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Gillanders, Robert and van der Werff, Lisa

Dublin City University Business School

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Corruption Experiences and Attitudes to Political, Interpersonal, and Domestic Violence

Robert Gillanders¹ and Lisa van der Werff²

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Abstract

It is well understood that corruption can change the incentives to engage in political violence. However, the scope for corruption to change attitudes towards the permissibility of violence has received less attention. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we argue that experiences of corruption in the social environment are likely to shape individual attitudes towards violent behavior. Using data from the Afrobarometer, we document a statistically significant and sizable relationship between an individual's experience of paying bribes and their attitudes to political, interpersonal, and domestic violence. These relationships are evident for both men and women and, with the exception of women's attitudes to domestic violence, are robust to the inclusion of variables capturing the local incidence of corruption, local norms regarding violence, and a proxy for the local incidence of violence with the community. We find that corruption is associated with permissive attitudes to violence even after controlling for the perceived legitimacy of the police and courts.

Keywords: Corruption; Bribery; Violence; Political Violence; Revenge; Domestic Violence; sub-Saharan Africa

¹ Corresponding author: Dublin City University Business School, Ireland, and Hanken School of Economics, Finland. E-mail: robert.gillanders@dcu.ie

² Irish Institute of Digital Business, Dublin City University Business School, Ireland. Email: lisa.vanderwerff@dcu.ie

1. INTRODUCTION

Corruption, commonly defined as the abuse of public power for private gain, can change the incentives that people face in relation to revolutionary activity and violence by lowering the costs and increasing the benefits. In a corrupt society, control over the levers of the economy can be lucrative. O'Day (2001) argues that corruption within the Mexican army has facilitated the country's drugs trade. The finding of De Luca et al (2018) that the homelands of political leaders tend to benefit economically demonstrates that political control confers benefits to ruling ethnic groups. Similarly, Pierskalla and Sacks (2017) argue that in Indonesia conflicts arose following decentralisation as groups fought for control of public services. Baev (2018) points to corrupt elite competition for control of resources as being a key driver of Georgia's post USSR armed conflicts. This argument aligns well with the finding of Berman et al (2017) that less corrupt countries are less prone to natural resource induced violence. Tollefsen (2017) similarly finds that poverty is particularly associated with conflict in regions with poor governance. Corruption also changes the trade-offs faced by potential revolutionaries by undermining economic growth (Mauro, 1995) and fostering poverty and inequality (Gupta et al, 2002; Dincer and Gunalp, 2011). Corruption has also been shown to undermine subjective wellbeing in some contexts (Tavits, 2008; Welsch, 2008; Djankov et al, 2016; Gillanders, 2016). The Arab Spring revolutions of 2011 can, in part, be traced to dissatisfaction with entrenched and pervasive corruption (Mansfield and Synder, 2012). Lindberg and Orjuela (2011) identify corruption as an obstacle to post war reconciliation and stability in Sri Lanka.

This paper examines another mechanism through which corruption can foster violence. Using Afrobarometer data, we show that experiencing corruption is an economically and statistically significant predictor of attitudes to violence. People are more likely to view violence as justifiable if they have been exposed to corrupt public officials. The data also allows us to go beyond political violence, which, along with corruption enabled drugs violence, has been the focus of the extant literature. We show that attitudes to interpersonal violence and domestic violence are also significantly associated with exposure to corruption. This fact that corruption influences attitudes to violence beyond

the political domain suggests that this association is not a simple artefact of diminished state legitimacy or increased sense of grievance with government.

These relationships exist for both men and women and, with the notable exception of female attitudes to domestic violence, they are robust to the inclusion of competing explanations which are plausibly correlated with one's own likelihood paying a bribe and attitudes to violence. Specifically, one's own corruption experience is still significant even when controlling for the local incidence of corruption, local violence norms, and a control for local violence. We also show that our results are robust to the inclusion of the perceived legitimacy of the courts and police. This suggests that our results are not simply capturing an effect of corruption on the willingness to comply with the law.

To the extent that people incur disutility from carrying out acts that they view as hard to justify, our results can be viewed as evidence of a new mechanism linking corruption to violent outcomes via a reduction in this psychological cost. Our findings, particularly those relating to domestic violence, also point to what is to the best of our knowledge a previously undocumented cost of corruption. Acts of petty corruption are associated with the briber payers being more likely to view acts of violence against others, including wives and children, as acceptable in some circumstances. This finding adds to the weight of evidence that the burden of corruption tends to fall most heavily on already vulnerable groups such as victims of crime (Hunt, 2007), and infants (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008).

Social psychology offers insights into the behaviors and mechanisms that can explain this observed link between corruption experiences to attitudes to violence. Drawing on Moral Foundations Theory, we present an argument that experiences of corruption in the social environment help to shape the moral foundations on which individuals base their attitudes and behavior. Specifically, we propose that corruption impacts the development of moral principles related to submission to authority, care and protection of others, attitudes towards abhorrent behavior or action and the coercion of less dominant individuals. In turn these foundations provide a basis from which individual attitudes towards political, domestic and interpersonal violence develop.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 further discusses the mechanisms through which corruption can plausibly influence attitudes to violence. Section 3 describes our data and approach, the results of which are presented in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5 and discuss the implications of our results for policy.

2. THEORY

Violence can be defined as behaviour that involves the use of physical force against oneself or another causing significant harm, injury or death (Ferguson, 2010). Although violence exists in many forms, our interest in this paper is in understanding the correlates of political, interpersonal and domestic violence. Given the heavy costs and harm that is associated for unwilling victims with each of these forms of violence, they are typically viewed as an immoral behaviour (Bratton, 2008). It has become clear in the extant literature that individual and collective levels of violence cannot be explained by a combination of motivation and opportunity but that factors influencing perception and ideas of violence influence the subsequent development of these immoral attitudes and behaviour (Bhavnani & Backer, 2007). We argue that permissive attitudes towards violence are likely to be related to factors which influence the development of morality perceptions.

