Munro, Alistair and Bateman, Ian J. and McNally, Tara (2008): The family under the microscope: an experiment testing economic models of household choice.
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We devise and execute three experiments to test key features of models of household decision-making. Using established couples (married and unmarried) we test income pooling, unanimity and Pareto efficiency. Subjects make choices individually and jointly and are asked to make predictions about their partner’s choices. Unanimity is rejected. Income pooling is not rejected in joint choice but has less explanatory power in individual choice. In direct tests both sexes do not pool income completely, but in econometric tests across all tasks, women place an equal weight on payoffs but men discount their partner’s payoffs by between 15 and 20%. We find that transparency has little impact on deviations from income pooling or indeed on behaviour generally. Many joint choices deviate from the Pareto principle in a systematic manner suggesting that choices made as a couple are more risk averse than individual decisions.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||The family under the microscope: an experiment testing economic models of household choice.|
|Keywords:||experiment; household; unitary; income pooling; Pareto; family|
|Subjects:||C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior
J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J12 - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure; Domestic Abuse
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C93 - Field Experiments
D - Microeconomics > D1 - Household Behavior and Family Economics
|Depositing User:||Alistair Munro|
|Date Deposited:||06. Jun 2008 07:50|
|Last Modified:||13. Feb 2013 09:46|
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