Berkman, Henk and Cole, Rebel and Fu, Lawrence (2007): Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder: Evidence from China.
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We examine changes in market values and accounting returns for a sample of publicly traded Chinese firms around announcements of block-share transfers among government agencies (“State Bureaucrats”), market-oriented State-owned enterprises (“MOSOEs”) and private investors (“Private Entities”). We provide evidence that transfers from State Bureaucrats to Private Entities result in larger increases in market value and accounting returns than transfers to MOSOEs. We also find that CEO turnover occurs more quickly when shares are transferred to Private Entities. Moreover, we find that the changes in firm value and accounting returns, as well as the likelihood of CEO turnover, are all functions of the incentives and managerial expertise of the new block holder. We conclude that corporate governance can be improved at State-controlled firms by improving the incentives and managerial expertise of controlling block holders, and that this is better accomplished by transferring ownership to private investors rather than by shuffling ownership among Statecontrolled entities.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder: Evidence from China|
|Keywords:||block-holder identity; China; partial corporate control; partial privatization; privatization; State ownership; SOE|
|Subjects:||G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
|Depositing User:||Rebel Cole|
|Date Deposited:||04. Apr 2008 06:25|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 07:34|
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