Morality refers to the social norms that guide behaviour whereby certain actions are prohibited and others prescribed (Yoder & Decety, 2018). Moral Foundations Theory (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Haidt, 2007; Haidt & Graham, 2007) proposes that moral perceptions and judgements are based on six key principles that humans are innately prepared to develop due to their alignment with recurrent social challenges (Haidt, 2012). These six moral principles or foundations are harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, ingroup/loyalty, authority/respect, liberty/oppression and purity/sanctity. Of particular interest to our paper are the principles of authority and respect which relates to submission to tradition and the legitimacy of authority; sanctity and purity which relates to an objection to disgusting behaviour and degradation; care which relates to the protection of others and prevention of harm; and liberty which concerns the coercion or oppression of less powerful individuals.

Haidt and colleagues argue that although all humans are innately prepared to develop a moral position in relation to these principles, this position develops over time as a result of experiences of the social world (e.g. Haidt & Joseph, 2007). This idea of social environments and exposure as sharpening morality is mirrored across many theories of moral development (Decety & Wheatley, 2015). The findings of Bucheli et al (2019) that return migrants reduce violence by injecting social capital into their communities can be interpreted in this light.

Previous research has demonstrated repeatedly that experiences of corruption in the social environment are powerful in shaping attitudes and behaviour. Indeed, research suggests that levels of corruption are linked to violence in the context of natural resources (Berman et al., 2017). We build on this literature to propose that experiences of corruption in the social environment are likely to influence attitudes to violence by challenging the moral foundations outlined by MFT.

In particular, the abuse of power inherent in the definition of corruption suggests that personal experiences of corruption are likely to undermine the authority foundation. Corruption is known to undermine the trust in, and the perceived legitimacy of, the state including politicians, officials, and the police (e.g. Seligson, 2002; Anderson & Tverdova, 2003; Chang & Chu, 2006; Armah-Attoh, Gyimah-Boadi, & Chikwanha, 2007; Lavallée, Razafindrakoto, & Roubaud, Kääriäinen, 2008; Morris & Klesner, 2010; Blanco, 2013). The seminal study of Fisman and Miguel (2007) pointed to the importance of norms in determining corrupt behaviour and provided an observational counterpart to the experimental finding of Abbink et al. (2002) that the threat of punishment can have a significant deterrent effect. The experimental work of Boly et al. (2019) points to a legitimacy effect whereby deterrent policies enacted by a corrupt policymaker have no effect on the embezzlement behaviour of others. Importantly, Vecina and colleagues argue that a lack of deference to a legitimate authority is crucial in predicting violent behaviour (Vecina, Marzana & Paruzel-Czachura, 2015). This may be influenced partially by the process of moral disengagement that allows people to engage in immoral actions which is commonly influenced by a displacement of responsibility to authority figures who have explicitly or implicitly condoned that action (Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012). In line with this, we hypothesize:

H1- Experienced corruption is positively related to attitudes to political violence

Although political violence has received considerable attention in the extant literature, our paper also aims to examine the correlates of domestic and interpersonal forms of violence. Domestic violence refers to violence specifically directed towards an intimate partner (McClennan, 2005). In contrast, interpersonal violence is a term used to describe violence directed at another individually more generally. In these more personal instances of violence, other moral foundations are likely to play a more central role. Experiences of corruption in the social environment which undermine perceptions of authority are also likely to impact beliefs about the responsibilities of dominant individuals to protect others (care foundation) and to avoid disgusting actions (purity foundation) or coercion of less dominant individuals (liberty foundation).

Empirical research suggests that challenges to these foundations are likely to have important consequences for more personal forms of violence. For instance, the purity foundation which concerns beliefs about disgusting actions and degradation is closely linked with attitudes towards women and sexism (Sakalh-Ugurlu & Glick, 2003). Furthermore, Gage (2005) reports that need for control and coercion is related to experiences of domestic violence. This need for control is likely to be underpinned by the liberty/oppression moral foundation particularly given the patriarchal power differentials that characterise many domestic violence cases (McClennan, 2005). Accordingly, we hypothesise:

H2 – Experienced corruption is positively related to attitudes to domestic violence

While the consequences we have considered thus far have related to attitudes towards the behaviour of others, the Afrobarometer also allows us to examine the impact of corruption on attitudes towards our own interpersonal violent behaviour. Measures of revenge include a judgement about the extent to which it is acceptable to enact revenge in response to violent crime or whether one should go to the police. In this instance, moral foundations related to authority, purity and care are all likely to be important in influencing attitudes. Specifically, experiences of corruption and abuse of power will shape individual perceptions of the need to submit to authority, avoid abhorrent behaviour and protect others. Impact on the care/harm foundation of moral behaviour is in line with social capital perspectives which

suggest that corruption undermines people’s willingness to cooperate and make themselves vulnerable to others (Bhayani and Backer, 2007; Kelly et al., 2010). We expect the impact on these moral foundations will be associated with a more permissive attitude to interpersonal violence as a means of revenge and a decreased likelihood of turning to the authorities. In line with this, we hypothesise:

H3 – Experienced corruption is positively related to attitudes to revenge

3. DATA AND APPROACH

Table 1 displays summary statistics for the variables used in our analysis and Table A1 in the appendix provides full definitions. We use data from the Afrobarometer, a series of representative household surveys of political attitudes and economic conditions. Our main focus is on Round 2 of the Afrobarometer which was conducted in 2002 and 2003 in 16 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. This round of the survey contains three variables which capture attitudes to violence in three distinct arenas – political, interpersonal, and domestic.

