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Can planners control competitive generators?

Contreras, Javier and Krawczyk, Jacek and Zuccollo, James (2008): Can planners control competitive generators?


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Consider an electricity market populated by competitive agents using thermal generating units. Generation often emits pollution which a planner may wish to constrain through regulation. Furthermore, generators’ ability to transmit energy may be naturally restricted by the grid’s facilities. The existence of both pollution standards and transmission constraints can impose several restrictions upon the joint strategy space of the agents. We propose a dynamic, game-theoretic model capable of analysing coupled constraints equilibria (also known as generalised Nash equilibria). Our equilibria arise as solutions to the planner’s problem of avoiding both network congestion and excessive pollution. The planner can use the coupled constraints’ Lagrange multipliers to compute the charges the players would pay if the constraints were violated. Once the players allow for the charges in their objective functions they will feel compelled to obey the constraints in equilibrium. However, a coupled constraints equilibrium needs to exist and be unique for this modification of the players’ objective functions ..[there was a “to” here, incorrect?].. induce the required behaviour. We extend the three-node dc model with transmission line constraints described in [10] and [2] to utilise a two-period load duration curve, and impose multi-period pollution constraints. We discuss the economic and environmental implications of the game’s solutions as we vary the planner’s preferences.

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