Novarese, Marco and Chelini, Chiara and Spada, Anna and Ambrosino, Angela and Trigona, Carla (2010): An experimental investigation on learning and context effects.
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This paper revisited Gregory Bateson’s theory of hierarchical learning through an experiment testing the existence of context effect and learning spill-over in two following games: a coordination game and a two-step battle-of-the sexes. The first part of the experiment is seen as a kind of training period. The different groups of the coordination game are, in fact, designed so to reinforce different representations of the games, requiring to look at different aspects of a series of images shown in the screen. The second game allows testing if differences in training determine different behaviors in a same situation. Our experiment suggests that the preliminary training influences how the second game is perceived. While the incentive structure of the battle-of-the sexes is not identical to the coordination game, the presence of an image determines a different kind of context similarity with the previous one.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||An experimental investigation on learning and context effects|
|Keywords:||hierarchical learning, Bateson, experiment, context effects, coordination|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D0 - General > D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
B - History of Economic Thought, Methodology, and Heterodox Approaches > B5 - Current Heterodox Approaches > B50 - General
|Depositing User:||Marco Novarese|
|Date Deposited:||27. Feb 2012 21:22|
|Last Modified:||15. Feb 2013 12:36|
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An Experimental Investigation on Learning and Context Effects. (deposited 04. Jan 2011 08:06)
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