[TABLE 1]

Each of the three questions asks respondents to identify which statement they agree with from a pair capturing attitudes regarding the acceptability of violence in different contexts. Our measure of political violence, *political*, takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “*In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause*” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “*The use of violence is never justified in [their country’s] politics.*” Similarly, *revenge*, takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “*If you were the victim of a violent crime, you would find a way to take revenge yourself*” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “*If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would to the police for help.*” Finally, *domestic*, takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “*A married man has a right to beat his wife and children if they misbehave.*” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “*No-one has the right to use physical violence against anyone else.*”

Table 1 shows that 22% of our sample hold the attitude that political violence is sometimes justifiable and that there is little difference between the attitudes of men (22%) and women (21%). Table 2 presents the correlation matrix for these three variables. Far fewer people (11%) express the view that taking revenge oneself is appropriate and once again there is little difference between the expressed attitudes of men (12%) and women (10%). However, the share of people who agree that there are circumstances in which a man can beat his wife and children is somewhat higher at 28%. There are also differences of opinion between male and female respondents with nearly a third of the former agreeing versus a quarter of the later. Domestic violence is the domain in which violence has the most acceptance – by men and women. It is possible that in some places, fear of revealing oneself to have committed a crime may lead people to hide their true views and so it will be important to control for unobserved country effects in our models. Local norms may also be important in this respect (and may also serve to change the mental cost of committing violence) and so we will control for the local average of each of these variables in robustness tests. We also cluster standard errors by local region. Table 2 presents the correlations between these three variables. These correlations are all rather low suggesting that people can and do hold different attitudes towards the acceptability of violence in different contexts, and that it makes sense to look at these as distinct outcomes.

[TABLE 2]

Our main explanatory variable of interest captures whether the respondent has had to pay a bribe to public officials in the past year. The Afrobarometer asks a series of questions of the form “*In the past year, how often (if ever) have you had to pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials in order to*” We create a dummy variable, *bribe*, which takes a value of one if the respondent reports having had to pay a bribe (with any frequency) in any of the following contexts; avoiding problems with the police; seeking to obtain documents or permits, a school placement, or a household service (such as piped water or electricity); or “anything else.”³ *bribe* therefore captures a wide range of

³ The surveys also ask about bribe experience in the context of crossing a border. Since this could entail paying a bribe to agents of another state, we do not include this information in our measure of bribery experience.

interactions between citizens and the state.⁴ Table 1 shows that 25% of our sample have experienced bribery in the past year. Men are more likely to experience this sort of corruption (29%) than women (22%). Much as in the case of attitudes to violence, in certain environments people may misrepresent their experiences for fear of exposure or being seen to break a norm. This is a valid concern and so it is worth noting that the bribery information in the Afrobarometer has been used in a variety of studies (Bratton and Mattes, 2003; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Ali et al., 2014; Justesen and Bjørnskov, 2014; Knutsen and Kotsadam, 2020). Moreover, our inclusion of country fixed effects allows us to account for any systematic misreporting across countries.

While our main focus is on experienced corruption, we also control for the individual's perceptions of corruption. A perception of corruption could inform attitudes to violence independently of any actual experience and so we are interested in this relationship in its own right. By controlling for perceptions of corruption, which can differ from reality (Seligson, 2006; Gillanders and Parviainen, 2018), we can examine whether the experience predicts attitudes to violence over and above any effect of change in attitudes to the state's rulers. The survey asks "*How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?*" in relation to "The President and Officials in his Office", "Elected leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councillors", and "Government officials." Each of the questions can be answered "none", "some of them", "most of them" and "all" to which we assign the values from 0 to 3 respectively. Our measure of perceptions of corruption, *perceptions*, therefore takes values between 0-9 with larger numbers indicating a more pronounced sense that corruption is common in the country's leadership.

The final key control variable, *history*, is included to capture the respondent's history of violence within the family. Simon et al (2001) find in their data from the United States that recent victims of violence are more likely to display attitudinal acceptance of intimate partner violence. Moreover, people who have been exposed to violence within their family may be both more accepting of violence as a solution

⁴ It is worth noting that it is not only the context of police corruption that drives our results. If we estimate our baseline models and include each context one at a time, we find that all are associated with attitudes to political violence, all but the "anything else" context are associated with attitudes to revenge, and the contexts of documents and permits, household services and "anything else" are associated with attitudes to domestic violence.

in general and more vulnerable to corruption. The variable takes a value of one if the respondent answers “sometimes” “often” or “always” to the question “*In your experience, how often do violent conflicts arise between people ... [w]ithin your own family?*” and zero if they answer “never” or “rarely.” Approximately one fifth of our sample can be categorised as having a history of violence according to this criterion.

We estimate probit models in which the dependent variable is one of our three measures of attitudes towards violence. As noted above, we include country dummies and cluster the standard errors by groups defined by the survey respondent’s region. We control for age, gender, a dummy capturing an urban location, broad profession indicators, and an index of lived poverty that captures how often the respondent has had to go without food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel for cooking, and a cash income. Larger values of this last variable indicate greater levels of deprivation.

We report the marginal effects obtained from these probit models and focus on the relationship between *bribe* and each of the violence variables. We lack a panel dimension that would allow us to control for individual fixed effects and it is conceivable that certain unobservable characteristics could lead to some people being both more likely to hold the view that violence is acceptable and being more likely to be asked for or willing to pay a bribe. Therefore, we refrain from making causal claims or statements. Given the immense social and personal costs of violence, we feel our results still offer valuable insights to policymakers and civil society actors.

4. RESULTS

4.1 Main Results

Table 3 presents our main results. We begin in Column 1 by examining attitudes to political violence. People who have experienced bribery are 7% more likely to express the view that violence can be justified for political ends. For comparisons sake, women are 1% less likely to hold this view. Corruption perceptions are also a significant predictor, with every unit increase on our 0-9 *perceptions* index associated with a 1% increase in *political*. We can also see that *history* has a significant and sizable marginal effect on *political*. People with a history of violence in their families are 6% more

likely to accept the validity of political violence. The comparable sizes of the *bribe* and *history* marginal effects reinforces the conclusion that corruption experiences play a large role in shaping attitudes to political violence.

