Piaser, Gwenaël (2007): Direct Mechanisms, Menus and Latent Contracts.
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In common agency games, one cannot characterize all equilibria by considering only direct mechanisms. In an attempt to overcome this difficulty, Peters [Econometrica, 2001]and Martimort and Stole [Econometrica, 2002] identified a class of indirect mechanisms (namely, menus) which are able to characterize every equilibrium. Unfortunately, menus are difficult to handle, and several methodologies have been proposed in the literature. Here, it is shown that, even if authors consider menus rather than simpler mechanisms, many equilibria described in the literature could have been characterized by direct incentive compatible mechanisms. Use of more sophisticated mechanisms was not necessary in these cases.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Direct Mechanisms, Menus and Latent Contracts|
|Keywords:||Common Agency, Revelation Principle, Delegation Principle, Direct Mechanisms, Menus, Latent Contracts|
|Subjects:||D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design|
|Depositing User:||Gwenaël Piaser|
|Date Deposited:||07. Feb 2008 20:09|
|Last Modified:||19. Feb 2013 05:31|