Scoppa, Vincenzo (2008): Are Subjective Evaluations Biased by Social Factors or Connections? An Econometric Analysis of Soccer Referee Decisions.
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Many incentive contracts are based on subjective evaluations and contractual disputes depend on judges’ decisions. However, subjective evaluations raise risks of favouritism and distortions. Sport contests are a fruitful field for testing empirically theories of incentives. In this paper the behaviour of the referees in the Italian soccer (football) league (“Serie A”) is analyzed. Using data on injury (or extra) time subjectively assigned by the referee at the end of the match and controlling for factors which may influence it (players substitutions, yellow and red cards, penalty kicks, etc.), we show that referees are biased in favour of home team, in that injury time is significantly greater if home teams are losing. The refereeing bias increases greatly when there is no running track in the stadium and the crowd is close to the pitch. Following the 2006 “Serie A” scandal we test whether favouritism emerges towards teams suspected of connections with referees finding that these teams obtain favourable decisions. Social pressure by the crowd attending the match however appears to be the main cause of favouritism.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Are Subjective Evaluations Biased by Social Factors or Connections? An Econometric Analysis of Soccer Referee Decisions|
|Keywords:||Favoritism, Subjective evaluation; Sport economics; Soccer; Referee bias;|
|Subjects:||L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L83 - Sports; Gambling; Recreation; Tourism
Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M50 - General
|Depositing User:||VINCENZO SCOPPA|
|Date Deposited:||22. Jun 2009 00:55|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 20:20|
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