Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Login | Create Account

Optimality, rational expectations and time inconsistency applied to inflation targeting strategy

Marinas, Marius and Zoican, Marius Andrei (2008): Optimality, rational expectations and time inconsistency applied to inflation targeting strategy. Published in: Theoretical and Applied Economics , Vol. 10(527) 2008, No. 10(527) October (October 2008): pp. 17-30.

This is the latest version of this item.

[img]
Preview
PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader
258Kb

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the characteristics of an inflation targeting strategy, using the Barro-Gordon model specific tools. This paper uses the initial Barro-Gordon concepts of inflationary social costs and benefits, adding a new dimension generated by the cost of output deviating from the potential level. The main contribution of this paper is the exhaustive study of the time inconsistency problem generated by the very existence of a policymaker-established inflation rate. The mathematic simulation of a model allowed a complete analysis of several parameters’ influence (parameters such as the optimal rate of inflation, the discount rate, the importance structure of inflationary social cost) on the applicable range of the target inflation rate, range that guarantees that the policymakers have no incentive to break their own rules, or at least this incentive is somewhat inferior to the future cost of doing so.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Language:English
Keywords:optimal inflation rate; inflation targeting strategies; the Barro-Gordon model; output gap; central bank credibility
Subjects:E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E3 - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles > E31 - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy (Targets, Instruments, and Effects)
ID Code:17298
Deposited By:Marius Andrei Zoican
Deposited On:15. Sep 2009 18:57
Last Modified:18. Jan 2012 15:35
References:

Barro, R.J., Gordon, D., „Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy”, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 91, 1983

Barro, R.J., Gordon, D., „A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model”, 1983, Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 12, nr. 1, 1983

Costain, J. (2004). Economic theory IV, source: http://www.econ.upf.es/~costain/

Greenspan, A., „Rules vs. discretionary monetary policy”, 15th Anniversary Conference of the Center for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1997

De Grauwe, P. (2006). Economics of Monetary Union, 6th edition, Oxford University Press

Mishkin, F.(2003). The Economics of Money, Banking and Financial Markets, 7th edition, Pearson Publishing

Soderlind, P. (2003). Lecture notes for monetary policy (PhD course at UNISG, source: http:// home.datacomm.ch/paulsoderlind/Courses/ Courses.html

Walsh, C. (2003). Monetary theory and policy, 2nd edition, The MIT Press

Available Versions of this Item

All papers reproduced by permission. Reproduction and distribution subject to the approval of the copyright owners.
Repository Staff Only: item control page

LMU-Logo
MPRA is a RePEc service hosted by
the Munich University Library in Germany.