Pivato, Marcus (2007): Twofold Optimality of the Relative Utilitarian Bargaining Solution. Forthcoming in:

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Abstract
Given a bargaining problem, the `relative utilitarian' (RU) solution maximizes the sum total of the bargainer's utilities, after having first renormalized each utility function to range from zero to one. We show that RU is `optimal' in two very different senses. First, RU is the maximal element (over the set of all bargaining solutions) under any partial ordering which satisfies certain axioms of fairness and consistency; this result is closely analogous to the result of Segal (2000). Second, RU offers each person the maximum expected utility amongst all rescalinginvariant solutions, when it is applied to a random sequence of future bargaining problems which are generated using a certain class of distributions; this is somewhat reminiscent of the results of Harsanyi (1953) and Karni (1998).
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Institution:  Department of Mathematics, Trent University 
Original Title:  Twofold Optimality of the Relative Utilitarian Bargaining Solution 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  relative utilitarian; bargaining solution; impartial observer 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D6  Welfare Economics > D63  Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations 
Item ID:  2637 
Depositing User:  Marcus Pivato 
Date Deposited:  09. Apr 2007 
Last Modified:  16. Feb 2013 11:09 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/2637 