Decreuse, Bruno (2003): Choosy search and the mismatch of talents.
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This paper proposes a multi-sector matching model where workers have (symmetric) sector-specific skills and the search market is segmented by sector. Workers choose the range of markets they are willing to participate in. I identify a composition externality: workers do not take into account the impact of their choice on sector-specific mean productivity among the pools of job-seekers. Consequently, workers prospect too many market segments, and there is room for public policy even when the so-called Hosios condition holds.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Choosy search and the mismatch of talents|
|Keywords:||Composition effects; Heterogeneity; Segmented markets; Efficiency|
|Subjects:||J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies > J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D62 - Externalities
|Depositing User:||Bruno Decreuse|
|Date Deposited:||20. Jun 2007|
|Last Modified:||17. Feb 2013 18:46|
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