Armstrong, Mark (2006): Access pricing, bypass and universal service in post. Unpublished.
![[img]](http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/style/images/fileicons/application_pdf.png)
| PDF - Requires a PDF viewer such as GSview, Xpdf or Adobe Acrobat Reader 214Kb |
An incumbent postal service provider faces two issues which make the design of efficient access pricing especially difficult. First, universal service obligations, together with the presence of significant fixed costs, require retail prices to be out of line with underlying marginal costs. Second, competing firms may be able to bypass the incumbent's delivery network. Within a simple framework, this note analyses how access charges should best be set in the light of these twin constraints.
| Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Keywords: | Access pricing; post; regulation; liberalisation |
| Subjects: | L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L87 - Postal and Delivery Services L - Industrial Organization > L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy > L51 - Economics of Regulation |
| ID Code: | 62 |
| Deposited By: | Mark Armstrong |
| Deposited On: | 03. Oct 2006 |
| Last Modified: | 25. Jul 2011 16:21 |
All papers reproduced by permission. Reproduction and distribution subject to the approval of the copyright owners.
Repository Staff Only: item control page
