The constitutional dilemma of European integration

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter (1998): The constitutional dilemma of European integration. Published in: Explaining European integration (1998): pp. 270-296.

Abstract

The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Prisoners Dilemma; constitutions; constitutional economics; public choice; European Union
• Subjects: D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General; D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities; D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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