders of these countries during their official visits to the United States. This is because power in non-democratic countries is usually centered around the person of the leader. Thus, such transition can only be undertaken after the approval of the leadership of the country, which can be obtained during their visit by enticement or coercion. In this context, we expect that the number of leader's trips to the United States to have a positive effect on democratic governance.

On the other hand, American foreign policy has another pragmatic approach aimed at achieving strategic objectives and ensuring economic interests without being preoccupied with what type of government delivers. This approach is willing to overlook non-democratic behavior as long as other practices are conducive to achieving these foreign policy goals. In this case, intervention for democracy is used only as a pretext for pressure on other more expedient issues to the United States. In this context, the leaders may be emboldened to continue with their autocratic practices as long as they perceive themselves indispensable strategically to the United States, which they can guarantee during their visits. Thus, we expect that the leader's trips to have an adverse effect on democracy.

Given that the effect of the number of leaders' foreign trips on democracy is inconclusive, an empirical analysis is warranted. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the United States of America from 1960-2015, which is derived from the archives of the U.S. Department of State. The baseline results show that the number of leaders' trips to the United States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that these foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance, measured by the fraction of years under democracy or by democratic capital. These results are robust even after the inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors of democracy, and after controlling for outliers.

We do not expect endogeneity to be an issue in this case because democracy, or the lack thereof, is not expected to have an effect on the number of leader's visits to the United States. Leaders of all sorts usually have the desire to visit the United States to plead for economic assistance, to request military supplies, to ask for diplomatic support, to earn the approval of the administration, to have the backing of the super power, and to strengthen bilateral ties. Those visits are usually crucial for leaders of countries with dire economic needs, those embroiled in conflict, or those who need to discuss bilateral or multilateral issues. Thus, we do not expect the form of government to have an effect on the number of leader's trips to the United States.

This paper's contribution to the literature is twofold. The paper is the first attempt to examine the effect of foreign travel by heads of state on democracy. The second contribution is that it is also the first to highlight the political consequences of a country's leader's trips abroad.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature survey, section 3 includes the detailed description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical estimation and the robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and figures are included thereafter.

2. Literature

This paper contributes to a new burgeoning literature on the determinants of democracy, that follows the seminal work in Barro (1999). The studies in this literature specifically focus on the political outcomes of the background of the country's leadership, in addition to the foreign experiences by the people and the leaders of the country. These experiences include foreign education or living abroad. Our paper contributes to the literature by considering the effect of foreign travel by the leader of the country on democracy.

Some studies show that there is an association between a leader's educational background and democracy. For instance, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) use a data set on over 1,400 world leaders to show that democracies are almost 20% more likely to select highly educated leaders. Mercier (2016) explores the relationship between political leaders' foreign education and the evolution of democracy during their leadership. The author shows a positive correlation between the fact that leaders studied abroad, especially in high-income OECD countries, and the change in democracy during their tenure. Gift and Krcmaric (2017) show that leaders educated at Western universities significantly and substantively improve a country's democratic prospects. Spilimbergo (2009) shows that foreign-educated individuals foster democracy in their home country, only if the education is attained in democratic countries. This obviously applies to a country's leadership as well. Leader's foreign education is also shown to affect a country's foreign policy. For instance, Dreher and Yu (2016) study whether leaders' foreign education influences their voting behavior at the United Nations General Assembly. The authors find that foreign-educated leaders are less likely to vote in line with their host countries but more likely to vote in line with other G7 countries.

There is also another stream of literature that focuses on the effect of foreign experiences of leaders or individuals, who lived abroad, on democracy in their home countries. This is because migrants may transmit to their home communities the political ideas and practices they absorbed while living abroad. These political spillovers have the potential to change political preferences and to increase the support for political change.

