Mukherjee, Vivekananda and Mitra, Siddhartha and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2013): Corruption, Pricing of Public Services and Entrepreneurship in Economies with Leakage.
Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2013): Status, incentives and random favouritism.
Pramanick, Amrita and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2014): Optimal organization of surrogacy contracts and underinvestment.
Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2014): Incentive, status and thereafter: A critical survey.
Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2014): Status and incentives: A critical survey.
Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2014): Incentives and status.
Banerjee, Swapnendu and Sarkar, Mainak (2014): Other regarding principal and moral hazard: the single agent case.
Dey, Oindrila and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2015): Endogenous favouritism with status incentives: A model of optimum inefficiency.
Dey, Oindrila and Das, Abhishek and Gupta, Gautam and Banerjee, Swapnendu (2017): Favouritism Or Fairness?: A Framed Laboratory Experiment.
Banerjee, Swapnendu and Poddar, Sougata (2017): ‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus Selling by an outside innovator.
Banerjee, Swapnendu (2018): ‘Women on top’ and/or ‘economic progress’: What affects actual and reported crime against women? An analysis of socio-economic factors in India.
Banerjee, Swapnendu and Chakraborty, Somenath (2022): Individual versus Team Production with Social Preferences.
Banerjee, Swapnendu and Saha, Soumyarup (2024): Absolute Power Corrupts Absolutely?: A Political Agency Theoretic Approach.
Contact us: mpra@ub.uni-muenchen.de
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