Lahiri, Somdeb (2008): Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem.
This is the latest version of this item.
Download (84Kb) | Preview
The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption bundles and a balanced vector of transfers so that they together form a non-linear market equilibrium. The first result is used to establish the second. Subsequently we prove the existence of egalitarian equivalent solutions for package assignment problems and shows that they satisfy the “fair share guaranteed” property.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C79 - Other
D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
|Depositing User:||Somdeb Lahiri|
|Date Deposited:||28. Apr 2008 07:14|
|Last Modified:||15. Mar 2013 18:41|
1. Alkan, A., G. Demage and D. Gale (1991): “Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice”, Econometrica, 59, 1023-1029.
2. Aragones, E. (1992): “A Derivation of the Money Rawlsian Solution”, Social Choice and Welfare 12, 267-276.
3. Bevia, C. (1998): “Fair allocation in a general model with indivisible goods”, Review of Economic Design 3, 195-213.
4. Bikhchandani, S. and J.W. Mamer (1997): “Competitive equilibrium in an economy with indivisibilities”, Journal of Economic Theory, 74, 385-413.
5. Bikhchandani, S. and J.M. Ostroy (2002): “The Package Assignment Model”, Journal of Economic Theory, 107, 377-406.
6. Brams, S. J. and A. D. Taylor (1996): “Fair Division: From cake-cutting to dispute resolution”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
7. Foley, D. (1967): “Resource Allocation and the Public Sector”, Yale Economic Essays, 7 (1), 45-98.
8. Gul, F. and E. Stacchetti (1997): “Walrasian equilibrium without complementarities”, Technical report, Princeton University and University of Michigan.
9. Keslo, A.S. and V.P. Crawford (1982): “Job matching, coalition formation, and gross substitutes”, Econometrica 50, 1483-1504.
10. Koopmans, T. and M. Beckmann (1957): “Assignment Problems and the Location of Economic Activities”, Econometrica, 25, 53-75.
11. Lahiri, S. (2006): “Existence of Market Equilibrium for Multi-unit Auctions”, (unpublished).
12. Lahiri, S. (2007): “The Value Function Theorem for Combinatorial Auctions and a New Proof of the Existence of Market Equilibrium for House-Auctions”, unpublished.
13. Moulin, H. (1995): “Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic Introduction”, Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, London.
14. Pazner, E. and D. Schmeidler (1978): “Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 92, 671-687.
15. Robertson, J. and W. Webb (1998): “Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair if You Can”, A. K. Peters, 1998.
16. Varian, H. (1974): “Equity, Envy and Efficiency”, Journal of Economic Theory, 29, 217-244.
17. Wurman, P.R. and M.P. Wellman (undated): “Equilibrium Prices in Bundle Auctions”.
Available Versions of this Item
Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem. (deposited 25. Apr 2008 14:48)
- Envy-free solutions, Non-linear equilibrium and Egalitarian-equivalence for the Package Assignment Problem. (deposited 28. Apr 2008 07:14) [Currently Displayed]