Chichilnisky, Graciela (1994): A robust theory of resource allocation. Published in: Social Choice and Welfare , Vol. 13, (2. May 1995): pp. 110.

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Abstract
The theory of social choice introduced in [5,6] is robust; it is completely independent of the choice of topology on spaces of preference. This theory has been fruitful in linking diverse forms of resource allocation; it has been shown [17] that contractibility is necessary and sufficient for solving the social choice paradox; this condition is equivalent [11] to another limited arbitrage which is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium and the core of an economy [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The space of monotone preferences is contractible; as shown already in [6, 17] such that spaces admit social choice rules. However, monotone preferences are of little interest in social choice theory becasue the essence of the social choice problem, such as Condorcet triples, rules out monotonicity.
Item Type:  MPRA Paper 

Original Title:  A robust theory of resource allocation 
Language:  English 
Keywords:  social choice; resource allocation; monotonicity; preferences; Condorcet triples 
Subjects:  D  Microeconomics > D7  Analysis of Collective DecisionMaking > D71  Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations C  Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C0  General > C02  Mathematical Methods R  Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R1  General Regional Economics > R12  Size and Spatial Distributions of Regional Economic Activity 
Item ID:  8599 
Depositing User:  Graciela Chichilnisky 
Date Deposited:  06. May 2008 05:01 
Last Modified:  16. Feb 2013 14:26 
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URI:  http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.de/id/eprint/8599 