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Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties

Langlais, Eric (2005): Indemnisation des préjudices et fréquence des procès en présence d'une asymétrie d'informaion sur l'aversion au risque des parties.

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Abstract

The paper addresses the issue of the impact of asymmetric information on risk aversion of litigant parties in a model à la Bebchuk. First we study the case where the plaintif is the informed party, and characterize the equilibrium with and without a pretrial negociation round. Then, we focuse on the comparative statics of the model and analyse the role of the choice of a cost allocation rule. Finally, we discuss several extensions: the case where the defendant is the informed party, the influence of the assumption on the representation of preferences, and the role of self-serving bias.

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