For instance, Chauvet and Mercier (2014) explore the connection between return migrants and political outcomes in their home country, using the case of Mali. The authors find a positive effect of return migrants, from non-African countries, on participation rates and on electoral competitiveness. The authors also provide evidence of a diffusion of political norms from these returnees to non-migrants. Batista et al. (2018) explore the role of migrants in shaping political attitudes in sending countries, with a focus on Mozambique. Their analysis shows that the number of migrants an individual is in close contact with through chatting significantly increases political participation in that area. Batista and Vicente (2011) conduct an experiment to examine whether migration increases the demand for political accountability in the country of origin. The authors find a positive effect which is stronger for migration to countries with better governance, and for return migrants than for current ones. Docquier et al. (2016) use cross-sectional and panel estimations for a large sample of developing countries, and find that openness to emigration has a positive effect on home-country democratization.

Karadja and Prawitz (2019) study the political effects of the mass emigration to the United States in the nineteenth century using data from Sweden. Their estimates show that emigration substantially increased the likelihood of adopting more inclusive political institutions, and increasing the demand for political change captured by labor movement membership, strike participation, and voting. Barsbai et al. (2017) show that the wave of emigration in the aftermath of the Russian crisis of 1998 affected electoral outcomes and political preferences in Moldova. The authors document a significant negative effect of emigration to the West on the share of votes for the Communist Party in the elections of 2009–2010.

Our paper contributes to this literature by arguing that if the experience of living abroad by citizens affects the political outcomes in the home country, it is more likely that the experience of official travelling abroad by leaders will have more of an effect on democracy.

3. Data

The countries included in the analysis are Taiwan, Canada, Liberia, Rwanda, Thailand, Czech Republic, Niger, Belize, USA, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Costa Rica, Malta, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Libya, China, Turkey, Mongolia, Latvia, Guatemala, Uruguay, Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Burundi, Tanzania, Portugal, Malawi, Netherlands, Antigua and Barbuda, Macao, Gabon, Nigeria, Cuba, Swaziland, Tunisia,

Bermuda, Mozambique, Oman, Bhutan, Nepal, Georgia, Angola, Armenia, Mali, Denmark, Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, Uganda, Comoros, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Brunei, Kuwait, Algeria, Congo, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Eritrea, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Haiti, Suriname, Benin, Germany, Norway, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Bahamas, Azerbaijan, Sao Tome and Principe, Singapore, Yemen, Fiji, Korea, Timor-Leste, Colombia, Albania, Djibouti, Nicaragua, Belarus, Jamaica, Madagascar, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, Iran, France, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Peru, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, New Zealand, Bahrain, Gambia, Zambia, El Salvador, Ukraine, Spain, Croatia, Iraq, Grenada, Jordan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, Russia, Belgium, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Dominica, Qatar, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Austria, Lithuania, Chad, Afghanistan, Slovenia, Tonga, Cameroon, Chile, Poland, Cyprus, Argentina, Singapore, Romania, Sudan, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, Barbados, Panama, Palau, Somalia, Seychelles, St. Lucia, Finland, Estonia, Cape Verde, Paraguay, Vanuatu, United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Guatemala, Guinea, Japan. Table 1 presents the data source and description of all the variables used in this study. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.

The dependent variable in our analysis is democracy. We use two measures of democratic governance during the period under study. The first is the fraction of years under democracy derived from Ashraf et al. (forthcoming). The second is democratic capital derived from Persson and Tabellini (2009) which captures a nation's historical experience with democracy. These two estimates of democracy are discussed in details in these papers.

The variable of interest is leaders' trips, which is calculated as the number of trips by the country's leader to the United States of America during the period 1960-2015. This data is derived from the Office of the Historian, which is affiliated to the Department of State of the United States of America.¹ Figure 1 shows a world map of leader's trips to the United States during the period 1960-2015. To the best of our knowledge, this variable has never been used before in the literature. To collect this variable, we use historical data from the Department of State of the United States of America. We counted the number of leaders' trips to the U.S.A. from 1960 to 2015. Initially, the objective was to use the total number of leaders' trips to all countries. However, instead of considering all destination countries we only consider leaders'

¹ <https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory>.

trips to the country whose foreign policy focuses on democracy promotion more than any other country. This fact can justify our focus on trips by leaders to the United States.

