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Pay What You Want – But Pay Enough! Information Asymmetries and PWYW Pricing

Greiff, Matthias and Egbert, Henrik and Xhangolli, Kreshnik (2013): Pay What You Want – But Pay Enough! Information Asymmetries and PWYW Pricing.

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Abstract

Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. Empirical studies show that when PWYW pricing is implemented buyers do not behave selfishly in a number of cases and that some sellers are able to use PWYW to increase turnover as well as profits. In this paper we present a theoretical model of buyer behavior under asymmetric information about production costs. Our model shows that information asymmetries provide an explanation for the results found in empirical studies.

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