Raduna, Daniela Viviana and Roman, Mihai Daniel (2011): Risk aversion influence on insurance market. Published in: Economics and Finance Review , Vol. 1(12), (28. February 2012): pp. 19-29.
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Human behavior, rational or irrational one, influences one of the most complex markets worldwide: the insurance market. In most situations, insurance markets are not competitive and risk neutral insurers negotiate under asymmetric information with actors who exhibit risk aversion. In this paper we develop a game theory model that analyzes the negotiation of an insurance contract under risk aversion conditions (in static and dynamic approach). Risk aversion influence was introduced in the model by intermediary of a discount factor (the in equivalent to players’ patience) instead of using a utility function. The main conclusion is that the customer prefers to agree on a contract of insurance in the first stage of negotiation than having to wait for another round of negotiations, during which they could register various losses.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Risk aversion influence on insurance market|
|Keywords:||contract negotiations, model, insurance, dynamic game, risk aversion, discount factor|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G22 - Insurance; Insurance Companies
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
|Depositing User:||Mihai Daniel Roman|
|Date Deposited:||27. Apr 2012 00:14|
|Last Modified:||24. Feb 2013 13:54|
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