Bruni, Luigino and Smerilli, Alessandra (2010): Cooperation and diversity. An evolutionary approach.
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n this paper we propose a pluralistic and multi-dimensional ap- proach to cooperation. Specifically, we seek to show that, in certain settings, less unconditional forms of cooperation may be combined with more gratuitous ones. Starting with the prisoner’s dilemma game, the evolution of cooperation is analyzed in the presence of different strate- gies, which represent the heterogeneity of the forms of cooperation in civil life. There are many behaviour patterns, though not all of them are based on self-interest and conditionality. The dynamics of coop- eration are studied through the use of evolutionary games applied in contexts that are either one-shot or repetitive. One of the most impor- tant results of the paper is the conclusion that cooperation is favoured by heterogeneity.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Cooperation and diversity. An evolutionary approach|
|English Title:||Cooperation and diversity. An evolutionary approach|
|Keywords:||cooperation, Prisoner’s Dilemma, reciprocity, hetero- geneity, evolutionary game theory|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism ; Philanthropy
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; Evolutionary Games ; Repeated Games
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||alessandra smerilli|
|Date Deposited:||09. Feb 2010 14:16|
|Last Modified:||17. Jan 2015 06:07|
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