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Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result

Wu, Haoyang (2011): Two-agent Nash implementation: A new result. Unpublished.

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Abstract

[Moore and Repullo, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099] and [Dutta and Sen, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128] are two fundamental papers on two-agent Nash implementation. Both of them are based on Maskin's classic paper [Maskin, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38]. A recent work [Wu, http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294, \emph{Inter. J. Quantum Information}, 2010 (accepted)] shows that when an additional condition is satisfied, the Maskin's theorem will no longer hold by using a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this result holds in the macro world by using an algorithmic mechanism. In this paper, we will investigate two-agent Nash implementation by virtue of the algorithmic mechanism. The main result is: The sufficient and necessary conditions for Nash implementation with two agents shall be amended, not only in the quantum world, but also in the macro world.

Item Type:MPRA Paper
Language:English
Keywords:Quantum game theory; Mechanism design; Nash implementation.
Subjects:D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
ID Code:30068
Deposited By:Haoyang Wu
Deposited On:09. Apr 2011 02:14
Last Modified:09. Apr 2011 02:14
References:

1. E. Maskin, Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{66} (1999) 23-38.

2. J. Moore and R. Repullo, Nash implementation: a full characterization, \emph{Econometrica} \textbf{58} (1990) 1083-1099.

3. B. Dutta and A. Sen, A necessary and sufficient condition for two-person Nash implementation, \emph{Rev. Econom. Stud.} \textbf{58} (1991) 121-128.

4. F. Busutto and G. Codognato, Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation, \emph{Social Choice and Welfare} \textbf{32} (2009) 171-179.

5. H. Wu, Quantum mechanism helps agents combat ``bad'' social choice rules. \emph{International Journal of Quantum Information}, 2010 (accepted). http://arxiv.org/abs/1002.4294

6. H. Wu, On amending the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation. \emph{Theoretical Computer Science}, 2011 (submitted). http://arxiv.org/abs/1004.5327

7. T.D. Ladd, F. Jelezko, R. Laflamme, Y. Nakamura, C. Monroe and J.L. O'Brien, Quantum computers, \emph{Nature}, \textbf{464} (2010) 45-53.

8. A.P. Flitney and L.C.L. Hollenberg, Nash equilibria in quantum games with generalized two-parameter strategies, \emph{Phys. Lett. A} \textbf{363} (2007) 381-388.

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