[TABLE 3]

The second column acts as a robustness check of this result by employing a dummy variable which equals one if the individual admits to having used violence or that they would do so if they had the chance and zero if they claim that they would never do this. Both corruption variables and *history* are significant predictors of this self-reported willingness to engage in violence. This finding that corruption influences peoples' willingness to admit to engaging in violence for political ends adds weight to our conclusion that, on average, corruption experiences change people's attitudes towards violence. An additional explanation for this particular result is that, as noted in Section 1 above, corruption may lower the expected cost or increase the expected benefit from engaging in violence.

Column 3 finds a similar relationship for the variable capturing attitudes to revenge, though the estimated marginal effect of *bribe* is smaller at 0.03. Once again, *perceptions*, *history*, and gender are strong predictors of one's attitude to violence with the results pointing towards both an experience of corruption and a perception of corruption increasing the likelihood that people will think it acceptable to take the law into their own hands.

The final columns of Table 3 examine attitudes towards domestic violence. Column 4 finds that those who have paid a bribe are more likely to think it is acceptable for a man to beat his wife and children under certain circumstances. Also, a greater perception of corruption is associated with holding this view regarding domestic violence. Not surprisingly, women are significantly and substantially less likely to agree with the acceptability of violence. The final column includes an additional control variable, *misogyny*, which takes a value of one if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that "*Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.*" and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that "*In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.*" Table 1 shows

that such views are common in our sample with 33% of males and 24% of females agreeing with the first statement. Holding this view is associated with a 20% increase in the likelihood of viewing domestic violence as acceptable. However, our conclusions regarding corruption are not changed by the inclusion of this variable.

Recall that (with the exception of Column 2) we are not looking at the incidence of violence which could be influenced by corruption changing the likelihood or severity of punishment. Rather we are looking at attitudes to violence. The results with respect to *political* and *revenge* can be understood in principle through the lens of disgust with the state and its agents. People who have been victims of malfeasance by state officials may view the state as less legitimate and its mechanisms for peaceful change as broken or rigged. Likewise, corruption may delegitimise law enforcement in the eyes bribe payers, leading them to view revenge actions as justifiable. These stories are less easy to tell when it comes to *domestic*. We interpret this to mean that corruption changes attitudes to violence over and above any change in attitudes regarding the legitimacy or efficacy of the state. We explore the legitimacy mechanism further below.

In terms of the control variables, our lived poverty index is not a significant predictor of attitudes to violence. Nor is urban status except for the case of *domestic* which concludes that urban dwellers are less likely to view domestic violence as justifiable. More educated people are less likely to find domestic violence excusable though the pattern is less clear cut when it comes to *political* and *revenge*. Interestingly, while older people are less likely to view political violence or revenge as acceptable, older people are more likely to view domestic violence as justifiable. However when we control for *misogyny*, age is not a significant predictor of attitudes to domestic violence.

4.2 Do Men and Women Respond Differently to Experiencing Corruption?

We have established that there is a robust correlation between corruption experiences and perceptions and attitudes to violence. We have also seen that women are less likely to view violence as acceptable. Before examining some potential mechanisms for these results, we now ask if men and women may have different responses to experiencing corruption. Previous work on moral foundations theory suggest

that women are more concerned with moral foundations related to harm, fairness and purity (Graham et al., 2012). Furthermore, neuroscience suggests significant gender differences in moral sensitivity and appraisals and call for more exploration of gender differences in moral behaviours in a field setting (Harenski, Antonenko, Shane, & Kiehl, 2008). To investigate the possibility of gender differences in response to corruption, we split our sample by gender and estimate the baseline models from Table 3 for each group. Table 4 presents the results of this exercise.

[TABLE 4]

bribe is a significant variable in each of our specifications. The estimated marginal effects are the same for men and women in the case of *political* and very similar for the other outcomes of interest, though in both of these later cases the estimated marginal effect for women is slightly smaller. Perceptions of corruption predict attitudes to political violence for men and women and to the same extent. However, for the other two domains of violence that we consider, *perceptions* is only significant in the male samples. This pattern repeats in terms of *history*. Age is also not a significant predictor of *revenge* or *domestic* for women. While the significance of some variables can vary by gender, the importance of corruption experiences is stable. We now proceed to examine some potential confounding factors and mechanisms for these results.

4.3 Local Conditions and Norms

A potential confounding factor is how corrupt the respondent's locality is. Living in a corrupt area could influence both one's own chances of being asked for a bribe and one's willingness to do so. Table 5 addresses this concern by including the local incidence of corruption as an additional control variable. This variable, *meanbribe*, is simply the average of *bribe* for all those in the same region as the respondent. While the regions in the survey need not correspond with actual administrative divisions, they do allow us to capture some information as to how prevalent bribery is in the respondent's broad geographical region.

[TABLE 5]

In terms of attitudes to political violence, while the local intensity of bribery is associated with a greater chance of holding the view that such acts can be justified, though only for men, our conclusions regarding the role of individual bribery experiences do not change (columns 1-3). Our results regarding the *revenge* outcome are also robust to the inclusion of *meanbribe* and in this case local corruption is not a significant predictor (columns 4-6). However, the results regarding attitudes to domestic violence are somewhat different when we include *meanbribe*. Column 7 suggests that on average an experience of bribery fosters an acceptance of domestic violence, however when we split our sample by gender it appears that this is being driven by the male response. Column 8 finds that men's attitudes to domestic violence are shaped by their own experiences and not by the local corruption environment. However, Column 9 suggests that for women, their own experiences do not predict *domestic* once *meanbribe* is allowed to enter the specification.

