Hanousek, Jan and Shamshur, Anastasiya and Tresl, Jiri (2019): Firm efficiency, foreign ownership and CEO gender in corrupt environments. Published in: Journal of Corporate Finance , Vol. 59, (December 2019): pp. 344-360.
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Abstract
We study the effects of corruption on firm efficiency using a unique dataset of private firms from 14 Central and Eastern European countries from 2000 to 2013. We find that an environment characterized by a high level of corruption has an adverse effect on firm efficiency. This effect is stronger for firms with a lower propensity to behave corruptly, such as foreign-controlled firms and firms managed by female CEOs, while local firms and firms with male CEOs are not disadvantaged. We also find that an environment characterized by considerable heterogeneity in the perception of corruption is associated with an increase in firm efficiency. This effect is particularly strong for foreign-controlled firms from low corruption countries, while no effect is observed for firms managed by a female CEO.
Item Type: | MPRA Paper |
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Original Title: | Firm efficiency, foreign ownership and CEO gender in corrupt environments |
English Title: | Firm efficiency, foreign ownership and CEO gender in corrupt environments |
Language: | English |
Keywords: | Efficiency; Corruption; Ownership structure; Foreign ownership; CEO gender; Firms; Panel data; Stochastic frontier; Europe |
Subjects: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models ; Multiple Variables > C33 - Panel Data Models ; Spatio-temporal Models D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D24 - Production ; Cost ; Capital ; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity ; Capacity G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G32 - Financing Policy ; Financial Risk and Risk Management ; Capital and Ownership Structure ; Value of Firms ; Goodwill L - Industrial Organization > L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing > L60 - General L - Industrial Organization > L8 - Industry Studies: Services > L80 - General M - Business Administration and Business Economics ; Marketing ; Accounting ; Personnel Economics > M2 - Business Economics > M21 - Business Economics |
Item ID: | 101027 |
Depositing User: | Jan Hanousek |
Date Deposited: | 07 Jul 2020 14:03 |
Last Modified: | 07 Jul 2020 14:03 |
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URI: | https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/id/eprint/101027 |