Allocation by coercion

Quesada, Antonio (2009): Allocation by coercion. Unpublished.

Abstract

The problem of allocating indivisible goods is considered when groups of individuals can make use of their power to plunder other groups. A monarch in a group of individuals is an individual who always obtains one of his most preferred goods. A Paretian condition together with a requirement of robust stability lead to the existence of monarchs in all subsets of individuals, except possibly one.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Allocation rule; dictator; indivisible good; power; coalition formation.
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis; D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D85 - Network Formation and Analysis: Theory

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