We next examine the role of local norms regarding the acceptability of violence. People living in areas in which attitudes to violence are more permissive may face a lower barrier or mental cost to holding and expressing such views themselves. Corruption could also change the local norms over time and so it is important to see if individual corruption experiences correlate with violence attitudes holding local norms constant. To this end, we average each of our outcome variables over the respondent's region. This results in three variables, *politicalnorm*, *revengenorm*, and, *domesticnorm*, which capture the share of people in the respondent's region who express the view that political violence, revenge, and domestic violence are acceptable. Table 6 shows that while local norms are a significant and strong predictor of individual attitudes, our results are for the most part robust to this exercise. Individual experiences of corruption are a statistically significant predictor of each of our outcomes except in the case of women's attitudes to domestic violence (column 9). We also observe that the link between women's attitudes to revenge and experience of corruption is only significant at the 10% level.

[TABLE 6]

The final local variable we consider is the extent of violence in the community. As noted above, corruption could lead to increased conflict and this in turn could influence attitudes to violence. To rule out this mechanism as being the driver of our results showing a correlation between one's experience

of corruption and attitude to violence, we include a variable, *violentcommunity*, which captures the share of people in the respondents region who express the view that violent conflicts arise between people within the community where they live “sometimes”, “often”, or “always.” This variable is a significant predictor of *political* for the overall sample and for both men and women (albeit at the 10% level in the case of the latter). However, it does not predict *revenge* for any of our samples and is only significantly correlated with *domestic* for women. In all of our models, *bribe* remains a statistically significant and meaningful correlate of attitudes to violence.

[TABLE 7]

If we include all of these local variables at the same time, we reach the same conclusions in that only in the case of the female sample for the *domestic* outcome is *bribe* statistically insignificant (results available on request). Given that the burden of domestic violence falls on women, it is not surprising that the way in which corruption influences female attitudes to domestic violence is different than it is for men. Our results suggest that women’s views of domestic violence are shaped more by local norms and conditions than by their own experiences of paying bribes.

4.4 Legitimacy of Law Enforcement and Crime

As noted above, several studies have pointed to the deleterious effect that corruption can have on trust in the state in general and on law enforcement institutions in particular. The perceived legitimacy of actors and institutions has also been shown to be important in terms of compliance with and efficacy of policy (Boly et al., 2019). Furthermore, Kirwin and Cho (2009) show that perceptions of state legitimacy predict attitudes to political violence using Afrobarometer data. To account for this potential effect of corruption on the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement, we generated variables reflecting respondent’s attitudes to the police and the courts. The first of these, *policelegit*, takes a value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that “The police always have the right to make people obey the law” and zero otherwise. Similarly, *courtslegit* takes a value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that “The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by” and zero otherwise.

[TABLE 8]

The first two columns of Table 8 demonstrate that these attitudes towards the police and courts are indeed shaped in part by one's experiences of corruption with victims of corruption significantly and meaningfully less likely to view these institutions as legitimate. The local incidence of bribery, *meanbribe*, is not a significant predictor. We also control for the respondent's history of experiencing other types of crime (being attacked or being the victim of theft) directly or in their family. This too strongly predicts holding negative views as to the legitimacy of the police and courts.

These results reinforce the need to control for legitimacy in our analysis of the links between corruption experience and attitudes to violence as it may be the case that corruption operates on such attitudes through an effect on legitimacy. Moreover, Jackson et al (2013) find that attitudes to violence amongst young males in London are associated with the perceived legitimacy of the police. The remaining columns of Table 8 do find that perceived legitimacy informs attitudes to violence in the cases of *political* and *revenge* but *bribe* remains a meaningful and statistically significant predictor. Over and above the potential effect on legitimacy, corruption is a significant correlate of attitudes to violence. Being a victim, or at least party, to corruption is also different to being exposed to other criminal activity as we find little evidence that *crime* predicts attitudes to violence, though we do find an association with attitudes to political violence in line with Kirwin and Cho (2009).

4.5 Robustness: Other Rounds of Afrobarometer

Relationships in the social sciences need not be immutable "laws" for them to be of interest or of value. However, rounds three (2005-2006, 18 countries) and five (2011-2013, 34 countries) of the Afrobarometer allow us to examine whether our relationship of interest is evident in more recent data that also covers substantially more countries in the case of Round 5. Both of these later rounds contain questions that can be used to create an outcome variable that captures attitudes to political violence.⁵

⁵ In round three the survey asks "Which of the following statements is closest to your view? A: The use of violence is never justified in [your country's] politics. B: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause." In round 5 the survey asks "Which of the following statements is closest to your view? Statement 1: The use of violence is never justified in [your country's] politics today. Statement 2: In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause." In both cases respondents are asked to indicate their views on a scale. We use this information in the same way as we did when using the round 2 data.

Round 5 also asks a question that allows us to examine attitudes to revenge.⁶ While neither round has information that can be used to study attitudes to domestic violence and the contexts in which corruption is asked about can vary from round to round, Table 9 demonstrates that our conclusions regarding *political* and *revenge* are evident in these larger samples from later years. We conclude that the relationship between an experience of corruption and attitudes to violence is not an artefact of either the given time period or narrow set of countries covered in Round 2 of the Afrobarometer.

[TABLE 9]

5. CONCLUSIONS

Using several rounds of representative household survey data for sub-Saharan African countries, this paper has shown that there is statistically significant and meaningful link between corruption and attitudes to political, interpersonal, and domestic violence. Those that have experienced petty corruption are more likely to view violence as justifiable. We find similar effects for both men and women. These findings are compatible with Moral Foundations Theory and are not an artefact of an ecological fallacy in which one's own experience of corruption and attitudes to violence are determined by the local prevalence of corruption and violence or the prevailing norms regarding violence. Our central findings are also not simply reflecting an erosion of the perceived legitimacy enjoyed by law enforcement that arises in the face of corruption.

