Amegashie, J. Atsu and Runkel, Marco (2008): The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts.
This is the latest version of this item.
Download (144Kb) | Preview
We model an infinitely-repeated conflict between two factions who both have a desire to exact revenge for past destruction suffered. The destruction suffered by a player is a stock that grows according to his opponent’s destructive efforts and the rate at which past destruction is forgotten (i.e., depreciates). This gives a differential game. We find that a desire for revenge can cause a low-ability player to exert a higher effort than a high-ability player, which means that the former may have a higher probability of success in a given period. Given a desire for revenge, we find that, the conflict initially escalates and eventually reaches a steady state. When there is no desire for revenge, the conflict reaches a steady state immediately. The conflict is sufficiently less destructive if the rate at which past destruction is forgotten is sufficiently high. We briefly discuss how our results apply to the USA’s invasion of Iraq, reconstruction assistance to Lebanon after the 1975-1990 war, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts|
|Keywords:||conflict, differential game, open-loop equilibrium, revenge|
|Subjects:||K - Law and Economics > K4 - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior|
|Depositing User:||J. Atsu Amegashie|
|Date Deposited:||17. Jan 2008 05:51|
|Last Modified:||03. Mar 2013 18:03|
References Amegashie, J.A., and Kutsoati, E. (2007). (Non)intervention in Intra-State Conflicts. European Journal of Political Economy 23: 754-767.
Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books, New York.
Bester, H., and Konrad, K.A. (2005). Easy Targets and the Timing of Conflict. Journal of Theoretical Politics 17: 199-215.
Binmore, K. (1998). Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract II. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Carlson, L. J. (1995). A Theory of Escalation and International Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39: 511-34
Carment, D., and Harvey, F. (2000). Using Force to Prevent Ethnic Violence: an Evaluation of Theory and Evidence. Westport, CT: Praeger.
Carment, D., and Rowlands, D. (1998). Three’s Company: Evaluating Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution 42: 572-599.
Chagnon, N. A. (1988). Life Histories, Blood Revenge, and Warfare in a Tribal Population. Science 239: 985 - 992.
Chang, Y-M., Potter, J., and Sanders, S. (2007). War and Peace: Third-Party Intervention in Conflict. European Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming.
Che, Y-K., and Gale, I. (2000). Difference-Form Contests and the Robustness of All-Pay Auctions. Games and Economic Behavior 30: 22-43.
Cohen, C., and Sela, S. (2005). Manipulations in Contests. Economics Letters 86: 135-139.
Elster, J. (1990). Norms of Revenge. Ethics 100: 862-885.
Fearon, J. D. (1994). Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes. American Political Science Review 88: 577-92.
Garfinkel, M. R., and Skarpedas, S. (2000). Conflict without Misperceptions or Incomplete Information: how the Future Matters. Journal of Conflict Resolution 44: 793-807.
Glaeser, E.L. (2005). The Political Economy of Hatred. Quarterly Journal of Economics 120: 45-86.
Hirshleifer, J. (1995). Anarchy and its Breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103: 26 – 52.
Hume, D. (1898). An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/Hume-Enquiry%20Concerning%20Morals.htm
Juah, T. (2002). Kosovo: War and Revenge. Yale University Press, 2002.
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk. Econometrica 47, 263-291.
Kim, S.H., and Smith, R.H. (1993). Revenge and Conflict Escalation. Negotiation Journal 9: 37-43.
Konrad, K.A., and Kovenock, D. (2005). Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 5205.
Martinez-Coll, J. and Hirshleifer, J. (1991). The Limits of Reciprocity. Rationality and Society 3: 35-64.
McAfee, R.P., Mialon, H., and Mialon, S. (2007). Do Sunk Costs Matter? Economic Inquiry, forthcoming.
Nalebuff, B (1986). Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: the Neutrality of Escalation. Conflict Management and Peace Science 9: 19-30
Nussbaum, M. (1999). Sex and Social Justice. Oxford University Press.
Siqueira, K. (2003). Conflict and Third-Party Intervention. Defence and Peace Economics 14: 389-400.
Skaperdas, S. (1992). Cooperation, Conflict and Power in the Absence of Property Rights. American Economic Review 82: 720–739.
Stuckless, N., and Goranson, R. (1992). The Vengeance Scale: Development of a Measure of Attitudes toward Revenge. Journal of Social Behavior and Personality 7:25-42.
Suny, R. G. (1993). The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford University Press.
Available Versions of this Item
The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts. (deposited 15. Jan 2008 01:27)
- The Desire for Revenge and the Dynamics of Conflicts. (deposited 17. Jan 2008 05:51) [Currently Displayed]