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Coarse Thinking and Collusion in Bertrand Duopoly with Increasing Marginal Costs

Siddiqi, Hammad (2009): Coarse Thinking and Collusion in Bertrand Duopoly with Increasing Marginal Costs.

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Abstract

Mullainathan, Schwartzstein, & Shleifer [Quarterly Journal of Economics, May 2008] put forward a model of coarse thinking. The essential idea behind coarse thinking is that agents put situations into categories and then apply the same model of inference to all situations in a given category. We extend the argument to strategies in a game-theoretic setting and propose the following: Agents split the choice-space into categories in comparison with salient choices and then choose each option in a given category with equal probability. We provide an alternative explanation for the puzzling results obtained in a Bertrand competition experiment as reported in Abbink & Brandts [Games and Economic Behavior, 63, 2008]

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