Our results, particularly those relating to interpersonal and domestic violence, therefore point to a set of previously undocumented indirect costs of corruption. The later result fits well with several findings in the corruption literature that suggest that the burden of corruption tends to fall disproportionately on already vulnerable groups (Hunt, 2007; Azfar and Gurgur, 2008). In terms of policy implications, by exposing new social and personal costs of corruption, our findings add further weight to the case for devoting substantial resources to anti-corruption efforts. Governmental and non-governmental agencies wishing to curb domestic violence may have common cause with anti-corruption advocates and

⁶ The survey asks "If you were a victim of crime in this country, who, if anyone, would you go to first for assistance?" We consider those who answer they "would personally take revenge" or "would join with others to take revenge" to hold the view that revenge is acceptable.

practitioners. Our findings also fit with the studies that have found that victims of petty corruption are more likely to report anxiety (Gillanders, 2016) and lower levels of well-being (Sulemana et al., 2017). Taken together, the literature points to a clear conclusion: corruption can damage lives in a variety of ways that go beyond the direct economic consequences.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Full Sample			Males			Females		
	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
<i>political</i>	14498	0.22	0.41	7607	0.22	0.42	6891	0.21	0.41
<i>revenge</i>	14699	0.11	0.31	7704	0.12	0.32	6995	0.10	0.30
<i>domestic</i>	14871	0.28	0.45	7770	0.31	0.46	7101	0.25	0.43
<i>bribe</i>	15196	0.25	0.43	7937	0.29	0.45	7259	0.22	0.41
<i>perceptions</i>	15196	3.73	2.24	7937	3.79	2.25	7259	3.67	2.22
<i>history</i>	15196	0.21	0.41	7937	0.21	0.41	7259	0.22	0.41
<i>age</i>	15196	35.36	14.06	7937	36.84	14.76	7259	33.75	13.07
<i>female</i>	15196	0.48	0.50						
<i>Poverty Index (0-24 Scale)</i>	15196	8.40	5.24	7937	8.42	5.25	7259	8.38	5.22
<i>urban</i>	15196	0.39	0.49	7937	0.38	0.49	7259	0.40	0.49
<i>misogyny</i>	14879	0.29	0.45	7762	0.33	0.47	7117	0.24	0.43

Table 2: Correlation between Attitudes to Violence in Different Contexts (N= 13,894)

	<i>political</i>	<i>revenge</i>	<i>domestic</i>
<i>political</i>	1		
<i>revenge</i>	0.2188	1	
<i>domestic</i>	0.0777	0.0923	1

Table 3: Main Results

	(1) <i>political</i>	(2) <i>usedviol</i>	(3) <i>revenge</i>	(4) <i>domestic</i>	(5) <i>domestic</i>
<i>bribe</i>	0.07*** (0.012)	0.05*** (0.011)	0.03*** (0.009)	0.04*** (0.012)	0.03*** (0.011)
<i>perceptions</i>	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.002)	0.01** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01** (0.003)
<i>history</i>	0.06*** (0.011)	0.04*** (0.011)	0.02** (0.009)	0.03** (0.013)	0.03** (0.013)
<i>misogyny</i>					0.20*** (0.014)
<i>age</i>	-0.00*** (0.000)	-0.00*** (0.000)	-0.00** (0.000)	0.00** (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)
<i>female</i>	-0.01* (0.008)	-0.03*** (0.005)	-0.02*** (0.006)	-0.07*** (0.010)	-0.05*** (0.009)
<i>Did Not Complete Primary School</i>	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
<i>Primary or Some Secondary</i>	0.00 (0.013)	0.02** (0.010)	-0.01* (0.007)	-0.05*** (0.011)	-0.03*** (0.012)
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.01 (0.018)	0.01 (0.013)	-0.02* (0.010)	-0.09*** (0.017)	-0.06*** (0.018)
<i>Post-Secondary Qualification</i>	-0.02 (0.015)	0.02 (0.018)	-0.03*** (0.009)	-0.14*** (0.017)	-0.11*** (0.018)
<i>University and Postgraduate</i>	-0.02 (0.027)	0.08** (0.033)	0.00 (0.019)	-0.17*** (0.017)	-0.14*** (0.019)
<i>Poverty Index (0-24 Scale)</i>	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)
<i>urban</i>	-0.01 (0.010)	-0.01 (0.012)	-0.01 (0.008)	-0.05*** (0.014)	-0.05*** (0.014)
Profession Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	14,498	15,034	14,699	14,871	14,609

Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.

Table 4: Sample Splits by Gender

Sample:	(1) Males <i>political</i>	(2) Females <i>political</i>	(3) Males <i>revenge</i>	(4) Females <i>revenge</i>	(5) Males <i>domestic</i>	(6) Females <i>domestic</i>
<i>bribe</i>	0.07*** (0.013)	0.07*** (0.015)	0.03*** (0.010)	0.02** (0.011)	0.04*** (0.015)	0.03** (0.015)
<i>perceptions</i>	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01** (0.004)	0.01** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)
<i>history</i>	0.05*** (0.014)	0.08*** (0.014)	0.02** (0.011)	0.02 (0.011)	0.03* (0.017)	0.02 (0.015)
<i>age</i>	-0.00*** (0.000)	-0.00** (0.000)	-0.00*** (0.000)	-0.00 (0.000)	0.00** (0.000)	0.00 (0.000)
<i>Did Not Complete Primary School</i>	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
<i>Primary or Some Secondary</i>	0.01 (0.014)	-0.01 (0.019)	-0.01 (0.009)	-0.02** (0.008)	-0.07*** (0.016)	-0.04** (0.015)
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.02 (0.019)	-0.00 (0.024)	-0.02 (0.012)	-0.01 (0.012)	-0.10*** (0.021)	-0.07*** (0.018)
<i>Post-Secondary Qualification</i>	-0.03 (0.018)	-0.02 (0.021)	-0.02* (0.013)	-0.03** (0.012)	-0.15*** (0.019)	-0.13*** (0.021)
<i>University and Postgraduate</i>	-0.05* (0.032)	0.02 (0.037)	-0.04*** (0.015)	0.06* (0.035)	-0.20*** (0.018)	-0.14*** (0.023)
<i>Poverty Index (0-24 Scale)</i>	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00 (0.001)	0.00* (0.001)	0.00 (0.002)	0.00 (0.002)
<i>urban</i>	-0.01 (0.012)	-0.01 (0.013)	-0.01 (0.010)	-0.01 (0.010)	-0.03* (0.015)	-0.06*** (0.018)
Profession Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	7,607	6,891	7,704	6,995	7,770	7,101

Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.