4. Estimation

This section conducts an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of leaders' trips to the United States of America on democracy in their country during the period 1960-2015. Figure 2 shows a positive association between leader's trips and the two measures of democracy. To explore this relationship we use the following equation

$$Democracy_i = \theta + \delta_i LeadersTrips_i + \mathfrak{X}_i \gamma + \mu_i \quad (1)$$

Where $Democracy_i$ is either the fraction of years under democracy, or the democratic capital in country i . $LeadersTrips_i$ is the number of trips by the leader of country i to the United States. \mathfrak{X}_i is a vector of control variables and μ_i is the error term. The vector of control variables includes those commonly identified in the literature as determinants of democracy. Thus, we control for income per capita, educational attainment, legal origin, continental and religion dummies, fractionalization, and natural endowments. The study is a cross-country analysis and applies the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation technique. The choice of this technique is dictated by our variable of interest, which is only available in cross-section.

4.1. Baseline Results

The baseline results are included in table 3. Column 1 includes the coefficient of the number of leader's trips without any control variables, column 2 adds a dummy for predominantly Muslim countries, column 3 adds the logarithm of GDP per capita, column 4 adds a dummy for oil or gas discovery, column 5 adds the continental dummies, column 6 adds legal origins, and column 7 adds all the control variables where the dependent variable is democratic capital.

The OLS estimation shows that the number of leaders' trips has a statistically significant positive coefficient in all specifications. This implies that a higher number of foreign trips by the head of state is associated with a higher level of democratic governance during the period of interest. When we include all the control variables, the leaders' trips variable has a significant coefficient of 0.008. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in the number of leaders' trips to the United States translates into an increase in the measure for democracy by 0.1432.

We include a Muslim dummy as some studies find that countries with Muslim majorities enjoy less freedom and are less democratic than countries in which Muslims are a minority, as in Potrafke (2012). The results show that the Muslim dummy is not significant in the case when we use the fraction of years under democracy as our dependent variable, but has a statistically significant negative coefficient when we use democratic capital. We also include the logarithm of GDP per capita. The central tenet of the modernization theory is that higher income per capita causes a country to be more democratic. Lipset (1959) suggested that the process of modernization involved changes in “the factors of industrialization, urbanization, wealth, and education [which] are so closely interrelated as to form one common factor. And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the political correlate of democracy” (p. 80). The results are consistent with this view and show that the logarithm of GDP per capita has a statistically significant positive coefficient in all specifications. This contradicts the previous results (e.g. Acemoglu, et al., 2008; Jha and Kodila-Tedika 2019).

We also add a dummy for gas or oil discovery. There are some studies which show a connection between oil abundance and the system of governance. Kevin Tsui (2011) finds that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil pushes a country’s democracy level almost 20 percentage points below trend after three decades. Our results show that the coefficient is negative but not statistically significant. Finally, the results of the last column also show that the British and French legal traditions have a positive significant effect on democratic capital.

4.2. Controlling for Outliers

The OLS estimates could be affected by the influence of a certain number of influential observations, or outliers. Our first sensitivity check estimates our baseline specification, with our full set of control variables, after dropping the ten countries with the largest number of leaders’ trips. The results are presented in column 1 of table 4. The coefficient of the number of leader’s trips is positive and significant. However, this technique is generically weak and more robust estimations are warranted.

Considering this issue, we apply Hubert’s Iteratively Weighted Least Squares IWLS as in Huber (1964, 1973) and Li (1985). This technique is used to mitigate the influence of outliers in an otherwise normally distributed data set. We omit all observations for which $|DFBETA_i| > 2/\sqrt{N}$, where N is the number of observations. The results are presented in column 2 of table 4. The coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant. We also

use the Hadi (1992) procedure to detect and control for outliers. The results of the estimation after correcting for the presence of outliers are shown in column 3 of table 4. These different corrections do not affect the results found so far. The coefficient of the leaders' trips remains positive and statistically significant. In different terms, the outliers have no real impact on the direction, sign or significance of the relationship of interest.

