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Number of items: 4.


Wu, Haoyang (2016): A Bayesian implementable social choice function cannot be implemented by a direct mechanism.

Wu, Haoyang (2018): The revelation principle does not always hold when strategies of agents are costly.

Wu, Haoyang (2019): Profitable Bayesian implementation in one-shot mechanism settings.

Wu, Haoyang (2020): The revelation principle fails when the format of each agent's strategy is an action.

This list was generated on Thu Apr 22 15:29:11 2021 CEST.
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