Table 5: Own Experience versus Local Bribery Incidence

Sample:	(1) Full <i>political</i>	(2) Males <i>political</i>	(3) Females <i>political</i>	(4) Full <i>revenge</i>	(5) Males <i>revenge</i>	(6) Females <i>revenge</i>	(7) Full <i>domestic</i>	(8) Males <i>domestic</i>	(9) Females <i>domestic</i>
<i>bribe</i>	0.06*** (0.011)	0.06*** (0.013)	0.07*** (0.015)	0.03*** (0.009)	0.03*** (0.010)	0.02** (0.011)	0.03*** (0.011)	0.04** (0.015)	0.02 (0.014)
<i>perceptions</i>	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01* (0.004)	0.01** (0.003)	0.01** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)
<i>history</i>	0.06*** (0.011)	0.05*** (0.014)	0.08*** (0.014)	0.02** (0.009)	0.02** (0.011)	0.02* (0.011)	0.03* (0.014)	0.03* (0.017)	0.02 (0.016)
<i>meanbribe</i>	0.17* (0.097)	0.25** (0.103)	0.08 (0.102)	0.01 (0.063)	0.01 (0.074)	0.00 (0.058)	0.24** (0.117)	0.17 (0.134)	0.32*** (0.113)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Profession Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	14,498	7,607	6,891	14,699	7,704	6,995	14,871	7,770	7,101

Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All models include controls for age, education, poverty, and urban status. Full sample models also control for gender.

Table 6: Local Norms

Sample:	(1) Full <i>political</i>	(2) Males <i>political</i>	(3) Females <i>political</i>	(4) Full <i>revenge</i>	(5) Males <i>revenge</i>	(6) Females <i>revenge</i>	(7) Full <i>domestic</i>	(8) Males <i>domestic</i>	(9) Females <i>domestic</i>
<i>bribe</i>	0.06*** (0.011)	0.06*** (0.013)	0.06*** (0.015)	0.02*** (0.008)	0.03*** (0.009)	0.02* (0.011)	0.03*** (0.011)	0.04*** (0.014)	0.02 (0.014)
<i>perceptions</i>	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01 (0.003)	0.00* (0.003)	0.01** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)
<i>history</i>	0.05*** (0.010)	0.04*** (0.013)	0.07*** (0.013)	0.02** (0.009)	0.02* (0.011)	0.02 (0.011)	0.02 (0.014)	0.02 (0.017)	0.01 (0.016)
<i>politicalnorm</i>	0.97*** (0.035)	0.97*** (0.043)	0.97*** (0.057)						
<i>revenge norm</i>				0.70*** (0.032)	0.75*** (0.056)	0.65*** (0.035)			
<i>domestic norm</i>							0.87*** (0.027)	0.89*** (0.048)	0.83*** (0.038)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Profession Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	14,498	7,607	6,891	14,699	7,704	6,995	14,871	7,770	7,101

Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All models include controls for age, gender, education, poverty, and urban status. Full sample models also control for gender.

Table 7: Violence within Community

Sample:	(1) Full <i>political</i>	(2) Males <i>political</i>	(3) Females <i>political</i>	(4) Full <i>revenge</i>	(5) Males <i>revenge</i>	(6) Females <i>revenge</i>	(7) Full <i>domestic</i>	(8) Males <i>domestic</i>	(9) Females <i>domestic</i>
<i>bribe</i>	0.07*** (0.011)	0.07*** (0.013)	0.07*** (0.015)	0.03*** (0.009)	0.03*** (0.010)	0.02** (0.011)	0.04*** (0.012)	0.04*** (0.015)	0.03* (0.015)
<i>perceptions</i>	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01** (0.004)	0.01** (0.003)	0.01** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.00 (0.003)
<i>history</i>	0.06*** (0.011)	0.05*** (0.014)	0.07*** (0.014)	0.02** (0.009)	0.02** (0.011)	0.02 (0.011)	0.02* (0.014)	0.03* (0.017)	0.02 (0.016)
<i>violentcommunity</i>	0.13** (0.066)	0.15** (0.073)	0.11* (0.066)	0.02 (0.039)	0.03 (0.049)	0.02 (0.039)	0.10 (0.063)	0.03 (0.069)	0.18** (0.070)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Profession Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	14,498	7,607	6,891	14,699	7,704	6,995	14,871	7,770	7,101

Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All models include controls for age, gender, education, poverty, and urban status. Full sample models also control for gender.

