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Alvarez, Francisco and André, Francisco J. (2015): Auctioning emission permits in a leader-follower setting.


André, Francisco J. (2015): Strategic Effects and the Porter Hypothesis.


André, Francisco J. and de Castro, Luis Miguel (2015): Scarcity Climate Rents in Emissions Permit Markets with Oligopoly Competition.


Alvarez, Francisco and André, Francisco J. and Mazón, Cristina (2016): Assigning pollution permits: are uniform auctions efficient?

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