Adamcik, Santiago (2008): Sobre la Elección de Regímenes de Tipo de Cambio en Economías Emergentes.
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This paper discusses that a lot of the debate on selecting an exchange rate regime misses the time. It begins explaining the standard theory of choice between exchange rate regimes, and then explores the fragilities in this theory, specifically when this is applied to emerging economies. Next presents a extent of institutional characteristics that might have influence upon a country to choose either fixed or floating rates , and then turns to the converse question of whether the selection of exchange rate regime may make for the development of some helpful institutional traits. The conclusion is that the election of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order significance to the development of good fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions in causing macroeconomic achievement in emerging market. A greater dedication in strong institution's development instead of focalizing in the exchange rate regimes could make economies healthier and less propense to the crises, as was observed of late years.
|Item Type:||MPRA Paper|
|Original Title:||Sobre la Elección de Regímenes de Tipo de Cambio en Economías Emergentes|
|English Title:||On Choosing an Exchange Rate Regimes in Emerging Economies|
|Keywords:||Regimenes de Tipo de Cambio; Economias Emergentes; Inflacion;Currency Board; Soft Pegs; Hard Pegs|
|Subjects:||F - International Economics > F4 - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
F - International Economics > F3 - International Finance
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E5 - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics > E4 - Money and Interest Rates
|Depositing User:||Santiago Adamcik|
|Date Deposited:||28. Jun 2008 07:08|
|Last Modified:||14. Feb 2013 01:34|
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