4.3. Model Uncertainty

In Table 5, we account for model uncertainty. Consistent with Young (2009), Young and Kroeger (2017) and Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2018), econometric models are always associated with some degree of uncertainty. We follow the technique developed in Young et al. (2013) who maintain that “This program facilitates robustness tests that are more rigorous, transparent, and informative. It takes a regression model and tests the robustness of a coefficient of interest with respect to the choice of controls. The program estimates all possible combinations of control variables, and reports key statistics on the resulting distribution of estimates.” (p.2)

This framework allows us to address one of the concerns in empirical social science, which is the sensitivity of empirical findings to credible variations in model specification, as argued in Young (2009), and Young and Kroeger (2017) who state that this is a “framework for model that can demonstrate robustness across sets of possible controls, variable definitions, standard errors, and functional forms. We estimate all possible combinations of specified model ingredients, report key statistics on the modeling distribution of estimates, and identify the model details that are empirically most influential” (p. 4). Our findings using this framework are disclosed in Table 5.

As shown in table 5, 4096 unique combinations of control variables were generated by the program. Moreover, the program ran each of those models using OLS and storing the estimates from each model. It is established that the estimated coefficient of the leader's trips is positive and significant (sign stability: 100%, significance rate: 100%, positive and significance: 100%). The average estimate across all of these models is 0.0093. Given the total standard error of 0.0028, the robustness student test statistic is 3.3652.

4.3. Alternative Controls

In this section, we include alternative drivers of democracy to our estimation. This is also to check the robustness of our results. In table 6, we include educational attainment, measured by the average years of schooling amongst the population aged 25 and over. In column 1 of table 6, we test the modernization hypothesis that a high level of human capital allows democracy to consolidate. There are also studies that show that education fosters political

participation. Glaeser et al. (2007) show that schooling increase the incentives for civic engagement and ensure a broader participation in the political process. Campante and Chor (2012) argue that "more educated citizens display a greater propensity to engage in virtually all forms of political activity, including voting, attending political events, staying informed about politics, working on campaigns, contributing money, and signing petitions." Column 1 of table 6 shows that the number of leader's trips is statistically significant and positive. Schooling, however, does not have a significant coefficient, while economic growth shows a statistically negative effect.

In column 2 of table 6 we add ethnic and religious fractionalization. In highly diverse societies, the group that dominates power tend to expropriate resources from the other groups and restrict the rights of the members of the other groups. Therefore, we expect that fractionalization would have an adverse effect on democratic governance. Jensen and Skaaning (2011) show that at with high levels of ethnic fractionalization, the positive effect of modernization decreases. Gerring et al. (2018) show that ethno-linguistic diversity increases prospects for democracy, while religious diversity decreases these prospects. Column 2 confirms the statistically significant positive effect of the number of leader's trips, while the coefficients of the two types of fractionalization are insignificant.

In column 4 of table 6, we include a Catholic and Protestant dummies. Some studies, as in Bruce (2004), argue that Protestantism, compared to Catholicism, has been linked to generating a political culture that promotes individualism, engagement and civic association. The results confirm our previous finding for the sign and significance of the number of leader's trips, but shows that the coefficients of these dummies are insignificant with a positive sign for the Catholic dummy and a negative one for the Protestant dummy.

In the last column, we include all control variables and confirm the robustness of our results that show that the number of leader's trips to the United States has a significant positive association with democracy.

5. Conclusion

This paper investigates whether the number of trips by a country's leader to the United States allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace better democratic practices. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the United States of America from 1960-2015. The baseline results show that the number of leaders' trips to the United States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that

these foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance. These results are robust even after the inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors of democracy, and after controlling for outliers.

