Munich Personal RePEc Archive

Risk aversion influence on insurance market

Raduna, Daniela Viviana and Roman, Mihai Daniel (2011): Risk aversion influence on insurance market. Published in: Economics and Finance Review , Vol. 1(12), (28. February 2012): pp. 19-29.

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Abstract

Human behavior, rational or irrational one, influences one of the most complex markets worldwide: the insurance market. In most situations, insurance markets are not competitive and risk neutral insurers negotiate under asymmetric information with actors who exhibit risk aversion. In this paper we develop a game theory model that analyzes the negotiation of an insurance contract under risk aversion conditions (in static and dynamic approach). Risk aversion influence was introduced in the model by intermediary of a discount factor (the in equivalent to players’ patience) instead of using a utility function. The main conclusion is that the customer prefers to agree on a contract of insurance in the first stage of negotiation than having to wait for another round of negotiations, during which they could register various losses.

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