Daily commuting

Berliant, Marcus (2020): Daily commuting.

Abstract

Workers generally commute on a daily basis, so we model commuting as a repeated game. The folk theorem implies that for sufficiently large discount factors the repeated commuting game has as a Nash equilibrium any strategy profile that is at least as good as the maximin strategy for a commuter in the one shot game, including the efficient ones. This result applies whether the game is static, in the sense that only routes are chosen as a strategy by commuters, or dynamic, where both routes and times of departure are chosen. Our conclusions pose a challenge to congestion pricing. We examine evidence from St. Louis to determine what equilibrium strategies are actually played in the repeated commuting game.

• Item Type: MPRA Paper
• Language: English
• Keywords: Repeated game; Nash equilibrium; Commuting; Folk theorem
• Subjects: R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics > R4 - Transportation Economics > R41 - Transportation: Demand, Supply, and Congestion ; Travel Time ; Safety and Accidents ; Transportation Noise

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