Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Delayed Collection of Unemployment Insurance in Recessions

Xie, Zoe (2019): Delayed Collection of Unemployment Insurance in Recessions. Published in: European Economic Review , Vol. 118, No. 2019 (7 June 2019): pp. 274-295.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF
MPRA_paper_99914.pdf

Download (1MB) | Preview

Abstract

Using variations in UI policies over time and across U.S. states, this paper provides evidence that allowing unemployed workers to delay the collection of benefits increases their job-finding rate. In a model with discrete job take-up decisions, benefit entitlement, wage- indexed benefits, and heterogeneous job types, I demonstrate that the policy can increase an unemployed worker’s willingness to work, even though more benefits in general reduce the relative value of employment. In a calibrated quantitative model, I find that allowing delayed benefit collection increases the overall job finding rates and may lower unemployment rate both in a steady state stationary economy and over a transition path during 2008–2012.

Available Versions of this Item

Logo of the University Library LMU Munich
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the University Library LMU Munich in Germany.