Table 8: Legitimacy and Crime

	(1) <i>policelegit</i>	(2) <i>courtslegit</i>	(3) <i>political</i>	(4) <i>revenge</i>	(5) <i>domestic</i>	(6) <i>political</i>	(7) <i>revenge</i>	(8) <i>domestic</i>
<i>bribe</i>	-0.05*** (0.010)	-0.03*** (0.010)	0.07*** (0.012)	0.02** (0.009)	0.04*** (0.012)	0.07*** (0.012)	0.02** (0.009)	0.04*** (0.012)
<i>perceptions</i>	-0.02*** (0.003)	-0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.00* (0.002)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)	0.00* (0.003)	0.01*** (0.003)
<i>history</i>	-0.01 (0.011)	-0.01 (0.011)	0.06*** (0.011)	0.02** (0.009)	0.03** (0.013)	0.06*** (0.012)	0.02** (0.009)	0.03** (0.013)
<i>crime</i>	-0.02** (0.010)	-0.03*** (0.010)	0.02* (0.009)	0.01 (0.007)	0.01 (0.009)	0.02* (0.009)	0.01 (0.007)	0.01 (0.009)
<i>meanbribe</i>	-0.02 (0.093)	-0.03 (0.091)						
<i>policelegit</i>			-0.03** (0.011)	-0.06*** (0.008)	0.01 (0.011)			
<i>courtslegit</i>						-0.02* (0.011)	-0.04*** (0.008)	0.00 (0.011)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Profession Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	15,033	14,870	14,354	14,548	14,715	14,213	14,396	14,555

Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. All models include controls for age, gender, education, poverty, and urban status.

Table 9: Robustness – Later Rounds of Data

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Round:	<u>Three</u>	<u>Three</u>	<u>Three</u>	<u>Five</u>	<u>Five</u>	<u>Five</u>	<u>Five</u>	<u>Five</u>	<u>Five</u>
Sample:	Full	Males	Females	Full	Males	Females	Full	Males	Females
	<i>political</i>	<i>political</i>	<i>political</i>	<i>political</i>	<i>political</i>	<i>political</i>	<i>revenge</i>	<i>revenge</i>	<i>revenge</i>
<i>bribe</i>	0.081*** (0.011)	0.072*** (0.012)	0.090*** (0.013)	0.046*** (0.007)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.051*** (0.009)	0.003** (0.001)	0.003** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)
<i>perceptions</i>	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.001)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.002*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)
<i>age</i>	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
<i>female</i>	-0.013** (0.006)			-0.011** (0.005)			-0.006*** (0.001)		
<i>Did Not Complete Primary School</i>	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref	Ref
<i>Primary or Some Secondary</i>	-0.010 (0.008)	-0.025** (0.012)	0.003 (0.012)	0.013** (0.006)	0.021** (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)
<i>Secondary</i>	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.027 (0.017)	0.002 (0.015)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.011 (0.011)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	0.003 (0.002)
<i>Post-Secondary Qualification</i>	-0.027** (0.012)	-0.035** (0.016)	-0.019 (0.016)	0.013 (0.011)	0.015 (0.013)	0.011 (0.015)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.002)
<i>University and Postgraduate</i>	-0.041** (0.020)	-0.064*** (0.023)	-0.006 (0.031)	-0.001 (0.013)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.014 (0.020)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)
<i>Poverty Index</i>	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.003*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
<i>urban</i>	0.006 (0.009)	0.010 (0.012)	0.002 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)	0.000 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)
Profession Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Dummies	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	17,657	9,226	8,431	37,003	19,150	17,853	38,252	18,580	18,042

*Notes: Probit marginal effects reported. The corresponding standard errors are clustered by region and reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.*

Appendix

Table A1: Round 2 Data Variable Definitions

Label	Definition
<i>political</i>	Takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “In this country, it is sometimes necessary to use violence in support of a just cause” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “The use of violence is never justified in [their country’s] politics”
<i>revenge</i>	Takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “If you were the victim of a violent crime, you would find a way to take revenge yourself” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “If you were a victim of a violent crime, you would to the police for help.”
<i>domestic</i>	Takes a value of 1 if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “A married man has a right to beat his wife and children if they misbehave.” and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that “No-one has the right to use physical violence against anyone else.”
<i>usedviol</i>	Takes a value of one if the respondent says that he or she has “Used force or violence for a political cause” or would do so if he or she had the chance and zero the response is “No, would never do this”
<i>bribe</i>	Takes a value of 1 if the respondent reports having had to, in the past year, “pay a bribe, give a gift, or do a favour to government officials” in the context of avoiding problems with the police, getting a child into school, getting a document or permit, getting a household service or for “anything else”
<i>meanbribe</i>	The average of <i>bribe</i> in the respondent’s region
<i>perceptions</i>	Created from questions which ask “How many of the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say?” in relation to “The President and Officials in his Office”, “Elected leaders, such as parliamentarians or local councillors”, and “Government officials.” Each of the questions can be answered “none”, “some of them”, “most of them” and “all” to which we assign the values from 0 to 3 respectively leading to an index that takes values from 0-9.
<i>history</i>	Takes a value of one if the respondent answers “sometimes” “often” or “always” to the question “In your experience, how often do violent

	conflicts arise between people ... [w]ithin your own family?" and zero if they answer "never" or "rarely."
<i>misogyny</i>	Takes a value of one if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that "Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so." and zero if the respondent agrees (or very strongly agrees) with the statement that "In our country, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do."
<i>politicalnorm</i>	The average of <i>political</i> in the respondent's region
<i>revengenorm</i>	The average of <i>revenge</i> in the respondent's region
<i>domesticnorm</i>	The average of <i>domestic</i> in the respondent's region
<i>violentcommunity</i>	Captures the share of people in the individual's region who answer that violent conflicts arise between people within the community where they live "sometimes", "often", or "always."
<i>crime</i>	Takes a value of one if the respondent or anyone in their family has in the past year had something stolen from their home or been physically attacked and zero otherwise.
<i>policelegit</i>	Takes a value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that "The police always have the right to make people obey the law" and zero otherwise.
<i>courtslegit</i>	Takes a value of one if the respondent agrees or strongly agrees with the statement that "The courts have the right to make decisions that people always have to abide by" and zero otherwise.
<i>Poverty Index (0-24 Scale)</i>	Sum of 0-4 scale questions which ask how often the respondent has had to go without food, water, medical care, electricity, fuel for cooking, and cash income. Larger numbers indicate more severe lived poverty.
<i>urban</i>	Takes a value of 1 if the primary sampling unit was urban