Azrieli, Yaron (2007): Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game.
Download (197kB) | Preview
We consider a random-matching model in which every agent has a categorization (partition) of his potential opponents. In equilibrium, the strategy of each player is a best response to the distribution of actions of his opponents in each category of his categorization. We provide equivalence theorems between distributions generated by equilibrium profiles and correlated equilibria of the underlying game.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Categorization and correlation in a random-matching game|
|Keywords:||Random-matching game; Categorization; Correlated equilibrium|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games
|Depositing User:||Yaron Azrieli|
|Date Deposited:||29. Oct 2007|
|Last Modified:||18. Feb 2013 06:33|