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Table 1. Data Definitions and Sources

Variables	Definitions	Sources
Domestic Democratic Capital	A country's historical experience with democracy	Persson, and Tabellini (2009)
School	Average years of schooling amongst the population aged 25 and over	Barro and Lee (2010).
Leaders' trips to USA	Number of trips by heads of governments or state leaders to the USA during the period 1960-2015.	https://history.state.gov/departments/history
GDP growth (annual %)	Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 1960-2015.	World Bank WDI online Database
Fractionalization	Ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization.	Alesina et al. (2003)
Fraction of years under democracy		Ashraf et al.
Oil or gas discovery		Ashraf et al.
Log of GDP per capita	GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international \$) 1960-2015.	World Bank WDI online Database
Africa	Dummy variables that take on the value of one when a country belongs to a Africa and 0 otherwise	Own Calculation
Asia	Dummy variables that take on the value of one when a country belongs to a Asia and 0 otherwise	Own Calculation
America	Dummy variables that take on the value of one when a country belongs to a America and 0 otherwise	Own Calculation
Oceania	Dummy variables that take on the value of one when a country belongs to a Oceania and 0 otherwise	Own Calculation
Europe	Dummy variables that take on the value of one when a country belongs to a Europe and 0 otherwise	Own Calculation
English legal origin	Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on the English common law.	Djankov et. al. (2007)
French legal origin	Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on the French civil law.	Djankov et. al. (2007)
German legal origin	Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on German civil law.	Djankov et. al. (2007)
Scandinavian legal origin	Dummy indicating a country's legal system based on Scandinavian legal system.	Djankov et. al. (2007)
Socialist legal origin	Dummy indicating a country's legal system is Socialist.	Djankov et. al. (2007)
Muslim	Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Islam.	La Porta et. al. (1999).
Catholic	Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Catholicism.	La Porta et. al. (1999).
Protestant	Dummy indicating the main religion in the country is Protestantism.	La Porta et. al. (1999).

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics

Variables	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Domestic Democratic Capital	147	.1885173	.2292014	0	.8037082
School	91	7.533427	2.874246	1.0188	13.004
Leaders' trips to USA	149	16.31544	17.90217	0	111
GDP growth (annual %)	149	4.002485	2.126755	-1.49013	16.49753
Ethnic Fractionalization	100	.4184353	.2813748	.009962	.958587
Fraction of years under democracy	149	.3921772	.3776692	0	1
Oil or gas discovery	149	.6577181	.4760736	0	1
Log of GDP per capita	146	8.8952	1.239154	6.458339	11.67319
Africa	141	.2553191	.437595	0	1
Asia	141	.2695035	.4452837	0	1
America	141	.1489362	.3572948	0	1
Religious Fractionalization	100	.2866467	.2384374	.0005998	.7822098
Europe	141	.248227	.4335242	0	1
English legal origin	102	.2745098	.4484707	0	1
French legal origin	102	.4509804	.5000485	0	1
German legal origin	102	.0490196	.2169752	0	1
Scandinavian legal origin	102	.0294118	.1697921	0	1
Socialist legal origin	102	.1960784	.3989892	0	1
Muslim	142	.1901408	.3938012	0	1
Catholic	142	.3396226	.475831	0	1
Protestant	142	.1226415	.3295836	0	1

