Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises

Chopard, Bertrand and Langlais, Eric (2009): Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises.

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Abstract

We compare the influence of bankruptcy law on the risk of default and the rate of liquidation by banks. We show that it depends on whether it is pro-creditors or pro-debtors oriented, and on the intensity of competition between banks. Then , we analyse the various tools at the disposal of public authority in order to accomdate the transition from a pro-creditors regime to a pro-debtors one. In a sense, our results suggest that there may exist a kind of consistency between the aims assigned to law, the orientation of bankruptcy law and the level of competition in the banking system.

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