Levieuge, Grégory and Lucotte, Yannick (2012): A simple empirical measure of central banks' conservatism.
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In this paper we suggest a simple empirical and model-independent measure of Central Banks' Conservatism, based on the Taylor curve. This new indicator can easily be extended in time and space, whatever the underlying monetary regime of the considered countries. We demonstrate that it evolves in accordance with the monetary experiences of 32 OECD member countries from 1980, and is largely equivalent to the model-based measure provided by Krause & Méndez [Southern Economic Journal, 2005]. We finally bring forward the interest of such an indicator for further empirical analysis dealing with the preferences of Central Banks.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||A simple empirical measure of central banks' conservatism|
|Keywords:||Central Banks' preferences; Conservatism; Taylor curve; Taylor rule|
|Subjects:||E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E43 - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E58 - Central Banks and Their Policies
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit > E52 - Monetary Policy
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates > E47 - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
|Depositing User:||Yannick Lucotte|
|Date Deposited:||30. Apr 2012 00:28|
|Last Modified:||06. Jul 2015 06:47|
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