Table 3. Baseline Results

	Fraction of years under democracy						Domestic Democratic Capital
Leaders' trip to USA	0.009*** (0.002)	0.009*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.004** (0.002)
Muslim dummy		0.014 (0.077)	0.026 (0.075)	0.029 (0.077)	0.025 (0.093)	0.024 (0.138)	-0.092* (0.051)
GDP per capita			0.111*** (0.028)	0.117*** (0.030)	0.107*** (0.031)	0.106*** (0.037)	0.079*** (0.022)
Oil or gas discovery				-0.068 (0.060)	-0.049 (0.063)	-0.060 (0.080)	-0.024 (0.040)
Asia					-0.184* (0.109)	0.004 (0.168)	0.074 (0.100)
Americas					-0.238** (0.099)	-0.155 (0.150)	-0.041 (0.085)
Africa					-0.187* (0.102)	-0.095 (0.160)	-0.064 (0.083)
Europe					-0.207** (0.090)	-0.042 (0.156)	0.045 (0.098)
legor_uk						0.239 (0.219)	0.209* (0.119)
legor_fr						0.294 (0.219)	0.277** (0.117)
legor_so						0.129 (0.217)	0.150 (0.116)
legor_sc						0.094 (0.224)	0.091 (0.123)
_cons	0.244*** (0.037)	0.250*** (0.039)	0.681*** (0.221)	0.692*** (0.224)	-0.428 (0.276)	-0.790* (0.406)	-0.761*** (0.245)
Number of observations	149	142	139	139	138	99	99
R2	0.186	0.182	0.286	0.292	0.317	0.334	0.441

note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;

Table 4. Controlling for Outliers

	Omit 10 countries with most Leaders' trips	Omit if DFBETA > $2/\sqrt{N}$	Hadi (1992)
Leaders' trip to USA	0.008*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.003)	0.009** (0.004)
Muslim dummy	0.021 (0.137)	-0.010 (0.146)	0.022 (0.137)
GDP per capita (log)	0.107*** (0.038)	0.078* (0.042)	0.099** (0.040)
Oil or gas discovery	-0.051 (0.083)	-0.072 (0.080)	-0.036 (0.082)
Legal origin	Yes	Yes	Yes
Continental effect	Yes	Yes	Yes
_cons	-0.643* (0.370)	-0.395 (0.518)	-0.644* (0.328)
Number of observations	96	88	92
R2	0.324	0.377	0.275

note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;

Table 5. Model Uncertainty and Robustness

Variable of interest	Leaders Trip to USA	Observations	
Outcome variable	Democracy		99
Possible control terms	12	Mean R2	0.26
		Multicollinearity	0.26
Number of models	4.096	Conventional Significance Testing:	
Model Robustness Statistics:		Sign Stability	100%
Mean(b)	0.0093	Significance rate	100%
Sampling SE	0.0023	Positive	100%
Modeling SE	0.0015	Positive and Sig	100%
Total SE	0.0028	Negative	0%
Robustness Ratio	3.3652	Negative and Sig	0%
Model Influence			
	Marginal Effect of Variable	Percent Change From Mean(b)	
	Inclusion		
GDP per capita (log)	-0.0028	-30.2%	
legor_ge	0.0005	5.3%	
Asia	-0.0002	-2.4%	
legor_uk	0.0002	2.2%	
Oil or gas discovery	0.0002	2.2%	
legor_fr	0.0002	1.6%	
mus	0.0001	1.6%	
Africa	-0.0001	-1.5%	
legor_so	0.0001	1.0%	
Americas	-0.0001	-0.8%	
legor_sc	0.0001	0.6%	
Europa	-0.0000	-0.2%	
Constant	0.0102		
R-squared	0.9837		

Table 6. Additional Controls

	Modernization Hypothesis	Fractionalization	Religion	All controls
Leaders' trip to USA	0.010*** (0.002)	0.010*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.011*** (0.002)
School	-0.024 (0.017)			-0.029 (0.026)
GDP growth (annual %)	-0.055*** (0.016)			-0.062*** (0.018)
Ethnic fractionalization		0.124 (0.166)		0.136 (0.180)
Religious fractionalization		-0.154 (0.257)		0.057 (0.284)
Catholic dummy			0.014 (0.117)	-0.046 (0.179)
Protestant dummy			-0.080 (0.199)	0.034 (0.238)
Cons	-0.458 (0.382)	-0.623 (0.386)	-0.634 (0.450)	-0.405 (0.460)
Number of observations	89	78	85	63
R2	0.454	0.403	0.330	0.547

note: .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *;

Figure 1. World Map of Leader's Trips




Figure 2. Leader's Trips and Democracy

